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
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# **CATHOLIC FAITH AND PRACTICE**

## **PART II**





# CATHOLIC FAITH AND PRACTICE

A MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

PART II

BY THE

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## PREFACE.

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**I**N the Preface to the first volume of this work it was stated that while that part was complete in itself, yet, should it meet with favour, it would be followed by a second, which would make the work a fairly complete manual of theology. The demand for three editions in little more than a year has emboldened me to hope that the book has been found useful, and has encouraged me to fulfil my purpose of completing it.

In the preparation of this volume, while the scheme proposed in the first part has been adhered to, with some differences of title or distribution, the projected chapter on "The Mystery of Evil" has been abandoned, and one on "The Study of Theology" added.

The character of many of the subjects treated, the fact that in regard to some of them no opinion can claim Catholic consent, and that most of them are more or less involved in controversy, have required a much fuller discussion than seemed necessary in treating the subjects included in Part I.; and since in controversy it is especially important that authorities be given, many references will be found, which is also an unavoidable departure from the course previously pursued. This has increased considerably the size of the volume, making it half as large again as the former part.

It will be observed that no less than seven chapters

have been devoted to Catholic Eschatology. This may seem a disproportionate space to give to a subject about which so little is *de fide*, and so much only theological opinion. But it may be pleaded that the great interest which all must feel in regard to the subject of the life beyond the grave (that life to which, whether for weal or woe, we are surely tending) justifies a somewhat full treatment of the mysterious questions connected with it ; and further, that this interest has led of late to the production of many books on that subject, written for the most part from an unorthodox standpoint, and bristling with novel theories in regard to probation after death, conditional immortality, universalism, etc., in conflict alike with Holy Scripture and the teachings of the Church. I may add that I had been requested by several priests, whose position in the Church gives them exceptional opportunities of knowing the needs of the day, to pay special attention to questions of Eschatology, and that these seven chapters are largely due to this request.

The standard of doctrine followed in this work, as implied in its title, is the teaching of the Catholic Church. On those subjects upon which East and West are not in agreement, both views have generally been given, with a brief statement of the arguments for following the one which seemed to me preferable. And I would repeat here that I have endeavoured to avoid opinions which, though perhaps tenable, are comparatively modern and lack Catholic consent.

In confining myself to this rule I have been unable to give to some subjects the adequate treatment I should have wished, and which I hope they may receive before long both from Latin theologians and from those of our own Church. Among these the chief are

Trichotomy, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and the Priesthood.

With regard to the first, while the simpler division of man's nature into two parts, body and soul, is undoubtedly true, and since the time of S. Augustine has been accepted, largely on his authority, as the safer view, yet I cannot doubt that Holy Scripture also teaches a trichotomy, and this indeed seems to have been the opinion of many weighty writers before S. Augustine. The subdivision of the immaterial part into soul and spirit is, however, full of difficulty, and dichotomy has prevailed as the easier, if not the only scriptural division. The relation of these two by no means incompatible views still awaits satisfactory settlement.

In the treatment of the Eucharistic Sacrifice I cannot but feel that the views of Latin theologians in regard to its nature are most inadequate; while in other directions, as Dr. Moberly has pointed out,\* their treatment is very disproportionate. That this is attracting the attention of some of their own theologians seems to be indicated by recent works on the subject. Among these may be noticed a study of the conception of the Eucharistic Sacrifice in the Latin Church by M. Vacant,† Professor in the Seminary at Nancy. In it he traces the history of the views put forth by theologians in regard to the Eucharistic Sacrifice from the time of S. Justin Martyr to the present day, and shows that while there has never been any dispute as to the fact that the Eucharist is a Sacrifice in which the Body and Blood of our LORD JESUS CHRIST are offered by the priest,

\* In his recent valuable work, *Ministerial Priesthood*.

† *Histoire de la Conception du Sacrifice de la Messe dans l'Eglise latine*. (Delhomme et Brigue, Paris.)



for quick and dead, in union with the sacrifice of Calvary, and as a perpetual memorial of it, yet theological opinion has been constantly changing with respect to the nature and essence of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, the most incongruous views sometimes holding sway ; and he admits that even now the question cannot be considered as settled. A fuller and more recent work from the pen of M. Lepin,\* of the Diocese of Lyons, deals with the question more exhaustively, while in Germany views of a similar character have been put forth by Dr. Thalhofer.†

We need, too, a more thorough treatment of the Sacrament of Holy Order. The many opinions which have been held by Latin theologians in regard to both the Form and Matter of Holy Order show us how greatly the subject needs to be studied more constructively ; and this can be satisfactorily accomplished only by clearing away the *débris* of exploded mechanical theories and starting afresh to investigate all that is included under the idea of priesthood. We shall then be better able to determine under what conditions it is validly bestowed.

As this work is so largely indebted to the writings of the Scholastic theologians, a few words may be in place with regard to the defects of Scholasticism. They are chiefly two. First, that the authorities cited are often untrustworthy, which arises from the frequency with which they are quoted at second hand. Errors have thus been propagated, and the opinions based upon them are therefore valueless. The other weakness is that the same opinions are repeated by

\* *L'Idée du Sacrifice dans la Religion chrétienne.*

† *Handbuch der katholischen Liturgie*, 2 vols. (Freiburg in Breisgau.)

one writer after another without investigation as to their accuracy, so that the premises from which conclusions are drawn are often faulty.

Both these defects are, however, the result of an uncritical age, and a scarcity of books, which in many cases made a verification of authorities impracticable.

Errors of this character have, however, long since been exposed, and there is little danger that a fairly well-read theologian would now be led astray by them.

But after due allowance is made for all defects, there remains in the works of the great Scholastics a rich mine of theological treasure. The thoroughness with which arguments are thrashed out, even the most trivial objections being seriously considered, is a useful lesson in an age when men prefer to get their opinions ready-made from brilliant but superficial magazine articles rather than undergo the drudgery of those slower methods which alone can impart solid learning. I am aware that it has been the fashion to ridicule the study of the Scholastics, but I venture to think that the fashion has been both set and followed by those who have only the most superficial acquaintance with the writings they criticise.

Another valuable lesson is the scholastic treatment of theology as a whole. The Scholastics do not take isolated doctrines and develop them to the contradiction of other parts of the Faith ; while there are few dangers against which we ourselves need to be more on our guard at the present time than the disproportionate study of a few articles of the Faith, to the neglect of a grasp of the Faith as a whole.

As in the Preface to Part I., I would deprecate any claim to originality in this work, which in many places is little more than a translation or paraphrase of Latin,

Greek, or French theological treatises. Indeed an inspection of the list of authors consulted will show that from Peter Lombard down there are but few Latin theologians of note whose works have not contributed something.

Of English books I would especially acknowledge my obligations to seven. In Chapter II. I own my indebtedness to the able treatise on Matrimony by the Rev. Oscar Watkins. While unable to accept his main contention, I have availed myself of much suggestive matter, especially in his quotations from Zhishman with regard to the position of Matrimony in the Greek Church.

In Chapter VII. I have drawn largely from the valuable works on the Incarnation by the Rev. H. C. Powell and the Rev. Dr. Gifford.

In the latter part of Chapter VIII. I have quoted much from the Rev. Dr. Green's *The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch*.

In Chapter X. I am greatly indebted to the careful analysis of the Cardinal Virtues prefixed to the Rev. Orby Shipley's work on that subject.

In parts of Chapter XII., to an Essay on Pain by the Rev. J. R. Illingworth.

And in Chapter XVI. to Dr. Percival's *The Invocation of Saints*,\* the only work in English, so far as I know, on this much controverted subject.

On page lxxv will be found a complete list of all other works which have been consulted.

I would also express hearty appreciation of the kind assistance rendered by several friends. My thanks are due to the Rev. H. R. Percival, D.D., for reading the manuscript and for many suggestions; to the Rev. T.

\* Longmans.

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A. Lacey, M.A., for his valuable criticism of Chapter IV., on Roman Objections to Anglican Orders ; to the Rev. Leighton Hoskins and the Rev. Shirley C. Hughson for correcting the proof sheets, and to Mr. W. H. McClellan for compiling the Index.

In treating of so many subjects where extreme accuracy is required, it is quite probable that through inadvertence errors have been overlooked. I can only say, as before, that I shall be very grateful to have any such pointed out, and that all I have written is submitted unreservedly to the judgment of the Church.

ALFRED G. MORTIMER.

S. MARK'S CLERGY HOUSE, PHILADELPHIA,  
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# CONTENTS.

## CHAPTER I.

### HOLY MATRIMONY.

	PAGE
<b>Introductory:</b> S. Augustine's opinion of the difficulties of the subject.—Hopeless antagonism between East and West . . . . .	1
<b>I. THE THREE STATES OF MATRIMONY . . . . .</b>	2
1. Its institution . . . . .	2
2. In the fallen state the institution perverted . . . . .	2
3. In the Christian dispensation restored . . . . .	3
The essential difference in these states, the presence or absence of grace . . . . .	3
<b>II. THE PURPOSE OF MATRIMONY: Definition . . . . .</b>	3
<b>III. TWO ASPECTS OF MATRIMONY . . . . .</b>	4
1. As an act . . . . .	4
2. As a state . . . . .	4
<b>IV. MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT: When instituted . . . . .</b>	4
1. Its Essence.—The consent for true Matrimony must be: i. True, not feigned; ii. deliberate; iii. mutual; iv. present; v. expressed; vi. simultaneous; vii. free from error; viii. free from fear . . . . .	6
2. The Minister.—Two views . . . . .	7
3. Matter and Form . . . . .	8
4. Subjects . . . . .	8
<b>V. THE EFFECTS OF MATRIMONY . . . . .</b>	8
1. Of the contract . . . . .	8
2. Of the Sacrament . . . . .	8

	PAGE
VI. THE ENDS OF MATRIMONY . . . . .	9
1. Offspring . . . . .	9
2. A remedy for sin . . . . .	9
3. Mutual society . . . . .	9
VII. THE BENEFITS, OR GOODS, OF MATRIMONY . . . . .	9
1. Offspring . . . . .	9
2. Mutual fidelity . . . . .	9
3. The Sacrament . . . . .	9
VIII. THE PROPERTIES OF MATRIMONY . . . . .	9
1. Unity . . . . .	9
2. Indissolubility . . . . .	10
IX. THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MATRIMONY . . . . .	10
1. The two divisions: i. "Impedimenta dirimentia;" ii. "impedimenta impediencia" . . . . .	11
2. Classification of "impedimenta" into "dirimentia," and "impediencia" . . . . .	12
3. Subdivision of "dirimentia" into: i. "De jure naturali;" ii. "de jure Divino;" iii. "de jure ecclesiastico."—This not a logical division, since classes overlap . . . . .	13
4. Difficult to limit right of dispensation exactly . . . . .	13
5. Five clearly "de jure naturali;" Error, Force, and Abduction invalidate consent; Impotence and Age cause physical incapacity.—Consanguinity and Affinity partly "de jure Divino," partly "ecclesiastico" . . . . .	13
Existing Marriage contrary to the property of unity.—	
Lack of Baptism invalidates the Sacrament . . . . .	14
X. DIVORCE: Of two kinds . . . . .	14
1. Divorce "a vinculo" . . . . .	14
2. Divorce "a toro et mensa" . . . . .	14
No divorce "a vinculo" in the Sacrament of Matrimony.—This is "de jure Divino;" S. Matt. xix. 9 refers only to divorce "a toro et mensa."—Divorce permitted "in matrimonio tantum rato:" . . . . .	15
1. For religious profession . . . . .	15
2. By dispensation . . . . .	15
Nullification of Marriage.—Separation "a toro et mensa."—Rehabilitation.—Radical rectification.—	

	PAGE
Non-sacramental Matrimony. — "Privilegium Paulinum;" 1 Cor. vii. 12-16 . . . . .	17
Gratian's view of the "interpellatio."—Divorce among the unbaptized . . . . .	19
XI. MIXED MARRIAGES: between a baptized person and one unbaptized . . . . .	19
XII. DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MATRIMONY . . . . .	20
1. Valid and Lawful Matrimony . . . . .	20
2. Ratified Matrimony . . . . .	20
3. Consummated Matrimony . . . . .	21
4. Morganatic Marriage . . . . .	21
5. Matrimony of Conscience . . . . .	21
6. Invalid Matrimony . . . . .	21
7. Unlawful Matrimony . . . . .	21
Other questions belong to Moral Theology . . . . .	21

## CHAPTER II.

## DIFFICULTIES IN REGARD TO THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY.

Introductory: On the difficulties in regard to the Sacrament of Matrimony . . . . .	22
I. ON THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHURCHES OF THE EAST AND WEST . . . . .	22
1. Erastianism in the Eastern Church.—Its causes: i. The influx of the world; ii. the influence of the court; iii. the authority of the Civil Law. . . . .	22
2. The Western Church free from these influences, and so more severe.—A warning to the Church in the present day . . . . .	23
3. Thirteen causes of divorce in the Eastern Church . . . . .	24
II. ON THE INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY: The Sacrament, when instituted? . . . . .	24
1. In Eden. i. Authorities: Henry VIII., Rochester, Pighius, De Castro, Klingius, De Soto, Catharinus; ii. view stated; iii. proofs. . . . .	25
2. A modern adaptation of this view.—Objection. . . . .	26
3. At Cana . . . . .	27



	PAGE
4. In S. Matt. xix. 6 . . . . .	27
5. In the Great Forty Days . . . . .	27
III. THE HISTORY OF THE DIFFERENT VIEWS IN REGARD TO THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY : Sevenfold divi- sion of the Sacraments in the 12th century . . . . .	27
1. Objection to including Matrimony.—Peter Lom- bard ; S. Thomas ; Durandus a S. Porciano ; Gottfredus ; Hostiensis ; S. Bernard . . . . .	28
2. Argument of Durandus : i. Its difference from other Sacraments : (1) No outward sign ; (2) no sacramental grace. ii. Difficulty of dowry. iii. The Church cannot alter the conditions of a Sacrament, but she has changed them in re- gard to Matrimony. iv. The case of valid Matrimony becoming sacramental . . . . .	29
3. Vasquez on the sacramental character.—Estius on the grace conferred . . . . .	30
IV. ON THE DISPUTE IN REGARD TO THE MINISTER OF MATRIMONY : A practical question . . . . .	31
1. The view of theologians generally . . . . .	31
2. The view of Melchior Canus ; supported by Estius, Sylvius, Juenin, Tournely, etc. . . . .	31
3. Perrone's account of the controversy : i. Canus and his followers argued : (1) By appealing to the Fathers and the Fourth Council of Carthage ; (2) that the Council of Trent implies this ; (3) from the analogy of the other Sacraments . . . . .	32
ii. Bellarmine and others replied by reference : (1) To Eugenius IV. ; (2) to the Council of Trent ; (3) to the effect of the Sacrament itself ; (4) and to the want of authority for this view ; (5) the question of second marriage ; (6) the Fourth Council of Carthage ; (7) the fewness of the adherents of this view . . . . .	34
iii. William of Paris . . . . .	34
4. Prayer Book statement . . . . .	34
V. ON MIXED MARRIAGES : A practical question in the mis- sion field and in America ; a difficult question for the Clergy . . . . .	35

	PAGE
1. The witness of Holy Scripture : 1 Cor. vii. 39,—Tertullian considers this prohibitory ; 2 Cor. vi. 14 ; vii. 1 ; 1 Cor. vi. 15 ; 1 Cor. vii. 14 . . . . .	35
2. The witness of history : SS. Susanna and Juliana ; S. Cecilia ; Euphrosyne ; S. Cyprian ; Tertullian ; S. Hippolytus on S. Callistus. —Disparity of sexes in the early Church . . . . .	38
Council of Eliberis.—Laxity introduced after conversion of Constantine.—The difficulty in regard to catechumens.—S. Monica and Patricius ; Council of Arles ; S. Ambrose ; S. Jerome ; S. Augustine ; Council of Hippo. . . . .	40
3. After the 6th century discipline enforced ; but dispensations have been given . . . . .	40
4. Conclusion : Mixed marriages are non-sacramental and unlawful, but not invalid . . . . .	40
VI. ON INDISSOLUBILITY AND DIVORCE : Importance of the question.—If the "vinculum" is indissoluble, divorce is impossible.—Sentiment and expediency of no weight.—Before Christianity Matrimony was dissoluble.—Our LORD acknowledges this and accounts for it.—Baptism in the subjects makes Matrimony sacramental . . . . .	
1. The teaching of Holy Scripture : i. S. Matt. v. 31, 32 ; ii. S. Mark x. 2-12 ; iii. S. Luke xvi. 18 ; iv. Rom. vii. 1-3 ; v. 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11 ; vi. 1 Cor. vii. 39.—Result of these passages . . . . .	43
2. S. Matt. xix. 7-9. —Can this contradict all other Scripture?—The text very corrupt ; and therefore very uncertain.—If the Textus Receptus be accepted, four views : i. that it does not refer to Christian Matrimony (Keble) ; ii. that it refers only to pre-nuptial sin (Döllinger) ; iii. that it refers only to divorce "a toro et mensa ;" iv. that it refers to remarriage.—Tertullian's reply to this . . . . .	46
3. The theory that adultery dissolves the "vinculum : " i. Involves adultery on the part of the innocent partner ; ii. if discovery of guilt . . . . .	46

	PAGE
dissolve the "vinculum," then "being found out," and not adultery, is the sin ; iii. the impossibility of the "vinculum" binding the guilty but not the innocent partner, shown by reason, and by our LORD'S express words.—This text only permits the man to remarry, if it does that.—Summary of evidence from Holy Scripture . . . . .	48
4. The teaching of the Church.—For three centuries no recognition of remarriage.—Hermas ; Justin Martyr ; Athenagoras ; Theophilus of Antioch ; S. Clement of Alexandria ; Tertullian, (Pusey's note on Tertullian) ; Origen ; S. Cyprian ; S. Augustine on S. Cyprian ; Council of Eliberis or Elvira.—The whole testimony of the primitive Church against any remarriage . . . . .	50
Council of Arles ; Lactantius ; S. Basil ; S. Epiphanius ; S. Asterius ; S. Timothy of Alexandria ; S. John Chrysostom ; Theodoret. In the West : SS. Ambrose, Chromatius, Jerome, Augustine, Innocent I., and Hilary all alike condemn remarriage.—Ambrosiaster the only exception . . . . .	55
VII. Is "MATRIMONIUM RATUM" DISSOLUBLE ? . . . . .	56
1. The ordinary view.—The case of the Blessed Virgin Mary and S. Joseph.—Indissolubility an essential property of the Sacrament ; yet "Matrimonium Ratum" is not indissoluble . . . . .	56
2. The difficulty here.—The only two possible solutions : i. Some therefore make the "copula" essential ; ii. the other solution considered. . . . .	57
3. It depends on the legality of Papal dispensations : i. Many great theologians deny their validity ; ii. Sanchez gives the two views and the arguments for each ; iii. of the four on the Papal side, all are fallacies ; iv. the history of such dispensations : Alexander III., A.D. 1180 ; Innocent III., A.D. 1210 ; Martin V.,	

	PAGE
A.D. 1431; Paul III., A.D. 1549; Paul IV., A.D. 1559 . . . . .	58
4. Conclusion: i. The power disputed until the 17th century; ii. its earliest exercise near the end of the 12th century . . . . .	60
VIII. ON THE CHURCH'S CLAIM TO CONSTITUTE AND DIS- PENSE "IMPEDIMENTS:" The grounds on which dis- pensations stand . . . . .	61
1. History of dispensations.—Earliest dispensation in case of affinity, Martin V., A.D. 1427; Eu- genius IV. refused to dispense; Alexander VI. dispensed; and Julius II.; the Council of Trent; Estius.—Cajetan's dilemma.—The general opinion of Latin theologians, but ex- ceptions of note . . . . .	61
2. The English Church has never dispensed . . . . .	63
3. The controversy of the 17th century.—De Dominis, "de Republica Ecclesiastica;" Launojus, "Regia in Matrimonium Potes- tas;" Synod of Pistoia, A.D. 1786; Leopold, Duke of Tuscany . . . . .	64
IX. ON THE IMPEDIMENTS OF CONSANGUINITY AND AFFIN- ITY: Two causes of impediments of consanguinity . . . . .	65
1. The fact of Divine prohibition.—"De jure Di- vino" in the Old Testament; incest the special sin of the Canaanites; Lev. xviii. . . . .	65
i. Three lists: (1) Lev. xviii.; (2) Lev. xx.; (3) Deut. xxvii.—GOD'S toleration of certain laxity on account of man's moral hardness.— Divorce and polygamy.—Incest not tolerated. —Levitical prohibitions "a fortiori" binding on Christians.—Incest abhorrent in the sight of GOD . . . . .	66
Comparison of lists.—Principle clear, though examples defective.—Two cases redundant; specified because of the examples of Abraham and Jacob.—Prohibitions number fourteen or fifteen.—The relationship through husband and wife is analogous.—Lev. xvii. cannot be exhaustive . . . . .	67

	PAGE
The principle of affinity.—Prohibited degrees in the American Church.—The guilt of incest in proportion to degree . . . . .	69
Principle of limitation of degrees.—Consanguinity only bars where one party is descended from the mother or father of the other.—Affinity does not bar the relations of the husband from marriage with those of the wife . . .	69
ii. The case of the deceased wife's sister. (1) Witness of the Old Testament.—Various views of Lev. xviii. 18: That "sister" means any woman; that it forbids simultaneous marriage of two sisters.—The prohibition does not rest on this verse.—Analogy of levirate marriage.—Principle of affinity found to apply.—Argument from expediency a mere assumption.—It violates family unity, and is therefore most inexpedient . . . . .	71
(a) Witness of the New Testament: Herod's case; Tertullian thinks Philip was dead; 1 Cor. v. 1-5 . . . . .	73
(3) Witness of the Church.—Tertullian; the Apostolic Canons; Council of Eliberis; first Council of Neo-Cæsarea; S. Basil; Diodorus of Tarsus; S. Timothy of Alexandria; S. Ambrose; S. Augustine.—Conclusion: Neither Scripture nor Church ever allows such marriage.	73
iii. Method of computing degrees of kinship: (1) In the Eastern Church; (2) in the Western Church . . . . .	75
iv. Spiritual kinship . . . . .	75
2. The sanctity of family life and the good of society require the prohibitions.—Marriage of deceased wife's sister illustrates this . . .	76

### CHAPTER III.

#### HOLY ORDERS.

**Introductory:** The Church a kingdom, and needs officers for its administration.—Our LORD provided for this need

	PAGE
in the Sacrament of Orders.—The dignity of this Sacrament . . . . .	78
Orders and Matrimony differ from the other Sacraments in two ways :	
1. They are limited to certain individuals . . . . .	79
2. They are necessary for the perpetuation and perfection of the Church . . . . .	79
This Sacrament provides both a hierarchy and a means of its perpetuation.—Definition of the Sacrament of Orders . . . . .	79
I. ITS SACRAMENTAL NATURE EXAMINED : . . . . .	79
1. Its institution by CHRIST.—The two essential powers of the priesthood—i. to offer sacrifice, and ii. to absolve sin—separately conferred :	
i. The first, on Maundy Thursday ; ii. the second on Easter Day . . . . .	79
2. The outward sign ordained by CHRIST mediately, through the Apostles. i. S. Paul in two places speaks of this sign or Matter, and also of the grace conferred by it : 1 Tim. iv. 14 ; 2 Tim. i. 6. ii. The objection that <i>χάρισμα</i> , not <i>χάρις</i> , is used, and that therefore “ <i>gratia gratis data</i> ,” and not “ <i>gratia gratum faciens</i> ” is implied. iii. Two replies : (1) <i>χάρισμα</i> is sometimes used of sanctifying grace : Rom. v. 15.—(2) S. Paul is referring both to the grace and to the priestly character, which is better expressed by <i>χάρισμα</i> . . . . .	80
II. THE NUMBER OF ORDERS IN THE CHURCH . . . . .	81
1. In the Roman Church, seven : three Sacred Orders and four Minor Orders . . . . .	81
2. The Eastern and Anglican Churches recognize only three Orders as properly so called . . . . .	81
3. The Romans exclude the episcopate, considering it only a superior grade of the priesthood : their argument for this . . . . .	82
4. The view that all the Orders have reference to the Holy Eucharist ; found in S. Thomas.—The views of Dionysius the Areopagite . . . . .	82

	PAGE
5. The seven Orders very ancient ; mentioned by Pope Cornelius, A.D. 252, and Pope Caius, A.D. 283 . . . . .	83
III. FORM AND MATTER.—Great difference of opinion on this point . . . . .	83
1. Five different views in regard to the Matter : i. Porrection of instruments ; ii. this together with imposition of hands ; iii. these two separated—the former conveying the power to consecrate, the latter to absolve ; iv. the imposition of hands connected with the anointing ; v. imposition of hands the sole Matter.—This now the prevailing view . . . . .	83
2. Four different opinions in regard to the Form : i. " Receive the power to offer Sacrifice," etc. ; ii. " Receive the HOLY GHOST," etc. ; iii. both these formulas ; iv. neither, but any prayer which " informs " the Matter.—This now the prevailing view.—In the East the Matter and Form are simply the imposition of hands with prayer . . . . .	84
3. The question in regard to the position of the Form and Matter : i. In the Roman Ordinal ; ii. in the Anglican Ordinal . . . . .	85
IV. MINISTER, A BISHOP, HAVING JURISDICTION.—For consecration of a Bishop three Bishops required . . . . .	85
V. SUBJECT, A BAPTIZED MALE FREE FROM IMPEDIMENTS.—He should not be ordained " per saltum."—This, though irregular, is valid, and confers the omitted grades.—The subject should have a distinct vocation.—Canonical age . . . . .	86
VI. EFFECTS . . . . .	87
1. Grace : i. Sanctifying grace ; ii. " Actual " graces . . . . .	87
2. Character . . . . .	87
VII. ITERATION AND DEPOSITION . . . . .	87
VIII. TIMES OF ORDINATION, THE EMBER SEASONS.—Their antiquity . . . . .	88

## CHAPTER IV.

## ROMAN OBJECTIONS TO ANGLICAN ORDERS.

	PAGE
<b>Introductory :</b> The spirit of the objections . . . . .	89
<b>I. THE ATTACK ON HISTORICAL GROUNDS . . . . .</b>	<b>89</b>
1. The consecration of Abp. Parker, Dec. 17, 1559 . . . . .	89
Evidence of the fact. i. Impugned by Nag's Head Fable, 1604.—Six versions of this story.	
ii. Barlow's consecration next attacked.—Positive evidence of it : His precedence in the House of Lords ; the new law, under which confirmation and consecration were commanded by the same royal instrument. iii. The mode of consecration made Barlow's part immaterial.—In the Greek and English rites only one Bishop consecrates, in the Roman all three ; in Parker's case all four repeated the Form, and therefore consecrated . . . . .	92
2. The positive proof : i. Invitation of English Bishops to Trent ; ii. the claim of the English Bishops to seats on the ground of their canonical ordination ; iii. refusal of Trent to condemn English Orders ; iv. for eleven years all Catholics communicated in the English Church ; v. offer of Pius IV. to acknowledge the English Prayer Book,—Walsingham's letter, June 21, 1571 ; vi. the great writers of the 16th and 17th centuries do not speak of English Orders as invalid . . . . .	95
3. The present Roman position authoritatively stated in the Pope's Bull of 1896.—Sufficient to answer it from recognized Roman theologians . . . . .	95
<b>II. DEFECT OF FORM THE FIRST OBJECTION OF LEO XIII. . . . .</b>	<b>95</b>
1. The Pope denies the sufficiency of the Form "Receive the HOLY GHOST : " i. This	



alone never constituted the Form in the Edwardine Ordinal ; ii. the Apostles were apparently ordained with the same words as in the Edwardine rite ; iii. the Pope's dictum is opposed,—(1) to the teaching of Roman theologians ; (2) to the practice of the Roman court :—(i.) The Abyssinian case.—Canon Estcourt's statement of the case.—Resolution of the S. C. ; in 1860 the decree reaffirmed in the case of the Copts ; in 1875 attention of the S. C. drawn by Cardinal Manning to the bearing of this on Anglican Orders ; Cardinal Patrizi's reply.—Fr. Brandi's explanation : The "dubia" of the Apostolic Prefect for Ethiopia ; the Consultor's "votum," referred back for investigation of the Abyssinian Form ; the new "quæsitum ;" the second "votum," which did not receive the approval of Clement XI.—The ancient "relatio."—The inference to be drawn from Fr. Brandi's statement.—Of what value is the accuracy of the S. C., since this was acted upon for 171 years ?—(ii.) "Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM" the Form with which all Roman Bishops are consecrated.—The rubric in the Pontifical, together with Form and prayer following. iv. "Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM" not the sole Form, but its application . . . .

103

2. Difficulties in the Roman Ordinal : i. Hunter's admission of this.—He gives three principal opinions ; the only point certain, that the Matter and Form occur before the Consecration in the Mass ; the view of Eugenius IV. shown to be faulty because lacking antiquity.—Summary of Hunter's position. ii. The majority now considers imposition of hands alone the essential Matter.—So apparently does Leo XIII. iii. The tangle in the Roman view caused by the influence of three distinct the-

ories : the mediævalism of S. Thomas, the 16th century reaction, and the scientific antiquarianism of Morinus.—In the Anglican rite is there sufficient expression of purpose to confer priesthood? iv. The Romans have to meet two difficulties : In regard (1) to the "imposition" theory, (2) and to the "porrection" view. v. De Lugo's proposed solution of the difficulty : a moral unity in the whole rite, so that from the first imposition to the porrection there is moral concurrence of the Matter.—Gasparri's modification of this view.—De Augustinis holds a similar opinion. vi. The opinions of four Popes as to Matter compared : (a) Eugenius IV., 1439 ; (b) Innocent XII., 1697 ; (c) Gregory IX., 1227-1241 ; (d) Leo XIII., 1896.—No canon of procedure when Popes differ.—Leo XIII. apparently not without misgivings on the subject . . . . .

112

3. What is the adequate Form in the English rite?  
 i. The Pope admits the prayer "Almighty GOD," etc., might be the Form but for lack of intention in the Service.—But this is most clearly expressed in the Ordinal. ii. The Pope assumes a non-Catholic sense ; but the Preface refutes this. iii. The Roman and Coptic Forms contain no mention of the power of consecrating and sacrificing until the 9th century.—The Pope in condemning Anglican Orders condemns his own.—"Sæpius Officio" notes that there is no mention of the "Sacerdotium," or its grace and power, in the Hippolytan and Leonine Sacramentaries . . . . .

116

**III. THE SECOND ARGUMENT IS DEFECT OF INTENTION.—**  
 Really the only one.—The strict force of the term "Intention."—What the Pope seems to mean . . . . .

117

1. Suarez' statement of the three theories of intention.—He holds the first two necessary, but admits that S. Thomas thought the first suffi-

	PAGE
cient.—This is the view of Catharinus, (Salmeron, Becanus, Contenson, and Bossuet).—Ryder considers it an open question; Addis and Arnold, and Scannell adopt it.—In the Edwardine Ordinal both first and second intention clearly expressed . . . . .	119
2. Bellarmine's theory of intention.—A general intention of doing what the Church does is sufficient, as taught by the Councils of Florence and Trent.—No need to intend to do what the Roman Church does.—An intention contrary to this would not invalidate the Sacrament.—That the Council of Trent requires an intention in regard to the "end" of the Sacrament is false; this charge of Tilmann and Chemnitz "an unmitigated lie," says Bellarmine, who proves it from the practice of the ancient Church in regard to those baptized by Pelagians, and in his day by Zwinglians and Calvinists.—The same teaching in Tournely.—These definitions applied to the Edwardine Ordinal, which satisfies them.—Doubtful whether the Pope requires third intention, but quite certain that his English vindicators do.—The Pope implies that the intention to do what the Roman Church does is wanting; Bellarmine says it is unnecessary . . . . .	122
IV. THE POPE'S MISSTATEMENTS . . . . .	122
1. No mention of "Sacerdotium," of which "every trace had been deliberately struck out;"—and yet four distinct mentions of it; and more, it is mentioned as the purpose or intention of the Bishop in ordaining, and of the Church in continuing the old Orders . . . . .	124
2. Misquotation of a passage from the Bull of Paul IV. in regard to dispensations.—Word "concernentia" omitted in Pole's copy, but found in the Vatican copy.—Omitted in the Bull so as to change the statement of Paul IV.—The	

	PAGE
full Latin text.—The dispensation does not refer to Orders, the Bull explicitly declaring that the Orders and benefices will be received. —The dispensations and indults, having been received from the King, were null in the eyes of Rome, but the Orders are expressly ratified as valid . . . . .	126
3. Statement that the brief of Julius III. must refer to the Edwardine Ordinal.—This is false in fact, and the Committee had evidence of the existence of the peculiar rite of John a Lasco.—Instances of those so ordained found in Martyr, Tremellio, Cavalier, and Bucer . . . .	127
4. Misquotation of the Council of Trent . . . .	127
V. THE OMISSION OF REFERENCE TO THE SACRIFICE . . . .	128
The state of theological opinion in regard to the Sacrifice in the 16th century.—In the 16th century no consensus whatever.—View of Catharinus ; view referred to in Article XXXI. ; Duns Scotus ; Scotists ; the Scotists according to Vasquez ; Canus ; Corrienero ; Bellarmine ; Vasquez ; Lessius ; Suarez ; De Lugo ; Cienfuegos . . . .	131
Some reasons why the compilers of our Ordinal returned to the norm of the ancient rites ; not that the English Church ever desired to reject the Eucharistic Sacrifice, as is clearly shown in confining to the priesthood the power of offering it.—Bishop Wordsworth on the Sacrifice.—The Prayer Book clearly sets forth that (1) the purpose of the institution was the Sacrifice ; (2) in the Eucharist the Body and Blood of CHRIST are objectively present ; (3) this Sacrifice is offered for the remission of sins of the whole Church.—It is therefore a propitiatory Sacrifice for the quick and the dead . . . .	133

## CHAPTER V.

## EXTREME UNCTION.

I. TITLES.—Meaning of " Extreme " Unction . . . .	134
II. INSTITUTION . . . . .	135

	PAGE
S. James v. 14, 15.—The relation of the anointing mentioned in S. Mark vi. 13 to this Sacrament.—View of Trent . . . . .	136
III. AS A SACRAMENT . . . . .	136
Definition fulfilled by Extreme Unction as described in S. James v. 14, 15.—The outward sign, conferring grace, and permanently instituted.—The Sacrament recognized in the first centuries of the Church: by Origen; S. Chrysostom; S. Innocent I. . . . .	138
IV. MATTER AND FORM . . . . .	138
1. Matter.—of two kinds: i. Remote Matter, olive oil—blessed by a Bishop, or a delegated Priest, or (in the East) by a parish Priest having ordinary jurisdiction.—Pontifical of Egbert. ii. Proximate Matter, the act of anointing.—The Matter the oil itself, an opinion rejected by SS. Thomas and Bonaventura.—What parts are to be anointed—two opinions: a fivefold, or a single anointing.—The <i>Rituale Romanum</i> requires a sevenfold anointing.—The rubric in Edward VI.'s First Prayer Book . . . . .	141
2. Form.—The Roman Form.—The Greek Form.—Form in the Sacramentary of S. Gregory.—Form from the old English Pontifical.—Form in the Prayer Book of 1549 . . . . .	143
V. MINISTER, A PRIEST.—Methods of administration of this Sacrament . . . . .	143
VI. SUBJECT . . . . .	144
VII. EFFECTS: . . . . .	144
1. Primary effects . . . . .	145
2. Secondary effects.—Some difficulties considered. . . . .	145
VIII. NECESSITY AND ITERATION . . . . .	147

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE RULE OF FAITH.

Introductory: The relation between Holy Scripture and Tradition.—The Church asserts her ability to prove her articles of faith from Holy Scripture . . . . .	148
--	-----

	PAGE
Preliminary considerations : Faith as a habit of the soul ; definition . . . . .	149
Explanation of terms : " Virtue ; " " supernatural,"— (1) as to the object of faith, (2) as to the motive or ground of faith, (3) as to the origin of faith in the soul. —A " theological " virtue.—The " mind."—" Firm assent."—" Divine authority."—" Revelation," the material object of faith . . . . .	150
Difference between faith and opinion ; between faith and feeling ; between faith and knowledge ; between faith and the Beatific Vision.—Different species of faith : In reference to the object, faith is " Divine " and " Catholic ; " in respect to the subject, faith is " living," or " dead ; " in respect to the manner, faith is " explicit," or " implicit " . . . . .	151
Three main divisions of the subject . . . . .	152
I. THE OBJECT OF FAITH . . . . .	152
1. The " material " object of faith . . . . .	152
i. The material object of " Divine " faith :— (1) Truth " formally " revealed ; (2) Truth " virtually " revealed.—(1) Of truths which are formally revealed : (i.) " explicitly " or in their proper terms, (ii.) " implicitly " or in equivalent terms.—(2) Of truths which are virtually revealed ; these called " theological conclusions."—Definition.—Is a theological conclusion the object of faith ?—(i.) View of Melchior Canus ; (ii.) of the Thomists ; (iii.) of Suarez, De Lugo, and others.—Conclu- sion.—(3) Private revelations.—Many examples in the Bible, and in the lives of the Saints.— Not " de fide ; " the approbation of the Church only witnesses that they are not contrary to faith or morals.—They should not be rejected as untrue.—The person who receives such a revelation, if convinced of the fact, ought to believe it ; but it may be doubted, or even denied, by others without heresy . . . . .	155
ii. The material object of " Catholic " faith.—	

	PAGE
This division not strictly logical.—For Catholic faith two conditions : formal revelation, and declaration by the Church.—The Church unable to put forth any new article of faith.—It is the office of the HOLY GHOST to unfold truth as the growing needs of the Church require . . . . .	156
The Church exercises her office in two ways : "extraordinary," and "ordinary."—(1) The "extraordinary" teaching office of the Church. (i.) Councils.—All things contained in decrees and canons of Œcumenical Councils not equally matters of faith.—The Seven Œcumenical Councils : 1°. Nicæa I., 325 ; 2°. Constantinople I., 381 ; 3°. Ephesus, 431 ; 4°. Chalcedon, 451 ; 5°. Constantinople II., 553 ; 6°. Constantinople III., 680–681 ; 7°. Nicæa II., 787. Lyons and Florence not Œcumenical, though Greeks were present. (ii.) The three Creeds : 1°. The Apostles' Creed ; 2°. the Nicene Creed (so called) ; 3°. the Athanasian Creed . . . . .	159
(2) The "ordinary" teaching office of the Church—exercised in various ways, but especially : (i.) In her Liturgies ; (ii.) in the consent of Fathers, Doctors, and theologians ; (iii.) by the general sense of the faithful ; (iv.) through historical documents . . . . .	162
(3) What is meant in the Roman Communion by the authority of the Church.—Two channels of authority peculiar to Rōman Church : Decrees of the Sacred Congregation, and decrees of Pontiffs : neither infallible.—Tanquerey's statement of this.—Instances of error in both these channels . . . . .	163
2. The "formal" object, or grounds, of faith.—Distinction between grounds of faith, and of credibility.—The ground of faith the authority of GOD.—Dispute between Thomists and Scotists.—Is faith discursive ? . . . . .	167

	PAGE
II. THE ACT OF FAITH . . . . .	167
1. The preparation of an act of faith : i. The revelation of a truth ; ii. the proposition or declaration of such revelation ; iii. the grounds of credibility ; moral certitude, absolute and relative . . . . .	169
2. The production of the act of faith : i. The subjective or effective causes : (1) The intellect ; (2) the will ; (3) actual grace. ii. The evidential or objective causes of faith : (1) The evidence of credibility ; (2) the infallible authority of the Church ; (3) the authority of GOD . . . . .	172
3. The properties of an act of faith . . . . .	173
4. The subjects of an act of faith : i. The Holy Angels and the Saints ; ii. the holy souls in Purgatory ; iii. the devils and the lost ; iv. those in the Church Militant : (1) the righteous, (2) infidels, (3) sinners, (4) heretics . . . . .	174
III. THE RELATION OF FAITH AND REASON . . . . .	175
1. Faith and reason two clearly distinct means of knowledge : i. In respect of evidence ; ii. in respect of principle ; iii. in respect of the object . . . . .	175
2. No real conflict possible between reason and faith . . . . .	176
3. Faith and reason are allies and co-workers . . . . .	176

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE LIMITS OF THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION.

<b>Introductory :</b> The rule of faith imposes limits to theological speculation.—Rash speculation a danger in times of religious revival . . . . .	178
<b>I. SOME CANONS LIMITING SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY :</b> . . . . .	178
1. In regard to Holy Scripture . . . . .	179
2. In regard to the Church's authority : i. Extra-	



	PAGE
ordinarily expressed by councils and creeds ;	
ii. ordinarily by Fathers, theologians, etc. . . . .	179
3. Not only the opinion, but its consequences, must not conflict with the Church's teaching . . . . .	179
4. Opinions emanating from schismatical or heretical sources should be suspected . . . . .	179
II. THE MODERN "KENOTIC" THEORY TESTED BY THESE RULES . . . . .	180
Its elements of danger.—No attempt here to discuss this theory exhaustively.—Its introduction into England traced to Godet's works ; his statement of the theory. —The theory of Gess ; of Thomasius ; of Ebrard ; of Martensen . . . . .	183
The more radical forms of Kenotism have few followers in England ; Martensen's view apparently the most popular there ; the objection to it : in America the theories of Thomasius and Gess have more followers.— The moderate Kenotists compared with the Semi- Arians : the parallel a warning to the Church to-day . . . . .	185
The appeal to Holy Scripture.—The assumption that the question has never been really faced by the Fathers and theologians : this is not the case.—The teaching of theologians in regard to our LORD'S knowledge.—The Fathers indirectly confirm this . . . . .	186
The principles involved in Kenotism : Change in the Being of GOD ; the surrender of some attributes of GOD ; separation between the FATHER and the SON, which destroys the doctrine of the HOLY TRINITY . . . . .	187
1. Kenotism and Holy Scripture.—The exegesis of Phil. ii. 5-8.—The text of the passage.— The context.—The phrase "Who, being in the form of GOD."— <i>Ἐκείνου</i> implies : i. Pre-existence (Gal. ii. 14 ; 2 Cor. viii. 17) ; ii. continued existence (S. Luke xxiii. 50 ; Acts ii. 30 ; 2 Cor. viii. 17 ; xii. 16 ; Rom. iv. 19). The exact force of <i>μορφῇ</i> ; observations of Bishop Lightfoot ; usage of Plato and Aris- totle.—The full phrase then describes CHRIST	191

	PAGE
JESUS as pre-existing and continually subsisting in the form of GOD.— <i>Ἰσα Θεῷ: ἀπαγγμὸν</i> : action of <i>λαβών</i> coincides with that of <i>ἐκένωσε: μορφῇ δούλου</i> .—The modern Kenotic view finds no support from this passage . . . . .	195
2. Kenotism and the teaching of the Church.—Absence of a uniform theory among Kenotists.—Thomasius' attempt to distinguish between GOD'S relative and essential attributes; the attributes of GOD not assigned by arbitrary speculation, but necessary in thought; the term as applied to GOD.—The human intellect as an instrument for the apprehension of truth; the Church's approval gives its conclusions the highest authority . . . . .	196
i. Kenotism and the Church's extraordinary teaching. (1) Kenotism destroys the attribute of Immutability, and thus conflicts with the Creed of Nicæa; the answer of Kenotists to this charge.—Surrender of Immutability involves that of other attributes; the consequences of the surrender of Immutability destroy our conception of GOD.—Kenotists object to what they call "a priori" views of GOD.—Ebrard and Gess teach Apollinarianism. (2) The Council of Constantinople condemned the Apollinarians.—This view found in two stages of development. (3) The Council of Ephesus and the Kenotist view of our LORD'S miracles.—The Ninth Anathema of S. Cyril in regard to those who say that CHRIST "received from the HOLY SPIRIT the ability to work miracles."—The explanation the Kenotists give. (4) The Council of Chalcedon (451) defined the relation of the two Natures in the Incarnation.—The acceptance of this definition inconsistent with Kenotism . . . . .	202
ii. Kenotism and the Church's ordinary teach-	

ing.—No Father or theologian since S. Augustine's time countenances Kenotism.—An examination of four Fathers before S. Augustine claimed as favourable to Kenotism ; Gore admits, however, that they do not teach a "limitation of knowledge," but their reference to the self-emptying without this gives no support to Kenotism.—(1) The passage quoted from S. Irenæus considered ; (2) the teaching of Origen on this subject ; (3) the teaching of S. Cyril of Alexandria.—Not the slightest support for Kenotism in any of these Fathers ; (4) S. Hilary of Poitiers uses "form" for the manifested glory, not for the Essence of the Godhead.—Three passages inconsistent with Kenotism.—S. Hilary on our LORD'S miracles ; on His being in Heaven whilst on earth ; and on His Omniscience . . . . .	208
The only ancient writer who teaches Kenotism is the heretic Beron about the 6th century.—His theory that the Incarnation introduced limits into GOD Himself.—The Chalcedonian decree is the answer to this.—The earliest attempt to misrepresent Phil. ii. 5-8 was that of Marcion in the interests of Docetism . . . .	210
3. The modern view of the Kenosis may be traced to Luther, who, however, confined it to our LORD'S Humanity ; Melancthon thought this savoured of Docetism.—The source of this theory entirely schismatic or heretical ; difficulty of this.—Zinzendorf the father of the Kenotism of to-day.—The Lutherans : Thomasius, Gess.—The Reformed : Ebrard, Godet.—Dorner's view of Kenotism.—The Danish Bishop Martensen . . . . .	211
Summary of argument against Kenotism.—If this theory be true, has not the Church been in error, at least since the first Œcumenical Council ? Is this consistent with our LORD'S	

promise that the gates of Hell should not prevail against the Church, and that the HOLY GHOST should lead the Church into all truth? . . . . .	211
--	-----

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

<b>Introductory:</b> Definition.—The relation between Holy Scripture and Tradition.—Analogy between Holy Scripture and the Incarnate Word; two elements, Human and Divine, in each . . . . .	213
<b>I. THE CANON OF HOLY SCRIPTURE</b> . . . . .	214
Meaning of word "canon;" its application in theology.—Distinction between canonicity and inspiration.—Classifications of the books of the Bible.—Into Old and New Testament.—Into protocanonical and deuterocanonical.—Hebrew Canon contained only the protocanonical.—The deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament; of the New Testament.—The authority of the deuterocanonical books.—The term "apocryphal" misleading, and not authoritatively used in the Anglican Church.—Jewish division of the Old Testament into Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa.—The Law.—The Prophets, earlier and later.—The Hagiographa.—Two-fold division of the New Testament.—A fourfold division of the whole Bible into: Legal, Historical, Sapiential, and Prophetical books.—A threefold division.—Difference between Palestinian and Alexandrian canons of the Old Testament.—Canon finally determined before the close of the 4th century.—Council of Hippo, 393.—Divisions of the text.—The Ammonian sections.—Andrew of Cæsarea's division.—Cardinal Hugo a S. Charo first divides the Bible into chapters; Robert Stephanus, 1548, into verses . . . . .	220
<b>II. THE INSPIRATION OF HOLY SCRIPTURE</b> . . . . .	220
Origin of the term.—Definition of inspiration.—It is a grace 'gratis data.'—The Old Testament prophets	

claim to be inspired.—The earliest use of the term “inspiration,” 180.—Difference between inspiration and revelation.—Inspiration does not preclude the ordinary labours of an author.—Inspiration differs from assistance.—The Church has never defined the method of inspiration.—Some inadequate views.—Two factors in inspiration : the natural powers of the writer, and the Divine impulse.—Holy Scripture not only contains, but is the Word of GOD.—GOD the efficient Cause, man the instrumental cause.—Three steps in inspiration . . . 224

1. The movement of the will to write . . . . . 224

2. Illumination of the intellect . . . . . 224

3. Divine assistance . . . . . 225

The individuality of the writers preserved.—Some inadequate views examined : Divine assistance only ; approbation of the Church ; mechanical theory ; reaction from this ; dynamical theory.—The twofold agency in Holy Scripture accounts for its phenomena.—The analogy between the Bible and the Incarnate Word.—Holy Scripture both a revelation and a veiling of Divine truth . . . . . 228

Some corollaries : A book need not be in all its parts the work of its reputed author ; existing documents may have been used, but the inspired mind must have passed judgment on them.—It is not necessary that the titles of books or their reputed authorship be correct ; this canon not invented to meet difficulties of to-day ; found in S. Gregory and in Melchior Canus.—There is no authoritative system of chronology.—Errors may have crept into MSS. ; difficulty about numbers often due to this.—Received interpretation often erroneous ; Dr. Whewell on the influence of current philosophy on interpretation.—Illustration from Fort Sumter.—No Scripture is of any private interpretation.—Facts of science recorded as they appeared to the writer . . . . . 231

### III.—THE INTERPRETATION AND USE OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. 231

The various senses of Holy Scripture.—First division twofold : literal, and spiritual.—The literal sense is twofold : proper, and metaphorical.—The spiritual sense

	PAGE
has three subdivisions: tropological, allegorical, and anagogical.—The mystical interpretation has the authority of CHRIST.—The accommodative sense . . .	234
Two sets of canons of scriptural interpretation, the Bible being human and Divine.—On the human side: . . .	234
1. The exact meaning of the text to be sought . . .	234
2. The context to be observed . . . . .	234
3. Parallel passages to be considered . . . . .	235
4. The opinions of commentators to be weighed . . .	235
On the Divine side: The Church's interpretation to be followed; this may be sought in Liturgies, Fathers, and theologians . . . . .	235
IV. ANOTHER THEORY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, ADVANCED BY "HIGHER CRITICISM," under the guidance of unaided human reason . . . . .	236
1. The methods by which the Church and the critics respectively reach conclusions.—The Church's method.—The method of higher criticism.—The Church's method may reach absolute truth in the premises; the critics' cannot.—The infallibility of the Church here assumed, but elsewhere discussed . . . . .	237
2. Apart from the authority of the Church, three lines of evidence for Holy Scripture: i. Archæology; ii. internal literary evidence; iii. internal moral evidence.—The testimony of archæology shows the narrative of the Pentateuch to be true to the life and customs of its assumed date.—The testimony of moral sense is altogether contrary to higher criticism . . . . .	238
3. Higher criticism described.—Its origin and history.—Strauss, 1835; Baur, 1844.—The three premises of higher criticism.—The attack first on the New Testament; since 1878 shifted to the Old Testament, but on the same lines . . . . .	241
4. The late date of books argued from absence of literary activity in Moses' time.—Alleged component parts of the Pentateuch: i. Priestly	

	PAGE
code ; ii. the Narrative ; iii. the Deuteronomist ; iv. subdivisions of each ; v. Redactors required ; but no agreement as to how many sources.—Driver requires six, Cornill fifteen .	242
5. Dates assigned are P, 450 ; D, 640 ; J-E, 800.—Recent archaeological discoveries, at Tel-el-Amarna, and in Babylon, trace literature back to Sargon, 3800 B.C.—Higher criticism therefore 2500 years out.—Examination of date assigned to J-E. ; Babylonian affinities of J, Egyptian affinities of E, but little intercourse with either country between 1290 and 586.—On this ground Moses the most probable author.—Recent discovery at Sippara of a J-E tablet of the 14th century destructive to the literary analysis of higher criticism . . .	244
V. EXAMINATION OF METHOD BY WHICH THE DIFFERENT SECTIONS ARE DETERMINED . . . . .	245
The method plausible, but a vicious circle.—The criteria derived from diversity of diction, and an arbitrary assumption of independent authors.—Illustration from Macaulay's works.—How the frequent conflicts between the criteria are met.—Higher criticism an attempt to solve an indeterminate equation of two unknown quantities ; the whole theory purely hypothetical.—Difficulties increase in the Pentateuch and culminate in Joshua.—Two causes why people accept higher criticism.—The theory works only for a few chapters of Genesis.—An example of its inconsistency in the account of the Flood.—Dr. Harper's admission on this point.—A summary : The method being vicious, the conclusions are not trustworthy ; the history of higher criticism shows that the ground has been frequently shifted . . . .	249
VI. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE VICIOUSNESS OF THE METHOD OF HIGHER CRITICISM : . . . . .	250
1. From the criticism of the Catilinarian Orations of Cicero . . . . .	250
2. Application of the method to certain parables .	252
Conclusion : Importance of internal evidence recognized.—	

	PAGE
The quarrel not with the results, but with the methods of higher criticism.—Recognition of discoveries made by critics, but such not contrary to the Church's teaching.—The conclusions of higher criticism which contradict the Church's teaching have been answered in detail by many writers . . . . .	259

## CHAPTER IX.

## JUSTIFICATION.

<b>Introductory:</b> The importance of right views of justification.	260
<b>I. THE PROTESTANT DOCTRINE.</b> —The Lutheran view.—By justification Luther meant not renewal of man's nature, but imputation of CHRIST'S righteousness.—The Calvinistic view.—Difference between the Church's view and these.—Under the Protestant system . . . . .	261
1. Man is not made, but imputed, righteous . . . . .	261
2. The Sacraments are unimportant . . . . .	262
3. Good works are unnecessary . . . . .	262
Three extracts from Luther's works.—Luther's doctrine compared with S. Paul's.—The effects of this doctrine in our day . . . . .	262
<b>II. THE MEANING OF δικαιούν . . . . .</b>	263
1. To declare righteous.—GOD'S declaration effects what it declares.—The Lutheran view contradicts this.—Newman's Lectures on Justification . . . . .	264
2. Justification used also for sanctification . . . . .	264
<b>III. DEFINITION OF JUSTIFICATION . . . . .</b>	264
1. Four points : i. The negative element, remission of sins ; ii. the positive, sanctification ; iii. the means, free acceptance ; iv. the effect, righteousness . . . . .	265
2. Causes of justification, five : i. The final cause ; ii. the efficient cause ; iii. the meritorious cause ; iv. the instrumental cause ; v. the formal cause . . . . .	265



	PAGE
3. The dispositions required for justification.— Art. XI. and the Homilies.—Relation of faith and the Sacraments as instruments.—What kind of faith is required? . . . . .	266
4. In what does justification consist? i. In the remission of sins; ii. in the bestowal of habitual grace . . . . .	267
5. The effects of justification: i. It renders us pleasing to GOD, and makes us His friends. —Characteristics of this friendship. ii. It makes us GOD'S children by adoption.— Meaning of "adoption." iii. It makes us partakers of the Divine Nature. iv. We be- come the dwelling-place of GOD.—This in- dwelling in us is common to the Three Persons of the HOLY TRINITY, but attributed especially to the HOLY GHOST. . . . .	269
IV. DEFINITION OF HABITUAL GRACE . . . . .	270
1. It is a "quality" . . . . .	270
2. It is "supernatural" . . . . .	271
3. It "inheres in the soul" . . . . .	271
4. "Permanently" . . . . .	271
5. It "makes us partakers of the Divine Nature." —Some illustrations of this.—This participa- tion is more than "moral," and is, in a sense, "physical."—And yet this is only by analogy. . . . .	272
V. THE PROPERTIES OF JUSTIFICATION . . . . .	273
1. Its uncertainty.—Its signs: i. The testimony of conscience; ii. love of GOD; iii. contempt for the world.—Some have had special revela- tions of their justification.—The first property is denied by Lutherans and Calvinists . . . . .	274
2. The inequality of justification. — Scriptural proof of this.—This second property also is de- nied by the Lutherans . . . . .	275
3. Defectibility.—Testimony of Scripture.—This property denied by Lutherans and Calvinists. —Habitual grace and mortal sin mutually exclusive . . . . .	277

<b>Conclusion :</b> Habitual grace, and the virtues and gifts which it infuses, constitute the spiritual or "new" life.— S. Leo's exhortation . . . . .	277
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## CHAPTER X.

## THE ENDOWMENTS OF MAN—THE CARDINAL VIRTUES.

<b>Introductory :</b> S. Paul's description of the effects of justification . . . . .	278
<b>I. THE ENDOWMENTS OF MAN . . . . .</b>	278
The change made by justification implies certain endowments of the spiritual man.—These are called "virtues" and "gifts."—Virtue a habit.—Examination of the term "habit."—Distinction between habit and disposition.—Habits are essential, or operative.—Three classes of habits : natural, acquired, infused.—Infused habits are not "powers" of the soul, but qualities.—Definition of "virtue."—Virtues also are natural, acquired, and infused.—Man may be considered in the natural, or the supernatural order.—In both he has certain endowments.—While the same virtues exist in both orders, they are different in their "end."—Infused virtues imply natural virtues raised to the supernatural order.—Virtues are divided into intellectual and moral, from the power they perfect ; theological and moral, from their object.—Theological virtues have GOD as their object ; moral virtues have the perfection of the act itself as their end . . . . .	280
<b>II. THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES . . . . .</b>	281
<b>i. The cardinal virtues generally considered . . . . .</b>	281
Meaning of the term "cardinal."—The cardinal virtues are the foundation of the active life of the Christian.—They must all be present in each human act which aims at perfection.—These virtues were well known in Greek philosophy, and are mentioned in Scripture : Wisd. viii. 7 ; (Prov. viii. 14).—The moral virtues philosophically examined : A	

virtue may reside in the intellect as Prudence ; in the will as Justice ; in the concupiscible appetite as Temperance ; in the irascible appetite as Fortitude.—These virtues existed in a high degree among the heathen.—The difference between them in the natural and supernatural order is found in their " motive " and " end."—Three gifts to sanctify daily life : Reason, Free Will, Grace.—The cardinal virtues enable us : to do all our duty ; to bear our cross ; to act rightly.—These virtues may be exercised actively, passively, and in a combination of these two manners.—A perfect act of virtue has three factors : the motive, rule, and test.—The four conditions of perfection in an act of virtue are that it be done : consciously, deliberately, unselfishly, and upon principle.—There are four elements in a moral choice : the wish, the deliberation, the decision, the will.—An act of virtue, to be perfect, must pass through four stages : viz., the cardinal virtues.—Plato's illustration of the four virtues.—Another illustration . . .	284
2. The cardinal virtues considered . . .	284
i. Fortitude.—Fortitude regulates the irascible appetite.—It is the mean between cowardice and rashness, between fear and desire.—Fortitude compared with Temperance.—Fortitude may be exercised towards our neighbour, self, and GOD—actively, passively, and in a combination of these two.—The golden mean is to avoid excess or defect.—The mean for Fortitude, its excess, and defect . . .	286
ii. Temperance.—This virtue governs the fleshly appetite, inducing moderation in the lawful use of GOD'S gifts.—Temperance implies the neglect of a lesser good to gain a greater.—Here a contrast to Fortitude, which endures a lesser evil to avoid a greater.—For-	

	PAGE
titute like the spur, Temperance the curb.— Temperance claims supremacy over all man's appetites.—By it we acquire detachment from creatures.—Temperance has many forms.— Temperance has three modes of exercise : physically, intellectually, in combination.— Its mean, excess, and defect . . . . .	287
iii. Prudence.—This virtue governs the intel- lect.—Illustration of the way in which all four virtues must be present in a perfect act of vir- tue.—Prudence is both an intellectual and a moral virtue.—As a virtue it must look to a worthy end.—Prudence needs the support of the other moral virtues.—Prudence has four elements : wisdom, judiciousness, vigilance, and perseverance.—Its golden mean, its ex- cess, and defect.—Prudence sometimes seems, but never is, akin to cowardice ; like Forti- tude, it includes perseverance . . . . .	290
iv. Justice.—This virtue governs the will.— The functions of Justice are threefold, accord- ing to its object : towards GOD, towards our neighbour, and towards self.—Justice may be exercised : positively, negatively, and intel- lectually.—Methods in which Justice may be exercised : towards GOD ; towards our neigh- bour ; towards ourselves.—The golden mean, its excess, and defect in Justice—towards GOD, our neighbour, and ourselves . . . . .	292

## CHAPTER XI.

THE ENDOWMENTS OF MAN—THE THEO-  
LOGICAL VIRTUES.

<b>Introductory :</b> The endowments of the soul which accom- pany sanctifying grace.—The Theological Virtues . . . . .	294
<b>I. SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS . . . . .</b>	294
The likeness and difference which may be traced in natural and supernatural virtues ; illustrated by the	

	PAGE
process of grafting.—The difference between natural and supernatural virtues is chiefly in their motive and end ; illustrated by the process of magnetizing iron .	296
II. THE RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL VIRTUES . . . . .	296
1. Faith, in the natural man ; in the supernatural man.—Difference of motive and end in natural and supernatural faith . . . . .	297
2. Hope, in the natural man ; in the supernatural man . . . . .	297
3. Love, as a natural virtue ; as a supernatural virtue . . . . .	297
The endowments of Faith, Hope, and Love enable man to live as the child of GOD.—The theological virtues in man illustrated from a plant . . . . .	299
III. THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES. . . . .	299
1. Faith.—Faith has for its subject the reason, which it perfects.—Faith bestows on the reason : i. strength, ii. and light.—Illustration of a man born blind. iii. "Obscurity," a property of Faith.—The theological virtues given to us potentially, and therefore need to be exercised.—"Meditation" is the exercise of Faith.—Some think they cannot meditate .	302
2. Hope. It has its seat in the will.—Hope rests on GOD'S Omnipotence ; its fruit is joy. i. Hope is intermediate between Faith and Love ; ii. and between presumption and despair ; iii. it is the special virtue of the Intermediate State.—Hope the stimulus of all spiritual effort.—To its neglect may be traced most of our sins.—An examination of the three kinds of sins : i. of the fallen angels ; ii. of Adam ; iii. of fallen man.—Hope is exercised especially by prayer, which is the operation in us of the HOLY SPIRIT.—Prayer is the fundamental function of the spiritual man . . . .	305
3. Charity.—Faith and Hope can co-exist with mortal sin ; Charity cannot.—The relation of	

Charity to sanctifying grace, and to the HOLY SPIRIT.—Why Charity is called a theological virtue.—Natural and supernatural Charity.—What Thomas a Kempis says of Charity ; what S. Paul says of it.—Charity enables us to possess GOD.—The effect of Charity in regard to our neighbour.—Charity needs to be exercised : by self-sacrifice ; but especially in worship.—This exercise seen in the offering of the Holy Eucharist, in which the law of sacrifice is fulfilled . . . . .	310
IV. IN ADDITION TO THE VIRTUES, JUSTIFICATION BESTOWS THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, which produce the " fruits " and the " beatitudes."—Christians should recognize the richness of their endowments and use them . . . . .	310
V. THE DOCTRINE OF MERIT.—Merit described.—Protestant denial of merit the logical result of Luther's view of justification.—Merit depends solely upon GOD'S merciful promise.—No injustice, had GOD promised no reward . . . . .	312
Our LORD tells us how GOD might have dealt with us, but distinctly promises that He will not do so.—Many passages of Scripture teach this doctrine : 2 S. Tim. iv. 7, 8 ; Heb. vi. 10 ; Rom. ii. 6, 7 ; S. Matt. v. 12 . . . . .	314
The conditions of merit.—Only works done in grace are meritorious.—This excludes works of the law, and those done through natural virtue.—The teaching of Articles XII. and XIII.—" Meritum de condigno."—" Meritum de congruo."—Things we cannot merit : justification and final perseverance . . . . .	316

## CHAPTER XII.

## THE MYSTERY OF SUFFERING.

Introductory : The universality of suffering ; unlike sin it extends even to the brute creation . . . . .	317
Upon right views of suffering depends our explanation	

of other mysteries.—Without pretending to solve this mystery, its purpose may be learned from its effects.—Pessimists use the existence of suffering as an argument against a benevolent Creator.—This requires suffering to be purposeless and therefore useless ; when it is shown to be a beneficent factor in man's development, pessimism is overthrown . . . . .	318
I. HUMAN LIFE IS DEVELOPED IN THREE SPHERES: THE PHYSICAL, MORAL, AND SPIRITUAL.—In each, suffering is a necessary agent of progress . . . . .	318
1. Suffering in physical life.—Pleasure and pain the two guides of life, acting as a spur and as a curb.—Pain a safeguard in the pursuit of pleasure, and forewarns man against disease.—In epidemics suffering leads to preservation, and improvement of the race . . . . .	319
2. Suffering in moral life.—Pain not only warns man from paths of sin, but is a great factor in his restoration after a fall.—It is preventive, remedial, strengthening, and educative . . . . .	320
3. Suffering in the spiritual life adds to its other functions by becoming sacramental, sacrificial, and meritorious, and is the agency by which GOD trains man for eternal happiness . . . . .	321
II. THE SUBJECT TREATED MORE GENERALLY . . . . .	321
1. The origin of suffering not revealed ; but related generally to sin.—Pain as a factor in the development of character in the presence of sin . . . . .	321
2. Sin is transgression of law ; pain is the penalty of this disobedience, but also the antidote . . . . .	322
3. Suffering is evidential : i. As punitive, an evidence of GOD'S Justice and Holiness, and of His hatred of sin ; ii. as revealing to us GOD'S Compassion, and by our LORD'S example teaching us sympathy ; iii. as revealing GOD to be man's only refuge.—Its twofold effect is seen on Calvary in the two robbers. iv. Suffering as a witness to truth.—The power of martyrdom . . . . .	323

	PAGE
4. Not only is deserved suffering efficacious, but undeserved has still greater power.—We see this in the attraction of the Passion, which still lives on . . . . .	324
5. The vicarious suffering of CHRIST the climax of the suffering by which man has progressed.—Pleasure and joy leave no legacy to the race ; its riches spring from suffering.—Man's whole life demands vicarious suffering.—Vicarious suffering points to the solidarity of the race.—The teaching of Heb. ii. 10.—All suffering, rightly borne, is gathered up and sanctified in the Cross.—Pain as a gift to be accounted for.—The danger of wasting it.—Rightly used, pain becomes the gold of Heaven . . . . .	326
III. SUFFERING IN RELATION TO ETERNITY . . . . .	327
S. Paul's teaching : 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18.—Present suffering the raw material of future glory.—S. Paul's "moment."—S. Paul's "light affliction."—The condition on which the glorious result depends.—The danger of self-pity.—The importance of seeing things in their true relation to each other.—The danger of exaggerating suffering, of letting it make us dizzy from fear . . . . .	329

## CHAPTER XIII.

## DEATH.

<b>Introductory :</b> Eschatology belongs largely to speculative theology.—Its discussion valuable for exposing error.—Inferences from revelation, and theological opinions not to be rashly rejected.—The limits of theological speculation to be here observed . . . . .	331
<b>I. DEATH</b> . . . . .	331
1. Different senses in which the term is used.—Physical death defined . . . . .	331
2. Is death natural to man ? . . . . .	332
3. The origin of death in the world.—Death is the penalty of sin ; not, however, arbitrary, but remedial . . . . .	333



4. It is the antidote of sin, and, like Goliath's sword, destroys him who wielded it.—Death is the close of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit.—An illustration from the citadel of a town.—Death brings no blessing to the unrepentant ; but to those who die in CHRIST it is indeed a blessing . . . .	335
II. THE PROPERTIES OF DEATH : . . . .	336
1. Its certainty . . . . .	336
2. Its uncertainty . . . . .	336
3. It happens but once . . . . .	336
4. It is an unknown experience to each . . . .	336
III. THE ACCOMPANIMENTS OF DEATH : . . . .	337
1. Adverse conditions of bodily and mental weakness . . . . .	337
2. The presence and activity of evil spirits . . .	338
3. To help us : the Angel, GOD'S special grace, prayers of the Church, and of friends, Sacraments of the Church . . . . .	338
4. Great possibilities at the hour of death : for sinners, of repentance ; for some, apparently righteous, of a bad death . . . . .	338
5. Death an opportunity for GOD to help His child . . . . .	338
6. Danger of our condition being concealed from us.—The responsibility of telling the dying of their state.—Danger of being drugged at the time of death.—Such dangers should be provided against . . . . .	339
IV. THESE CONSIDERATIONS ENFORCE THE NEED OF PREPARATION FOR DEATH.—Elements of preparation : . .	340
1. A knowledge of GOD and of His revelation . .	340
2. Conquest of the besetting sin . . . . .	340
3. Habits of prayer . . . . .	340
4. Sacraments received with right dispositions . .	340
5. What is to be desired for a good death . . .	340
V. WHAT TAKES PLACE AT THE MOMENT AFTER DEATH ? .	341
We see our LORD and are judged by Him.—The Particular Judgment differs from that of the Last Day.—	

The evidence of the Particular Judgment rests on the necessities of thought, and on revelation.—The fact is “*de fide*.”—Different opinions as to the details.—Commonly held that it takes place at the moment of death, and in the place where one dies.—After this Judgment, the soul passes into Heaven, Hell, or Purgatory . . . 342

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

<b>Introductory:</b> On the state of the soul after death . . .	343
<b>I. WHERE ARE THE DEAD, AND WHAT IS THEIR CONDITION?</b>	
—To this three answers are possible : . . .	343
1. They sleep in unconscious slumber: An early heresy; revived in the Middle Ages among the Armenians, and at the Reformation by the Anabaptists; held by Luther, and by the Irvingites.—It has always been condemned by the Church, and is contrary to Holy Scripture.	344
2. All souls at death go immediately to Heaven or Hell. — This too conflicts with both Holy Scripture, and reason; unless death itself has wonderful cleansing power . . .	345
3. Souls not yet perfect at death enter an intermediate state of purification: this is the view of the great majority of Christians . . .	346
<b>II. WHAT IS THE RELATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE STATE TO TIME AND SPACE?</b> . . .	346
<b>III. THREE VIEWS OF THE INTERMEDIATE STATE:</b> . . .	348
1. The view of the Greek Church: i. The doctrine of the Telonies or Particular Judgment. —Three principal points of the Greek view.	
ii. Extracts from the Orthodox Confession.	
iii. Summary of the Greek view. iv. The Greek view compared with the Western theory of Purgatory.—The differences are two:	
(1) As to the cause of the suffering; (2) as to the manner of the relief . . .	352

	PAGE
Moral difficulties of the Greek view.—The doctrine of Purgatory flows necessarily from right views of justification.—Rejected by Luther because in conflict with his theory of imputed justice.—The Easterns reject it rather in theory than in practice . . . . .	354
2. The view of those who deny that the souls of the Saints are in Heaven : . . . . .	354
i. Not a modern error; Pope John XXII. its most celebrated adherent.—History of the controversy . . . . .	356
ii. Three objections to the Catholic view.—(1) The first objection, that the soul without the body cannot enter Heaven, is a mere assumption, conflicting with the teaching of the Church, and with Holy Scripture: Rev. iv. 4; Rev. v. 9 (objections to these texts considered); Rev. vi. 9-11.—(2) Answer to the second objection, that the Catholic view renders the Judgment at the Last Day purposeless.—(3) Answer to the third objection, drawn from the words of our LORD to the Penitent Thief.—S. Paul's use of the word "Paradise" . . . . .	360
iii. The Catholic view accords with Holy Scripture.—Our LORD locally in Heaven only.—The theory of the ubiquity of His Humanity a Lutheran heresy.—Further Scripture proof: 2 Cor. v. 8; Phil. i. 23; Phil. ii. 10; Rev. v. 13 . . . . .	361
iv. The teaching of the Fathers.—Only four writers of antiquity seem to question it.—Authorities for the Catholic view.—S. Gregory the Great discusses the subject in his Dialogues . . . . .	362
v. The inconsistency of the adherents of the "Paradise" theory in using certain hymns.—A cause of the adoption of this view by some of the Tractarians . . . . .	363

	PAGE
vi. Summary of authorities for and against this view.—It is "de fide" that the Saints are in Heaven . . . . .	364
3. The faithful departed are divided into two classes: the Blessed Saints in Heaven; and the holy souls in Purgatory.—Objection to this term.—Said to be inconsistent with Art. XXII.—History of the Article, and of the Tridentine definition, now the only authoritative teaching of the Roman Church on the subject.—No protest against the present Roman doctrine, and some doctrine of Purgatory is demanded by the language of the Article.—What was the "Romish" doctrine against which Art. XXII. is directed?—Bishop Forbes describes it.—The wise reserve of Trent on this subject.—Its denunciation of the same "Romish" doctrine . . . . .	367
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF PURGATORY CONSIDERED . . . . .	368
1. Its relation to the doctrine of justification.—The method of justification.—Sin has two effects, guilt and penalty.—By infusion of grace, the guilt is removed and the eternal punishment remitted.—The payment of this "debt" called "satisfaction."—The debt must be paid, either in this life or in Purgatory.—All that is absolutely needful for salvation is an act of contrition, but this involves certain results . . . . .	369
2. What is Purgatory?—Distinguish between what is essential, and what is speculative in this doctrine . . . . .	370
3. Three effects of Purgatory: in regard to venial sin; evil habits; temporal penalty . . . . .	370
4. Three properties of the holy souls: They are confirmed in grace; are conformed to GOD'S Will; cannot merit . . . . .	370
5. Two views of the sufferings of Purgatory: i. The mediæval view; ii. that of S. Catha-	

	PAGE
rine of Genoa and S. Francis de Sales.—S. Catharine of Genoa's opinion . . . . .	371
6. Nature of the sufferings of Purgatory.— i. "Poena damni." ii. "Poena sensus" only an opinion. iii. Duration of Purgatory . . . . .	372
7. Consolations of Purgatory . . . . .	372
V. Conclusion . . . . .	373
1. Antiquity of a belief in Purgatory:—i. Testi- mony of the Catacombs, ii. and early Litur- gies . . . . .	373
2. It removes two great stumbling-blocks in regard to GOD'S Providence: i. The salvation of two men, one of whom has led a godly life, the other has only turned to GOD at the last ; ii. the unequal distribution of suffering in this life.—The teaching of the Church alone meets these difficulties . . . . .	374

## CHAPTER XV.

### PRAYERS FOR THE DEAD.

<b>Introductory:</b> Prayers for the dead follow from a belief in Purgatory, and in the Communion of Saints . . . . .	376
The term "Saints."—The HOLY GHOST, the life- blood of the mystical Body of CHRIST, effects the unity of all the members.—This illustrated by the parts of a tree, the sap circulating through every part ; so, in the Body of CHRIST, all the members are joined to- gether by the operation of the HOLY GHOST.—This unity involves a fellowship of interest and prayer.— Quite inconceivable that it can temporarily cease in the case of the holy dead . . . . .	377
I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PRACTICE OF PRAYER FOR THE DEAD . . . . .	378
1. The instincts of natural piety . . . . .	378
2. The witness of almost all religions . . . . .	378
3. Its place among the Jews.—Belief in a future life among the Jews: testimony of Job ; the case of Enoch ; teaching of Eccles. iii. 21 and xii. 7 ; the case of Samuel.—Prayer for the	

	PAGE
dead in the case of Judas Maccabæus, 2 Macc. xii. 43-45 . . . . .	379
4. The New Testament.—The argument from silence applied to Holy Scripture.—Example of S. Paul.—Ancient interpretations of S. Matt. v. 26 and xii. 32 . . . . .	380
5. Testimony of the Catacombs . . . . .	380
6. Of ancient liturgies . . . . .	381
7. Of the Fathers : S. Augustine, Sermon 172 . . . . .	381
8. The authoritative teaching of the East (Orthodox Confession) . . . . .	381
9. Of the Latin Church (Council of Trent) . . . . .	381
10. Discouraged at the English Reformation, on account of gross views of Purgatory, but never condemned ; found in the first English Prayer Book in the Canon of the Mass (part of which now in the American Prayer Book, Burial of the Dead, Additional Prayers), and in the present book.—A Homily against it, but the Homilies not necessarily the teaching of the Church.—The judgment in its favour in 1838.—The growth of the practice among us . . . . .	383
II. THE PRACTICE ITSELF . . . . .	383
1. The condition of the faithful departed. i. They are confirmed in grace ; ii. conformed entirely to the Will of GOD ; iii. they can no longer merit, and must therefore depend for help on the Church Militant, and Triumphant.—We should strive to pay the debt of sin in this life.—In what ways can our prayers help them ?—Do the holy souls know of our prayers, and do they pray for us ? . . . . .	385
2. Their consolations : i. Their knowledge that they are saved ; ii. their possession of joy and peace ; iii. angelic ministrations ; iv. the prayers of the Church.—An objection noticed.—Are our prayers, if unavailing for the soul, therefore useless ?—Our LORD'S words to the Seventy, S. Luke x. 5, 6 . . . . .	387

	PAGE
3. How can we help the holy souls? i. By prayer; ii. by almsgiving; iii. by fasting; iv. by offering the Holy Sacrifice for them . . . . .	387
4. What is meant by "good works."—Every good work has three effects: i. Merit, which is inalienable; ii. impetration, which can be offered for others; iii. satisfaction, which also can be offered for others . . . . .	388
5. We can help the holy souls: i. By prayer (some examples); ii. by almsgiving (examples); iii. by fasting, which includes all acts of penance; iv. by offering the Holy Sacrifice (both East and West dwell on this) . . . . .	389
6. What motives should impel us to care for the holy souls? i. Charity (S. Augustine, S. Jerome, S. Francis de Sales applying the Corporal Works of Mercy to the holy souls); ii. the thought that we may need the same charity; iii. its helpfulness in reminding us of our own death; iv. and in teaching us to make our satisfaction here . . . . .	392

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE INVOCATION OF THE SAINTS.

<b>Introductory:</b> The difference between a doctrine and a practice of the Church . . . . .	393
A doctrine, to be "de fide," must have formed part of the Pentecostal deposit.—The Church cannot put forth new dogmas, nor retract those defined.—The opposite is the case with the practices of the Church.—The rejection of a practice very different from that of a doctrine of the Church.—Article XXXIV., of the Traditions of the Church.—Inference drawn from these facts.—Some examples.—Important that the doctrine on which a practice rests should be unassailable . . . . .	
<b>I. THE PRACTICE OF INVOCATION OF SAINTS FOLLOWS FROM A BELIEF IN THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS.</b> —This article	395

	PAGE
inserted in the Creed to meet the heresy of Vigilantius, who denied the intercession of the Saints ; its history ; Dr. Harnack's opinion.—The invocation follows from a belief in the intercession of the Saints . . . .	396
II. THE INTERCESSION OF THE SAINTS.—Testimony of Holy Scripture : Old Testament ; New Testament.—Testimony of the Fathers . . . . .	399
III. INVOCATION OF SAINTS.—Two methods, direct and indirect ; few object to the latter . . . . .	400
1. Objections to direct invocation answered.	
i. That the Saints do not know our prayers, contrary to Holy Scripture and theological opinion.—We have no certain knowledge of the manner in which the Saints know our prayers ; certainly not by natural hearing.—Various theories : That the Saints see us "in the WORD," or in the mirror of the HOLY TRINITY, or by some particular manifestation from GOD. ii. That, having perfect Charity, the Saints do not need to be asked to pray for us. iii. That the time spent in invocation would be better spent in prayer to GOD, from which it detracts.—This is true of all intercession, and yet the Scripture enjoins it both by precept and example ; besides, the prayers of the Saints may be more effectual than ours. iv. That invocation makes the Saints mediators, and so detracts from our LORD'S mediatorship . . . . .	403
The Church's teaching in regard to the veneration of the Saints.—Distinction between "Latria" and "Dulia," one not of degree, but of kind ; illustrated by the use of the word "worship" . . . . .	405
v. That many abuses have arisen from the cultus of the Saints.—Extract from sermon of the Archbishop of York . . . . .	406
2. Evidences for the practice of direct invocation.—Authorities and examples : The Catacombs ;	



	PAGE
S. Gregory Nyssen ; S. Gregory Nazianzen ; S. Chrysostom ; S. Jerome.—Testimony of the Eastern Church (Orthodox Confession).— Testimony of the Latin Church (Council of Trent).—The Anglican Communion entirely alone in its neglect of invocation . . . .	408
IV. THE CAUSE OF ITS REMOVAL FROM OUR PRAYER BOOK, ITS ABUSE.—Popularity of S. Thomas of Canterbury. —Dangerous teaching in regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary.—“ But the abuse of a thing doth not take away the lawful use of it.”—To some souls invocation is especially helpful . . . . .	409

## CHAPTER XVII.

### THE GENERAL JUDGMENT.

<b>Introductory :</b> The Judgment an article of the Creed, and a special revelation of the New Testament.—Lacordaire's assertion that the sense of responsibility implies a judg- ment.—The judgment, like death, a most certain and a most uncertain event . . . . .	411
I. DIFFERENCES OF THE TWO JUDGMENTS.—If there be a particular judgment, what is the object of the general ?	412
1. Difference of the purpose in the two judgments : i. The first, to decide the destiny of the soul ; ii. the second, to manifest three great facts : (*) The Justice and Love of GOD in His providential ruling of the world, (2) the Majesty of our Blessed LORD, (3) the glory of His elect . . . . .	413
2. Differences in the nature of the two judgments : i. In the former, the soul is judged ; in the latter, body and soul ; ii. at the former, no other man present ; at the latter, every one ; iii. the matter both of sin and of good works incomplete until the Last Day, (effects of S. Stephen's prayer, of Boccaccio's Decameron) ; iv. the chief constituents of this judgment are truth and completeness . . . . .	414

	PAGE
II. THE TIME OF THE JUDGMENT . . . . .	415
III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE JUDGMENT.—A question concerning those who are living when CHRIST appears.	416
IV. THE SUBJECTS OF THE JUDGMENT: all men and the fallen angels . . . . .	416
V. THE MATTER OF THE JUDGMENT: . . . . .	417
1. Deeds . . . . .	417
2. Words . . . . .	417
3. Thoughts . . . . .	417
Are the sins of the Saints known at the judgment?—Pulleyne's view; Peter Lombard's; the more common view . . . . .	417
VI. THE MANNER OF THE JUDGMENT; the imagery of Holy Scripture true, but not to be taken literally . . . . .	417
1. The judgment probably not by words, but by illumination . . . . .	417
2. The separation between the good and evil . . . . .	418
3. The sentence, and its execution . . . . .	418
Conclusion: The vision of Heaven described by S. John . . . . .	418

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## HELL.

Introductory: The awfulness of the subject . . . . .	419
Tendency of the age to pass over or tamper with this doctrine.—The responsibility of explaining away what is clearly revealed by our LORD.—Nearly all we know of Hell comes from the lips of CHRIST, Who teaches this doctrine again and again.—Our LORD knew exactly in what sense the Church would understand these words . . . . .	420
I. PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF HELL . . . . .	421
1. The Old Testament: Isa. xxxiii. 14; lxvi. 24; Dan. xii. 2.—Two passages in the deuterocanonical books: Ecclus. vii. 16, 17; Judith xvi. 17; both applying Isa. lxvi. 24.—The views of the Talmudists . . . . .	422
2. In the New Testament Hell is unmistakably	

	PAGE
revealed; it has a special name, Gehenna; and a long series of passages refers to it . . .	422
3. The testimony of the Church: in the Athanasian Creed, which is authoritative in the Latin and English Communions; in the Orthodox Con- fession of the Eastern Church . . .	423
II. THE NATURE OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF HELL . . .	423
1. All agree in regard to the "pœna damni;" what this involves . . .	423
2. The common opinion that there is a "pœna sensus."—No consensus in regard to the fire, whether material or metaphorical . . .	424
3. The companionship in Hell . . .	424
4. The worm of remorse . . .	424
5. The duration of punishment the same for all, but of unequal severity.—Accidental mitiga- tions; diminution of punishment; theory of successive mitigations.—Prayers in old Missals for the lost . . .	425
III. THE ETERNAL DURATION OF HELL.—The testimony of Holy Scripture: . . .	425
1. The Old Testament; the deuterocanonical books . . .	426
2. The New Testament.—Three classes of texts: i. Those that use the word <i>αἰώνιος</i> : 2 Thess. i. 9; S. Matt. xxv. 41, 46; xviii. 8. ii. Those that speak of the punishment as having no end: S. Mark ix. 43-48 (five times); 1 Cor. vi. 9; Gal. v. 21; S. Matt. iii. 12; S. Luke iii. 17. iii. Those that speak of an unchange- able state: (Eccl. xi. 3); S. Mark iii. 29; S. Matt. xii. 32; S. Luke xvi. 26 . . .	427
The first class of texts.—The use of <i>αἰώνιος</i> in the New Testament.—The parallelism of everlasting punishment with everlasting life in S. Matt. xxv. 46.—The second class of texts. —The force of <i>ἀσβεστος</i> considered.—The third class of texts.—An "unchangeable state" explained . . .	428

	PAGE
3. Two passages adduced in favour of Universalism : Acts iii. 19-21 ; the exegesis of the passage.—1 Cor. xv. 28 ; the context considered.	429
4. The testimony of the Fathers : S. Polycarp ; S. Justin Martyr ; consensus of Fathers, except Origen, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, and a few others.—Origen's views.—He, denying the restoration of Satan, generally teaches the orthodox view, and distinctly disclaims any certainty in regard to Universalism ; condemned by an Ecumenical Council.—Summary of authority against Universalism .	431
5. A warning against unwarranted representations of the doctrine.—Extent of what the Church teaches . . . . .	432
6. Extenuating considerations ; the heathen and unbaptized may attain to natural beatitude .	433
7. The moral question involved.—Newman on our moral sense and everlasting punishment.—We must argue from what we do know to what we do not know.—No reason to suppose that a moral nature can be arbitrarily changed.—Eternal punishment may be only the necessary consequence of sin and free will.—The choice man's, not GOD'S.—Vindictive punishment and our moral sense.—The power of this doctrine as a deterrent from sin . . . . .	435
IV. THE PRINCIPAL MODERN SUBSTITUTES FOR THIS DOCTRINE . . . . .	436
1. Universalism ; its difficulties . . . . .	436
2. Probation after death ; its immoral influence on sinners . . . . .	437
3. Conditional immortality, or annihilation ; unsupported by revelation, and contrary to what we know of the indestructibility of both matter and force . . . . .	438
V. Conclusion : . . . . .	438
1. Misbelief and disbelief in everlasting punishment compared with the first temptation of	

	PAGE
Eve.—The method, first to doubt the fact of the revelation, then to deny its truth.—To deceive man as to the consequences of sin is always Satan's method . . . . .	439
2. The revelation of Hell is from the lips of CHRIST ; it was part of His kindness.—For many of the Saints fear was the first motive of repentance.—S. Augustine on the relation of fear to love . . . . .	440

## CHAPTER XIX.

### HEAVEN.

<b>Introductory:</b> None can now comprehend the glories of Heaven, but revelation tells us much about them.—Heaven will be the working out of our life here.—Heaven is a place, as well as a state.—Definition of Beatitude.—The glory of Heaven is twofold : . . .	441
<b>I. THE GLORY OF THE SOUL.</b> —This glory consists in its union with GOD by an act of the intellect and of the will . . . . .	442
1. Definition of the Beatific Vision.—It is distinct, intuitive, but not comprehensive.—In the Vision we see GOD'S Essence ; not, of course, with bodily eyes, but by an elevation of the powers of the soul, through the bestowal of a special gift. i. This quality is called the "light of glory."—It bestows three gifts : (1) It elevates the intellect, (2) expands it, (3) directs and assists it. ii. The Saints differ in capacity for the Vision.—This difference depends chiefly on faithful use of GOD'S gifts here. iii. Two objects are seen in the Vision : (1) GOD Himself, (2) and the creatures in Him.—This second knowledge is threefold : (i.) of the mysteries of the faith, (ii.) the laws of nature, (iii.) individual interests . . .	445
2. By an act of the will the Blessed love GOD per-	

	PAGE
fectly. i. The will is attracted to the highest Good, the intellect recognizing GOD as this ;	
ii. the will is enabled to love GOD perfectly ;	
iii. the effect of this beatific love is twofold : (1) Ecstasy, (2) and perfect union with GOD.	
iv. A controversy as to the essence of Beatitude : (1) The Scotist view ; (2) that of the Thomists ; (3) a Jesuit theory combining these.	
—Summary of this part of the subject . . .	447
<b>II. THE GLORY OF THE BODY . . . . .</b>	<b>448</b>
1. All men shall rise at the Last Day with their own bodies. i. The resurrection-body will be perfect and entire, ii. but no longer dependent upon the functions of animal life ; iii. and will be of perfect development . . . . .	448
2. The four properties of the glorified body, 1 Cor. xv. 42-44 : i. Impassibility,—its cause according to S. Thomas ; ii. subtlety,—its cause ; iii. agility,—its cause ; iv. clarity,—its cause .	449
<b>III. OTHER ELEMENTS OF JOY IN HEAVEN : . . . .</b>	<b>450</b>
1. The negative joys . . . . .	450
2. The individuality of the joys in Heaven ;—this implied in the imagery of S. John . . . .	451
3. The special glory of each Saint largely the result of the struggles of earth . . . .	451
4. Heaven is eternal.—Eternity defined . . .	452

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY.

<b>Introductory :</b> Excellent work done by English scholars in Biblical Criticism and Exegesis, in editing MSS., and in other departments of theology ; but Dogmatic Theology neglected . . . . .	453
<b>I. THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY AMONG ANGLICANS.</b> —The average priest has a good education, but theology as a science omitted.—The result of this.—The necessity of facing it . . . .	454

	PAGE
I. The root of the evil is the spirit of protestantism, which is the right of private judgment.—From this root three fruits have sprung . . . . .	455
i. Lack of method in theological study . . . . .	455
(1) The books mostly used . . . . .	455
(i.) Pearson on the Creed . . . . .	456
(ii.) The Articles ; their value.—Their defects as a manual of theology.—The purpose for which they were intended.—The conditions to be met in the 16th century ; those to be dealt with to-day.—Our present need definite dogmatic teaching, to counteract false teaching, and to satisfy seekers after truth.—A very large part of the teaching of the Articles is negative.—An illustration from medical science.—Such teaching belongs rightly to the history of the science.—The Articles form an unscientific basis for theological study.—An examination of Bishop Browne's treatise.	459
(iii.) Martensen's " Dogmatics " . . . . .	460
(2) The practical result of studying such books.—The lack of method leads to unbalanced views of truth, as well as to actual heresy . . . . .	461
(3) Some object to logic in theology, from fear of unpopular doctrines ; others, because it is fatal to their special views.—Definition of logic.—Logic applied to heresy.—The " reductio ad absurdum " fatal to heresy.—Heresy generally starts from false premises.—Logic has its limits . . . . .	462
ii. Lack of theological works in English . . . . .	462
iii. Inability of the Clergy to read Latin easily . . . . .	464
2. The remedies for our lack of theological knowledge. i. A practical knowledge of Latin ;	
ii. mastery of a good outline of theology.—The divisions of the " Summa " of S. Thomas.	465
II. LATIN THEOLOGICAL TREATISES . . . . .	466
General works : Schouppe, Hurter, Tanqueray, Franzelin, Perrone.—Gousset (in French).—S. Thomas.—	

Ferraris.—Special works on the Sacraments: De Augustinis, Billot, Gasparri.—On other subjects: Mazzella, Denzinger, "Manuale Ecclesiasticorum."—The three great theologians after S. Thomas: De Lugo, Vasquez, Suarez.—Other able writers: Bellarmine, Estius, Petavius, Tournely, Billuart.—Roman works untrustworthy on two subjects, Papal claims and cultus of the Blessed Virgin Mary; but Roman dogma far more conservative than practice.—Examples: S. Thomas, Billuart . . . . .	469
<b>Conclusion:</b> A table of ecclesiastical writers added.—No desire to discourage the study of English divines . . .	469
<b>A TABLE OF THE PRINCIPAL THEOLOGIANS AND WRITERS OF THE CHURCH . . . . .</b>	<b>470</b>
<b>I. EASTERN AND WESTERN WRITERS. First to eighth century . . . . .</b>	<b>470</b>
<b>II. LATIN THEOLOGIANS SINCE THE DIVISION OF EAST AND WEST. Ninth to fifteenth century . . . .</b>	<b>471</b>
<b>III. WESTERN THEOLOGIANS IN COMMUNION WITH THE SEE OF ROME. Sixteenth to nineteenth century . .</b>	<b>472</b>





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# CATHOLIC FAITH AND PRACTICE.

## PART II.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### HOLY MATRIMONY.

**O**F the Fathers of the Church no one probably had a greater knowledge of the subject, or has discussed Holy Matrimony in all its various aspects more fully, than S. Augustine ; and he sums up the result of his researches in the following passage :

Introductory.

“ Although I have thus thoroughly treated and sifted these matters, so far as my ability allows me, I nevertheless realize that the subject of marriages is most obscure and complicated ; nor do I venture to assert that either in this or in any other work I have yet unravelled all its entanglements, nor that if pressed I could even now do so.” \*

S. Augustine's opinion of the difficulties of the subject.

Since the year 419, when these words were written, the subject has been discussed by theologians again and again, and anyone who has carefully followed its history will be inclined to reiterate the words of S. Augustine with even greater emphasis, and acknowledge it to be so obscure and complicated that no fair-

\* *De Conjugiis Adulterinis*, lib. I., c. xxv.



mindful theologian can venture to regard any theory as affording a complete solution of all difficulties.

Hopeless antagonism between East and West.

At the outset we may observe that the Eastern Church is so hopelessly in antagonism with the West on the very fundamentals of Holy Matrimony, that in a work like the present its views have to be left entirely out of consideration.\*

I. The Three States or Matrimony.

Matrimony may be considered under three distinct aspects, or as existing in three different states : (1) as "instituted of GOD in the time of man's innocency"; (2) as it existed from the Fall until the coming of the HOLY GHOST at Pentecost; and (3) as it is found amongst Christians, from the establishment of the Church to the present day. Those who are not Christians may be considered as still in the second class.

1. Its Institution.

In regard to the first division, we have the authority of our LORD Himself for believing that marriage was of Divine institution : "And He answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that He Which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife : and they twain shall be one flesh ? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder" (S. Matt. xix. 4-6 ; cf. also S. Mark x. 6-9).

2. In the fallen state the institution perverted.

And we have the same authority for putting into a different class marriage after the Fall, since, when questioned as to the Mosaic permission of divorce, our LORD replied, "Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives : but from the beginning it was not so"; thus distinguishing the

\* For a fuller treatment of this question see Chap. II., p. 22.

state of marriage under the Mosaic dispensation from marriage as instituted of GOD "at the beginning."

And thirdly, we have the authority both of our LORD and of His Apostle S. Paul for considering that marriage under the Christian dispensation was to be very different from what it had been during the previous period, when, on account of the hardness of men's hearts, GOD suffered divorce to exist (S. Matt. xix. 8 ; cf. Rom. vii. 1-4, 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11).

3. In the Christian dispensation restored.

When we examine carefully these three states of matrimony and endeavour to discover in what lay their essential difference, we find without doubt that it was in the presence or absence of grace ; for Adam, before the Fall, by a special gift of GOD was endowed with sanctifying grace, and man, since the gift of the HOLY GHOST through the merits of CHRIST, has had sanctifying grace restored to him. Thus we may observe that our three divisions really fall into two, and that matrimony may be considered either in the natural order in fallen man ; or else as possessing the dignity of a Sacrament both in unfallen man (as in Adam's case), and also in redeemed and sanctified humanity (as in the case of the marriage of Christians). Whether marriage in the unfallen state was sacramental has, however, been disputed among theologians.\*

The essential difference in these states, the presence or absence of grace.

As Holy Order was instituted for the spiritual preservation and continuance of the Church, so Holy Matrimony was ordained for its physical perpetuation. For the Sacrament of Matrimony sanctifies the propagation of the human race, so that from a righteous stock a better and more holy race may be born, and that a Christian people may be multiplied for the worship and service of the true GOD and our Saviour JESUS CHRIST.

II. The Purpose of Matrimony.

\* For a fuller treatment of this question see Chap. II., p. 24.

**Definition.**

Matrimony may be most briefly defined as that union of a man and a woman which binds them to an indissoluble partnership during life. Matrimony is always sacred, since it was instituted by God; but it is a Sacrament of the New Law only when there is added to it that grace which since the Fall has been bestowed upon baptized persons.

**III. Two Aspects of Matrimony.**

Matrimony in the order of nature may evidently be regarded either as an act (*in fieri*) or as a state (*in facto esse*); that is, we may consider the contract by which the marriage is effected, or the effects of that contract in the life of those who are married.

**1. As an Act.**

In the first sense (*in fieri*) matrimony may be defined as the legitimate contract by which a man and woman, who are capable of doing so, mutually give each to the other power over his or her body for the purpose of procreation of offspring, and bind themselves to an undivided partnership of life.

**2. As a State.**

In the second sense (*in facto esse*) we have the permanent state resulting from this contract, which is generally spoken of as the *vinculum*, or bond, or estate of matrimony.

**IV. Matrimony as a Sacrament.**

The Fathers of the Church often speak of that matrimony which existed from the beginning of the world as in a loose sense a Sacrament, since it was a sign of a sacred thing; for not only in the state of innocence, but even after the Fall, matrimony typified the future union of CHRIST with His Church. Our LORD, however, desired that matrimony amongst Christians should express this union more clearly, so that the love of the man for the woman might set forth His love for the Church, and the love of the woman for the man (together with her reverence and obedience) might express the love of the Church with its reverent

obedience towards Himself. And since, without supernatural grace, this would be impossible, CHRIST added this grace to the matrimony of Christians. That is to say, He adds to the matrimonial contract itself the power of producing grace *ex opere operato*, and by this grace He perfects the natural love and confirms the indissoluble union of those who are married in the LORD. And so He elevates matrimony (*in fieri*) amongst Christians to the dignity of a Sacrament in the strict sense of the word.\* From this it follows that all valid matrimony amongst Christians is sacramental, since between the contract and the Sacrament, *in the baptized*, there is no real distinction. Our LORD, in elevating the matrimony of the baptized to the dignity of a true Sacrament, does not change the *nature* of the contract, but its *order*. He removes it from the mere order of nature by adding to it the power of producing grace. The matrimony of the baptized is therefore a supernatural contract, whilst the matrimony of the unbaptized is only a natural contract, but even then sacred and religious. Thus our LORD did not change the conditions of the contract itself, but raised it, just as it was, to the dignity of a Sacrament.

There is no agreement among theologians in regard to the occasion on which the Sacrament of Matrimony was instituted. The majority consider as such the nuptials at Cana of Galilee, when CHRIST blessed them with His presence and first miracle. This is the opinion of SS. Cyril, Epiphanius and Augustine. Others say that CHRIST instituted it when He abrogated the law of divorce, and restored the original indissolubility of Matrimony (S. Matt. xix.); others again think it was

When instituted.

\* For a fuller treatment of this point see Chap. II., p. 27.

instituted during the great Forty Days after the Resurrection ; and there is also a school which holds that its institution *as a Sacrament* is to be referred to the original institution in Eden.

**i. Its Essence.**

Holy Matrimony involves five things : (1) mutual consent externally expressed, or the contract ; (2) the mutual tradition of the body of each to the other ; (3) the *vinculum*, or bond, between husband and wife ; (4) the mutual rights of each over the other, resulting from this bond ; (5) the exercise of this right, or the use of matrimony.

The important question here comes in, which of these is the essence of matrimony considered as a permanent state. Two answers have been given : the one, by practically all theologians, that the essence of matrimony as an *act (in fieri)* is mutual consent externally expressed, or the contract, and its essence as a *state* is the habit of life which results from this, or the bond ; the other, by some Anglican theologians, that the essence of matrimony is its use, or the *copula*. This, however, is expressly rejected by almost all theologians of the Western Church.

The Consent  
required for  
true Matrimony  
must be

The efficient cause of the Sacrament of Matrimony is the mutual consent of those contracting it. As this is the essence of matrimony (*in fieri*) the consent must fulfil the following conditions :

**i. True, not feigned.**

It must be true, not feigned ; for the contract by its nature requires this ; and regard must be had not only to the words, but to the intention. A mock marriage, therefore, is null, because the consent is not true, but feigned.

**ii. Deliberate.**

It must be deliberate ; that is, with full knowledge and consideration of what is being done.

**iii. Mutual.**

It must be mutual ; that is, given and accepted by both parties.

It must be in regard to the *present*; since by a promise in regard to the future, espousals are made, but not matrimony.

iv. Present.

It must be sufficiently expressed, by words or by external signs.

v. Expressed.

It must be morally simultaneous; that is, having a moral simultaneity of consent of each of the contracting parties.

vi. Simultaneous.

It must be free from error in regard to the person. Otherwise, the matrimony is null by the law of nature; e. g., Jacob's marriage with Leah was null from error in regard to the person. And, by ecclesiastical law, it must be free from error in regard to the condition; e. g., marriage with a slave would be null if the servile condition be concealed.

vii. Free from Error.

It must be free from fear. Consent extorted under fear or under compulsion is not free consent.

viii. Free from Fear.

In regard to the "Minister" there have been two views: the one, which in the West took its origin from Melchior Canus in the sixteenth century,\* that a Priest was the Minister of the Sacrament; the other, which was the unanimous opinion of all theologians before him, and which is the universal opinion at the present day in the West, that the Ministers of the Sacrament of Matrimony are the parties themselves who contract matrimony; that is to say, they marry one another, the Priest only "solemnizing the marriage," witnessing it as representing the Church, and bestowing upon it the Church's benediction. Hence it follows that the matrimony of baptized persons is always sacramental, whether solemnized by a Priest, or contracted before a civil magistrate, or in any other way.

2. The Minister.—Two views.

Those who held that a Priest was the Minister of the

\* For a fuller treatment of this question see Chap. II., p. 31.

### 3. Matter and Form.

Sacrament, considered the contracting parties to be the remote *matter*, the external actions and words by which they signified the contract to be the proximate *matter*, and the words of the Priest to be the *form*. But the common opinion, which teaches that the contracting parties themselves are the Ministers, would require that the *matter and form* should be the consent of each of the contracting parties, expressed by words or signs, although each under a different aspect; the *matter* being consent so far as it signifies the mutual tradition of their bodies to one another; the *form*, so far as it signifies the mutual acceptance of the same.

### 4. Subjects.

The Subjects of Matrimony as a Sacrament are two baptized persons. Two unbaptized persons can contract valid matrimony, though not sacramental. But, according to the laws of the Church, there can be no matrimony possible between a person who is baptized and one who is not baptized, since it is certainly not sacramental Matrimony, nor is it natural Matrimony, and it is forbidden by the Church.\*

### V. The Effects of Matrimony.

The effects of Holy Matrimony may be regarded from two points of view, the effects of the contract, and the effects of the grace conferred by the Sacrament.

#### 1. Of the Contract.

The effects of the contract are generally held to be five: (1) an indissoluble bond; (2) power over each other's body, in order to the conjugal act; (3) the obligation of mutual fidelity; (4) the obligation of bringing up children in the fear and admonition of the LORD; (5) the obligation of cohabitation and co-operation.

#### 2. Of the Sacrament.

If, however, we regard Matrimony from its sacramental side, the effects are: (1) increase of sanctifying grace; (2) actual graces, bestowed on opportune occasions, for the purpose of strengthening conjugal love

\* For a fuller treatment of this point see Chap. II., p. 35.

and of restraining indulgence, for enabling one another mutually to support the burdens of that state and to preserve inviolable fidelity to one another, for the right education of the offspring of the marriage, and for the right government of the family; (3) an increase of virtues, both theological and moral, especially charity, piety, fidelity and patience.

The ends of Matrimony are three : (1) The principal or primary end is the procreation of children to be brought up in the fear and admonition of the LORD. (2) For a remedy against sin, and to avoid fornication, that such persons as have not the gift of continency might marry, and keep themselves undefiled members of CHRIST'S Body. (3) For the mutual society, help and comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity. Of these the first is the principal end ; the other two being only secondary.

The benefits, or goods, of Matrimony are generally considered as three : offspring, fidelity, and the Sacrament itself. (1) By offspring is to be understood not only the procreation of children, but also their education and religious training. (2) By fidelity is meant that mutual fidelity which each owes to the other in matrimony. And (3) by the Sacrament is meant that indissolubility which belongs only to sacramental, or Christian, marriage.

The properties of Matrimony are two, unity and indissolubility.

The unity of Matrimony demands the union of one man with one woman, as originally instituted by God, and forbids all polygamy, either by way of polyandry or polygyny. Under the Jewish dispensation polygamy and divorce were suffered by God on account of the

VI. The Ends of Matrimony.  
1. Offspring.

2. A remedy for sin.

3. Mutual society.

VII. The Benefits, or Goods, of Matrimony.  
1. Offspring.

2. Mutual fidelity.

3. The Sacrament.

VIII. The Properties of Matrimony.  
1. Unity.



hardness of men's hearts, but in the beginning matrimony as originally instituted was between one man and one woman, Adam and Eve ; and Christian Matrimony is a return to the conditions of God's original institution.

2. Indissolubility.

The indissolubility of Matrimony is its perpetual bond, which nothing but death can break. This indissolubility is sometimes distinguished as twofold : (1) perfect indissolubility, as regards the bond, which nothing but death can sever, and (2) imperfect indissolubility, as regards cohabitation, which can be suspended temporarily or altogether, but without any loosing of the marriage bond. So that, while husband and wife may live apart, neither can ever marry during the life of the other.\*

Most Roman theologians of the present day teach that matrimony which is *ratum, sed non consummatum* is not indissoluble, but may be dissolved in two ways : (1) by entering religion and taking the solemn vows, and (2) by Papal dispensation for sufficient cause. This opinion, however, does not seem to go back much earlier than the twelfth century, and is doubtful. The earliest instance of the recognition of the right to dissolve *matrimonium ratum* by religious profession is found in a decree of Alexander III. in 1180.†

Matrimony which has been consummated is in the baptized absolutely indissoluble.

IX. The Impediments of Matrimony.

In every sufficient definition of Matrimony there is expressed the qualification that the parties must be *capable* of contracting matrimony ; hence it becomes necessary to inquire who are thus capable of matri-

\* For evidence of this opinion see Chap. II., p. 41.

† For a fuller treatment of this question see Chap. II., p. 56.

mony, and this brings us to the consideration of what are known as the *impediments* to matrimony, all persons being capable of matrimony who are not hindered by some one or more of the impediments. In this sense "impediment" has been defined as a moral obstacle, or efficient inability, which prevents those who are subject to it from contracting matrimony.

The impediments of matrimony clearly fall into two divisions: (1) those which destroy entirely the capacity to marry, rendering the marriage in such a case invalid; and (2) those which do not *invalidate* a marriage, but make it *unlawful*. Impediments of the latter class are dispensable by the authority of the Church, since the power which imposes a law can dispense it. Those of the former class, however, are not dispensable, so far as they are *jure divino*; although theologians of the Roman Church claim for the Pope and those to whom he has committed jurisdiction, the power of dispensing some even of these, and of late years that power has been frequently exercised, often to the great scandal of the Church. But this, like so many Papal claims, is of comparatively modern date, since the first instance of a dispensation from the impediments of matrimony was in 1427, when Pope Martin V. granted a dispensation in a case of affinity.\*

1. The two divisions.

Theologians accordingly divide the impediments into *impedimenta dirimentia*, i. e., impediments which destroy the capacity for marriage and so render it invalid (although by no means all of them are *jure divino*), and *impedimenta impedientia*, which do not render the marriage invalid, but unlawful, except where a dispensation has been obtained.

There is no consensus among Roman theologians as

\* For a fuller treatment of this question see Chap. II., p. 61.

i. "Impedimenta Dirimentia."

to the exact number or nature of the impediments. The *impedimenta dirimentia* are generally said to be fourteen or fifteen, and are contained in the following lines :

" Error, conditio, votum, cognatio, crimen,  
Cultus disparitas, vis, ordo, ligamen, honestas,  
Ætas, affinis, si clandestinus, et impos,  
Si mulier sit rapta, loco nec reddita tuto,  
Hæc facienda vetant connubia, tracta retractant."

ii. "Impedimenta Impedientia."

The *impedimenta impedientia* are variously given as four, five, and six. The four are expressed in the following lines :

" Ecclesiæ vetitum, tempus, sponsalia, votum,  
Impediunt fieri, permittunt juncta teneri."

Some writers omit from the *dirimentia* " ætas " and add to the *impedientia* " catechismus et crimen." S. Thomas, however, reduces the *impedimenta impedientia* to two only, namely, ecclesiastical prohibition and ferial seasons, because the other four are really already provided for by the *impedimenta dirimentia*, since " sponsalia " comes under the head of " ligamen," " votum simplex " under " votum solemne," " catechismus " under " cognatio," and " crimen " under " crimen."

2. Classification of "Impedimenta" into "Dirimentia" and "Impedientia."

If we examine the table of *impedimenta* with a view to making some classification of them, we have, of course, the ordinary division into *impedimenta dirimentia* and *impedimenta impedientia*, the latter class being purely of ecclesiastical authority, and therefore always dispensable.

When we examine the former division it is not so easy to make any clear subdivision, since these impediments

are evidently traceable to three sources, though two of them somewhat overlap. There are, first of all, those that are *de jure naturali*, which are, of course, under no circumstances dispensable, and which probably never have been dispensed, since they are abhorrent to the moral being of GOD as revealed in man's moral sense and, explicitly, in revelation: "None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness: I am the LORD" (Lev. xviii. 6).

A second class are those which are partly *jure divino* and partly *jure ecclesiastico*, that is, imposed by the Church on account of GOD's revelation in Leviticus. This is not because they are contained in the Mosaic Law, but because they are a revelation of the will of GOD in a matter which applies equally to all men, and in regard to which there are no grounds for supposing that GOD's will referred only to the Jewish Dispensation, but rather an *a priori* reason to believe that it is even more binding on the Christian Church.

Some of these have been dispensed, probably rightly, but it is difficult to draw the line as to exactly where power to dispense ceases, and it has doubtless often been unlawfully exercised.

If we now turn to the *impedimenta dirimentia* we shall find that error, force and abduction, inasmuch as they invalidate free consent, which is of the essence of matrimony, and impotence and age (by which, of course, is meant permanent impotence and impuberty), in so far as they cause physical incapacity, are all *de jure divino*; while consanguinity and affinity are *de jure divino* as revealed by GOD in Holy Scripture, and *de jure ecclesiastico* as specified in the Church's tables of prohibited degrees.

3. Subdivision of "Dirimentia" into  
i. "De Jure Naturali."

ii. "De Jure Divino."  
iii. "De Jure Ecclesiastico." This not a logical division, since classes overlap.

4. Difficult to limit right of dispensation exactly.

5. Five clearly "de Jure Naturali": Error, Force and Abduction invalidate consent. Impotence and Age cause physical incapacity. Consanguinity and Affinity partly "de Jure Divino," partly "Ecclesiastico."

Existing Marriage contrary to the property of unity.  
Lack of Baptism invalidates the Sacrament.

Existing marriage ("ligamen") is contrary to the unity of Christian marriage, which unity is one of the properties of the Sacrament of Matrimony; and lack of Baptism ("cultus disparitas"), of course, renders the Sacrament of Matrimony impossible. The remaining *impedimenta dirimentia* are either *jure ecclesiastico* or *jure civili*; namely, condition (slavery), crime, clandestinity, Holy Orders, Religion, and mixed marriages ("cultus disparitas"), i. e., between those who are baptized, but are not Catholics.

The treatment of these *impedimenta*, however, belongs rather to the department of moral theology. We shall therefore pass them over in this place, leaving consanguinity and affinity, lack of Baptism, and mixed marriages for treatment in the next chapter.\*

X. Divorce of two kinds:  
1. Divorce "a vinculo."  
2. Divorce "a toro et mensa."

Divorce is the separation of husband and wife, and is of two kinds: (1) a complete divorce, in which the *vinculum* is dissolved, and (2) a partial divorce, in which a separation *a toro et mensa* is decreed. Strictly speaking, the first only is understood by the term "divorce," while the second kind is generally called a "separation."

No divorce "a vinculo" in the Sacrament of Matrimony.

As regards the Sacrament of Matrimony, that is, the matrimony of baptized persons, where it has been consummated and so completed, there can under no circumstances whatever be a full divorce, that is, a dissolution of the *vinculum*.†

This is "de Jure Divino."

This is certain, and rests upon Divine authority, whether we take the original institution of marriage by GOD in the time of man's innocence, or our LORD's reinstitution of it as a Sacrament of the Gospel. For our LORD said: "Have ye not read, that He Which

\* See pp. 65 and 35.

† For a fuller treatment of this point see Chap. II., p. 41.

made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife : and they twain shall be one flesh ? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore GOD hath joined together, let not man put asunder " (S. Matt. xix. 4-6).

The solitary passage in which our LORD is thought by some to have countenanced divorce in the case of adultery (S. Matt. xix. 9), properly understood, refers only to separation *a toro et mensa*, and gives no authority for dissolution of the *vinculum* or for re-marriage of either party, whether innocent or guilty of adultery.\*

S. Matt. xix. 9 refers only to divorce "a toro et mensa."

In the case of matrimony which is *ratum tantum, sed non consummatum* the Church has recognized divorce *a vinculo* in two cases. The first is, when either party desires to enter religion by taking solemn vows, in which case the other party is free to marry. But it is a question whether in *matrimonium ratum* there is perfect matrimony. Secondly, some theologians of the Roman Church have claimed for the Pope power to dispense in certain other cases when the matrimony is only *ratum*. These dispensations, however, as we have already shown, are of comparatively late date,† and are not admitted by Billuart and others.

Divorce permitted "in matrimonio tantum ratum" :  
1. For religious profession.

2. By dispensation.

In other cases where diriment impediments are discovered, the marriage is pronounced null *ab initio*. This, however, is not a dissolution of the bond, because in such cases no bond ever existed, since the parties were not capable of matrimony.

Nullification of Marriage.

\* For a fuller treatment of this question see Chap. II., p. 41.

† For a fuller treatment of this question see Chap. II., p. 56.

Separation "a  
toro et mensa."

In cases of adultery and for other causes a decree of separation *a toro et mensa* may be pronounced.

Rehabilitation.

In the case of those who were married with impediments which are only *de jure ecclesiastico*, the marriage may be rehabilitated by ecclesiastical authority. To rehabilitate a marriage is really to contract it *de novo*, and whatever things would have been necessary for lawful marriage in the first instance are necessary in the case of rehabilitation ; that is to say, if there be any impediment it must be removed. If it cannot be removed, the marriage of course cannot be rehabilitated. The parties should be in a state of grace at the time of rehabilitation, for it is then that true sacramental matrimony is considered to be contracted, the grace of which can only be appropriated by those who are free from the *obex* of mortal sin.

Radical  
Rectification.

In the Roman Church there is a rehabilitation which is called a "radical rectification" (*sanatio in radice*), inasmuch as the Church is said in dispensing to rectify the marriage in its root. There has been some discussion as to exactly what this means, some theologians holding that the marriage thus becomes valid from the beginning (*ex tunc*), that is from the moment of its first celebration. Others hold that it becomes valid only from the time of its dispensation. Benedict XIV. rules that by this (*sanatione in radice*) a marriage which has been invalidly or illegally contracted is not made as though it had not been so contracted, but its intermediate effects are removed by dispensation, so that the offspring of such a marriage are legitimized *ab initio*.

Non-sacra-  
mental  
Matrimony.

In the case of the marriage of the unbaptized there is, of course, no Sacrament ; and such marriage, while it is perfectly valid, is not indissoluble, inasmuch as indissolubility does not enter into the conditions of the

contract. Thus we find that although in the original institution of marriage it was indissoluble, yet that even amongst His chosen people God for the hardness of their hearts suffered them to use divorce, as also polygamy; and what was permissively allowed in the case of the Jews, was, of course, in the case of the heathen. The marriage, therefore, of the unbaptized certainly does not possess the property of indissolubility, and probably does not necessarily possess that of unity, since, as we have seen, both divorce and polygamy were permitted.

Under this head we must briefly consider the *Privilegium Paulinum*. It is not uncommon in the history of the Church in all ages to find cases where two unbaptized persons have contracted valid matrimony (but not sacramental), and one of them has been converted and by Baptism has entered the Church. S. Paul rules in such a case as follows: "If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And the woman which hath an husband that believeth not, and if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband: else were your children unclean; but now are they holy. But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or sister is not under bondage in such cases: but GOD hath called us to peace. For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?" (1 Cor. vii. 12-16). From this ruling the Church has always held that if the unbelieving partner be willing to continue the marriage relation without interference with the obligations which Baptism in-

"Privilegium Paulinum."

1 Cor. vii. 12-16.



volves (*sine contumelia Creatoris*), the Christian partner is not to separate. If, however, the unbelieving partner interferes with the obligations of a Christian life, then the Christian is to separate, and may marry again, if it be so desired.

This *Privilegium Paulinum* follows consistently from the fact that the marriage originally was dissoluble, and the entrance into a new condition through Baptism was a good reason for its dissolution. Since, however, such a marriage was originally valid and sacred, though not indissoluble, the *Privilegium Paulinum* permits it to continue, provided the obligations of Christianity are not interfered with. It should be carefully observed, however, that the "privilege" is for the baptized person to continue a union previously contracted in good faith, and not in the permission given in certain cases to dissolve the previous union. Indeed, the Church has held that the Christian member is bound to continue the union if the unbaptized partner desires it, and does not interfere with religious obligations.

In order to give the newly baptized the right to dissolve the union, there must either be interference (*injuria seu contumelia Creatoris*) or release on the part of the unbaptized. It is of importance to grasp this in dealing with similar cases in the present day. Where two unbaptized persons have contracted valid matrimony and one is baptized, such an one has no right to separate from the other unless with his or her consent, or on the ground of interference with Christian obligations. In fact, Gratian and other canonists made the dissolubility or indissolubility of marriage depend upon the expressed will of the unbelieving party, so that before a baptized convert could separate there must either be the interference or the permission ex-

Gratian's view  
of the  
"interpel-  
latio."

PLICITLY given by the unbeliever. This appeal to the unbelieving party to give consent to the separation came to be called an *interpellatio*, and after the sixteenth century it came into great prominence. When the kingdoms of the old world began to colonize the new countries, large numbers of natives were converted to Christianity, and this question became a very important one ; and it was strictly held that Baptism did not justify the convert in leaving the unbaptized partner unless with his or her free consent. Further, we may observe that after Baptism the union became in some sense Christian matrimony to the Christian, since it was indissoluble from his or her side, though not from the side of the unbeliever ; and while probably there was no sacramental grace conferred, since there was no Sacrament, doubtless a special gift of grace was bestowed upon the believing party to enable him or her to fulfil the duties of that state.

Divorce amongst the unbaptized is a matter in which the Church has no rights and need have no interest, inasmuch as she has no jurisdiction excepting over the baptized. Such divorce may well be left to the civil law ; and however undesirable it may be that persons so divorced should marry again, it is not necessarily a bar to their reception of the Sacraments of the Church, since their original marriage was dissoluble.

Marriage between a baptized person and one unbaptized, in the first place, can never be sacramental matrimony, since it cannot confer the grace of union where one of the parties is incapable of grace. The Western Church declines to recognize it even as valid matrimony, some holding that it is expressly forbidden by S. Paul in two places. (1) In one of these passages he says : " The wife is bound by the law as long as her

Divorce among  
the un-  
baptized.

XI. Mixed  
marriages—be-  
tween a bap-  
tized person  
and one  
unbaptized.

husband liveth ; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will ; only in the LORD" (1 Cor. vii. 39). Here, writing to Christians, S. Paul seems distinctly to limit the marriage of a widow to a Christian ; she can marry only "in the LORD." (2) In the other place he enjoins : "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers," etc. (2 Cor. vi. 14 to vii. 1).

Exceptions have been made in the early Church in the case of the marriage of a Christian with a catechumen, and dispensations have been and are frequently given for such marriages, although such dispensations cannot, of course, make the matrimony sacramental.\*

It may be well, before finishing this chapter, to explain certain technical terms which are used in connection with Holy Matrimony.

## XII. Different Classes of Matrimony.

Where the marriage bond really exists, matrimony is called valid or true, lawful, ratified, consummated, of conscience, or morganatic. If the bond does not exist at all, it is called invalid, null, presumptive. Where the marriage ceremony has been performed by the Church we have public matrimony ; without it, clandestine, or civil, matrimony. Where matrimony is invalid it is sometimes said to be *irritum (non ratum)*.

### 1. Valid and Lawful Matrimony.

To explain these more fully, we may say that matrimony is valid or true matrimony, if there exists no *impedimentum dirimens*. If there be also no *impedimentum impediens* it is both valid and lawful ; otherwise, it is valid but not lawful.

### 2. Ratified Matrimony.

Marriage is said to have been ratified (*ratum*) when it has been contracted by baptized persons, so that *matrimonium ratum* of the baptized is generally valid and lawful. The term *ratum* is sometimes applied to it when it is valid but not lawful matrimony. When

\* For a fuller treatment of this point see Chap. II., p. 35.

matrimony is said to be *ratum tantum*, this implies that it has never been consummated.

Matrimony is said to have been consummated when the carnal *copula* has taken place.

Morganatic marriage is so called when a nobleman, especially after having children by a noble wife who has died, marries another of lower condition, all the laws and solemnities of the Church, however, having been observed, but with this understanding, that the wife and her children by this marriage shall not acquire any right in the husband's estates, excepting so far as is necessary for their sufficient support ; so that in this case the wife and her children are not fully admitted into the man's family, they do not assume his nobility and titles of family dignity, nor do the children succeed to the whole inheritance of their father. As this condition simply refers to the civil aspect of matrimony, such a marriage is a valid and lawful marriage in the sight of the Church.

Matrimony is said to be *of conscience* when it is secret in the sense that it has never been proclaimed to the world, although it has been contracted before a Priest and two witnesses. There is, therefore, no doubt as to its validity and lawfulness. Since, however, it is for the good of society that matrimony should be public, matrimony of conscience is only permitted by a special faculty and where there are most urgent causes for it, which causes belong to the department of moral theology.

On the other hand, invalid matrimony is where there is some impediment *de jure divino vel ecclesiastico*.

Unlawful matrimony is where the matrimony is valid, but not according to the laws of the Church.

Many other questions in regard to Holy Matrimony pertain to the department of moral theology.

3. Consummated Matrimony.

4. Morganatic Marriage.

5. Matrimony of Conscience.

6. Invalid Matrimony.

7. Unlawful Matrimony.— Other questions belong to Moral Theology.

## CHAPTER II.

### DIFFICULTIES IN REGARD TO THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY.

**Introductory:**  
On the difficulties in regard to the Sacrament of Matrimony.

**I**N our treatment of Matrimony in the foregoing chapter several difficulties were passed over with a simple statement of the conclusions arrived at in regard to them by the majority of theologians. This was done because a fuller discussion of these difficulties would have somewhat obscured and thrown out of proportion the general plan of the book.

Many of these questions, however, are of so great importance that it seems necessary to give the grounds on which the conclusions which have been adopted are based, and also a sketch of the controversies which at different times have arisen.

In this chapter, therefore, we shall take up these points one by one and briefly indicate the various views which have been held by theologians.

#### I. ON THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHURCHES OF THE EAST AND WEST.

The great divergence of the East and West in regard to the indissolubility of Holy Matrimony, which begins with the conversion of Constantine and continues until the present day, may be traced with little doubt to that spirit of Erastianism which is generally found where the Church makes compromises with the world. The foundation of Constantinople by Constantine soon after

**1. Erastianism in the Eastern Church. - Its causes :**

his conversion and the removal of the court and seat of empire to that city were undoubtedly the saving of the Western Church, but they led to disastrous results in the low tone of marriage law in the Churches of the East.

Three things followed the setting up of the imperial authority at Constantinople by the nominally Christian emperor.

First, the influx of the world into the Church, those who were baptized probably accepting the teachings and restraints of Christianity with considerable reservation, and so lowering the whole tone of the Christian community. Secondly, the presence at Constantinople of the Court, with its worldliness, frivolity and loose morals. And thirdly, the authority of Roman law, under which all alike were living, both Christians and pagans—law, which in no case recognized the indissolubility of marriage, and, indeed, allowed divorce and remarriage almost at will.

i. The influx of the World.

ii. The influence of the Court.

iii. The authority of the Civil Law.

The spirit of the Churches of the East has always been, and is to this day, what we have come to call Erastianism; that is, the Church has always been dominated by the State. On the other hand, the older capital, Rome, was largely free from these influences. The Court having removed from there, the sterner morals and higher character of the Roman Christians and their Bishops enabled them to hold to these teachings in regard to marriage which had been the teachings of the whole Church up to the time of Constantine.

2. The Western Church free from these influences, and so more severe.

In the history of the West we see a realization that the Kingdom of God could not be subordinate to the kingdom of the world, and a manifest determination to maintain spiritual independence at all hazards. Hence it is not difficult to trace the cause of the sad divergence between the East and West on the important subject

A warning to the Church in the present day.

of marriage ; and this we may look on not merely as an interesting fact of past history, but as a most solemn warning for our own days, that unless we uphold the authority of the Church, Erastianism will gradually undermine both the doctrine and the morals of her children.

3. Thirteen causes of divorce in Eastern Church.

Practically we may say that the Eastern Church has simply accepted secular legislation in all matters pertaining to Holy Matrimony, for at the present day it allows divorce for thirteen different causes ; and, as there is no recognition of separation *a toro et mensa*, in every case it is supposed to be a divorce *a vinculo* : although in the case of the guilty party in a divorce for adultery, it forbids his or her remarriage with the correspondent, and this binds even after the death of the spouse.

The grounds on which the Eastern Church to-day admits divorce are as follows : I. Divorce with penalty—(1) high treason, (2) designs by either of the parties on the life of the other, (3) adultery, (4) circumstances affording presumption of adultery, or equivalent to adultery, (5) the procuring of abortion, (6) differences of religion arising from the conversion to Christianity of one of the parties, (7) the reception by either party of his or her own children from the baptismal font. II. Divorce without penalty—(1) impotence, (2) absence without tidings received, (3) insanity, (4) leprosy, (5) the undertaking of monastic obligations, (6) episcopal consecration. (Zhishman, quoted by Watkins, p. 354.)

## II. ON THE INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY.

The Sacrament, when instituted?

Among Catholic theologians there are many, and they not of small repute, who think Matrimony to be indeed

a Sacrament, not because it was instituted by CHRIST in the New Law, but because it was instituted by GOD in the beginning of the world, when He joined our first parents in matrimony in Eden.

So teaches Henry VIII., King of England, in the Treatise on the Seven Sacraments which he wrote against Luther, in the chapter concerning the Sacrament of Matrimony, and so also the Bishop of Rochester in his defence of the King. Besides these Albertus Pighius, Alfonzo de Castro, Conrad Klingius, Peter de Soto and Catharinus affirm that in the state of innocence (if Adam had not sinned) Matrimony would have been a Sacrament conferring grace.

i. In Eden.

i. Authorities :  
Henry VIII.,  
Rochester,  
Pighius,  
De Castro,  
Klingius,  
De Soto,  
Catharinus.

But after sin, they say, it was not the same until GOD by penance restored man to His favour, but that, man being thus restored, it was then instituted anew by GOD, when He said to the woman : " In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children ; " this institution, however, gained its efficacy from the merits of the Passion of CHRIST, Who is said to have been slain from the beginning of the world, conferring grace by reason of the effect of His merits.

ii. View stated

And although Peter de Soto says in regard to S. Matt. xix., " What therefore GOD hath joined together, let not man put asunder, " that Matrimony was then instituted as a Sacrament, nevertheless he also says the first institution was in the state of innocence, and that in S. Matt. xix. Matrimony was brought back to its original purpose, and so was confirmed rather than instituted.

This opinion of Catholic theologians is proved as follows : First, because when GOD blessed the matrimony of our first parents, and in it all other matrimony, He said, " Increase and multiply. "

iii. Proofs.



It follows that He must have conferred grace, and have promised it in other marriages, since the word of the LORD is always efficacious, and the efficacious benediction of GOD produces grace. And truly, as Pighius says, unless GOD by His benediction not only on Adam, but on others joined in matrimony, had conferred and is conferring grace, Matrimony could neither be said to have been instituted as a remedy against sin, nor the act of marriage to be without sin.

Another proof is as follows: If from any place in Holy Scripture it is possible to gather that Matrimony is a Sacrament, it is certainly from Eph. v. 32: "This is a great mystery," etc. But this place seems to teach that Matrimony was instituted as a Sacrament not first in the Gospel, but by GOD in the beginning of the world. And therefore from these words of S. Paul it follows that Matrimony from the beginning was and always has been a Sacrament instituted by GOD. So Leo I. in Epistle XC., *ad Rusticum*, c. 4, says the cohabitation of matrimony was thus constituted from the beginning, in order that in addition to the union of the sexes it might be in itself a Sacrament of CHRIST and of the Church.\*

2. A modern adaptation of this view.

Thus far we have given the opinions of the theologians of the middle ages. There are some in our own time who consider, with those quoted, that the Sacrament of Matrimony was instituted in the time of man's innocency, but differ from them in holding that Matrimony ceased to be sacramental during the period between man's fall and his restoration in CHRIST. Their argument is briefly this: That since Adam in his un-fallen state possessed sanctifying grace and infused

\* This subject is fully discussed in Vasquez, tom. VIII., *de Matrimonio*, disp. 2, c. 2, p. 300.

gifts, he was in the state of a baptized person, and therefore his matrimony was sacramental.

Against this last view, it may of course be said that a baptized person is a member of CHRIST'S Mystical Body, sanctifying grace and infused gifts being a result of this; and S. Paul's argument against fornication is that "the bodies of" Christians "are the members of CHRIST" and must not be made "the members of an harlot" (1 Cor. vi. 15); and again, when speaking of being "unequally yoked together with unbelievers," he says: "What agreement hath the temple of GOD with idols? for ye are the temple of the living GOD" (2 Cor. vi. 16). Objection.

It is not therefore only the possession of sanctifying grace, but incorporation into CHRIST, which makes Matrimony sacramental. But the opinion that the Sacrament of Matrimony was instituted in the time of man's innocence is well deserving of consideration.

Some have thought that the Sacrament of Matrimony was instituted at the Marriage of Cana. 3. At Cana.

Others consider that it was instituted when our LORD declared its indissolubility in S. Matt. xix. 6. 4. In S. Matt. xix. 6.

Yet others hold that it was one of those "things pertaining to the Kingdom of GOD" (Acts i. 3), concerning which He gave instructions to His Apostles during the forty days after His Resurrection. 5. In the great Forty Days.

### III. THE HISTORY OF THE DIFFERENT VIEWS IN REGARD TO THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY.

The sevenfold classification of the Sacraments as we now have it is not authoritatively earlier than the beginning of the twelfth century. By the Fathers of the Church the term "Sacrament" was used in a loose sense, and applied to many other things besides those Sevenfold division of the Sacraments in the 12th Century.

1. Objection to including Matrimony.

Peter Lombard.  
S. Thomas.

which to-day we call Sacraments ; for example, S. Dionysius the Areopagite speaks of the religious life as a Sacrament. When the sevenfold division was suggested there were numerous discussions, and objections were raised to including Matrimony among the Sacraments.

Peter Lombard (lib. IV., d. 2) seems first to have doubted whether it was a Sacrament, and S. Thomas (*Summa*, supp., quæst. 42, art. 3) only gives it as the *more probable* opinion that it confers grace, with which S. Bonaventura and Scotus agree.

Durandus a S. Porciano.

It is, however, in the writings of Durandus a S. Porciano, who died 1333, that we have the fullest discussion of these views. Although he admits that to deny that Matrimony is a Sacrament is manifestly heresy, because it has been defined to be a Sacrament, nevertheless he affirms that "it is a Sacrament in an equivocal sense in regard to the other six, because it does not confer grace on those receiving it, and so is not a sign of grace sanctifying the recipients, as the definition of a Sacrament of the Church requires; but [he says] it is a Sacrament in that it is a symbol of a certain sacred thing, that is of the union of CHRIST with the Church."

Gotfredus.

Hostiensis.  
S. Bernard.

This sentence Durandus tells us is held by many lawyers ; of whom he cites Gotfredus, in his *Summa*, in the chapter on the non-iteration of Sacraments ; he notes that Hostiensis also, in his *Summa*, Book I., affirms the same, and likewise S. Bernard, in the chapter *Cum in Ecclesiæ Corpore*, on Simony.

It seems also to be the opinion of Peter Lombard in IV., d. 2, where he says : "Certain of the Sacraments confer a remedy against sin, and assisting grace, such as Baptism ; but others only a remedy, such as Marriage ; others support us by grace and virtue, as the

Eucharist and Orders." For since Matrimony, according to his opinion, is only a remedy against sin, and indeed was used for this purpose before the Advent of CHRIST, when it did not bestow grace, there does not seem any reason to concede that it is even a Sacrament, as Durandus does.

Durandus first proves Matrimony to be equivocally a Sacrament in regard to the other six by various considerations.

First, because all the other Sacraments are signs, not by their own nature, but by Divine institution and in a supernatural manner, as is evident ; but Matrimony is a natural sign. From this it would seem to follow that the term " Sacrament " is not applied to Matrimony in the same sense as to the other Sacraments, but in an equivocal sense ; for in the others external matter, by which they are perfected, is always used (as water in Baptism) ; but in Matrimony the acts of the contracting parties themselves are sufficient.

He therefore considers that in Matrimony no grace is conferred ; since by Matrimony the " first grace " cannot be conferred, for it was not instituted for the remission of sins ; nor the " second grace," because this would imply an increase of sanctifying grace. For if it conferred " second grace " it would follow that those who by the grace of GOD were living in the state of virginity, if they contracted matrimony, and so left the more perfect state of continence, would have their grace increased. But this, as he says, is not credible ; for indeed it would seem that their grace would be diminished rather than increased, since a change from a more perfect to a less perfect state would be a declension, not an advance.

Secondly (and this is the reason of the canonists

2. Argument of Durandus.

i. Its difference from other Sacraments :  
(1) No outward sign.

(2) No sacramental grace.

ii. Difficulty of dowry.

whose opinion he follows), because in Matrimony an agreement is made by the contracting parties in regard to dowry, but this would not be in any sense lawful if it were a Sacrament conferring grace, for it would manifestly be the sin of simony.

iii. The Church cannot alter the conditions of a Sacrament, but she has changed them in regard to Matrimony.

Thirdly, because the Church has not power to order or alter anything in regard to the Subjects, Matter and Form of Sacraments; but she has altered and ordered many things in regard to these in Matrimony, for she has rendered many persons incapable of Matrimony by constituting impediments; therefore Matrimony is not a Sacrament.

iv. The case of valid Matrimony becoming sacramental.

Fourthly, because infidels, not being baptized, are capable of no Sacrament of the Church which confers grace, except the Sacrament of Baptism; but they are capable of matrimony, since amongst them there is true and legitimate matrimony; therefore it is not a Sacrament of the Church conferring grace.

Nor can it be objected that the matrimony of infidels is not called *ratum*, for if they afterwards are baptized it becomes *ratum* and yet is not made a Sacrament, since nothing is then done in regard to the previous matrimony. To this may be added that if it be asserted that matrimony then becomes a Sacrament, it must follow that they not only then receive the Sacrament of Baptism, but also at the same time the Sacrament of Matrimony, which does not seem possible.

3. Vasquez on the sacramental character.

These views of Durandus and others may be found fully discussed, and their arguments answered, in Vasquez, tom. VIII., *de Matrimonio*, disp. 2; c. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10; pp. 299-318. The question in regard to the grace conferred in Holy Matrimony is very fully treated, with all the objections and the replies to them, in Estius, *Com. in Sent.*, tom. II., lib. IV., dist. 26; §§ 7, 8, 9; pp. 67-73.

Estius on the grace conferred.

IV. ON THE DISPUTE IN REGARD TO THE MINISTER OF MATRIMONY.

In treating of the Matter, Form, and Minister of the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony, it will be well to discuss more fully an opinion which at one time prevailed on this subject—namely, that a Priest is the “Minister” of the Sacrament, so that there is no Sacrament apart from marriage by a Priest. This discussion is rendered necessary, not only because of the weighty names on both sides, but also because there are many persons in the present day (not theologians, and without knowledge that the subject has ever been considered or decided), who practically hold this opinion; although it has been given up by all theologians, and formally condemned. This view, as we have shown, requires also an alteration in the theory of the Matter and Form.

A practical question.

Until the sixteenth century theologians were unanimous in teaching that the Ministers of the Sacrament of Matrimony were the contracting parties themselves, or that they really married themselves, the Priest being only the Church’s witness, giving the Church’s benediction, and so solemnizing the marriage.

1. The view of theologians generally.

Among the famous theologians of the sixteenth century was Melchior Canus, a Spanish theologian who died at Toledo in 1560, having been a professor of theology at Alcalà and Salamanca, Bishop of the Canaries and Provincial of the Dominicans. He, in his celebrated work *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. VIII., cap. v., started a new view in regard to the Matter, Form and Minister of Matrimony; namely, that the Minister, as in the case of other Sacraments, must be a Priest of the Church.

2. The view of Melchior Canus.

This view was discussed in the Council of Trent, though not adopted by it, but, as is probable, formally

Supported by  
Estius,  
Sylvius,  
Juenin,  
Tournely, etc.

3. Perrone's  
account of the  
controversy—

i. Canus and  
his followers  
argued :  
(1) By appeal-  
ing to the  
Fathers and  
Fourth Council  
of Carthage.

(2) That the  
Council of  
Trent implies  
this.

(3) The analogy  
of the other  
Sacraments.

ii. Bellarmine  
and others  
replied by  
reference :

(1) To Eugen-  
ius IV.,

(2) To the  
Council of  
Trent,

excluded by its definition ; and for a considerable period it held its place in the theological schools, numbering among its adherents theologians as celebrated as Estius, Sylvius, Juenin, Tournely, and others.

The whole controversy is well summed up by Perrone.\* Canus and his followers supported their opinion as follows:

First, they appealed to the teaching of the Fathers, and especially to the Fourth Council of Carthage, which required that out of reverence for the nuptial benediction given by the Priest, the spouses should remain continent during the first night. From this they assumed that there must be something especially solemn in the benediction, which would not be the case unless it were the Form of the Sacrament.

Secondly, they adduced the words prescribed by the Council of Trent for the celebration of Matrimony (*Ego conjungo vos in matrimonium*), which they compared with the words of Baptism and Absolution (*Ego te baptizo* and *Ego te absolvo*).

Thirdly, they urged the analogy of the other Sacraments, which are only administered by the Priest, quoting S. Paul's words, " Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of CHRIST, and stewards of the mysteries of GOD " (dispensers of the Sacraments).

This view was opposed by Bellarmine and many others, who defended the more ancient theory thus:

First, they referred to the authority of Eugenius IV., who in the *Instructio pro Armenis* says that the efficient cause of Matrimony is the mutual consent, etc.

Secondly, they relied on the declaration of the Council of Trent itself, which had been claimed on the side of Canus, where, in regard to clandestine marriages,

\* *Tract. de Matr.*, vol. VII., cap. I., sec. 35 ; pp. 217-228.

which that Council makes invalid, they showed that as such marriages were allowed to be valid until thirty days after the publication of the decree, and are also considered *rata et vera* in those countries in which the decrees of the Council of Trent on marriage are not in force, that therefore the marriage was not *ratum et verum* merely because it was a natural and civil contract, but because it was a Sacrament, which nevertheless was perfected and completed by the free consent of the contracting parties only. Therefore not the Priest, but the contracting parties solely, are the Ministers of the Sacrament of Matrimony.

They answered the third argument by an appeal to the effect itself of the Sacrament, which is indissolubility, and which arises from the Sacrament, and not from a natural or civil contract, which intrinsically is dissoluble; and they showed that the words quoted, *Ego conjungo vos*, are a new form, and to be found in scarcely any of the old ritual books, since the Priest up to that time had been directed to say, *Quod Deus conjunxit, homo non separet*. And they also showed that even the Council of Trent itself recognizes this by giving permission to use other words than *Ego conjungo vos*, according to the received rite of each province.

They also objected on the ground of the newness of the view of Canus, which till that time was found in few schools, if in any. They answered to the argument from the authority of the Fathers, that the Fathers certainly did not teach any such thing, since they from the earliest ages refused the benediction of the Priest to second marriages, but they did not on that account deny that such marriages have sacramental efficacy.

Further—in regard to the direction of the Council of Carthage that continence should be preserved for the

(3) To the effect of the Sacrament itself,

(4) And to the want of authority for this view.

(5) The question of second marriage.

(6) The Fourth Council of Carthage.



first night after the marriage—they showed that the reason was simply to follow the example of the pious Tobias.

(7) The fewness  
of the adher-  
ents of this  
view.

They showed by reference to Cardinal Palavicini's History of the Council of Trent, that the opinion of Canus had but few adherents in the Council; and they answered the argument drawn from the analogy of the other Sacraments, by pointing out what no one can doubt, that each Sacrament has some peculiarity of its own, in which it differs from the other Sacraments.

iii. William of  
Paris.

The followers of Canus had claimed William, Bishop of Paris, as having anticipated their view, because in his *Tract. de Baptismo*, cap. I., he referred to the power of the priestly benediction in obtaining grace from GOD. But an examination of his work "On the Seven Sacraments" shows clearly that he did not mean to teach that the priestly benediction pertained in any sense to the essence of Matrimony, since, in treating of clandestine marriages, he describes the three ways in which a marriage may be clandestine: first, when celebrated without witnesses; secondly, when celebrated without the solemnity which the Church enjoins in marriages, i. e., the benediction, etc.; thirdly, when without banns.

He, however, distinctly says that clandestine matrimony of this kind is true matrimony, although unlawful. Hence it is evident that he does not consider the priestly benediction as in any sense necessary to the essence of the Sacrament of Matrimony.

4. Prayer Book  
statement.

There can be no question about the opinion of the English Church, since in the Marriage Service the Priest is directed to say: "Forasmuch as M. and N. have consented together in holy wedlock, and have witnessed the same before GOD and this company, and thereto have given and pledged their troth either to

other, and have declared the same by giving and receiving of a Ring, and by joining of hands ; I pronounce that they be Man and Wife together, In the name of the FATHER, and of the SON, and of the HOLY GHOST. Amen."

Here the consent of the parties is affirmed to have constituted the marriage, and the Priest only pronounces that they *are*, what that consent has made them, Man and Wife.

#### V. ON MIXED MARRIAGES.

In view of the practical difficulty in the present day in regard to Mixed Marriages (that is, the marriage of a baptized person to one who is unbaptized), especially in missionary fields, and in countries like America, where Baptism has often been omitted, either through carelessness or from the person having been brought up by Quakers or Baptists, it may be useful very briefly to investigate the actual practice of the Church from the very earliest times.

A practical question in the Mission field and in America.

In the present day such marriages are absolutely forbidden both by the East and the West, and are considered to be null and void, and yet they are often contracted in entirely good faith by persons who are ignorant of this restriction, and the Clergy are brought face to face with the question whether such marriages are valid or not, and whether, therefore, the baptized party can be admitted to the Holy Communion, or whether such marriages are indeed invalid, and the parties, therefore, living in sin.

A difficult question for the Clergy.

We naturally begin our investigation with the teaching of Holy Scripture, in regard to which we may say that there is certainly no passage in the New Testament which in any way sanctions such a union, and that

1. The witness of Holy Scripture.

there are two passages which have been thought to forbid it.

1 Cor. vii. 39.

The first is in 1 Cor. vii. 39 : "The wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth ; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will ; only in the LORD." The phrase "in the LORD" seems to be equivalent to "with a Christian." S. Paul says that a widow is at liberty to be married to whom she will, only in the LORD. This passage thus amounts to an express prohibition of mixed marriages, and so Tertullian understands it in his comment on S. Paul's words : "But of marrying in the LORD, when he says, '*only* in the LORD,' he is now not persuading, but expressly commanding" (Tertullian, *ad Uxorem*, lib. II., c. 1).

Tertullian considers this prohibitory.

2 Cor. vi. 14-vii. 1.

The second passage is in 2 Cor. vi. 14-vii. 1 : "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers : for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness ? and what communion hath light with darkness ? and what concord hath CHRIST with Belial ? or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel ? And what agreement hath the temple of GOD with idols ? for ye are the temple of the living GOD ; as GOD hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them ; and I will be their GOD, and they shall be My people. Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the LORD, and touch not the unclean thing ; and I will receive you, and will be a FATHER unto you, and ye shall be My sons and daughters, saith the LORD Almighty. Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of GOD."

The question here arises, whether S. Paul is re-

ferring (1) to mixed marriages and other sexual connections between Christians and heathens, or (2) whether he has in mind rather the ordinary intercourse of life between Christians and non-Christians. There are many reasons for thinking that the former is the correct view, for the word *ἑτεροζυγοῦντες*, translated "unequally yoked together," which is *ἀπαξ λεγόμενον* in the New Testament, is evidently derived from the *ἑτερόζυγος* of the Septuagint version of Lev. xix. 19, "Thou shalt not let thy cattle gender with a diverse kind," which clearly refers to sexual union.

Again, in 1 Cor. vi. 15, S. Paul, speaking of the duty of purity in sexual relations, uses the argument that Christians are themselves the temple of GOD and members of CHRIST, and therefore not to be "joined to an harlot."

1 Cor. vi. 15.

Turning to the alternative explanation, we find no argument in its favour, since it is inconsistent with S. Paul's teaching in other places; for Christians were not required to abstain from all intercourse with the heathen; on the contrary they were to do their duty in the world, which then was heathen. And further, we may observe that this text has been interpreted by the Church, both of the East and West, as referring to and forbidding mixed marriages.

The passage 1 Cor. vii. 14 refers only to the case of one who has been baptized after marriage; it is fully discussed, pages 17, 18.

1 Cor. vii. 14.

We pass next to the testimony of history, and we find that before the influx of the world into the Church at the conversion of Constantine, while there were some exceptions, the rule certainly was that a Christian could not intermarry with an unbaptized person.

2. The witness of history.

S. Susanna and S. Juliana both suffered martyrdom

SS. Susanna and Juliana.

- under Maximian, A.D. 286-310, being put to death on account of refusal to marry non-Christians. S. Cecilia was married by her parents, apparently against her will, to Valerian, a young Roman who was not a Christian, and she persuaded her husband to receive Baptism before marital intercourse, which, however, did not take place. Euphrosyne, the mother of S. Clement of Ancyra, was given in marriage against her will to a heathen husband.
- S. Cyprian. S. Cyprian (*de Lapsis*, c. vi.) ascribes the wrath of GOD in the Decian persecution to the prevalence of mixed marriages in Africa, and says: "To join with unbelievers in the bond of matrimony is to prostitute the members of CHRIST to the gentiles." Tertullian holds that believers entering into marriage with heathens are guilty of fornication.
- S. Hippolytus on S. Callistus. S. Hippolytus tells us that Callistus, Bishop of Rome A.D. 218-223, permitted women of senatorial rank, if they were unmarried and in danger of incontinence, to marry slaves with the sanction of the Church. This is extremely interesting as apparently pointing to the fewness of Christian converts among men in the higher ranks of Roman society, although there seem to have been many women of this class of life who were Christians. On this account they had either to marry with unbelievers, which was, of course, not Christian marriage, or for the most part to remain unmarried. It was to meet this difficulty that Callistus allowed them to marry slaves, although this marriage was not recognized by the Roman law; and this witness against mixed marriages is very strong, Callistus preferring that a woman of high rank should marry a baptized slave, which would be true Christian matrimony, rather than contract a mixed marriage.
- Disparity of sexes in the early Church.

The fifteenth canon of the Council of Eliberis forbids the giving of Christian virgins in marriage to heathen even on the excuse of the disparity of the sexes amongst Christians. Here is direct evidence of the preponderance of women in the Church, already indicated by the action of Callistus ; but notwithstanding this the Council peremptorily forbids all such unions. The sixteenth canon prohibits the marriage of Christian girls to either heretics or Jews, on the ground that there can be no *societas* between a believer and an unbeliever.

Council of  
Eliberis.

After the conversion of Constantine the Church had to meet with another very serious difficulty, which seems to have led to the partial relaxation of its rule in regard to mixed marriages. It was in the case of catechumens. We know that a large number of those who nominally accepted Christianity when it became the religion of the Empire, delayed Baptism sometimes to the very end of their life, remaining in the condition of catechumens—under instruction, but not baptized. This was the case to a much greater degree with men than with women, the men calling themselves Christians, but remaining catechumens chiefly in order to escape the strictness of Christian life without entirely denying the Christian religion.

Laxity intro-  
duced after  
conversion of  
Constantine.

The difficulty  
in regard to  
Catechumens.

The Church, especially in the East, seems in these cases to have relaxed her rules and permitted marriage between Christian women and catechumens though unbaptized. We have an example of this in the case of S. Monica, the mother of S. Augustine, whose husband Patricius was unbaptized, though apparently a nominal adherent of the Christian faith.

S. Monica and  
Patricius.

The Council of Arles dealing with this question says : “ Concerning baptized women who were united to gentiles, it was determined that for some time they should

Council of  
Arles.

be excluded from Communion." Thus by the Council of Arles the marriage does not seem to have been treated as invalid, for the parties are not required to separate ; but as unlawful, so that the baptized partner is excommunicated for a time, and having done penance is apparently then restored to Communion.

S. Ambrose.

S. Ambrose is very clear in his disapproval of mixed marriages, saying the fact that the person sought is a catechumen does not justify marriage with the unbaptized. S. Jerome holds to the strict teaching of S. Cyprian, that baptized women who united themselves with gentiles "despise the commandment of the Apostle, and prostitute the temple of CHRIST to idols."

S. Augustine.

S. Augustine bears witness to the fact that there was no very strong feeling in Africa in his day against mixed marriages, although the Council of Hippo forbids them in the case of the sons of Bishops and Clergy. He himself speaks doubtfully of the subject when treating of it in general, though in a particular case which came before him he combated it with all his power (S. Aug., ep. 253, *ad Benenatum* ; id., ep. 255, *ad Rusticum*).

Council of Hippo.

3. After the sixth century, stricter discipline enforced,

As the discipline of the Church became stricter again after the sixth century, the rule prohibiting mixed marriages was more strictly enforced, both in the East and the West, but we still find a few solitary exceptions. Such marriages have, however, been frequently allowed by dispensation, which is, of course, a surrender of the principle of their essential nullity.

but dispensations have been given.

4. Conclusion. They are non-sacramental, and unlawful, but not invalid.

We may conclude that while such marriages—even with dispensation—cannot be sacramental, yet they are not invalid, although unlawful ; and the principle of the canon of the Council of Arles would guide one to the admission of the baptized party to Communion after penance.

VI. ON INDISSOLUBILITY AND DIVORCE.

The question of the indissolubility of Christian matrimony is not only immensely the most important of the many questions connected with this subject, but is probably the most difficult ; and it has, too, this feature—that it must be faced and answered. There are many questions in connection with the theology of Matrimony which are of great interest, and yet which may safely be left open questions without essentially affecting the married estate either in principle or practice ; such, for instance, as the nature of the grace conveyed, or even the question of the Minister, Matter and Form of the Sacrament. Holy Matrimony can go on with these questions still disputed. But when we come to the subject of indissolubility, we come to a matter which is not only important as regards any theory of marriage, but which is at the root of Christian family life and is the foundation of the Church's whole doctrine of marriage.

Importance of the question.

There can be no question upon which it is more important to speak with absolute decision ; for if Christian marriage is indissoluble, then the remarriage of one party during the lifetime of the other, whatever may be the extenuating circumstances, is simply and clearly adultery. If, on the other hand, divorce from the marriage bond is permitted under any circumstances whatever, then the indissoluble character of Christian marriage must be absolutely given up. It is important clearly to realize this fact : That if marriage is indissoluble, divorce *a vinculo* is impossible, and that no amount of pleading the hardship of individual cases can in the slightest degree alter this fact.

If the "*vinculum*" is indissoluble, divorce is impossible.

So many of the arguments that are made in favour of divorce—for example, that adultery breaks the *vin-*



Sentiment and expediency of no weight.

*culum*, or that an exception may be made in favour of the innocent party, while the guilty one is still held bound—are mere appeals to sentiment or expediency, and are often so stated as to confuse the real issue, namely, whether indissolubility is of the essence of Christian Matrimony.

For this reason, it may be well to give a *résumé* of the history of this question, together with the authority for the view that Christian Matrimony is indissoluble.

Before Christianity Matrimony was dissoluble.

We may begin by repeating what has been stated in the early part of the chapter on Matrimony—that from the Fall to the establishment of the Christian Church, matrimony, whether amongst the Jews or the heathen nations around, most certainly was dissoluble; and that when our LORD's attention was called to this fact, He acknowledged it, and accounted for it by saying: "Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so" (S. Matt. xix. 8).

Our LORD acknowledges this and accounts for it.

Baptism in the Subjects makes Matrimony sacramental.

By Baptism a person is made a member of CHRIST's Mystical Body and a temple of the HOLY GHOST; and when two Christians enter into the marriage state, their condition is entirely different from that of two unbaptized persons. Instead of a fallen and unredeemed nature being united to another fallen and unredeemed nature, from which union no state of holiness could be expected to ensue, we have in Christian Matrimony the union of a man and woman in whose bodies the HOLY GHOST dwells.

Christian Matrimony therefore is a *holy* estate, on which the blessing of GOD rests, and for which special provision has been made, both in GOD's original institution of marriage and in the Church's sacramental system. From this it follows that the marriage of the

unbaptized, even now, is of the same character as was the marriage of those who lived before the Christian dispensation, and that it is therefore as dissoluble as was theirs. In examining, therefore, the history of the indissolubility of marriage, we shall confine ourselves solely to the marriage of the baptized, clearly recognizing that the marriage of the unbaptized is not indissoluble.

The authority on which the whole doctrine of Christian marriage rests is, of course, in the first place, the revelation of GOD in Holy Scripture. We must begin, therefore, by briefly examining the principal texts which bear upon the indissolubility of marriage. We have in the Gospels four recorded utterances of our LORD on this subject. First, in the Sermon on the Mount, we read : " It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement : But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery : and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery " (S. Matt. v. 31, 32).

i. The teaching of Holy Scripture.

i. S. Matt. v. 31, 32.

Here we learn that a man may put away his wife for *πορνεία*, but there is no hint that he can marry again, and we are distinctly told that any one who marries a divorced woman commits adultery. So that we should gather from this passage that the marriage bond was absolutely indissoluble, and though an adulteress might be put away *a toro et mensa*, there is no ground here for thinking that the marriage bond can be dissolved.

In S. Mark we read that the Pharisees came to our LORD and asked Him : " Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife ? tempting Him. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you ? And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement,

ii. S. Mark x. 2-12.

and to put her away. And JESUS answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation GOD made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife ; and they twain shall be one flesh : so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore GOD hath joined together, let not man put asunder. And in the house His disciples asked him again of the same matter. And He saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery " (S. Mark x. 2-12).

Here again we are taught that by the original institution of GOD, man and wife become one flesh, and that what GOD hath joined together, man is not to put asunder. This is our LORD'S teaching to the Pharisees. To His own disciples in the house, when they asked Him again of the matter, He adds distinctly that if a man put away his wife and marry another, he commits adultery, and if the woman put away be married again, she commits adultery.

There is here, therefore, no hint of any dissolution of the marriage bond ; on the contrary, we are told that even where a separation is lawful there can be no remarriage of either party ; in other words, that the bond is indissoluble.

iii. S. Luke xvi.  
18.

The third passage is in S. Luke, and is as follows : " Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery : and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery " (S. Luke xvi. 18). Here, as in S. Mark, remarriage after divorce is called adultery, and we are

distinctly told that there is no exception, whether it be the marriage of the man or of the woman.

Before considering the fourth passage in the Gospels we will examine S. Paul's teaching on the subject.

And first, in the Epistle to the Romans : " Know ye not, brethren, (for I speak to them that know the law,) how that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth ? For the woman which hath an husband is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth ; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. So then *if, while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress* : but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law ; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man " (Rom. vii. 1-3).

iv. Romans  
vii. 1-3.

Here there is certainly no hint of any possibility of dissolution of marriage, for a woman who is married to another man while her husband lives is to be called an adulteress.

In the first Epistle to the Corinthians we have two passages. First : " And unto the married I command, yet not I, but the LORD, Let not the wife depart from her husband : but and if she depart, *let her remain unmarried*, or be reconciled to her husband : and let not the husband put away his wife " (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11).

v. 1 Cor. vii. 10,  
11.

Here we are most expressly told that in case a wife is separated from her husband she must remain unmarried ; that is, the bond is indissoluble.

Again, in the second passage : " The wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth ; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will " (1 Cor. vii. 39). This is simply a repetition of S. Paul's statement in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

vi. 1 Cor. vii.  
39.

Result of these passages.

2. S. Matt. xix. 7-9.

Can this contradict all other Scripture?

The text very corrupt,

So far we should say that there is not only no hint of any possibility of dissolving the marriage bond, but that on the other hand it is expressly declared to be indissoluble. We will now take up the remaining passage—the *locus classicus*—in S. Matt. xix. 7-9 : “ They say unto Him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away ? He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives : but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery : and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.”

We must first observe that if this passage teach that the bond is dissoluble, *it contradicts every other passage on the subject in the New Testament.*

Now there is a canon of interpretation which tells us that no one passage of Holy Scripture may be so interpreted as to contradict the rest of Holy Scripture, which law is expressed in Article XX. of the Articles of Religion, as follows : “ It is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God’s Word written, neither may [*potest*] it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another.”

The text itself, at least as far as the 9th verse is concerned (the only one which seems to differ from the other passages), is very corrupt. The words “ and shall marry another,” and the phrase “ and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery ” are omitted by some of the best manuscripts and versions, and unknown to Origen and most of the Fathers ; while the word *μοιχᾶται* (“ commits adultery ”) gives place to *ποιεῖ αὐτὴν μοιχευθῆναι* (“ causeth her to

commit adultery ") in two of the best manuscripts, B and C, and in some of the versions and Fathers.

Indeed the documentary evidence is so divided that it is not too much to say that there can be no certainty as to what the true text was, and so for purposes of doctrine it would be very undesirable to make use of the passage, even if it did not seem inconsistent with other passages. If, however, the text as it stands in the *Textus Receptus* be accepted, we still find that it is so little clear that four distinct conclusions have been drawn from it.

and therefore  
very uncertain.

If the *Textus*  
*Receptus* be  
accepted, four  
views:

First, it has been thought that it does not refer to Christian matrimony at all, since our LORD in this place was not speaking to His own followers, but to the Jews, and answering a distinct question of the Pharisees as to a matter of rabbinical interpretation—"Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife *for every cause*?"—and that, while admitting the Mosaic provision to which they drew His attention, He points out that it was only endured by GOD on account of the hardness of their hearts, and so by this implies that when that hardness was removed by the work of the HOLY SPIRIT the concession would no longer be permitted. This has sometimes been called Keble's view, and is found in his tractate "Against Repealing the Laws which Treat the Nuptial Bond as Indissoluble."

i. That it does  
not refer to  
Christian mat-  
rimony.  
(Keble).

The second is the view of Döllinger, who holds that the passage has no reference to adultery, or post-nuptial sin, but that *πορνεία* is to be understood strictly of fornication, or pre-nuptial unchastity.

ii. That it re-  
fers only to pre  
nuptial sin.  
(Döllinger).

The third view understands our LORD to concede to Christians the right of divorce for adultery, but without the right of remarriage.

iii. That it re-  
fers only to  
divorce "a toro  
et mensa."

The fourth view is that this concession covers the

iv. That it refers to remarriage.

right of remarriage after such divorce. If this be so, it only applies to the case of the man, since we are expressly told that anyone who marries the woman who has been divorced commits adultery.

Tertullian's reply to this.

Now, as Tertullian remarks, adultery is a crime incident to the marriage state, and if it be possible in either party, it must be because the bond of marriage continues; and if this bond continue, then both are bound. How is it possible that the man can be free to marry, while the woman is still fettered by the marriage bond, so that he who marries her commits adultery? Yet this is distinctly affirmed.

3. The theory that adultery dissolves the "*vinculum*"

It is taught by some who favour the remarriage of the innocent party in a divorce for adultery, that adultery *ipso facto* dissolves the *vinculum*; and one sometimes finds it stated that this is the teaching of the Greek Church.

In the first place, we may reply that the Greek Church allows remarriage, and therefore the dissolution of the *vinculum*, not only for adultery but for eleven other causes.

i. involves adultery on the part of the innocent partner.

Then again, this view lands one in such difficulties, not to say absurdities, that it is inconceivable that it should be held by anyone who realizes all that it involves. For, first, if adultery breaks the bond, and is committed by the husband without his wife's knowledge (as is very often the case), all further cohabitation between them becomes fornication, since they are no longer married, and the innocent wife is therefore living in fornication with her own husband, which would manifestly happen so often as to destroy the certainty of Christian marriage.

ii. If discovery of guilt dissolves the "*vin-*"

Secondly, if it be replied that the *vinculum* is broken only when such act of adultery on the part of the hus-

band becomes known to the wife, then it follows that it is not the act of adultery which breaks the *vinculum*, but the being found out ; and while it is very true that in the world's esteem "being found out" is almost the only sin which is universally recognized as sin, yet from a theological standpoint it is impossible to admit that being found out can dissolve the *vinculum*.

Thirdly, those who hold this view generally consider also that it permits the remarriage of the innocent party only ; that is to say, that the *vinculum*, which is dissolved by adultery, still binds one party, but not the other. This is quite unthinkable, since the essence of a covenant is a bond which binds two parties. If the bond be broken, neither of the parties is bound. It is possible to prohibit the marriage of the guilty party as a penalty for the sin, but it is impossible to say that the marriage still binds one partner but not the other.

But there is an insuperable difficulty to this view that the prohibition to the guilty party of remarriage is penal and not on account of the *vinculum* (which no longer exists). It is our LORD'S distinct statement that he who marries her that is put away commits *adultery*. Any law may forbid a guilty party to remarry, but the breaking of this law, however sinful, cannot be *adultery*, and yet our LORD said that it is adultery—thus showing that it is not forbidden as a penal enactment, but because the *vinculum* still exists and therefore still binds.

It may be well to call the attention of those who from this text draw the conclusion that the innocent party in a divorce for adultery is free to marry again to the fact that this verse, on which they base their argument, only permits it (if it permits it at all) in the case of the *man*, and distinctly excludes it in the case of the woman.

VOL. II.—4

culum," then "being found out," and not adultery, is the sin.

iii. The impossibility of the "*vinculum*" binding the guilty but not the innocent partner shown by reason,

and by our LORD'S express words.

This text only permits the *man* to remarry, if it does that.



Summary of  
evidence from  
Holy  
Scripture.

On the whole, we may sum up this part of the investigation by saying that every text in the New Testament, except one, teaches the indissolubility of marriage implicitly, and that two passages (those in S. Mark and S. Luke) teach it explicitly; while the only doubtful text, S. Matt. xix. 9, is so corrupt that it is impossible to determine with certainty what the true reading is; and that even if we take it as it stands in the *Textus Receptus* there are four possible views of it—the only one of them which seems to allow remarriage after divorce granting this to the man alone, and expressly forbidding it to the woman, so showing that on her side at least the bond continues; and as a matter of logical necessity a bond cannot bind one party to a covenant without binding the other.

4. The teaching of the Church.

We have considered the evidence of Holy Scripture in regard to the indissolubility of Christian marriage. We must now turn to the teaching of the Church on this subject.

For three centuries no recognition of remarriage.

We should naturally expect to find in the Church in subapostolic times such views as were derived from the Apostles and their immediate successors. If the doubtful passage in the nineteenth chapter of S. Matthew were considered in Apostolic times to permit the remarriage of divorced persons (even though it were limited to the innocent party in a divorce for adultery), we should certainly expect to find some allusion to this understanding of it in the writings of the early Fathers, especially where they were treating of the subject of marriage. And yet during the period when the Church was uncontaminated by union with the world—that is, before the conversion of Constantine—there is no evidence of any recognition whatever of the remarriage of divorced persons, or of any such interpretation of the

nineteenth chapter of S. Matthew as would countenance such remarriage.

It will be well for us very briefly to run over the names of those writers of this period who touch upon the question of marriage.

The first Christian writer who alludes to this subject is Hermas, whom some have supposed to be the Hermas mentioned in Rom. xvi. 14. In his *Pastor*, Mand. iv., c. 1, he requires a husband to put away an adulterous wife until she has done penance, but he distinctly states that it is commanded to both husband and wife to abide single, both in order that in case of penitence they may be reconciled, and also because of the *vinculum*. And he adds: "The matters stand on the same footing on the man's side as on the woman's." Hermas.

The next writer is Justin Martyr. In his First Apology, A.D. 140, he says that our LORD had taught that "he that marrieth one put away by another man committeth adultery." There is no allusion to the remarriage of the man, but it is evident that on the woman's side the marriage bond is considered to hold, and there is no indication of any exception on the side of the husband.\* In his Second Apology he mentions an interesting case in which a woman divorced her husband for grievous sin, but gives no hint of any remarriage.† Justin Martyr.

Athenagoras, another apologist, who wrote about A.D. 177, is the earliest advocate of rigorous views in regard to second marriages. He considered that any second union was but a reputable adultery. While these views have been rejected by the Church, it shows that in his day the possibility of the remarriage of a divorced husband was not recognized. Athenagoras.

\* S. Justin, *Apologia Prima*, c. 15.

† S. Justin, *Apologia Secunda*, c. 2.

Theophilus of  
Antioch.

Theophilus of Antioch, between A.D. 171 and 183, in his *Apology to Autolycus*, lib. iii., c. 13, quotes from the *Sermon on the Mount* that "whoso marrieth a woman put away by her husband committeth adultery; and whoso putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery." He makes no allusion to any possibility of remarriage.

S. Clement of  
Alexandria.

S. Clement of Alexandria, A.D. 190, the head of the Catechetical School at Alexandria, is more than a mere witness to the current opinions of his day. Referring to the nineteenth chapter of S. Matthew he says that Holy Scripture only permits the putting away of a wife on the ground of fornication, and "considers it adultery to contract another marriage during the lifetime of either of the separated parties." \* He deals with the case of the innocent husband, stating that he understands our LORD, as the Apostles did, to bar all remarriage. †

Tertullian.

A contemporary of S. Clement, Tertullian, the first, in point of date, of the great Latin writers, was converted to Christianity A.D. 192. He became a Montanist about seven years later. He treats of the question in several of his writings, and most distinctly asserts that no remarriage is possible for either of the separated parties in case of divorce, and assumes that such impossibility of remarriage is recognized by all Christians alike. ‡

\* S. Clement, *Stromata* ii. 23.

† S. Clement, *Stromata* iii. 6.

Pusey's note on  
Tertullian.

‡ Pusey, in Note O to the Oxford translation of Tertullian, p. 431, understands that Tertullian indicates a permission to remarry in certain cases. In the Fourth Book against Marcion Tertullian says: "He hath forbidden divorce with a condition, if a man put away his wife to that end, that he may marry another. Thus, if it was under a condition that He forbade putting away, He did not entirely forbid; and what He did not

We may next notice a statement of Origen's when commenting on S. Matt. xix. He speaks of certain laxity in that some Bishops have gone so far as to permit a person to marry a woman in the lifetime of her husband. He distinctly asserts that this was doing contrary to the Scripture, and contrary to what was enacted and written from the beginning.\* It is possible that the remarriage to which he refers as contrary to the Scripture may have been that of the wives of non-Christian husbands.

The last writer to be noticed in this period is S. Cyprian, who became Bishop of Carthage A.D. 248. He quotes as a rule of the Church S. Paul's commandment that "the wife do not separate from her husband; but and if she depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband; and that the wife do not send away her husband."† There is no reference to the remarriage of the husband, but S. Augustine considers that S. Cyprian's silence on this entirely forbid, He permitted in other cases, where the ground of prohibition does not hold." The meaning here seems to be that He allowed separation, if without a view to dissolution of marriage. That this is the correct view is made clear by a passage in the Fifth Book against Marcion, which Pusey appears to have overlooked, where Tertullian says: "CHRIST, however, when He commands the wife not to depart from her husband, or if she depart, to remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband, has both permitted putting away, in that He has not altogether forbidden it, and has confirmed marriage [i. e., the bond]; indeed, He has first forbidden it to be severed." This, taken in conjunction with Tertullian's other teaching on the subject, makes it abundantly clear that in the one passage spoken of by Pusey he does not mean to countenance remarriage under any condition (*Adv. Marcionem*, lib. v., c. 7).

\* Origen, *Com. in S. Matt.*, tract. vii., vol. ii. ; p. 75.

† *Testimonia adv. Jud.*, lib. iii., c. 90.

matter implies that he had no cause to speak, because such a remarriage was unknown.\*

In the Apostolic Canons, whose date is uncertain, but which are for the most part earlier than the conversion of Constantine, the 47th Canon says: "If any layman, having put away his own wife, shall take another, or if anyone take a woman divorced by another man, let him be excommunicated." Here we see there is no exception or hint of exception, and all remarriage after divorce is with the penalty of excommunication.

Council of Eliberis or Elvira.

The date of the Council of Eliberis, or Elvira, is doubtful. Hefele assigns it to 305 or 306, although some have thought it of later date. The 9th Canon of this Council is as follows: "A woman baptized, who has forsaken an adulterous husband also baptized, and is marrying another, must be forbidden to marry him; and if she so marry, she must not receive the Communion until after the husband she has left be dead, unless extremity of sickness compel the indulgence." Here there is a clear recognition of the indissolubility of the *vinculum*, and a prohibition to marry during the lifetime of the adulterous husband.

The whole testimony of the primitive Church against any remarriage.

We may observe that in this period there is no instance of any writer referring to S. Matt. xix. 9 as authorizing remarriage after divorce, or even as a difficult passage requiring to be explained away. All alike condemn such remarriage.

To those who value the teaching of the primitive Church before the stream of tradition had been polluted by the influx of the pagan world at the conversion of Constantine this testimony must be absolutely convincing; since it is to the effect that no Apostle, or writer of the first three centuries, understood our

\* S. Aug., *de Fide et Operibus*, § 35.

LORD'S words as justifying remarriage after divorce ; that the Apostle who ventured to say : " We have the mind of CHRIST " ( 1 Cor. ii. 16 ), and who when speaking on the subject of marriage said : " I think also that I have the Spirit of GOD " ( 1 Cor. vii. 40 ), explicitly forbids such remarriage ( 1 Cor. vii. 11 ); and all this is the stronger, if we remember that it was in direct opposition to the civil law of that day.

If we pursue the subject after the conversion of Constantine, we have, first, the Council of Arles, A.D. 314, which forbids the innocent husband to marry on account of the *vinculum*. Council of Arles.

Lactantius, a layman, who was the tutor of Constantine's son, is the first writer to express the view that the innocent husband who has put away his wife is free to marry another. He speaks of the marriage covenant being undone by faithlessness.\* Lactantius.

S. Basil says : " If the husband depart from his wife and betake himself to another, both he is an adulterer because he maketh her to commit adultery, and she who cohabits with him is an adulteress because she transferred another woman's husband to herself." † S. Basil.

S. Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, who died A.D. 404, is the next after Lactantius who admits remarriage after divorce. S. Epiphanius.

S. Asterius, who lived about A.D. 400, speaks of marriages as severed by nothing save death and adultery; possibly, therefore, he would admit remarriage. S. Asterius.

S. Timothy of Alexandria, A.D. 385, speaks of remarriage as adultery. S. Timothy of Alexandria.

S. John Chrysostom makes no reference whatever to S. John Chrysostom.

\* Lact., *Epitome*, c. lxvi.

† S. Basil, Canon IX. ; IV., p. 672.

S. Matt. xix. as bearing upon the question of remarriage, and apparently does not admit remarriage during the lifetime of the other partner.

Theodoret.

In the case of Theodoret it is difficult to see which side he took. Probably he agreed with S. Chrysostom in not admitting remarriage.

In the West SS.

Ambrose,  
Chromatius,  
Jerome,  
Augustine,  
Innocent I. and  
Hilary all alike  
condemn re-  
marriage.  
Ambrosiaster  
the only excep-  
tion.

In the West during this period we shall find a much more consistent rejection of remarriage. S. Ambrose, S. Chromatius, S. Jerome, S. Augustine, S. Innocent I. and S. Hilary of Poitiers all alike condemn the remarriage of either party after divorce. The solitary exception is the so-called Ambrosiaster, who, together with Lactantius, thinks that the husband in a divorce for adultery may remarry.

It does not seem necessary to continue this catena of authorities further. We may only say that from this time on the recognition of divorce and remarriage in the Eastern Church became more frequent, until it was allowed for almost every trifling reason, as it is to-day.

In the West, however, it was absolutely forbidden in the Churches in Italy, though in the Churches beyond the Alps there was a long and difficult struggle with the license of secular laws and lax customs. From the twelfth century, however, the indissolubility of marriage was recognized everywhere in the West.

## VII. IS "MATRIMONIUM RATUM" DISSOLUBLE?

1. The ordinary  
view.

Western theologians teach that the essence of Holy Matrimony is the consent of the parties and not the *copula carnalis*, or in other words, that the *copula carnalis* is not essential to Christian matrimony, and they generally cite in support of this view the marriage of the Blessed Virgin and S. Joseph, since this, which was an ideal marriage and in some respects a pattern

The case of the  
Blessed Virgin  
Mary and S.  
Joseph.

to the faithful, was *matrimonium ratum* only and never consummated.

In the present day there are some who would deny that the marriage of the Blessed Virgin was Christian marriage at all, since it took place before she was baptized and before the gift of the HOLY GHOST. They would therefore say that her marriage was not a case in point.

To this, however, may be replied that we are distinctly told that the Blessed Virgin was "full of grace," and that the HOLY GHOST came down upon her; and S. Joseph's relation to our LORD, while not implying as great gifts, probably implies some gift of the HOLY GHOST which might have been equal to Baptism. Further, it would be extremely difficult for us to conceive of so holy a marriage being dissoluble, as of course it would have been if not sacramental matrimony.

Again, theologians unanimously agree that one of the properties of Holy Matrimony is indissolubility, and that in this it is differentiated from non-sacramental marriage; and yet many teach that *matrimonium ratum* is Christian marriage, but is under certain circumstances dissoluble, namely, to enter religion or by Papal dispensation.

Indissolubility an essential property of the Sacrament. Yet "*Matrimonium Ratum*" is not indissoluble.

We have here three propositions: (1) that consent, and not the *copula*, is the essence of Christian marriage; (2) that Christian marriage is indissoluble; (3) that *matrimonium ratum* is Christian marriage, but not indissoluble.

2. The difficulty here.

This last proposition is obviously impossible, if we accept as true the two which precede it, for if indissolubility be a property which differentiates Christian marriage from all other marriage, all Christian marriage must be indissoluble; therefore *matrimonium ratum*



must either be indissoluble or not Christian marriage. Some writers, as for instance De Augustinis, speak of *matrimonium ratum* as imperfect matrimony, but still Christian matrimony; but this does not really meet the difficulty that matrimony cannot be Christian matrimony unless it be indissoluble.

The three propositions as stated lead us inexorably to one of two conclusions: either that the *copula* is essential to Christian matrimony, and not consent alone, or that *matrimonium ratum* is not dissoluble. From this it follows that either proposition 1 or 3 must be untrue.

There are some who meet the difficulty by admitting that the first proposition is untrue, and that the *copula*, and not consent, is of the essence of Christian marriage. But may not the other position be well defended, at least by those who are not bound by the decisions of the Roman Church—that is, may not *matrimonium ratum* be Christian marriage, and therefore indissoluble, and the two exceptions which have been quoted quite unjustifiable, namely, (1) that a person who has taken the vows of Holy Matrimony can set them aside in order to take the vows of Religion, and (2) that the Papal dispensations can practically annul matrimony and allow the remarriage of one or both of the parties?

The second exception is the only one we need to discuss, since in the West for the last seven hundred years married people have been allowed to enter Religion only on the authority of the Papal ruling.

When we examine the question of dispensations in the case of *matrimonium ratum*, we find that such theologians as Bonaventura, Scotus, Palludus, Victoria, De Soto and others held that the Pope had no power to dispense.

Sanchez, who treats the question in his great work

The only two possible solutions.

i. Some therefore make the "Copula" essential.

ii. The other solution considered.

3. It depends on the legality of Papal dispensations.

i. Many great theologians deny their validity.

*De Matrimonio*, lib. II., disp. 14; p. 133, gives ten reasons why the Pope has not power to dispense. He then gives four reasons on the other side, which he only says is the more probable—namely, that the Pope has this power. But these four reasons are all of them of little weight and entirely inconclusive, all but one of them involving the *petitio principii*.

For example, the first reason is that in doubtful questions it is best to be on the side of your superiors, and that various Popes have already dispensed. This is certainly begging the question as to whether they have power to do so.

Secondly, because the power of the Pope, so far as it is lawful, must be extended, especially in those cases which are useful to the Church; for we must believe that CHRIST conferred full power on His vicar for those things that are necessary for the good of the Church; but the power of dispensing *in matrimonio rato* was very necessary for the good of the Church, etc. Here we have two questions begged; first, the condition "so far as it is lawful," and secondly, whether it is for the good of the Church.

Thirdly, the Pope, according to the most probable sentence, is able to dispense from the solemn vows of Religion, therefore he ought to be able *in matrimonio rato*. Here again the conclusion does not follow at all, solemn vows and the vows of Matrimony not standing necessarily on the same ground, the vows of Matrimony but not those of Religion having been proclaimed indissoluble by GOD Himself.

The last reason of Sanchez is that *matrimonium ratum* is not altogether indissoluble; which again is begging the question which is to be argued.

If we pass now to the history of dispensations we find

ii. Sanchez gives the two views and the arguments for each.  
iii. Of the four on the Papal side all are fallacies.

iv. The history of such dispensations.—Alexander III., A.D. 1180.

that the first instance of a dispensation *in matrimonio rato*, so far as we know, was one given by Alexander III., A.D. 1180, who, writing to the Archbishop of Salerno, gives permission for one party to enter the religious life, even though the other were unwilling, but the other to have the privilege of remarriage.

Innocent III., A.D. 1210.

The next dispensation was given by Innocent III., A.D. 1210, in a letter to the Archbishop of Lyons, in which he says that being unwilling to depart from the precedent of his predecessors, he gives a similar permission. Although he speaks of "predecessors," in the plural, so far as we know only one Pope had ever done this before; but perhaps as Popes, like editors, always speak of themselves as "we," the one predecessor necessarily has to be put in the plural. On such authority, however, it is hardly fair for De Augustinis to quote Alexander III. and Innocent III. as saying that *they* have received this tradition from their predecessors.\*

Martin V., A.D. 1431; Paul III., A.D. 1549; Paul IV., A.D. 1559.

S. Antoninus of Florence tells us that he had seen similar dispensations which had been granted by Martin V. and Eugenius IV., and Navarrus speaks of such dispensations granted by Paul III. and Paul IV.; since which time there have been many others.

4. Conclusion.  
i. The power disputed until the 17th century.  
ii. Its earliest exercise near the end of the 12th century.

From all this we learn: first, that up to the seventeenth century many theologians denied the Pope's power to dispense, or taught it only as the more probable opinion, that is to say, as an open question; secondly, that, the earliest instance being at the end of the twelfth century, it entirely lacks Catholic antiquity. We may add that this is the opinion of Billuart, who teaches that the Popes have no power to dispense *in matrimonio rato*, although he holds that religious profession with solemn vows dispenses *jure divino* and not *jure pontificio*.

\* De Aug., *de Re Sacramentaria*, vol. II., p. 783.

VIII. ON THE CHURCH'S CLAIM TO CONSTITUTE AND DISPENSE "IMPEDIMENTS."

Dispensation, with certain limitations, stands upon good grounds, for a power which is able to make a law is able to dispense from it. Hence, the claim of the Church of Rome to dispense might be allowed if it were confined to those impediments to matrimony which are purely *de jure ecclesiastico*: such as dispensation from proclaiming the banns of marriage, and allowing it to be by license; dispensation in regard to the time of marriage, etc. But unfortunately it has been stretched to those which are evidently *de jure divino*; those, that is, within the degrees of consanguinity and affinity which are clearly condemned in Leviticus.

No Pope apparently ventured to dispense in such cases until the fifteenth century. The first case that is known was in 1427, when Martin V. granted a dispensation to the Count of Foix to marry his wife's sister, or to continue a union with a woman whose sister he had formerly seduced, the affinity being the same in either case. Eugenius IV., this Pope's immediate successor, refused to sanction the marriage of the Dauphin, afterwards Louis XI., with his wife's sister, and refused it as being *ultra vires*. The canonist Turrecremata, who adjudged the case, records that "that affair was considered by the command of the lord Eugenius in the presence of us to whom the cause was committed, and it was adjudged that the Pope could not dispense."

This excellent precedent was, however, soon abandoned. Alexander VI. (Borgia) granted a dispensation to Emanuel, King of Portugal, to marry his wife's sister, and another to Ferdinand, King of Sicily, to marry his aunt by blood. The familiar instance of Henry

The grounds on which dispensations stand.

1. History of dispensations.— Earliest dispensation in case of Affinity, Martin V., A.D. 1427.

Eugenius IV. refused to dispense.

Alexander VI. dispensed,

and Julius II.

VIII. and Catharine of Arragon, for which a dispensation was granted by Julius II. in 1503, is the first known case of a dispensation to marry a brother's wife, and the third of dispensation in the same degree of affinity, counting as the two first the dispensations of marriage with the wife's sister already noticed.

The Council of Trent.

The Council of Trent is very guarded in its utterances on this subject, for it says : " If any say that only those degrees of consanguinity and affinity which are mentioned in Leviticus can hinder a contract of marriage, or dissolve one already contracted, and that the Church cannot dispense in *some* of these or lay down that a greater number shall hinder or nullify, let him be anathema " (Trent, Session XXIV., Canon 3). The Council thus carefully avoids specifying the dispensable degrees.

Estius.

Estius, who died in 1613, says that he has only heard of one example of a dispensation to marry a wife's sister since the Council of Trent ; and anything like readiness to grant such dispensations is only to be found in the last two centuries. The marriage of uncle and niece, or of aunt and nephew, by blood, is in some respects more shocking than the closest marriage of affinity, yet in these cases, following the deplorable precedent of Alexander VI., dispensations have been frequently granted.

Cajetan's dilemma.

Theologians of the Latin obedience accordingly find themselves in a grave dilemma, aptly expressed by Cardinal Cajetan : " The Pope is subject to the natural law, and does not stand above it, so that he can move or alter it ; and yet King Emanuel of Portugal has taken two sisters as his brides, one after another, of whom the second is still living ; the Queen of England had contracted marriage with the

brother of her present consort; Ferdinand the Younger, King of Naples, married, with a dispensation from Pope Alexander VI., Junia, his father's sister, who still lives; and yet it is evident that this is prohibited in the Law Divine. Thus are opposed on the one hand the Divine Law in precepts of this kind, on the other the authority of the Roman Pontiff."

Cardinal Cajetan, holding that the Pope cannot well be wrong, concludes that the only marriages which are excluded by the law of nature are marriages with the father and the mother.

On the whole, this appears to be the usual doctrine of the Latin Church at the present day. Many theologians of repute are not, however, prepared to go so far, and Sanchez says that the marriage of brother and sister cannot be sanctioned by Papal dispensation.\*

The general opinion of Latin theologians, but exceptions of note.

The English Church of the post-Reformation period, with many faults, may claim to have been true to the primitive traditions of Christian marriage. Unlike the Church of the East, she has never admitted by one sufficient act the rightfulness of marriage after divorce; and unlike her sisters of the West, she has been careful to maintain the Divine prohibition of marriage with too near kin.

2. The English Church has never dispensed.

Since the Reformation the English Church has never dispensed in regard to the degrees of affinity, and as such dispensations in the Roman Church only date back to the fifteenth century, and were then questioned by Roman theologians, we may, on the whole, conclude that many of them were *ultra vires* and therefore unlawful. This would not, of course, apply to the dispensation of those degrees which are evidently only of ecclesiastical imposition.

\* Lib. VIII., disp. VI., § 10.

3. The Controversy of the 17th century.

In the seventeenth century there was a strongly Erastian movement in the Roman Church, which recognized the civil power as having authority to constitute and remove impediments to matrimony, and, in fact, as having complete jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. This view, of course, involved a practical repudiation of the decrees of the Council of Trent, which explicitly asserted such powers to belong to the Church. The history of the movement was, briefly, as follows.

De Dominis,  
"de Repub.  
Eccles."

In the year A.D. 1617 Marcus Antonius de Dominis, Archbishop of Spalatro, in his *De Republica Ecclesiastica*, lib. V., c. xi., denied both that the Church had a right to constitute or to dispense impediments in regard to matrimony, and also that all matrimonial causes should be tried before ecclesiastical judges. He asserted, on the contrary, that it pertained to secular princes alone to make laws which might invalidate matrimony, and not to the Church, excepting in so far as princes might give their consent to the Church acting.

Launoïus,  
"de Regia in  
Matr. Pot."

In the same century Launoïus, in his celebrated work *De Regia in Matrimonium Potestate*, adopted the sentence of De Dominis and defended it, saying that the Tridentine Canons in regard to impediments in matrimony were disciplinary and not dogmatic, and that where they speak of the Church having power to constitute and to dispense impediments in matrimony, by the term "Church" secular princes were meant, by whose authority alone the Church could either constitute or dispense such impediments.

In the last century many lawyers, canonists and theologians, especially in Austria, France and Italy, adopted the perverse doctrine of the new school in regard to the impediments of matrimony and the hearing of matrimonial causes, as defended by De Dominis and

his follower Launoïus ; and, so far as they were able, reduced it to practice.

The Synod of Pistoia, assembled in the year 1786 under Scipio de Riccis, openly acknowledged this doctrine, stating that the right of constituting impediments in matrimony originally belonged to the supreme civil power, and the right of dispensing them belonged to the same authority. Hence this same Synod asked Leopold, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to remove from the number of impediments spiritual affinity and public honesty, and to limit to the second degree consanguinity and affinity arising out of any union whatever. Besides, it declared that espousals were altogether subjected to the precepts of the civil law.

Synod of  
Pistoia, A.D.  
1786.

Leopold, Duke  
of Tuscany.

#### IX. ON THE IMPEDIMENTS OF CONSANGUINITY AND AFFINITY.

The prohibition of intermarriage between those who are near of kin may be traced to two sources : first, the physical degeneration which experience teaches such marriages produce; and second, the Divine Revelation on the subject. In a theological treatise we have, of course, only to do with the second. We may notice, first, the fact; and secondly, that the fact is based on the sanctity of family life, and in some sense on the interests of society.

Two causes of  
Impediments  
of Consan-  
guinity.

First, the fact of Divine prohibition of marriage between those who are near of kin is found clearly expressed in the Old Testament. Certainly from the Flood we can trace the sin of incest as the cause of disaster to the human race, reaching its climax in God's judgment upon the inhabitants of Canaan. For if we ask the cause of the Divine vengeance upon the Canaanites, we are told not only that it was on account

1. The fact of  
Divine pro-  
hibition.  
" De Jure  
Divino " in the  
Old Testament.  
Incest the  
special sin of  
the Canaanites.



of the wickedness of the people of the land, but that their wickedness was chiefly manifested in sins of impurity, and that chief among these was the sin of incest.

*Lev. xviii.*

In the eighteenth chapter of *Leviticus* we read that GOD charged Moses to say unto the children of Israel : " I am the LORD your GOD. After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do : and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do : neither shall ye walk in their ordinances. . . . None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness : I am the LORD " (*Lev. xviii. 2-6*).

Then follows an enumeration of the sins of incest which GOD forbids, ending with the warning : " Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things : for in all these the nations are defiled which I cast out before you : and the land is defiled : therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vomiteth out her inhabitants " (*Lev. xviii. 24, 25*). " For whosoever shall commit any of these abominations, even the souls that commit them shall be cut off from among their people " (verse 29).

This eighteenth chapter of *Leviticus* reveals to us the cause of GOD's vengeance upon the Canaanites, naming especially fifteen cases of incest (verses 24-30), the sin of sodomy (verse 22) and the sin of bestiality (verse 23).

1. Three lists :

(1) *Lev. xviii.*

(2) *Lev. xx.*

(3) *Deut. xxvii.*

There are in the Pentateuch three lists of prohibited marriages. The first, that just quoted, in *Leviticus xviii.*, enumerates fifteen relationships. The second is in *Leviticus xx.*, and consists of eight relationships, with a penalty attached in each case for the breach of the law. The third is in *Deuteronomy xxvii.*, where three relationships are mentioned, with the addition of a curse.

We have already remarked that on account of the hardness of man's heart, in the period between the Fall and the Christian Dispensation GOD suffered certain breaches of the marriage law to pass without rebuke, such as divorce and polygamy, but that our LORD in speaking of Christian marriage teaches that the period of laxity has passed and that Christians are to be held to the strict fulfilment of GOD's purpose in the institution of Holy Matrimony.

GOD'S toleration of certain laxity on account of man's moral hardness. Divorce and Polygamy.

If this be so in regard to those things which GOD suffered on account of the hardness of men's hearts, *a fortiori* it is so in regard to those things which GOD did not suffer, but condemned and punished with His greatest vengeance, even in that time of ignorance. Such are sins of incest.

Incest not tolerated.

To those therefore who would use the argument that the prohibitions in Leviticus are not binding on Christians, because the Mosaic Law has been abrogated, we may reply that in such matters as the sin of incest, what was not permitted even to the heathen in sexual intercourse is *a fortiori* forbidden to Christians. And when we observe that the penalty attached to the breaches of these commandments was in the case of the nations which violated them no less than utter destruction—this sin being so heinous that the land was said to have “vomited out” such inhabitants—we cannot doubt that the sin is intrinsically most abhorrent in the sight of GOD.

Levitical prohibitions “*a fortiori*” binding on Christians.

Incest abhorrent in the sight of GOD.

We would here repeat what was said in the last chapter, that the prohibitions are binding on us because imposed by the Church as a revelation of GOD's will in a matter which applies equally to all men, and not because they are contained in the Mosaic Law.

When we compare these three prohibitory tables we

Comparison of lists.

Principle clear,  
though  
examples  
defective.

Two cases  
redundant,

specified be-  
cause of the  
examples of  
Abraham and  
Jacob.

Prohibitions  
number four-  
teen or fifteen.

The relation-  
ship through  
husband or  
wife is  
analogous.

Lev. xviii.  
cannot be  
exhaustive.

find that Lev. xx. and Deut. xxvii. only add to the list given in Lev. xviii. a prohibition in regard to an uncle's wife. We see, too, that while the principle on which the prohibitions are based is clear, the representative cases are defective, although they seem almost redundant in two cases, namely, the marriage of a sister or half-sister, and the marriage of two sisters at the same time.

These two latter instances are evidently intended to warn people against following the example of the two great patriarchs Abraham and Jacob, who (doubtless in a time of ignorance) sinned against this law—Abraham by the marriage with his half-sister Sarah, and Jacob by the simultaneous marriage with Rachel and Leah. Lest these should be quoted as authorities, the prohibition is laid down with redundant emphasis in regard to these two cases.

An examination of the prohibitions shows that they are in all fourteen, without counting the possibly doubtful case of the deceased wife's sister. Of these six are relationships of consanguinity and eight of affinity, so that there is a greater number of prohibitions of marriage on the ground of affinity than on the ground of consanguinity.

We also see another principle clearly enunciated, that relationship through the woman is precisely analogous to that through the man, so that there is an equal prohibition of marriage with a son's daughter and with a daughter's daughter, with a father's sister and with a mother's sister, with a wife's son's daughter and with a wife's daughter's daughter.

Luther, and some even in the present day, have insisted that the list in Lev. xviii. was intended to be exhaustive, and that all relationships not expressly

forbidden in it must be understood to be sanctioned ; and on this ground plea is often made for the marriage with the deceased wife's sister. The absurdity of this will be at once evident by pointing out that if this be the case the Divine Law sanctions the marriage of a woman with her father, with her grandson and with her uncle. This therefore shows that the analogous relationships included in the English Table are not an arbitrary, but a necessary deduction.

We may observe that the principle which governs relationships by affinity is that a man and his wife are one flesh, or kin, and that accordingly the wife's relations are forbidden to the husband and the husband's to the wife.

The principle of affinity.

The English Table has justly been said to be the most complete statement of the Divine Laws in regard to consanguinity and affinity. The Eastern and Roman Churches have more prohibitions than this Table, but they are not asserted to be of Divine obligation. The Mosaic Code, on the other hand, has fewer prohibitions, but the principles there affirmed require that the prohibitions expressed shall be supplemented by the additional prohibitions of the Table. Therefore the English Table of Consanguinity and Affinity is simply an expression of the Divine Law on the subject—nothing added to it, nothing taken away.

In A.D. 1808 the House of Bishops in America, replying to a message from the House of Clerical and Lay Deputies, in regard to the Table of Degrees of the Church of England, said that " they considered that Table as now obligatory on the Church, and as what will remain so, unless there should hereafter appear cause to alter it without departing from the Word of GOD, or endangering the peace and good order of this Church."

Prohibited degrees in the American Church.

In 1874 the Committee on Canons, to whom was referred the resolution of the Bishop of Maryland concerning a canon on marriage with relatives, reported the following canon : " No Minister of this Church shall marry persons related within the degrees of kindred forbidden in the Table now obligatory in this Church." The Bishop of Maryland presented the following as an amendment : " No Minister of this Church shall marry persons related within the degrees of kindred forbidden in the Table now obligatory in this Church, as declared in the General Convention of 1808; nor shall persons hereafter so married be admitted to Confirmation or the Holy Sacraments, unless after due penitence, with the direction and consent of the Bishop " (Journals of Conventions of 1808 and 1874).

The guilt of incest in proportion to degree.

The guilt of the violation of the Mosaic laws seems to be in proportion to the nearness of relationship, so that the greater punishments are assigned to cases of incest in the first degree. A man, for instance, who offends with his father's wife or his son's wife is to be put to death, together with the partner of his offence ; a man who takes a wife and her mother is to be burnt with fire, both women sharing the punishment ; while, as we read the list, we find that in more remote degrees the punishment becomes less.

Principle of limitation of degrees.

Again, we may notice a principle of limitation ; that relationship does not bar marriage after a certain distance. From the Mosaic Code certain subsidiary principles have been drawn by which to determine at what point prohibition ceases. They are as follows :

Consanguinity only bars where one party is descended from the mother or

Consanguinity does not bar unless one of the parties is descended from the father or from the mother of the other ; e. g., uncle and niece may not marry, for the niece is descended from the uncle's father. First

cousins may marry, for neither is descended from the father or from the mother of the other.

Affinity does not bar the relations of the husband from marriage with the relations of the wife ; e. g., a man may not marry any of his wife's relations who are nearer in blood than he can of his own, nor may a woman marry any of her husband's relations nearer in blood than she can of her own ; for the wife becomes a member of the husband's family, and the husband becomes a member of the wife's family.

But it must be clearly noticed that there is no confusion of the two families, so that a man and his son may marry a woman and her daughter, or two brothers may marry two sisters, or a man may marry the widow of his deceased brother-in-law.

In England the only prohibition to which there is serious opposition is that of the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's sister. It is claimed that this is not really barred by Lev. xviii. 18, because it is very doubtful whether that refers to such a case at all ; and further, that no one is more fit to take care of a man's children than their mother's sister.

In regard to the first argument, it may be admitted that it is most difficult to say exactly what Lev. xviii. 18 means.

Some Hebrew scholars have given many authorities for considering the word "sister" as covering any woman, and so understanding by the verse a prohibition of polygamy, or of marrying two wives at the same time. Against this it may be observed that polygamy certainly was not forbidden by the Mosaic Law, and that this verse was not so understood by the Jews.

Others hold that it merely forbids the simultaneous

father of the other.

Affinity does not bar the relations of the husband from marriage with those of the wife.

ii. The case of the deceased wife's sister.

(1) Witness of the Old Testament.—

Various views of Lev. xviii. 18:

That "sister" means any woman.

That it forbids simultaneous marriage of two sisters.

marriage with two sisters, as in the case of Jacob's marriage with Leah and Rachel; that while not forbidding polygamy in itself, it forbids the polygamous union only with two sisters at the same time.

The prohibition does not rest on this verse.

There are several other interpretations of this verse, but we may be content to say that the prohibition of the marriage of a deceased wife's sister does not rest upon this verse at all; that it is clearly included under the principles of the Mosaic Code; that to those who object that it is a connection of affinity and not of consanguinity, it is sufficient to reply that more than half the cases specified by the Mosaic Code are cases of affinity and not of consanguinity.

Analogy of Levirate marriage.

To those who plead the analogy of the levirate marriage, which under certain circumstances is commanded (that in the case of a man dying childless his brother is to "raise up seed unto him"), it may be replied that like polygamy and divorce this was a special case suffered by God; but that where a man did not die childless it was absolutely forbidden by Lev. xx. 21, with the penalty of childlessness attached.

Principle of affinity found to apply.

The principle underlying all the prohibitions of marriage on the ground of affinity—namely, that a man and his wife are one flesh, and therefore one kin—applies with entire force to the case of the deceased wife's sister, whose relationship is thus as near as a man's own sister.

Argument from expediency a mere assumption.

There seems to be no possible argument in its favour, for the fact that a wife's sister is the best person to take care of her children, is a mere assumption, and by no means proved by experience; and further, the principle of prohibition, in protecting the family honour, requires that no one who can come into the family as a relation can be a possible future subject of marriage.

It violates family unity, and is therefore most inexpedient.

If we turn now to the New Testament, we find in S. Matt. xiv. 3, 4; S. Mark vi. 17, 18; and S. Luke iii. 19 a case of incestuous marriage—the marriage of Herod with his half-brother Philip's wife. S. John the Baptist distinctly says, "It is not lawful for thee to have her."

(2) Witness of the New Testament—Herod's case.

Some have thought that Philip was still alive, and therefore that it was the marriage of the woman without divorce that was condemned; but this could not have been so, since divorce was allowed among the Jews and could have been easily obtained; while the whole stress in every place is on the fact, not that she was another man's wife, but that she was his *brother's* wife.

Tertullian and many others think that Philip was dead, and that it was simply the condemnation of an incestuous union, very much the same as that of the deceased wife's sister, in this case it being that of the deceased half-brother's wife. In 1 Cor. v. 1-5 we are told of an incestuous Corinthian who had taken his father's wife, and who was by S. Paul solemnly excommunicated. These are the only notices of the sin of incest in the New Testament.

Tertullian thinks Philip was dead.

1 Cor. v. 1-5.

If we turn now to the teaching of the Church before the conversion of Constantine, we find Tertullian referring to the case of Herod's unlawful connection, and saying that S. John reprov'd Herod "because in opposition to the law he had married the wife of his deceased brother, who had a daughter by her; a union which the law permitted only on the one occasion of the brother being childless." Tertullian, while explaining the levirate law, has no doubt that the main reason of S. John's reproof was the relation of affinity.

(3) Witness of the Church,—Tertullian.

In the Apostolic Canons, which have been assigned

The Apostolic Canons.



to the end of the second, or to the third century, the nineteenth Canon bears on this matter, providing that no one could become a clerk (*κληρικός*) who had married two sisters. As this included all those who were in minor orders, such as readers and singers, it shows that the marriage with two sisters in succession was a bar even to the lowest service in the Church.

Council of  
Eliberis.

In the sixty-first Canon of the Council of Eliberis it was decreed that if a man married his deceased wife's sister, both parties being Christians, he was to be excluded from Communion for five years.

First Council of  
Neo-Cæsarea.

The second Canon of the First Council of Neo-Cæsarea enacted that a woman who married two brothers was to be excluded from Communion till death. If at the approach of death she expressed her resolution to break off the connection in the event of her recovery, she might be admitted to penance. From these citations it is evident that marriage with a deceased wife's sister was entirely forbidden in the early Church.

S. Basil.

After the conversion of Constantine we find S. Basil ruling that a man who has married his brother's wife is not to be received until he has left her. Diodorus of Tarsus expresses S. Basil's mind on the subject of marriage with a deceased wife's sister, and in No. 78 of the Canons of S. Basil seven years' penance is assigned to a man who has married two sisters. S. Timothy of Alexandria, who was elected Patriarch in 381, in answer to a question condemned such a marriage. S. Ambrose, while not touching on this case, condemns the marriage of a man with his niece, and S. Augustine speaks of the doubtfulness of the marriage even of cousins, though he distinctly says that such is not unlawful.

Diodorus of  
Tarsus.

S. Timothy of  
Alexandria.

S. Ambrose.

S. Augustine.

Conclusion.

It is probably unnecessary to carry the subject further.

We have shown that neither in the Bible nor in the early Church is there the slightest authority for the marriage with a deceased wife's sister.

A few words may be useful in regard to the method of computing degrees. In the Eastern Church the Roman method of computation was followed, which was, to count from one of the parties up to a common ancestor and then down to the other party. Thus, first cousins were held to be related in the fourth degree. For example, from John to John's father is one degree, to John's grandfather is two degrees. But John's grandfather is also the grandfather of the other cousin, Mary. From the grandfather to Mary's mother is a degree, making the third, and from Mary's mother to herself is the fourth degree. In the same way uncle and niece are related in the third degree. William is the uncle of Jane. From William to his father is one degree; but his father is the grandfather of Jane, and between Jane and her grandfather are two degrees, thus making three degrees between the uncle and niece.

In the Western Church degrees are practically generations, and in the twelfth century intermarriage in the West was prohibited for seven generations. Thus brother and sister were related in the first degree, first cousins in the second degree, second cousins in the third degree, and so on; so that the prohibition of marriage within seven degrees in the West was far more burdensome than the prohibition in the East. On the other hand, the prohibitions on the ground of affinity, other than affinity of the first degree, were abandoned after the Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, which also reduced the prohibited degrees of consanguinity from seven to four.

Both East and West recognized a doctrine of *spiritual*

Neither Scripture nor Church ever allows such marriage.

iii. Method of computing degrees of kinship :  
(1) In the Eastern Church.

(2) In the Western Church.

iv. Spiritual kinship.

*relationship*, which probably grew directly from the prohibitions of the Roman law in the case of relationship by adoption. While unknown to Christian antiquity, it is found in the Code of Justinian, where in an enactment mainly in regard to relationship by adoption the further provision is made : " That person is on all wise to be prohibited from marriage, whom anyone, whether she be his ward or not, has undertaken (as godparent) from Holy Baptism, since no other circumstance can so induce paternal affection and the just prohibition of nuptials as a bond of this kind, whereby their souls are united, with GOD as mediator." \*

This principle was extended to collaterals, so that sponsors were considered in spiritual relationship to one another, to one another's natural relations, and to the natural relations of the godchild. The spiritual relationship must therefore involve the prohibition of marriage to so many degrees. Such spiritual affinity has never found place in the Canons of the English Church, and certainly forms no part of the Divine Law of marriage, nor of the enactments of the primitive Church.

We have now abundantly proved our first contention in regard to the *fact* of a Divine revelation prohibiting the intermarriage of those who are near of kin.

2. The sanctity of family life and good of society require the prohibitions.

We shall pass very briefly over our second point, that this fact is based on the sanctity of family life, and in some sense on the interests of society. It is based on the sanctity of family life, which requires that no member of the family can be a possible future subject of marriage to any other member of the family. Without this prohibition pure family life could scarcely exist, for the

\* *Code of Justinian*, V. 4, c. 26.

intercourse of one with another in the family needs some such protection ; and if this did not extend to kinship by affinity, neither the husband's nor the wife's relations could be received into the family, but would have to observe the ordinary code of the mere intercourse of friendship.

Thus, to refer once more to the disputed question of the deceased wife's sister, under the laws of the Church prohibiting such marriage the wife's sister can live without reproach as a member of the family.

**Marriage of  
deceased wife's  
sister illus-  
trates this.**

If, however, she may possibly be the prospective second wife, she is thereby debarred from such close intimacy and relegated to the intercourse of social friendship only. In this sense we see that both the sanctity of family life and the interests of society require that the impediments of consanguinity should be extended to affinity.

## CHAPTER III.

### HOLY ORDERS.

**Introductory :  
The Church a  
Kingdom,**

**O**UR LORD during His life on earth constantly speaks of the Church, which He had come to found, as a Kingdom. Sometimes He calls it "the Kingdom of Heaven," more often "the Kingdom of GOD." And we are especially told that during the forty days between His Resurrection and Ascension He instructed the Apostles in regard to "the things pertaining to the Kingdom of GOD" (Acts i. 3).

**and needs Officers for its administration.**

**Our LORD provided for this need in the Sacrament of Orders.**

**The dignity of this Sacrament.**

**Orders and Matrimony differ from the other Sacraments in two ways :**

A kingdom must have officers for its administration, who shall represent the king, and to whom the care and government of the kingdom may be left during the king's absence. We find that our LORD provided for this by the institution of the Sacrament of Orders; that He first chose out from amongst His followers twelve Apostles, whom He taught and trained during His earthly life, and that before His departure, with great solemnity He ordained them, that is, He bestowed on them certain powers, and gave them authority to govern His Church.

The Sacrament of Orders is of the highest dignity, in the sense that it is the Sacrament upon which all the other Sacraments, except Baptism and Matrimony, depend for their validity, and these two for their legitimate administration.

Together with Holy Matrimony it differs from the other Sacraments in two ways.

First, while the others are of general application,

these two are limited to individuals, to whom GOD has given a special vocation.

Secondly, they are also alike necessary to the perpetuation and perfection of the Church on earth and the completion of the Church in Heaven. The principal end of the Sacrament of Matrimony is the procreation of children to be brought up "in the fear and nurture of the LORD," and so to become living members of His Mystical Body, the Church. By the Sacrament of Holy Orders this is accomplished, for by it the other Sacraments are perpetuated, and become the means by which such children are "born again," spiritually nourished and fitted for Heaven.

In the Sacrament of Holy Orders not only did our LORD provide a hierarchy for the government of His Church, but a means by which that hierarchy might be perpetuated.

Orders, or Ordination, may be defined as a sacred rite or Sacrament of the New Law, instituted by CHRIST, by which spiritual power is conferred for effecting and administering the Sacraments, and grace given rightly to perform other ecclesiastical functions.

That it is a Sacrament has been disputed by some, but without sufficient reason, since it was evidently instituted by CHRIST Himself, with outward signs, and does confer grace.

Since the essential functions of the Priesthood are chiefly two—to offer the Holy Sacrifice in the celebration of the Eucharist, and to absolve in the Sacrament of Penance—it seems fitting that our LORD should have conferred these powers separately; hence, the institution of the Sacrament of Orders is generally referred to two occasions. The power of consecrating the Body and Blood of CHRIST and offering the Eucharistic Sacri-

1. They are limited to certain individuals; 2. They are necessary for the perpetuation and perfection of the Church.

This Sacrament provides both a hierarchy and a means of its perpetuation.  
Definition of Sacrament of Orders.

I. Its Sacramental nature examined.—  
1. Its institution by CHRIST

The two essential powers of the Priesthood —i. to offer sacrifice, and ii. to absolve sin—separately conferred:

i. The first, on Maundy Thursday;

ii. The second,  
on Easter Day.

fice was given at the institution of the Holy Eucharist, when our LORD said to His Apostles, "This do in remembrance of Me" (S. Luke xxii. 19)—the command conveying the power needed for its fulfilment. The authority to forgive sins was bestowed immediately after our LORD'S triumph over sin and its penalty, death, when on the evening of Easter Day He said to His Apostles: "As My FATHER hath sent Me, even so send I you. And when He had said this, He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the HOLY GHOST: whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained" (S. John xx. 21-23).

2. The Outward  
Sign ordained  
by CHRIST  
mediately,  
through the  
Apostles.

The outward sign, of which we shall speak more fully when we treat of the Matter and Form of the Sacrament, was ordained by our LORD medially, through His Apostles, for we find them ordaining by the imposition of hands; while the inward part, or grace of Orders (as well as the outward sign) is distinctly referred to by S. Paul when he writes to S. Timothy: "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by [*διὰ*] prophecy, with [*μετὰ*] the laying on of the hands of the presbytery" (1 S. Tim. iv. 14); and again: "Wherefore I put thee in remembrance that thou stir up the gift of GOD, which is in thee by [*διὰ*] the putting on of my hands" (2 S. Tim. i. 6).

i. S. Paul in  
two places  
speaks of this  
sign or Matter  
and also of the  
grace con-  
ferred by it:  
1 Tim. iv. 14;  
2 Tim. i. 6.

ii. The objec-  
tion that  
*χάρισμα*, not  
*χάρις*, is used,  
and therefore  
"*gratia gratis*  
*data*," and not  
"*gratia*  
*gratum fa-*  
*ciens*" is  
implied.

It has been objected by some that in both these texts the word *χάρισμα* is used, and not *χάρις*, and therefore that it only implies a special gift (such as the gift of prophecy) bestowed for the edification, perhaps, of others, and not the gift of sanctifying grace; i. e., that it refers to *gratia gratis data*, and not *gratia gratum faciens*.

To this it will be sufficient to make two replies.

First, that *χάρισμα* is not always used by S. Paul for a special gift (or *gratia gratis data*), for in Rom. v. 15 it is distinctly used for sanctifying grace (or *gratia gratum faciens*); and not only so, but in that place, in the latter part of the verse, *χάρις* is used as the equivalent of *χάρισμα* in the beginning of the passage. The whole text is as follows: “*Ἄλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τὸ παραπτῶμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ χάρισμα. εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτῶματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσε.*” The second answer is that S. Paul is exhorting S. Timothy to stir up the whole gift [which had been imparted to him at his ordination; but the Sacrament of Orders confers not only grace but character, and the whole is therefore better summed up by *χάρισμα* than by *χάρις*.]

While the Sacrament of Orders essentially conveys the Order of Priesthood, it also includes other Orders. According to the general teaching of the Roman Church the number of Orders is seven, of which three—Priest, Deacon and Subdeacon—are said to be Sacred Orders, and four—Acolyte, Exorcist, Reader and Doorkeeper—are called Minor Orders. In the Roman Church the Episcopate is considered by many a grade of the Priesthood, and not a separate Order.

The Eastern Church, together with the Anglican, speaks of only three Orders as properly so called,—Bishop, Priest and Deacon—although in the East from the earliest times the Minor Orders are to be found under varying titles. Two councils in the fourth century speak of them—that of Antioch enumerating Lectors, Subdeacons, and Exorcists, and that of Laodicea giving Subdeacons, Lectors, Cantors, Exorcists and

iii. Two replies:

(1) *χάρισμα* is sometimes used of sanctifying grace: Rom. v. 15.

(2) S. Paul is referring both to the grace and to the priestly character, which is better expressed by *χάρισμα*.

II. The number of Orders in the Church.—

I. In the Roman Church, seven: three Sacred Orders and four Minor Orders.

2. The Eastern and Anglican Churches recognize only three Orders as properly so called.



Doorkeepers. Peter Mogilas, in his Orthodox Confession, A.D. 1643, counts Lectors, Cantors, Lampadaries and Subdeacons among the Minor Orders ; and in the English Church to-day the Order of Readers has been revived. But neither the Eastern Church nor the Anglican seems to assign sacramental character to them, as the Romans do.

3. The Romans exclude the Episcopate, considering it only a superior grade of the Priesthood : their argument for this.

The argument for considering the Episcopate as a superior grade of the Priesthood is twofold. First, that in the New Testament the words " Bishop " and " Priest " seem to be interchangeable, and to refer to the same Order ; and secondly, that, as the offering of the Holy Eucharist is the highest function of the Priesthood, and all the other Orders lead up to this, the Priesthood should be the crown and head of all—the Bishop being only a Priest of superior grade set apart for the government of the Church and for perpetuating its Orders and ministering the Sacrament of Confirmation.

4. The view that all the Orders have reference to the Holy Eucharist ; found in S. Thomas.

This view, that all the Orders have reference to the ministration of the Holy Eucharist, is generally traced to S. Thomas in his Commentary on the Sentences (*S. Thom. in Sent.*, lib. IV., dist. xxiv., q. 2, art. 1), where he says that, as the Church and Altar and vessels and vestments, so also the Ministers who are appointed for the Eucharist need consecration, and this consecration is the Sacrament of Orders ; and therefore the distinction of the Orders is to be found in their relation to the Eucharist, because the power of Orders is either for the consecration of the Eucharist or for some subordinate ministry connected with it. The Priesthood, therefore, is the terminus and apex of these Orders, embracing in itself two grades, the Episcopate and the Presbytery.

It is interesting to observe that S. Thomas in the discussion of this subject largely quotes from Dionysius the Areopagite, who, however, recognizes only three Orders: Bishop, Priest and Deacon (Dionys. Areop., *Ecl. Hierar.*, cap. v., § 3).

The other Orders, however, are most ancient, since Eusebius (*Hist. Ecl.*, VI. 43) quotes a letter of Pope Cornelius to Fabius of Antioch, written about the year 252, in which he mentions by name every one of the seven Orders, together with the Bishop; and Anastasius the Librarian also says that about the year 283 Pope Caius ordered that no one should be made a Bishop who had not first been Doorkeeper, Reader, Exorcist, Acolyte, Subdeacon, Deacon and Presbyter (*De Vitis Rom. Pont.*, edit. Blanchinii, Romæ, 1723, tom. II., p. 249 et seq.).

While there has been a consensus of opinion in regard to the Form and Matter in the ordination of Bishops and of Deacons, a dispute has been waged among theologians in the Roman Church for several centuries in regard to the Form and Matter in the ordination of Priests. Morinus points out that in his day there were five different views.

The first and most common was that the Matter consisted in the porrection of the instruments, that is, the giving of a chalice with wine and water and a paten with bread into the hands of the ordinand.

The second considered this giving of the instruments to be only partial Matter, and needing to be joined to imposition of hands, so that in the union of these two the integrity of the Matter consisted.

The third opinion differed from the second in separating the two, making the porrection of instruments the Matter for conveying the power of consecrating the

The views of Dionysius the Areopagite.

5. The seven Orders most ancient; mentioned by Pope Cornelius, A.D. 252, and Pope Caius, A.D. 283.

III. Form and Matter. Great difference of opinion on this point.

i. Five different views in regard to the Matter: i. Porrection of Instruments.

ii. This together with imposition of hands.

iii. These two separated—the former conveying the power

to consecrate, the latter to absolve.

iv. Imposition of hands, connected with the anointing.

v. Imposition of hands the sole Matter. This now the prevailing view.

2. Four different opinions in regard to the Form :

i. "Receive power to offer Sacrifice," etc.

ii. "Receive the HOLY GHOST," etc.

iii. Both these formulas.

iv. Neither, but any Prayer which "informs" the Matter.—This now the prevailing view. In the East, the Matter and Form are simply the imposition of

Eucharist, and the imposition of hands the Matter by which authority was conveyed to absolve sin.

The fourth opinion—which was that of Cardinal Hosius, and which has had but few followers—finds an imposition in connection with the anointing of the Priest's hands which he holds to be the Matter.

The last opinion, which in the present day is almost universally prevalent, teaches that the sole Matter of Ordination is the imposition of hands.

There has been the same difficulty among Roman theologians in deciding what is the Form, four views at least being prevalent.

Those who took the first view—that the porrection of the instruments was the Matter—held that the Form consisted in the words which accompanied it: "Receive power to offer sacrifice to GOD, and to celebrate Masses, both for the living and the dead, in the Name of the LORD. Amen." Many of those who held the imposition of hands alone to be the Matter considered that the Form was to be found in the words: "Receive the HOLY GHOST: whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained."

Those who held the second and third views in regard to the Matter, required for the integrity of the Form the use of both these formulas; while still another class, who held that the imposition of hands alone was the Matter, taught that the proper Form consisted of words of prayer expressing the purpose with which the Matter, or laying on of hands, was applied.

The Eastern Church teaches that the Matter is simply the laying on of hands, and the Form some words of prayer which express the purpose of the act. The best Roman theologians have come to admit that the

Greeks are right on this point, and we may say, therefore, that the Form is the laying on of hands, and the Matter is the prayer by which the purpose of the Form is expressed.

hands with  
prayer.

A further question has arisen in regard to where the Form and Matter are to be found in the Ordinal of the Roman Church (which we shall consider in the next chapter), and also as to where they are to be found in our own Ordinal. Until lately most theologians would have said that the Form with us was in the words, "Receive the HOLY GHOST," etc., which accompany the laying on of hands; but it seems more consonant with antiquity that the Form be found in the prayer, "Almighty GOD and Heavenly FATHER," which precedes the laying on of hands, and that the imperative formula "Receive the HOLY GHOST," etc., be considered as the application of that Form to the individual ordinand.

3. The question  
in regard to  
the position of  
the Form and  
Matter :  
i. In the Ro-  
man Ordinal ;  
ii. In the An-  
glican Ordinal.

The Minister of the Sacrament of Orders in all its grades is a Bishop. While any Bishop who has received episcopal consecration can confer *valid* Orders, in order that they may also be *legitimate* or regular, he must have jurisdiction, that is, he must be the Bishop of the diocese, ordaining in his own diocese, or else ordaining for some other Bishop. For while any Bishop by virtue of his own consecration has the *power* of conferring Orders, he has not the *right* to do so unless he has jurisdiction, either his own, or, as we have said, that of some other Bishop delegated to him.

IV. Minister, a  
Bishop,

having  
Jurisdiction.

In the case of the consecration of a Bishop, by ancient custom which can be traced to the twentieth Canon of the Council of Arles and the fourth Canon of the Council of Nicæa, three Bishops must consecrate. The purpose of this is disputed, some holding that each one confers the Sacrament, so that if there should be any-

For Consecra-  
tion of a Bishop  
three Bishops  
required.

thing invalid in the ordination of any one or even two of the Bishops consecrating, it would be made up by the third. The more common opinion, however, is that the chief consecrator alone conveys the Sacrament, and that two Bishops are required to assist for other and ceremonial reasons only.

V. Subject, a Baptized Male, free from impediments.

The Subject of Holy Orders must be a baptized male and capable of Orders, that is, free from any impediments. He should also have been confirmed, but the absence of this does not invalidate the Sacrament of Orders. Baptism, however, is an absolute essential, for without it a person would be incapable of Orders. In the case of a Priest, he should have received Deacon's Orders, and of a Bishop, he should have received both Deacon's and Priest's Orders.

He should not be ordained "*per saltum*." This, though irregular, is valid, and confers the omitted grades.

There are, however, many instances in the past of ordinations *per saltum*, which, though irregular, were valid. These, of course, conferred the lower grades, which were missing—the theory of the Church being that the Priest sums up in his Orders all Orders below his, and in the same way the Bishop; so that, though ordained *per saltum*, they receive all the powers which the Sacrament bestows.

The Subject should have a distinct Vocation.

The Priest should have a distinct vocation, and is asked by the Bishop: "Do you think in your heart that you are truly called according to the will of our LORD JESUS CHRIST?" etc. The absence of vocation does not invalidate Orders, but ought to be sufficient to prevent a man taking Orders.

Canonical Age.

The Subject should be of canonical age. The Roman and Anglican Churches require the same age for Bishops, who must have completed their thirtieth year. Both Churches also require practically the same age for Priests, who must be in their twenty-fifth

year according to the Roman Canon, and must have completed their twenty-fourth year by the English requirement. In the Roman Church a Deacon must be twenty-two years of age, in the English twenty-three, and in America twenty-one. In regard to the other impediments, as the discussion would require considerable space, the reader is referred to Gasparri, *De Ordinatione*, vol. I., pp. 72-382.

The effect of the Sacrament of Orders is twofold : it confers grace and character.

That is, it confers (i.) sanctifying grace, and so increases the sanctifying grace of the Subject. This, however, would of course be hindered, if he were not already in a state of grace. (ii.) It also bestows, as needed, certain "actual" graces, which are effective in regard to the "end" of the Sacrament, and enable the Subject rightly and devoutly to exercise the functions of Holy Orders.

The other gift of ordination is the impression of character, which S. Thomas calls the principal effect of Orders. And to this gift of character is attached the sublime power of the Priest in regard to both the real and the mystical Body of CHRIST. Ordination, when validly received, always impresses this priestly character, though it does not confer grace unless there be also right dispositions.

Since Holy Orders, together with Baptism and Confirmation, confers character, like these it cannot be repeated, and knowingly to repeat it would be sacrilege.

Deposition from Holy Orders does not destroy the priestly character ; it only takes away the power of exercising it. The Sacraments ministered by a deposed Priest are therefore valid, though irregular. In the case, however, of a person *in extremis*, a deposed Priest is per-

VI. Effects.

1. Grace :  
i. Sanctifying Grace ;  
ii. "Actual" Graces.

2. Character.

VII. Iteration and Deposition.

mitted to minister, if no other Priest can be obtained, and the Sacraments then are both valid and regular.

VIII. Times of  
Ordination,  
the Ember  
Seasons :

In the Western Church, from very early times Holy Orders have been conferred at certain definite seasons. The present custom is that ordinations should take place at the four Ember Seasons, which follow December 13th, the First Sunday in Lent, Whitsunday and September 14th (Holy Cross Day). The Wednesday, Friday and Saturday after these dates are observed as days of fasting, abstinence and prayer for those who are then to be ordained.

In the Roman Church the ordinations take place on the Saturdays of the Ember Weeks, in the English Church generally on the Sunday following, although the rubric of the Ordinal allows them to be held, "on urgent occasion, upon some other Sunday or holy day," and in the case of an Archbishop or Bishop by the English Prayer Book they are "always to be performed upon some Sunday or holy day."

their  
antiquity.

S. Leo speaks of this observance in his day and ascribes the fast to an Apostolic origin. It was introduced into England by S. Augustine, although at first the weeks in which the Ember Days occurred do not seem to have been definitely fixed, and even in the eleventh century a German council speaks of the date of the Ember Fast as uncertain.

In the Eastern Church ordinations take place at any time.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ROMAN OBJECTIONS TO ANGLICAN ORDERS.

**I**N approaching this sad and wearisome subject a fable of Phædrus and Æsop, and an old proverb suggest themselves. The fable is the well-known one of the wolf who, having made up his mind to eat a certain lamb, sought excuses for this action, and when the lamb clearly showed each of those advanced to be entirely invalid, only tried to find another. The proverb is that "people who live in glass houses should not throw stones."

Introductory:  
The spirit of  
the objections.

The first attack on Anglican Orders was made on historical lines, and the point assaulted was the consecration of Archbishop Parker, which was performed on Sunday, December 17th, 1559, by William Barlow, Bishop of Bath and Wells; John Hodgkins, Suffragan Bishop of Bedford; Miles Coverdale, the illegally deprived Bishop of Exeter; and John Scory, the illegally deprived Bishop of Chichester. Of these four Barlow and Hodgkins had been made Bishops in Henry VIII.'s reign, under the old Pontifical, and Coverdale and Scory in Edward VI.'s time, 1551, by Cranmer and two suffragans.

I. The attack  
on historical  
grounds.  
1. The conse-  
cration of Abp.  
Parker, Dec.  
17, 1559.

The fact of this consecration is most abundantly proved by state papers and private documents, amounting in all to some nine independent witnesses to it. In the year 1604, however, Christopher Holywood, a

Evidence of  
the fact.



i. Impugned  
by Nag's Head  
Fable, 1604.

Six versions of  
this story.

Jesuit, published a story, generally known as the "Nag's Head Fable," in which it was stated that Parker and others met at the Nag's Head Tavern in Cheapside, where Scory laid his hands upon them, and then they in turn laid their hands upon Scory to make him a Bishop. There are five other forms of the story, differing in details, but this is the general outline of it. This version was said to have come as hearsay from Thomas Neale, Hebrew lecturer at Oxford, who died in 1590, fourteen years before it came out, and without ever having published it himself.

This story we find persistently repeated in Roman Catholic controversial works until comparatively recent times. It is to be found even in so good and recent a work as Perrone's *Prælectiones Theologicae*. We may, however, observe that it was not heard of until forty-five years after Parker's consecration.

ii. Barlow's  
consecration  
next at-  
tacked.

The next objection the Romans made—after the fact of the consecration of Parker had been abundantly proved—was that Barlow had never been consecrated Bishop, since the record of his consecration was missing; as, however, were those of eight other Bishops out of forty-five, in Cranmer's Register. But Barlow's *confirmation* was entered, together with those of four of the other Bishops whose consecrations were omitted, and two of these consecrations were found recorded in diocesan registers.

Positive evi-  
dence of it:

His precedence  
in the House of  
Lords;

There is much indirect evidence of Barlow's consecration, but we shall confine ourselves here to two facts which are positive evidence of it. The first is his precedence in the House of Lords. We know that Barlow sat in the House of Lords and his precedence would depend absolutely on the *date of his consecration*, so that we can fix his consecration as having taken

place before that of all Bishops over whom he took precedence. The second is that under the law as then recently enacted, confirmation and consecration were commanded by one and the same royal instrument addressed to the Metropolitan. Now we know that Barlow was confirmed; therefore this royal command must have been issued. Cranmer was not the man to neglect it, nor was Henry VIII. the man to allow it to be neglected.

the new law, under which confirmation and consecration were commanded by the same royal instrument.

As we have said, there are many indirect arguments, and the evidence for the fact of Barlow's consecration is indeed overwhelming. But even if there had been a defect in Barlow's Orders it would not have affected the validity of Parker's consecration, since the mode of that consecration made all four Bishops who took part in it co-ministers, and therefore equal and independent consecrators.

iii. The mode of consecration made Barlow's part immaterial.

In the rite for the consecration of Bishops in the Greek and English Ordinals there is possibly only one consecrator, for, while there are assisting Bishops, they do not repeat the Form with the consecrator. In the Roman rite, however, both consecrator and assistants lay their hands upon the head of the Bishop-elect and together say the Form aloud; so that, as Gasparri says, "one is not more the Minister of episcopal consecration than the other, but all act together" (*De Sac. Ord.*, tom. II., n. 1088, p. 265. See also n. 1112, p. 279).

In the Greek and English rites only one Bishop consecrates; in the Roman all three.

This ruling of Gasparri's, of course, is on the hypothesis that *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM* is the Form for the consecration of a Bishop. Few, however, now maintain this; the more common opinion being that these words are the *application* to the ordinand of the virtue of the prayers which really constitute the

Form. Still, even on this theory, it would seem that the fact of the assistants saying these words aloud would make them morally partners in all that the principal consecrator does, and therefore really *Communistri*.

In Parker's case all four repeated the Form, and therefore consecrated.

Now at the consecration of Parker it is distinctly stated that all four Bishops not only laid their hands on his head, but together said the Form aloud ; so that, had there been any defect in the validity of the Orders of Barlow, who was the chief consecrator, the others, according to Gasparri, would have conferred a valid Sacrament. One of them—Hodgkins, Suffragan Bishop of Bedford—had been consecrated with the Form of the old Pontifical. Hence, while there is no real doubt about Barlow's consecration, even had it been defective, it would not in any way have invalidated Parker's Orders.

2. The positive proof:

On the positive side of the argument the following facts may be adduced.

i. Invitation of English Bishops to Trent ;

First, that by express action of the Pope through his Legate Parpalia, Elizabeth and her Bishops were invited to the Council of Trent.

ii. The claim of the English Bishops to seats on the ground of their canonical ordination ;

Secondly, that the Spanish ambassador (who also informally represented the Roman court) on the 25th of March, 1561, wrote to Philip, King of Spain, in regard to the participation of the English in the coming Council, and narrated a conversation which he had had with Lord Cecil, who on behalf of the Queen stated that the English would attend the Council on these conditions :

That the place of meeting should be settled by the decision of the Christian princes ; that the Pope might preside, either himself or through his Legate, on the understanding that he occupied that position only as head and president of the Council, and not as universal

Bishop ; that those definitions which were to bind *de fide* should be drawn from the teachings of Holy Scripture, the consensus of doctors, and the rulings of the ancient Councils ; and that the Anglican Bishops, *since they were canonically ordained*, should sit in the Council as having equal rights with the other Bishops.

Hence we see that the reason why the English Bishops did not attend was because Elizabeth felt that the Council would not be a free council, if the Pope designated the place of meeting and presided as Pope ; but that the English Bishops claimed seats in the Council and equal rights with other Bishops on the very ground that *they had been canonically ordained* ; and that the Spanish ambassador in reporting this claim apparently accepted as a fact the ground on which it was based.

Thirdly, that in 1563, only four years after the consecration of Parker, when all the circumstances of it must have been fresh in people's minds, the question of Anglican Orders was brought before the Council of Trent, then in session, by the University of Louvain and some English theologians.

iii. Refusal of Trent to condemn English Orders ;

With the express approval of Pius IV., the Council was asked to pronounce the Orders of the Bishops appointed by Elizabeth illicit (not invalid), and they refused to do so (Pallavicini, *Hist. Conc. Trid.*, lib. XXI., cap. vii., n. 4, 5, 6). Indeed, the *substance* of the Anglican Orders was not even called in question. O'Harte, Bishop of Achonry, arguing in favour of the condemnation, contended that even though the English had received true and undoubted consecration, yet they had not jurisdiction, since they had been promoted by the secular power, and had not received the approval of the Pope.

iv. For eleven years all Catholics communicated in the English Church;

v. Offer of Pius IV. to acknowledge English Prayer Book,—

Walsingham's letter, June 21, 1571;

vi. The great writers of the 16th and 17th centuries do not speak of English Orders as invalid.

Fourthly, that for eleven years those Catholics who were in heart opposed to the Reformation, and who afterwards became Papists, were not troubled by any doubts in regard to the Sacraments of the English Church, and proved this by communicating at her altars.

It is commonly reported that Pius IV. offered to acknowledge the Book of Common Prayer, provided the Queen would accept it at his hands; and this report has of late received some confirmation, attention having been recently directed to a letter from Walsingham to Burleigh, written from Louviers, June 21, 1571. In it he refers to a conversation held with Catharine de' Medici in regard to the proposed marriage of her son, the Duke of Anjou, to Elizabeth, and reports the Duke's scruples on the religious question involved.

Walsingham says: "I showed her that sudden change was not required, . . . but only a forbearing of his Mass, and to content himself with the form of our prayers, whereof I showed her I had delivered a copy to Monsieur de Foix. 'Which form of prayers, madam,' said I, 'the Pope, as I am informed, would have by Council confirmed as Catholic, so the Queen my mistress would have acknowledged the same as received from him.'" In the margin is the following note: "An offer made by the C[ardinal] of Lorraine, as Sir N. Throgmorton showed me." This Cardinal of Lorraine was the Papal Legate in France.

Yet again, it is very suggestive that the great theological writers of the sixteenth century, and the early part of the seventeenth, who lived at a time *when the facts of the case must have been well known*, and who speak strongly in regard to the schismatical position of England under Elizabeth, do not say anything about the invalidity of the ordination of our Bishops.

Indeed, the first attack seems to have been the putting forth of the Nag's Head Fable in 1604 ; for the invalidity of Barlow's consecration was apparently not suggested until 1616, which was forty-seven years after his death, and eighty years after his accession to the See of S. David. We hear nothing of it during the reigns of Henry VIII., Edward VI., Mary, and Elizabeth.

This second attack on historical lines has, however, been given up, and the late Papal Bull on Anglican Orders, (which may now be considered the authoritative Roman position towards them) while it refers to the historical difficulties in regard to the succession of English Bishops, refers to them only to put them aside.

The whole argument in it is based on insufficiency of Form and lack of Intention. It will therefore be sufficient for our purpose to confine ourselves in this chapter to answering in detail the principal objections of the Papal Bull,\* and in meeting the attack we shall draw our arguments exclusively from recognized Roman theologians, and shall endeavour to show that the Papal ruling is contrary to their teaching.

The Pope says : " But the words which until recently were commonly held by Anglicans to constitute the proper Form of priestly ordination, namely, ' Receive the HOLY GHOST,' certainly do not in the least definitely express the sacred Order of Priesthood or its grace and power, which is chiefly the power of consecrating and of offering the true Body and Blood of the LORD. . . . The same holds good of episcopal consecration."

\* For fuller treatment of this subject the reader is referred to *De Hierarchia Anglicana* by the Rev. Messrs. Denny and Lacey, *Roman Catholic Claims* by Gore, and, for the question of Jurisdiction, to Father Puller's excellent work, *The Primitive Saints and the See of Rome*, and Ingram's *England and Rome*.

3. The present Roman position authoritatively stated in the Pope's Bull of 1896.

Sufficient to answer it from recognized Roman theologians.

II. Defect of Form the first objection of Leo XIII.

1. The Pope denies the sufficiency of the Form "Receive the HOLY GHOST."

i. This alone never constituted the Form in the Edwardine Ordinal.

ii. The Apostles were apparently ordained with the same words as in the Edwardine rite.

iii. The Pope's dictum is opposed—

(1) To the teaching of Roman theologians;

(2) to the practice of the Roman court:—

To this we may answer, first, that it is not true that the words "Receive the HOLY GHOST" *alone* ever constituted the Anglican Form of ordination. The full Form in the Edwardine Ordinal is: "Receive the HOLY GHOST: whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven: and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained: and be thou a faithful dispenser of the Word of GOD, and of His Holy Sacraments. In the Name of the FATHER, and of the SON, and of the HOLY GHOST. Amen." And these further words do, as a matter of fact, "definitely express the sacred Order of Priesthood," since to express a power belonging exclusively to Priesthood is to express Priesthood itself.

When the Pope tells us that this Form is insufficient, we can reply that our LORD appears to have ordained the Apostles with these very words, which was the reason why they were exactly followed in the Edwardine Ordinal.

The Pope's dictum is opposed to the general teaching of Roman theologians, for it was for a long time the most common opinion that *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM* was the Form for the Episcopate, it being *determined* by the other prayers concomitant in the rite. This view is now being given up, but it must still remain a highly probable opinion that this Form, thus determined, is at least sufficient. So Gasparri holds.

It is also opposed to the practice of the Roman court, since the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office in the year 1704 was thought to have decided that "Receive the HOLY GHOST" alone was sufficient Form, and that Priests ordained by that Form were not to be reordained; and such Priests, indeed, have ministered in the Roman Church.

The history of this action is instructive as a com-

ment on the value and accuracy of decisions of the Holy Office, to which the question of Anglican Orders was referred, and which drafted the Papal Bull we are now considering. One form of the supposed decision, though of doubtful authenticity, is found in full in Estcourt's book on Anglican Orders, pages 190 and 191. He probably took it from the *Propaganda Collectanea*. It is as follows :

(1.) The Abyssinian case.

" 'Resolution of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, given on Fer. iv., being the 9th of April, 1704.—In Ethiopia, as it is necessary that the persons to be ordained should assemble for their ordination from distant parts to the city where the schismatic Archbishop resides, and as he will only hold an ordination when persons to receive orders are collected together to the number of eight or ten thousand in the said city, he has therefore at such a time to ordain three or four thousand, or even more, in one day. In short, when those that are to receive the Priesthood are arranged in ranks in the Church, the Archbishop passing hastily in front of them, imposes his hands on the head of each, saying, *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*. And for those to be ordained deacons he simply imposes the patriarchal cross on the head of each. And in consequence of the great multitude and the confusion and the haste with which he proceeds, it follows that the Archbishop on some does not impose the hands at all ; and in other cases does not pronounce the words of the Form ; and not a few are passed over without either one or the other. Hence the question is asked, whether priests and deacons in such a mode and Form are validly ordained ; and consequently whether such a priest on becoming a Catholic ought to be admitted to the exercise of his Orders ; and by

Canon Estcourt's statement of the case.

VOL. II.—7



what rule in such circumstances ought a missionary to be guided?

Resolution of  
the S. C.

“ ‘Resolution of the S. C. The ordination of a priest with imposition of hands and pronouncement of the Form as stated in the case *is valid*; but the ordination of a deacon simply with imposition of the patriarchal cross is altogether invalid. Hence in admitting presbyters and deacons to the exercise of their Orders after they have received the Catholic faith, the following rules are to be observed :

“ ‘If a priest should say absolutely, that he was ordained with imposition of hands and pronouncement of the Form, and if there should be no other impediment, the missionary, after giving him a dispensation from irregularity, and absolution from excommunication, may admit him to the exercise of his Orders, according to the rite, approved and expurgated, in which he was ordained.

“ ‘But if such a priest should ingenuously acknowledge that he has not a clear remembrance about the Matter and Form of his ordination, or if he has a doubt concerning either one or the other, he cannot be admitted to the exercise of his Orders till he has been ordained conditionally. And if he should absolutely assert that the imposition of hands and pronouncement of the Form had been omitted, or either of them, he must be reordained absolutely, before he can be admitted to the exercise of his Orders.’ ”

In 1860 the decree reaffirmed in the case of the Copts.

In the year 1860 the Vicar General of the Copts found himself involved in the same difficulties when two Coptic Priests wished to join the Roman Church, and he applied for direction. The Sacred Congregation referred him to the above decision as of authority in the case. So we have two decisions of the

Holy Office that "*Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*" is sufficient Form.

It is quite true that Romans now repudiate this as a decree of the Holy Office, and have conveniently found out that it never received Papal sanction. But the Propaganda circulated it as a guide to missionaries from 1704 till 1875, when Cardinal Manning consulted the Sacred Congregation, pointing out that some said this decision entirely covered the case of Anglican Orders, and asked for an explanation. Cardinal Patrizi, to the question whether the Sacred Congregation had ruled that the imposition of hands with the words only "*Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*" was sufficient for the validity of Priest's Orders, replied that it was not a decree of the Sacred Congregation, and further, that it did not declare explicitly or implicitly that "*Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*" alone was sufficient Form.

In the recent controversy we have had various explanations of this decree, and, in fact, different editions of it. Probably the latest is that contained in a treatise published in 1897 by the Rev. S. M. Brandi, S. J., entitled "A Last Word on Anglican Orders," together with a special brief from the Pope approving of his work. He states the case as follows :

"On Oct. 20, 1703, the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda sent up to the Holy Office six *dubia* proposed by the Most Rev. P. Giuseppe di Gerusalemme, Prefect Apostolic of the missions of Ethiopia, of which the second was as to 'whether an Abyssinian priest or monk is rightly ordained, and consequently whether on becoming a Catholic he can be or ought to be admitted to the exercise of his Orders.' Their Eminences, Judges of the Holy Office, appointed the Consultor Giovanni Damasceno '*ut referat et sententiam suam exprimat de*

In 1875 attention of the S. C. drawn by Cardinal Manning to the bearing of this on Anglican Orders. Cardinal Patrizi's reply.

Fr. Brandi's explanation.

The "*dubia*" of the Apostolic Prefect for Ethiopia.

The Consultor's "votum"

referred back for investigation of the Abyssinian Form.

The new "quæsitum."

The second "votum,"

*quæsitis.* The Consultor obeyed and answered the inquiry as follows: '*Quatenus Æthiopes Jacobitarum vel alio ritu utantur*, in quo eorum sacerdotes seu monachi per manuum impositionem ordinentur, eorum ordinatio est valida. . . .' This *votum* was referred *coram SSmo.*, on Feb. 14, 1704 (Feria v.), but was not approved by His Holiness. The Pope's answer is thus reported by the Assessor: 'The Pontiff orders me to inquire from P. Giuseppe, and from *others versed in the rites of the Abyssinians*, by what *Form* the Sacred Orders and the Priesthood are conferred by the schismatical Bishops of Ethiopia, and then that the question be formulated and proposed anew.' The new *quæsitum* was prepared and set forth in the following terms: 'In Ethiopia, since the candidates for ordination have come from places far apart in order to be ordained in the city where the schismatical Archbishop resides, and since the latter will only ordain when from eight to ten thousand are gathered for ordination in the said city, it happens at times that he will ordain three or four thousand in one day. The candidates for priesthood being drawn up in lines in the church, the Archbishop passing rapidly in front of them lays his hand on the head of each and says: "*Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*;" and upon the head of the candidates for diaconate he simply lays his episcopal cross, and since, by reason of the great crowd and the confusion and the rate he goes at, it happens that with some he omits the laying-on of hands; and with others, the words of the Form; and both one and the other with not a few, it is desirable to know if priests and deacons ordained in this fashion and with this Form are validly ordained.' It is to this question that the supposed decree of April 9, 1704, is a reply." While this did not receive Papal approba-

tion, yet it was not rejected, but marked *dilata* (deferred).

Father Brandi, following Cardinal Patrizi and Cardinal Franzelin (who in 1875 made a deep study of the question in order to get out of the difficulty proposed by Cardinal Manning's letter), states that the facts are as follows: The decree is not a genuine decree, since it was only a *votum*, which did not receive the approval of Pope Clement XI. Also, an ancient *relatio* sent to the Sacred Congregation by the Prefect Apostolic of the Copts in 1803 shows that "*Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*" did not constitute the whole Form in the Coptic ordinations, since this relation states that "when there are many to be ordained, for instance twenty or thirty, the Bishop does not lay his hand upon the heads of all, but holds it stretched out a little above their heads, without touching them, and recites the Form for all together. Then, before giving the Communion in both kinds, he puts his two hands upon the two cheeks of each, and blows three times upon their face and mouth, and says in Coptic, *Ci imbneuma csuab*, i. e., *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*."

which did not receive the approval of Clement XI.

The ancient "*relatio*."

The inference which Father Brandi seems to draw from this statement is that *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM* was used to apply to each individual the Matter and Form which were contained in other parts of the rite. From his point of view, therefore, it was not a case of omission of either Matter or Form, since these, he holds, were collectively said over all the candidates in somewhat the same way, perhaps, as in the present Roman Ordinal where the Bishop with hands extended says the prayer over all candidates collectively. It was rather a sense of inadequate application of the Matter or Form which led to the question.

The inference to be drawn from Fr. Brandi's statement.

This inference of Father Brandi's, of course, is based upon the new theory of the Matter and Form in the Sacrament of Holy Orders, which theologians of the present day are teaching, and which is a modification of De Lugo's view of the moral unity of the whole rite. Under the old view it implied that Priests could be ordained simply with the words *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM* and the hands placed upon their cheeks, without having received any other imposition of hands, or the use of any other Form. What the Sacred Congregation may have ruled is, of course, of small importance to us; but, as we have said, the whole history of this matter does not impress one very favourably as to the value or accuracy of their rulings; since this was acted upon as a decree for 171 years, and might have been acted upon in this way to the end of time had not Cardinal Manning's question reopened the matter.

Of what value is the accuracy of the S. C., since this was acted upon for 171 years?

(ii.) "Accipe S. S.," the Form with which all Roman Bishops are consecrated.

The rubric in the Pontifical, together with Form and prayer following.

Before we pass from the Papal statement that *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM* is insufficient Form, we may observe that, according to the most common opinion (until of late), it is the Form with which all Roman Bishops are consecrated.

In the Roman Pontifical the rubric is as follows: "Then the consecrator and assisting Bishops touch with both hands the head of him who is to be consecrated, saying, *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*. Which having been done, the consecrator, standing, puts off his mitre and says: 'Be favourable, O LORD, to our prayers, and incline the horn of sacerdotal grace over this Thy servant, and pour upon him the virtue of Thy benediction; through our LORD,' " etc.

Here we see that the Form is simply, *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*, pronounced by all the Bishops together, and

the prayer which follows does not specify episcopal, but sacerdotal grace ; although later in the rite, after the unction of the hands, there is an allusion to the pontifical office which is now generally considered to be the full Form. It is then evident that if *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*, etc., alone were the Form, we have abundant reason to consider it sufficient, from the testimony of Holy Scripture in the ordination of the Apostles, from the ruling and practice of the Holy Office, and from the Roman Pontifical itself.

We must, however, remember that although for a long period this was supposed to be the Form, yet, as we indicated in the last chapter, it is probably not the full Form. It is used with concomitant prayers, and these all taken together, along with the imperative formula, constitute the Form, and they, taken thus as a whole, clearly and definitely "express the Sacred Order of Priesthood." As was pointed out in the last chapter (p. 85), this imperative formula is the application of the Sacrament to the ordinand.

iv "Accipe S. S.," not the sole Form, but its application.

One would suppose, from the tone of the Pope's letter and from the strictures of Roman theologians on our Ordinal, that the Roman Ordinal was a model of theological accuracy and perspicacity.

It will probably surprise many to learn that the Roman Ordinal is of all the most confused and difficult ; so much so that, as we have said, even Roman theologians themselves cannot agree at all as to where or when a Priest is made a Priest by this Ordinal. For a proof of this assertion let us take the recently published *Outlines of Dogmatic Theology*, by the Jesuit, Hunter. The third volume bears the date, Stonyhurst, 1896.\*

2. Difficulties in the Roman Ordinal.

"It is certain," says Hunter (p. 378), "that the

\* We are not responsible for the English of this extract.

1. Hunter's admission of this.

He gives three principal opinions.

The only point certain, that the Matter and Form occur before the Consecration in the Mass.

The view of Eugenius IV. shown to be faulty because lacking antiquity.

subject of the ceremony, who was not a Priest at the beginning, is a Priest at the end, but the difficulty is to tell *at what part* of the ceremony he became a Priest and had the priestly character impressed upon his soul : in other words, *when* were the Matter and Form of the Sacrament applied to him? On this point three principal opinions are found in grave authors : the first holds that the Matter is the act of the Bishop who stretches out his hand upon the group of ordinands, and the Form is the prayer with which he accompanies the action ; according to the second, the Matter is the act of delivering the instruments of the Mass, and the Form is the words uttered as they are delivered ; the third requires both the imposition of hands and the tradition of the instruments.

" Some points may be considered certain. The ordination has been effected *before* the time of the Consecration, for no one who was not a Priest would be allowed to utter the sacred words with the Bishop ; besides which, the rubric of the Pontifical, from the tradition of the instruments onwards, uses the word 'ordained' in place of 'ordinand,' which had been used previously ; it follows that the last laying on of hands when the words refer to the power of forgiving sin, merely expresses what has already been done.

" From this it might seem that the tradition of the instruments was the essential matter, . . . and this, as we have seen, is the teaching of Pope Eugenius IV. to the Armenians. . . . But this ceremony has certainly not always been everywhere requisite, . . . for the tradition of the instruments was nowhere used in the Church until the ninth century, and is even now confined to the West ; and yet the Roman Church fully recognizes the validity of the

ancient rite employed in the East, although it contains no 'tradition.' "

In this somewhat long quotation from Hunter we have a confession that there is no agreement whatever among Romans in regard to the Matter and Form, three different opinions being held.

Summary of  
Hunter's position.

One of them—that the giving of the chalice and paten (the *tradition of the instruments*) is the Matter, and the words said at that time the Form—has the authority of the decree of Eugenius IV., *Pro Armenis*, at the Council of Florence, and this was the almost universal opinion of Roman scholastics from the twelfth to the sixteenth century.

It is overthrown, however, as Hunter points out, by the discovery which Morinus made (*de Sacris Ordinationibus* ; pars III., exerc. vii., cap. 1), that this ceremony formed no part of the ancient Ordinal, and was certainly not in use before the ninth century. So that the Romans are confronted with the dilemma, that either their Church invented a new Form and Matter of conveying the Sacrament of Orders at that time, or that this is not the Form and Matter. The former of these is quite inadmissible, since the Church has probably no power to alter the Form and Matter of Sacraments, and the latter labours under the difficulty that an infallible Pope has to be proved fallible, and this too on a very serious occasion, when putting forth the decrees *Pro Armenis* of the Council of Florence.

For some time past the tendency of Roman theologians has been to regard the imposition of hands as alone the essential Matter (De Augustinis, *de Re Sacramentaria* ; tom. II., p. 497), and this is apparently the view of Leo XIII. in his Bull, where he says : "The Matter of the Sacrament of Orders, in so

ii. The majority now considers imposition of hands alone the essential Matter. So apparently does Leo XIII.



far as we have to consider it in this case, is the imposition of hands." In this Leo XIII. is undoubtedly right, but, unfortunately for the Romans, he contradicts the decision of Eugenius IV.

And this is not the only difficulty that they have to meet,—two Popes contradicting each other in regard to so important a question as the Form and Matter of the Sacrament of Orders. For when we come to examine Leo XIII.'s position we find in it most serious difficulties in connection with the Roman Ordinal itself, since it practically requires that a clean sweep be made of all the Roman teaching in regard to the Matter and Form of Orders, from the time of S. Thomas to the present day. And with regard to this subject the tangle is so hopeless that there seems no other way out of it.

iii. The tangle in the Roman view caused by the influence of three distinct theories :

The mediævalism of S. Thomas ; the 16th century reaction ; the scientific antiquarianism of Morinus.

The three main threads are : the mediævalism of Innocent III. and S. Thomas ; the teaching of sixteenth-century theologians, which was largely coloured by a reaction from and an antagonism to Protestantism ; and the scientific antiquarianism of the school of Morinus. The attempt to explain the present Roman Ordinal without giving up any of these views, has resulted in a perfect labyrinth of opinions, out of which it is most difficult to extract any clear principle ; especially as the necessity of reckoning with the first runs through all the practice of the Roman court, and makes a really scientific theory impossible.

We, who are unfettered by these chains, need have no hesitation in answering Hunter's difficulty by saying that in the Roman Ordinal the Matter is the first imposition of hands, which is morally one with the extension of hands following it and continues while the prayer or Form is being said ; and further, that this

Matter and Form are the application to the individual ordinand of the Sacrament of Holy Orders, which depends not only upon those particular words, but upon the whole rite.

From this it follows that the real question involved in the validity both of Anglican and Roman Orders is whether there be in the rite sufficient expression of a purpose to confer the Priesthood ; and this, indeed, is what the Pope intimates in his Bull, although he considers that such expression of purpose is not to be found in our Ordinal. While the difficulty, as we have said, does not really concern us, inasmuch as we are in no way bound by the mediæval theory, yet for the Romans it is very serious, because it requires an abandonment of all their teaching since the thirteenth century.

If, however, they do not make this sacrifice, but require that the Matter and Form should be coincident, and that the Form should in itself express the purpose of the Sacrament, they are confronted with two difficulties.

First ; if they regard the imposition of hands as the Matter, there is no imposition of hands in which Matter and Form coincide, except that which occurs after the newly ordained Priests have said Mass with the Bishop, and, as Hunter remarks, "uttered those solemn words of Consecration which no one but a Priest would be allowed to utter." For the first imposition of hands is unaccompanied by any Form whatever ; and the second (*extensio manuum*) has a Form, but inasmuch as the hands do not touch the candidates, but are merely extended over them all in a body, it is not an imposition of hands.

Secondly ; if they regard as Matter and Form the delivery of the vessels, with the words, "Receive

In the Anglican rite is there sufficient expression of purpose to confer Priesthood ?

iv. The Romans have to meet two difficulties :

in regard (1) to the "imposition" theory,

(2) and to the "porrection" view.

the power of offering Sacrifice," according to the decision of Eugenius IV., there is the difficulty that these were not in the Ordinal for at least nine centuries.

Now with reference to our insertion into the Ordinal in 1662 of the words "for the office and work of a Priest in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands," the Pope very properly remarks: "Even if this addition could give to the Form its due signification, it was introduced too late, as a century had already elapsed since the adoption of the Edwardine Ordinal, for, as the hierarchy had become extinct, there remained no power of ordaining." But that which Eugenius IV. teaches to be the Form labours under the difficulty that it was introduced, not one century, but nine centuries too late, and the inference which follows is inevitable.

v. De Lugo's  
proposed solu-  
tion of the  
difficulty;

De Lugo, who died in 1660, (certainly one of the greatest of Roman theologians, and one who has suggested for many theological questions solutions generally accepted at the present day) discusses the subject of the relation of Form to Matter and comes to the conclusion that it is not necessary for them to be coincident, so long as they are contained in the same Service.

a moral unity  
in the whole  
rite,

For instance, while still bound by the mediæval theory that the porrection of the instruments is the essential Matter, he holds that the first imposition of hands together with this make up a joint Matter, of which the latter alone is essential, the former being an integral part. He considers the whole rite as one act of ordaining, using the illustration of the coronation of a king, in which there are many different ceremonies, drawn out through a considerable length of time, and yet the whole is the one act of coronation.

So, he says, we must consider in regard to ordination that there is a moral concurrence from the application of the Matter, when the Bishop *first* lays his hands on the candidates without any words, through the other acts (namely, the extension of the right hand over the whole body of the ordinands, while the prayer is read; the vesting of the ordinands with the stole and chasuble; the anointing of their hands; the giving to them a chalice with wine and water, and a paten with bread), until at last the Form is reached in the words "Receive the power of offering Sacrifice," etc. (De Lugo; tom. III., *de Sac. in Genere*, disp. ii., § 5, n. 99-104).

Gasparri (*de Ordinatione*; tom. II., p. 204; cap. v., § 2, n. 988), with the best modern Roman theologians, modifies De Lugo's view thus far, that he considers the Matter to be the first imposition of hands, and the Form to be contained in the prayer following, giving up the porrection of the instruments as being any essential part of the Matter. De Augustinis (p. 497) similarly holds that the imposition of hands is the Matter, and that a prayer signifying the purpose is the Form.

We are often reminded by Romans of their great advantage over us, in that they have a Church with a living voice, always ready, through its head the Pope, to condemn error and teach infallible truth. It will be interesting, therefore, at this point to compare the official teachings of some of the Popes in regard to this much vexed question of the Matter of Holy Orders.

We have already seen that Eugenius IV., in his decree *Pro Armenis*, distinctly asserts that the Matter is the tradition of the instruments. He says not a word about imposition of hands, which he evidently does not consider to be any part of the Matter.

so that from the first imposition to the porrection there is moral concurrence of the Matter.

Gasparri's modification of this view.

De Augustinis holds a similar opinion.

vi. The opinions of four Popes as to Matter compared :

(a) Eugenius IV., 1439;

(b) Innocent  
XII., 1697 ;

But he was not the only Pope who attached supreme importance to the tradition of the instruments as the Matter of Holy Orders, for we find that on Wednesday, August 1, 1697, the following doubt was brought before the Holy Office. Mgr. Scanagatta, Bishop of Avellino, who suffered from gout in the hands, had for some time omitted in ordinations the customary *traditio instrumentorum* prescribed by the Pontifical. When this came to be known by Cardinal Orsini, then Archbishop of Benevento, afterwards Pope Benedict XIII., he referred the case to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, asking "not, indeed, if the ordinations are to be repeated, but only as to the mode of ordaining, whether it is to be repeated absolutely or conditionally." The inquiry was answered by the following decree. On the date above mentioned His Holiness Innocent XII., having heard, etc., decreed "that in the case in question it was safer that the ordination should be reiterated under condition."

Innocent XII., therefore, in spite of the light thrown upon the question in the sixteenth century, still thought the omission of the tradition of the instruments so important as to require a reiteration of the Sacrament *sub conditione*.

(c) Gregory  
IX., 1227-1241 ;

If we now go back a few centuries we shall find that Gregory IX. (who published five books of decretals, and who made the blunder of denying the validity of the Orders of the Greek Church), in his chapter *De Sacramentis non Iterandis* expressly says that the imposition of hands by which Priests are ordained is a rite introduced by the Apostles, and therefore not that outward sign essentially and determinately required by CHRIST, but one indeterminately required, or some other equivalent sign.

But elsewhere in the same chapter Gregory says that if a Priest or a Deacon when he was ordained did not receive imposition of hands, [the rite] is not to be in any wise iterated, but that which has been omitted by error is to be carefully supplied at the next ordination season ; that is, if the Priest or Deacon finds it out within three months ; but, if a longer period elapse, he is to be reordained.

Whence, as De Lugo says, this imposition of hands is not so essentially requisite to the validity of Orders that without it Order cannot exist ; otherwise it would not suffice after three months to add it without the Form, as Gregory says may be done, but the Form which is used at the porrection of the bread and wine would have to be repeated, for when the Bishop first imposes his hands he uses no words (De Lugo ; tom. III., *de Sac.*, disp. ii., n. 87, 88).

It is instructive to compare Gregory IX.'s view with Innocent XII.'s. The latter says that if the tradition of the instruments has been omitted, this is so important that the man must be ordained again *sub conditione*. Gregory IX. says that if the imposition of hands be omitted, that is so unimportant that there is no need to reordain him, but that this can be supplied at any time within three months, apparently without the accompaniment of any Form.

Leo XIII. in the Bull which we are considering takes, however, a different view. He says that "the Matter, . . . in so far as we have to consider it in this case, is the imposition of hands." (d) Leo XIII., 1896.

There is, so far as we are aware, no canon in the Roman Church which clearly lays down what should be done when infallible Popes differ ; and it certainly may somewhat reconcile us to our poverty to find that

No canon of procedure when Popes differ.

the teachings of Popes are not always an entirely unalloyed blessing. We may here respectfully ask how we are to proceed. Is the utterance of the latest Pope, or that of the earliest, to be considered as of more value? Or should numbers prevail, and the opinion of Gregory IX., Eugenius IV., and Innocent XII. be considered to outweigh that of Leo XIII.?

As in most cases when we go to the Bishop of Rome for settlement of theological difficulties, we return sadder, but not wiser men; though perhaps more resigned to our lot in having only what the Church has always had to help us to Divine truth, namely, the rule of faith, uncomplicated by Papal decisions.

Possibly Leo XIII. has some misgivings on the subject himself, especially as we believe he is not supposed to be speaking *ex cathedra*; and he seems to give us a hint of this when he says: "The Matter, . . . *in so far as we have to consider it in this case*, is the imposition of hands." Does he mean that in our simple rite there can be no difficulty in deciding what the Matter is, it being clearly that imposition of hands which from the very earliest times, and everywhere, the Church has used; but that, in view of the confusion of his own Ordinal and the different opinions of his own theologians, he does not desire to commit himself to any opinion in regard to the question as bearing on Roman ordinations?

To us it would seem that since the Church has no power to change the Matter or Form of a Sacrament, that which is the Matter of the Sacrament in the Anglican and Greek rites *must* be the Matter in that of Rome. But we have shown that there were at least three Popes who did not think so.

Until quite recently all theologians probably held

Leo XIII. apparently not without misgivings on the subject.

that the words "Receive the HOLY GHOST," etc., were the sufficient Form in the English Ordinal. The study of ancient rites which has been stimulated by this controversy has, however, led many, both in our own and in the Roman Church, to conclude that the Form should be precatory and not imperative, and that—as we have already pointed out—the imperative formula simply confers on the individual candidate the grace of Orders, which may (so to speak) be collected from the Form in other parts of the rite.

Accordingly many have now adopted the view that the prayer "Almighty GOD," etc., which serves as the collect in the Mass, is the sufficient Form. Others, however, adopting De Lugo's view of the moral unity of the whole rite, hold that this prayer is to be taken in connection with the *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM*, and that taken together they constitute adequate Form.

The question as to which is the more correct view is, however, of little moment. We know as a matter of faith that the rite *taken as a whole* is sufficient, and, therefore, it is of comparatively small importance, except academically, to determine precisely wherein the adequacy resides. When we say that this is a matter of faith we mean that because the Church gives us the Ordinal, *therefore* it is sufficient.

However, the Pope draws our attention to this question by saying that while the prayer "Almighty GOD, Giver of all good things," etc., which precedes the laying on of hands, "might suffice as the legitimate Form of Orders . . . in a Catholic rite approved by the Church, it is insufficient in the Edwardine Ordinal, because the whole spirit and character of that Ordinal is faulty, since in it there is no mention of the *Sacerdotium*, or purpose of the Service."

VOL. II.—8

3. What is the adequate Form in the English rite?

i. The Pope admits the prayer "Almighty GOD," etc., might be the Form but for lack of intention in the Service.



But this most clearly expressed in Ordinal.

The answer to this is very simple. In the Edwardine Ordinal not only are the titles "The Ordering of Priests," and "The Consecration of Bishops," but the Preface to the Ordinal says: "It is evident unto all men, diligently reading Holy Scripture and ancient Authors, that from the Apostles' time there hath been these Orders of Ministers in CHRIST's Church, Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. . . . And, therefore, to the *intent* that these Orders should be *continued*," etc. Here the actual words "intent" and "continued" are used, and yet we are accused of defect of *intention* and breach of *continuity*.

ii. The Pope assumes a non-Catholic sense;

The Pope says that "the words 'for the office and work of a Priest' or 'of a Bishop'" in our Ordinal "must be understood in a sense different to that which they bear in the Catholic rite."

but the Preface refutes this.

And yet the Ordinal explicitly states that it is the intention that these Orders which have come down from the Apostles' time are to be *continued*. Not only are the candidates presented by the Archdeacon "to be admitted to the Order of Priesthood," and by the two Bishops "to be consecrated Bishop," but in the prayer which the Pope quotes, and which many hold to be the Form,—*"Almighty GOD, Giver of all good things,"* etc.,—we have the words: "Mercifully behold these Thy servants now called to the Office of Priesthood," and in the corresponding prayer in the consecration of a Bishop we have: "Mercifully behold this Thy servant now called to the work and ministry of a Bishop."

It is surely unnecessary to specify all the various functions belonging to the Priesthood. The Roman Church specifies especially the offering of the Holy Sacrifice, and we, following our LORD's own words,

specify the absolution of sin ; and in the Greek Church, whose Orders the Church of Rome recognizes as valid, there is no mention of any of the functions of the Priesthood or Episcopate, but only, as in our Ordinal, the use of the titles " Priest " and " Bishop."

But there is another and still more overwhelming answer to the Pope's position when he says : " That Form, consequently, cannot be considered apt or sufficient for the Sacrament which omits what it ought properly to signify." Now according to the Pope's Bull the Form must signify either " the Sacred Order of *Sacerdotium* " or " the grace and power thereof."

iii. The Roman and Coptic Forms contain no mention of the power of consecrating and sacrificing till the 9th century.

Gasparri, one of the greatest living authorities on the subject, and one of the theologians who examined our Orders, some little time before carefully collated various Forms of ordination used in the Church. Among these he has noted several which lack the precise features which the Pope has declared to be essential. He says (in p. 40 of his work *De la Valeur des Ordinations Anglicanes*) : " The enumeration of the powers conferred by ordination is not found in all the prayers. . . . The Coptic Form and the Roman Form for the Presbyterate say nothing about the power of consecrating and of sacrificing."

How marvellous ! The *Roman* rite, Gasparri says, is lacking in the very thing which the Pope says is proper to it. How is this ? A superficial theologian would say that there is indeed in the Roman rite mention of the power of sacrificing. It is true it is not a part of the Form, properly so called ; but is found elsewhere in the rite, attached to a subsidiary ceremony. Still, it is there.

Yes ; but this subsidiary ceremony with its accompanying words found its way into the Roman rite dur-

ing the ninth century at the earliest. For nearly a thousand years, then, the Roman rite of ordination contained not the slightest allusion to the Sacrifice; yet the Pope implies this to be essential, and for lack of it condemns the English Form as defective, and the English ordinations as absolutely null and void.

The conclusion which follows is inevitable: for a thousand years there were no valid ordinations in the Roman Church. If there were none then, there are none now. In condemning our Orders the Pope by the same judgment condemns his own. And we may add yet a word more—that in some of the Uniat rites *now used with Roman approval* there is also no mention of Sacrifice. People who live in glass houses should certainly not throw stones.

The Pope in condemning Anglican Orders condemns his own.

"*Sæpius Officio*" notes that there is no mention of the "*Sacerdotium*," or its grace and power in the Hippolytan and Leonine Sacramentaries.

But some may say that the Pope leaves himself a loophole, although one not very apparent, by implying it to be necessary that there should be *either* a mention of the *Sacerdotium* or of "the grace and power thereof." We have just seen that Gasparri proves that the latter is absent from some Forms, and especially from the ancient Roman; while our Archbishops, in their reply to the Pope (*Sæpius Officio*, cap. xii.) rightly call attention to the fact that in the Hippolytan and Leonine Sacramentaries neither of these alternative specifications is found. It seems impossible to conceive of a more complete answer.

III. The second argument is defect of *Intention*. Really the only one.

The second argument against our Orders used in the Pope's letter is defect of *Intention*. We might say that this is the *only* argument, since the Pope really admits, though grudgingly, that if the intention were right the Form would be sufficient, when he says that if the Form were found in a Catholic rite it might, perhaps, be adequate.

Before treating of the doctrine of intention in the Roman Church it will be well to call attention to a common misunderstanding about the use of the term *Intention*. Strictly speaking, intention can only be the act of a person, for it is an act of the will ; hence defect of intention is a personal defect, and it is an abuse of the term to speak of the intention of a rite.

The strict force of the term "Intention."

What the Pope seems to mean is that the only recognizable test of the Minister's intention is the rite which he uses ; if he uses a Catholic rite we must assume his good intention. So that his argument is that the defect of intention in the Anglican Church is, so to speak, imposed upon the Bishops using the English Ordinal, by the native defects of the Ordinal itself,—what he calls *nativa Ordinalis indoles ac spiritus*. In fact he bases both his objections on this vague ground, that this *nativa indoles* deprives both the Form and the Minister's intention of validity.

What the Pope seems to mean.

Like most doctrines of which we have to treat in a discussion of Holy Orders, the teaching in regard to intention varies very much amongst Roman theologians. This is clearly stated by Suarez (tom. XX., quæst. lxiv., art. 8, p. 233), where he says : " Intention in the Minister of a Sacrament may be understood in a threefold way. First, there is the intention or will . . . of doing an external action, for instance of washing or anointing. Secondly, there is the intention of effecting a Sacrament, or what is the same, of doing what CHRIST instituted, or what the Church intends. Thirdly, there is the intention of conferring the effect of the Sacrament."

1. Suarez's statement of the three theories of intention.

Suarez, while claiming that the first two are necessary—that is, the intention (1) to do an external act and (2) to effect a Sacrament—says, with almost all Roman theologians, that the third, which he calls

"the intention of conferring the effect of the Sacrament," or, as it is often expressed, an intention which has regard to the "end" of the Sacrament, is not necessary.

He holds the first two necessary, but admits that S. Thomas thought the first sufficient. This is the view of Catharinus,

But, while claiming that the first two are necessary, he admits that it is quite doubtful whether S. Thomas held more than one to be necessary, that is, the intention to do the external act (cf. *Summa*; pars III., quæst. lxiv., art. 8; tom. V., p. 344).

Catharinus, a Dominican theologian, present at the very session of the Council of Trent in which the doctrine of intention was defined, taught distinctly that the only intention required was the first and external intention, that is, the intention to do the act seriously.

Salmeron, Becanus, Contenson, and Bossuet.

Many great theologians have espoused this view—the Jesuits Salmeron and Becanus, the celebrated Dominican Contenson, and the great Bossuet.

Ryder considers it an open question; Addis and Arnold, and Scannell adopt it.

It has never been condemned by Rome, and Father Ryder in his recent book on Catholic controversy admits that the question is still quite open; while Addis and Arnold, together with the Rev. T. E. Scannell (who was one of the theologians who examined our Orders), say in their *Catholic Dictionary*, which is published with the approval of Cardinal Manning in England and of Archbishop Corrigan in America, that they hold this doctrine of Bossuet. We quote their words: "But is it enough for validity if the minister merely perform the external rite in a serious manner, even if internally he withhold his intention, *i. e.*, even if from malice or impiety? . . . We follow the opinion of those who answer in the affirmative and we give our reply in the words of Bossuet," etc.\*

Of course there can be no possible question about

\* *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 811.

the external intention of the Ministers in the Edwardine Ordinal to perform the rite seriously, and as we shall see, it is just as clear that they had the second intention—that of effecting a Sacrament. But before discussing this it will be well to understand clearly what Romanists mean by this second intention of effecting a Sacrament.

In the Edwardine Ordinal both first and second intention clearly expressed.

We could hardly have a more representative Roman theologian on this point than Cardinal Bellarmine, the great Jesuit controversial writer. Let us therefore see what he says in his treatise on the Sacraments in General (vol. III., book I., chap. xxvii.) about the way intention is to be understood. He says:

2. Bellarmine's theory of intention.

"The opinion of Catholics is that the intention of doing what the Church does is to be required." But here, he says, certain things must be noted.

"First, it is not to be required that the Minister should have a general intention of doing what the Church does, in such a way that he is not able to have a particular intention. Indeed, it is better to have a particular intention, that is, of conferring the Sacrament of Baptism, of Absolution, of Confirmation, of consecrating the Eucharist, etc. But for him who does not comprehend our mysteries it is sufficient if in a general way he intends to do what the Church does; and this the Councils [of Florence and Trent] teach.

A general intention of doing what the Church does is sufficient,

Secondly, there is no need to intend to do what the Roman Church does, but what the true Church does, whichever Church that may be, or what CHRIST instituted, or what Christians do; for these all come to the same thing. You ask, What if anyone intends to do what some particular Church does, and that a false one (though he think it true), as, for instance, the Church of Geneva, and intends not to do what the

as taught by the Councils of Florence and Trent.

No need to intend to do what the Roman Church does.

An intention contrary to this would not invalidate the Sacrament.

Roman Church does? I reply, Even this is sufficient ; for he who intends to do what the Church of Geneva does, intends to do what the Universal Church does, for he intends to do that which such a Church does as he thinks to be a member of the true Universal Church, although he is deceived in his knowledge of the true Church. But the error of the Minister about the true Church does not take away the efficacy of the Sacrament, only his *defect of intention* can do this."

That the Council of Trent requires an intention in regard to the "end" of the Sacrament is false.

This charge of Tilmann and Chemnitz "an unmitigated lie," says Bellarmine,

who proves it from the practice of the ancient Church in regard to those baptized by Pelagians, and in his day by Zwinglians and Calvinists.

The same teaching in Tournely.

Bellarmino then goes on to say that heretics, such as Tilmann and Chemnitz, falsely say that the Council of Trent has decided that a Sacrament is not valid unless the Minister intends not only the act, but also the *end* of the Sacrament, "that is, unless he intends that [end] on account of which the Sacrament was instituted ; which is certainly very different from our opinion. But this is an *unmitigated lie* (*merum mendacium*) ; for the Council [of Trent] in the whole of Canon XI. does not speak of the 'end' of the Sacrament, nor does the Council say that the Minister ought to intend to do that which the Church *intends*, but that which the Church *does*. What the Church does, however, signifies not the *end*, but the *action*. And, finally, this agrees with our practice ; for neither was the ancient Church in the habit of rebaptizing children who had been baptized by Pelagians, nor do we rebaptize those who have been baptized by Zwinglians and Calvinists, although we know that all these were baptized without the intention of the true end of Baptism, which is, to take away original sin."

We have almost the same teaching in Tournely (tom. III., *de Sacramentis in Genere*, quæst. vi., art. 1) : "Whatever a man's opinion may be about the Sacrament, its effect and end, or about the Church itself,

whether he rejects all these things or admits them, makes no difference to the substance of the Sacrament. . . . He need not intend to produce the effect of the Sacrament, or to perform the rite of the Church as a Sacrament, or to do what the Catholic and Roman Church does. It is enough that he should intend in some general way to do what the Church does, whatever his opinion about the Church, the Sacrament, its effect and object, may be."

If we apply to the Edwardine Ordinal these definitions of Bellarmine and Tournely—namely, that the Ordinal only requires the act to be done seriously and in order to effect a Sacrament—there can be no doubt, first, that the act of ordination was done seriously; and secondly, that it was done with the intention of effecting a Sacrament, that is, of doing what the Church does, of ordaining Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; for in the Preface it distinctly states this to be the intent of the Service, and, as the Pope says, the intention of the Minister is to be judged by the Service he uses.

These definitions applied to the Edwardine Ordinal,

which satisfies them.

The Pope tells us that "the words 'Receive the HOLY GHOST' certainly do not in the least definitely express the Sacred Order of Priesthood, or its grace and power." But, as we have already shown, the words which follow,—"Whose sins thou dost forgive," etc.,—do, as a matter of fact, definitely express the Sacred Order of Priesthood; since to express a power belonging exclusively to Priesthood is to express Priesthood itself.

It is doubtful whether the Pope means to imply that it is also necessary that in the Form (or possibly in some other prayer) there should be an expression of the third intention, that of the end or effect of the Sacrament,—i. e., its grace and power. But there is no doubt whatever that this is what the defenders and

Doubtful whether the Pope requires third intention,



but quite certain that his English vindicators do.

vindicators of the Bull openly demand when they say that the crucial question is whether the English Ordinal requires the Bishop to convey the specific power of effecting transubstantiation.

This has been admirably answered by the English Archbishops in their short reply to the letter put forth by the Roman Bishops in England.

And we may also answer by reminding them that Bellarmine said this was what heretics accused the Roman Church of holding and the Council of Trent of defining, and that it was "an unmitigated lie." (The words are Bellarmine's, not ours.) Furthermore he proves his point from the practice in regard to Baptism. He says the ancient Church did not rebaptize those "who had been baptized by Pelagians, nor do we rebaptize those who have been baptized by Zwinglians and Calvinists;" yet in both these cases it is perfectly clear that there was no intention to effect the end of the Sacrament, which was the remission of original sin—because the Pelagians did not believe in original sin. And so Bellarmine, with Tournely, distinctly affirms that the intention required is the intention to effect a Sacrament, but not necessarily any belief in the end for which it was instituted.

The Pope implies that the intention to do what the Roman Church does is wanting; Bellarmine says it is unnecessary.

The Pope also implies that the intention to do what the Roman Church does is wanting. But again, Bellarmine says explicitly, there is no need to intend to do what the Roman Church does, but what CHRIST instituted, and what Christians do. And so we find that the objection to our Orders on account of defect of intention falls to the ground just as much as the objection based on the Form used.

IV. The Pope's misstatements.

Before we pass from this subject, it may be well to notice some of the misstatements of the Papal Bull.

In Sections vii. and viii. of the authorized translation of the Papal Bull the word *Sacerdotium* occurs several times *untranslated*.

1. No mention of "Sacerdotium,"

For instance: "In the whole Ordinal not only is there no clear mention of the Sacrifice, of Consecration, of the *Sacerdotium*, and of the power of consecrating and offering sacrifice, but, as we have just stated, every trace of these things, which had been in such prayers of the Catholic rite as they had not entirely rejected, was deliberately removed and struck out" (Sec. viii.).

of which "every trace had been deliberately struck out ;"

Now here it is to be observed that in the authorized translation one word only is left in its Latin dress. Why is this? Not because it is a difficult word to translate, for there can be absolutely no question that it means "Priesthood;" but because, if translated, the falsehood would be so obvious.

Let us substitute "Priesthood" in the above extract. The statement then is: "In the whole Ordinal not only is there no clear mention . . . of the Priesthood, but . . . every trace . . . was deliberately removed and struck out"—that is, struck out of the Ordinal.

And yet the title is "The Form of Ordering of Priests;" the Archdeacon presents the persons "to be admitted to the Order of Priesthood;" and the Bishop thereupon says to the congregation: "Good people, these be they whom we purpose, GOD willing, to receive this day unto the holy Office of Priesthood;" and in the Collect the Bishop prays: "Mercifully behold these Thy servants, now called to the Office of Priesthood." "Every trace," says the Papal letter, "of Priesthood was removed from the Ordinal," and yet here are four distinct mentions of it! How many times would it be necessary to mention it in order to satisfy Roman theologians?

and yet four distinct mentions of it;

and more, it is mentioned as the purpose or intention of the Bishop in ordaining,

and of the Church in continuing the old Orders.

2. Misquotation of a passage from the Bull of Paul IV. in regard to dispensations.

Word "concernentia" omitted in Pole's copy,

And not only is there mention of it, but mention of it as the *purpose* of the Bishop in ordaining :—"Good people, these be they whom we *purpose*, GOD willing, to receive this day unto the holy Office of Priesthood." That is, the Bishop distinctly states his *intention* to ordain to the Priesthood, while the Papal Bull states that all mention of the Priesthood has been deliberately eliminated from the prayers. And, as we have already observed, the Preface to the Ordinal states the intention of the Church to continue the old Orders which had come down "from the Apostles' time." Yet the Bull implies that the intention was not to perpetuate those Orders, but to reject them.

To take another point : In Sec. iii., the Bull of Paul IV., *Præclara Carissimi*, issued June 20, 1555, is quoted in several places, among others in this : "Neither should the passage much to the point in the same Pontifical letter be overlooked, where, together with others needing *dispensation* are enumerated those 'who had obtained as well Orders as benefices *nulliter et de facto*.' For to obtain Orders *nulliter* means the same as by an act null and void, that is, invalid, as the very meaning of the word and as common parlance requires. This is especially clear when the word is used in the same way about Orders as about 'ecclesiastical benefices.' "

In the general dispensation given by Cardinal Pole on the reconciliation of England there is this very sentence about benefices and Orders that had been obtained *nulliter et de facto*, which is (in Latin) very ungrammatical and very puzzling.

Many translations have been suggested, but during the examination of our Orders at Rome, the Bull itself, *Præclara Carissimi*, of Paul IV., which the Pope

quotes, was found in the Vatican and published in *The Tablet*, a Roman Catholic newspaper. This Bull recites at length a great part of Pole's dispensation, *including* the disputed passage, but with the addition of the word *concernentia*, which makes alike the grammar and the sense perfect, and shows that it was not *benefices and Orders* which had been obtained *nulliter et de facto*, but certain *dispensations* and indults *concerning* benefices and Orders. It was obvious at once that the word *concernentia* had slipped out of the copies of Pole's dispensation.

but found in the Vatican copy;

Now will it be believed that the present Papal Bull, professing to quote the passage from the Bull of Paul IV., which is in the Vatican, quotes it leaving out the word *concernentia*? That is to say, to put it clearly, there is no such passage in the Bull of Paul IV. as the Pope quotes. We give the full Latin text of the passage :

omitted in the Bull so as to change the statement of Paul IV.

"*Ac omnes ecclesiasticas, seculares seu quorumvis ordinum regulares, personas, quæ aliquas impetrationes, dispensationes, concessiones, gratias et indulta, tam ordines quam beneficia ecclesiastica, seu alias spirituales materias [concernentia], prætensa auctoritate supremæ Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ nulliter et de facto obtinuerint, et ad cor reversæ Ecclesiæ unitati restitutæ fuerint, in suis ordinibus et beneficiis per nos ipsos seu a nobis ad id deputatos, misericorditer recipiemus.*"

The full Latin text.

The English of this is : " And all ecclesiastical persons, whether seculars or regulars of any Order, who, under the pretended authority of the supremacy of the Anglican Church, have *nulliter et de facto* obtained any requests, dispensations, grants, graces, or indults concerning as well Orders as ecclesiastical benefices and other matters spiritual, but who have returned to the

The dispensation does not refer to Orders,

the Bull explicitly declaring that the Orders and benefices will be received. The dispensations and indulgences, having been received from the King, were null in the eyes of Rome, but the Orders are expressly ratified as valid.

3. Statement that the brief of Julius III. must refer to the Edwardine Ordinal.

This is false in fact, and the Committee had evidence of the existence of the peculiar rite of John a Lasco.

bosom of the Church and been restored to unity, we will indulgently receive in their Orders and benefices, either in our own proper person or by deputies by us appointed for that purpose."

These dispensations and indulgences, having been obtained not from the Pope, but from the King, were, of course, null in the eyes of Rome; but Paul IV., so far from pretending that the Orders conferred in pursuance of them were null, expressly ratifies his legate's acceptance of these Orders. So that the very Bull of Paul IV., which Leo XIII. *misquotes* as condemning our Orders, expressly states that though the dispensations and indulgences concerning them were null and void, because obtained from the King, the Orders themselves were to be accepted as valid.

Yet again; in Sec. iii., where the brief of Julius III. is quoted, we find this comment: "By this expression those only could be meant who had been consecrated according to the Edwardine rite, *since beside it and the Catholic form there was then no other in England.*"

This statement is simply false in fact, and the Committee who examined our Orders knew it. They had before them a document printed in *Pococks' Burnett*, by which Edward VI. permitted John a Lasco and his German congregation to appoint their own ministers and to use their own proper and peculiar rite.

In the face of this the Papal Bull asserts that no rite was used in England save the old rite of the Latin Pontificals and the new rite of the English Ordinal, and that the two classes of men spoken of by Julius III. as "those who, rightly and lawfully promoted, might be maintained in their Orders, and others who, not promoted to Sacred Orders, might be promoted if they were found to be worthy and fitting subjects," referred,

the first to those who were ordained under Henry VIII., and the second to those who were ordained by the Edwardine Ordinal; the grounds for this statement being that *there was no other rite* in England. And yet there was the rite of the reformed foreign Protestants, and we know that certain of these were allowed to minister, and were intruded into benefices; for instance, Peter Martyr, Tremellio, and Cavalier at Oxford, and Martin Bucer at Cambridge, etc.

Instances of those so ordained found in Martyr, Tremellio, Cavalier, and Bucer.

Consequently, the statement of the Papal letter not only contradicts history, but contradicts evidence *which the Committee had before it*.

4. Misquotation of the Council of Trent.

The Pope says: "But the words . . . 'Receive the HOLY GHOST' certainly do not in the least definitely express the Sacred Order of Priesthood, or its grace and power, which is chiefly the power 'of consecrating and of offering the true Body and Blood of the LORD' (Council of Trent; sess. xxiii., *de Sacr. Ord.*, can. I.)." Here he states that the grace and power of the Priesthood is chiefly the power of consecrating and offering the true Body and Blood of the LORD, and appeals to the Council of Trent as his authority.

If we turn to the canon from which he quotes we find it is as follows: "Canon I. If any man saith that there is not in the New Testament a visible and external Priesthood, or that there is not any power of consecrating and offering the true Body and Blood of the LORD, and of forgiving and retaining sins, but only an office and bare ministry of preaching the Gospel, or that they which do not preach are not Priests at all, let him be anathema."

In this we observe that the Council does not say that the *chief* grace and power of the Priesthood is the con-

secrating and offering the true Body and Blood of our LORD. It puts the forgiving and retaining of sins on exactly the same footing as the consecrating and offering; and simply anathematizes those who say that there is not any power of consecrating and offering, which certainly neither the Prayer Book nor any English theologians have taught. Indeed, this canon would probably be subscribed to by every Priest in the Anglican Communion who accepts the statements of the Book of Common Prayer.

V. The omission of reference to the Sacrifice.

The state of theological opinion in regard to the Sacrifice in the 16th century.

Lastly, we may notice the very strong emphasis which the Papal Bull places upon the omission from our Prayer Book of reference to the Eucharistic Sacrifice, insisting that such omission implies a complete rejection of the doctrine. Before we meet this objection it will be well to draw attention to the exact state of theological opinion in the sixteenth century with regard to the Eucharistic Sacrifice.

From the way the Pope speaks of it in his Bull, and some modern theologians discuss it, one would be led to believe that in the sixteenth century the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice was clearly defined and universally accepted; and we venture to think that many will be astonished to know that nothing could possibly be further from the truth. For, while all held that the Eucharist was a Sacrifice, exactly what was the essence of the Eucharistic Sacrifice has never been defined; and is, therefore, to-day only a matter of opinion in the Roman Church.

M. Vacant, in an extremely able and interesting history of the Sacrifice of the Mass in the Latin Church (published in 1894), concludes with these words: "The result of this study is, we think, that God has in the Eucharistic Sacrifice given us a gift of such in-

comparable richness that after nineteen centuries theology has not yet succeeded in fathoming what JESUS CHRIST has in a few words revealed to us in regard to it."

But if this is true of the present time, in the sixteenth century there was a perfect Babel of theological voices, each proclaiming a different theory, and some holding views altogether untrue. Of these the following are examples.

There was the view that the Sacrifice of the Cross was for the remission of original sin, and that of the Eucharist for the remission of actual sin. This view, Vasquez says, was taught by Catharinus, one of the Tridentine theologians.

Again, there was the view to which our Article XXXI. refers when it says: "The sacrifices of Masses, in the which it was commonly said, that the Priest did offer CHRIST for the quick and the dead, to have remission of pain or guilt, were blasphemous fables, and dangerous deceits." The view which the Article condemns was, for example, that if a man committed murder, by paying a Priest to say a Mass for him, without either contrition, confession, or absolution, he could thus get "remission of pain or guilt."

Duns Scotus taught that our LORD does not directly co-operate in the Sacrifice of the Eucharist, since each Mass is celebrated by an act not of His will, but of the officiating Priest's. His followers developed from this the view that our LORD is not the Priest in the Eucharistic Sacrifice, since He has conferred on Priests the power of offering it; and from this theory they drew two inferences: first, that the Priests act as the representatives, not of CHRIST, but of the Church; secondly, that the Mass, not being the act of CHRIST Himself, has not the same value as the Sacrifice of the

In the 16th century no consensus whatever.

View of Catharinus. (Vasquez; tom. VII., p. 402, in 3d part. quest. 83, disp. 221, cap. iv.)

View referred to in Art. XXXI.

Duns Scotus. (Tom. XXVI., Quodlib., quest. 20, a-c.) Scotists. (Biquæus; tom. VIII., pp. 831, 832.)



Cross ; that it only applies a part of the benefits of that Sacrifice, and that this application is made through the prayer of the Church, and not through the actual offering of the Sacred Victim by CHRIST Himself. The effect of this is to deny that the Sacrifice of the Mass reproduces the Sacrifice of the Cross either in its essence or in its effects.

The Scotists according to Vasquez. (Vasquez, p. 48.)

Vasquez attributes to the Scotists the teaching that an heretical Priest consecrates validly, but does not offer the Sacrifice.

Canus. ("Loc. Theol.," lib. XII., c. xl.) Corrionero. (Massaretto, tom. I., pp. 608, 609.)

The question of the Sacrifice of the Mass was studied at the Council of Trent in two sessions, those of 1551 and 1562, and in numerous preparatory congregations. In the second discussion some of the theologians doubted whether the Eucharist as celebrated by CHRIST was a true Sacrifice. Melchior Canus, one of them, taught that the fraction of the consecrated Host is necessary to effect the Sacrifice. Another—Corrionero, Bishop of Almeria—contended at the Council that a Priest does not offer any Sacrifice by consecrating, but that it is the oblation afterwards which constitutes the Sacrifice. Somewhat later Bellarmine believed that the Sacrifice consists in the Consecration and the Communion.

Bellarmino. ("De Mina," l. I., c. xxvii.) Vasquez. (Tom. VII., quest. 83, disp. 222, cap. vi.)

Vasquez differed from the views of Canus and Bellarmine, and held that the sacrificial act is neither the fraction nor the Communion, but simply the Consecration, although he believed that the Sacrifice is of the nature of a sign, and is but a symbol or commemoration of the Sacrifice of the Cross ; so that he saw in the Mass the Victim CHRIST and the effects of His presence, but no sacrificial action.

Lessius. (Lib. XII., c. xlii.)

Lessius taught that the Words of Consecration are a sacrificial sword, and that in place of the material sword with which the victims of old were slain, the

words pronounced by the Priest at the Consecration are a spiritual sword, which by its virtue puts the Body of JESUS CHRIST under the species of bread and His Blood under the species of wine, and, while respecting the Victim's life, nevertheless places this Victim in a state of immolation.

The view peculiar to Suarez sees in the supernatural production of the Victim on the altar by the words of Consecration, the essence of the Sacrifice, which Sacrifice he finds in this supernatural *production*, and not in a *destruction*.

Suarez. (Tom. XXI., pp. 666, 667, disp. 75, sec. 5, n. 4, 6.)

The present theory held by the majority of theologians in the Roman Church is substantially that of De Lugo, which practically rejects all these views. He sees in the double Consecration the Body and Blood of our LORD present in the Eucharist, but reduced to an inferior condition, such as renders them useless except for food, and this change he thinks is sufficient for a true Sacrifice. "For although by the Consecration itself the Body of CHRIST is not substantially destroyed, yet nevertheless it is virtually destroyed, in so far as it is reduced to an inferior state, in which it is incapable of exercising the functions of a human body, but is suitable for food, so that virtually it is the same as if it had really become bread and had been prepared for food; which change is sufficient for a true Sacrifice."

De Lugo. (Tom. IV., "de Euch.," disp. 19, n. 67.)

Later, Cardinal Cienfuegos taught that at the moment of Consecration our LORD deprives Himself of His vital functions until the commingling of the bread and wine, which symbolizes the Resurrection.

Cienfuegos. (Vacant, p. 59.)

These are some examples of the many theories in regard to the Eucharistic Sacrifice; so that in the sixteenth century, what with conflicting interpretations of the meaning of the Sacrifice of the Mass, and what

Some reasons why the compilers of our Ordinal returned to the

norm of the  
ancient rites.

with the shameful traffic in Masses, it is little to be wondered at that the compilers of our Ordinal preferred to go back to a time when these abuses had not crept in, and to return to the pattern of the ancient Ordinals of both East and West (even the Roman rite included), in which there was no mention of the power of consecrating or of sacrificing.

Not that the English Church ever desired to reject the Eucharistic Sacrifice, as is clearly shown in confining to the Priesthood the power of offering it.

Not that there was ever any doubt that the Eucharist was a true Sacrifice, or that the Church of England ever desired to reject the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice; for there can be no possible doubt (1) that the essential difference between a Deacon and a Priest in the Church of England is the power of celebrating the Holy Communion; (2) that there has never been any Bishop in the Church of England (whatever may have been his private views) who has not intended to give to the Deacon whom he ordained Priest the power of celebrating the Holy Communion; and (3) that this power is the power of consecrating the Body and Blood of CHRIST, and so of offering the Eucharistic Sacrifice; the essence of which is the act of Consecration.

Bishop Wordsworth on the Sacrifice.

As Bishop Wordsworth says: "The Church of England has all the Sacrifice which the Catholic Church has, and she dare not have more. In her Office for the Holy Communion she has a *sacrificium primitivum*, i. e., a sacrifice in which she offers 'alms and oblations,' *primitiæ*, or *first-fruits*, of His own gifts, to GOD, as the Creator and Giver of all; she has a *sacrificium eucharisticum*, i. e., a 'sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving;' she has a *sacrificium votivum*, in which the communicant presents *himself*, his 'soul and body, to be a reasonable sacrifice to GOD,' and in which the Church offers herself, which is 'CHRIST's mystical Body,' to GOD; a *sacrificium commemorativum*, com-

memorative of the death and sacrifice of CHRIST; a *sacrificium representativum*, which represents and pleads His meritorious sufferings to GOD; a *sacrificium impetrativum*, which implores the benefits of CHRIST's death from Him; and she has a *sacrificium applicativum*, which applies them to the worthy receiver" (*Theophilus Anglicanus*, p. 194).

Since the Church of England clearly sets forth in the Prayer Book, first, that the Holy Eucharist was ordained "for the continual remembrance of the Sacrifice of the death of CHRIST, and of the benefits which we receive thereby;" secondly, that in the Holy Eucharist is really and objectively present the Body and Blood of CHRIST, since it is "verily and indeed" both "taken and received;" thirdly, that "this our Sacrifice" is offered to the Eternal FATHER with the prayer "that by the merits and death" of CHRIST there pleaded, "and through faith in His Blood, we, and all Thy *whole* Church," (both those on earth and those in Purgatory,) "may obtain remission of our sins, and all other benefits of His Passion;"—we may certainly affirm that, according to her teaching, the Holy Eucharist is a propitiatory Sacrifice for the quick and the dead.

The Prayer Book clearly sets forth that:

- (1) the purpose of the institution was the Sacrifice;
- (2) in the Eucharist the Body and Blood of CHRIST are objectively present;
- (3) this Sacrifice is offered for the remission of sins of the whole Church. It is therefore a propitiatory Sacrifice for the quick and the dead.

## CHAPTER V.

### EXTREME UNCTION.

#### I. Titles.

THE Sacrament for the anointing of the sick has since the twelfth century been commonly called in the Western Church the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, but we also find it designated by ecclesiastical writers under various other names.

From the Matter which is used it is called among the Greeks "The Holy Oil," and among the more ancient Latin writers "The Oil of Benediction," or "The Unction of the Sacred Oil," or "The Benediction of the Sacred Oil," or even "The Sacrament of Sacred Unction," and "The Unction of the Sacrament of Oil." From the Matter, taken together with the Form, it has been called by the Greeks "The Prayer-oil" (εὐχέλαιον), and by the Latins, from the subject of the Sacrament, "The Unction of the Sick."

Meaning of  
"Extreme"  
Unction.

The term *Extreme Unction*, by which it has been generally known in the West since the twelfth century, and by which it is designated in Article XXV., indicates that it is the last of the unctions which the Church gives to her children, for the name does not arise, as some have supposed, from the fact that it is given only to persons *in extremis*.

In the Western Church there is the Unction of Catechumens, of Baptism, of Confirmation, of Holy Orders, and, lastly, of the Sick. Some derive the title from

the fact that it is the last of the unctions which are ordained for the perfecting of the *individual*, that of Holy Orders having been instituted for the perfecting of the *multitude*.

The Sacrament of Extreme Unction was instituted by our LORD Himself, Who is the Institutor of all the Sacraments, for, as the Author and Dispenser of grace, He alone is able to ordain that a material sign shall have the power of conferring grace. And indeed, it would be impossible to conceive that any one (or all) of the Apostles should have instituted a Sacrament, when our LORD Himself had not ordained it.

II. Institution.

But S. James describes the Sacrament in the clearest terms, and enjoins its use, when he says : " Is any sick among you ? let him call for the Elders of the Church ; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the Name of the LORD : and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the LORD shall raise him up ; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him " (S. James v. 14, 15).

S. James v. 14, 15.

We may therefore conclude, with theologians generally, that the Sacrament of Extreme Unction was ordained by our LORD, and promulgated by S. James in this passage.

There have been some writers, however, who have thought that the existence of this Sacrament was indicated in S. Mark vi. 12, 13 : " And they went out, and preached that men should repent. And they cast out many devils, and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them."

The relation of the anointing mentioned in S. Mark vi. 13 to this Sacrament.

A few, such as Alphonsus de Castro, Thomas Waldensis, Catharinus, Maldonatus, Sainte-Beuve, and others, consider that this was truly a Sacrament of the New Law, conveying grace to the sick.

But the majority of theologians hold that this could not have been a Sacrament, first, because the Apostles were not then ordained Priests, and a Priest is the Minister of Extreme Unction ; and though some have tried to answer this by saying that the Apostles themselves baptized before they were ordained Priests, yet this does not meet the case, since the Sacrament of Baptism does not depend for its validity upon being administered by a Priest.

And again, the unction of which S. Mark speaks was evidently used for the cure of the diseases of the body, and this cure belonged not to the administration of a Sacrament, but to the power of working miracles, casting out devils, etc., which was conferred upon the disciples.

Then, too, in the case noted by S. Mark they apparently anointed all sick of bodily infirmities, without distinction as to whether they had been baptized or not ; but the Sacrament of Unction can be conferred only upon those who have been baptized.

View of Trent.

The Council of Trent (sess. XIV., cap. i.) speaks of the Sacrament of Unction as having been foreshadowed (*insinuat*) by S. Mark, and again (cap. xvi.) it speaks of this anointing by the Apostles as a certain figure (*specimen quoddam*) of the Sacrament, by which it shows clearly that it does not consider this anointing to have been the Sacrament, since the figure of a thing is not the thing itself.

III. As a Sacrament.  
Definition fulfilled by Extreme Unction as described in S. James v. 14, 15.

A Sacrament is sometimes defined as a sensible sign, conveying grace, permanently instituted by CHRIST our LORD for the sanctification of men. We shall see, by applying this definition to the statement of S. James, that Extreme Unction fulfils all the conditions of a Sacrament.

In the definition, an external rite is indicated by the words "a sensible sign." This is found, in Extreme Unction, in the anointing with oil and the prayer of the Priest, both of which may be clearly apprehended by the senses.

The outward sign,

It is also distinctly stated that the outward sign confers grace, and S. James shows this by saying that "the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the LORD shall raise him up," and further, that "if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him." While the raising of a man from sickness might be effected by a grace which was not sacramental, and was what we call *gratia gratis data*, the forgiveness of sins is effected by conferring sanctifying, or sacramental, grace.

conferring grace,

Again, we may observe the phrase "permanently instituted." S. James in his Epistle is writing not to any individual, but to the Church Catholic, and says, "Is any sick among you?" thus showing that he is speaking of a permanent and universal grace.

and permanently instituted.

As regards those to whom the injunction is addressed, they are evidently baptized Christians, and the word used for "be sick" (*καμνεῖν*) perhaps implies those who are seriously ill; it is used by Homer even for the dead, although it is true that there are many instances in which it is used of those who are not beyond recovery (Suicer).

That the sacramental character of Extreme Unction was recognized in the earliest ages of the Church may be proved from references to it in the writings of the Fathers.

The Sacrament recognized in the first centuries of the Church:

Origen (Hom. II. in *Levit.*, n. 4), speaking of different ways in which sins are remitted, under the Christian dispensation, mentions penitence and the Unction of the sick, referring to the passage in S. James.

by Origen,



**S. Chrysostom,** S. Chrysostom (i. 470 : *de Sacerd.*, lib. III.), speaking of the power given to Priests of remitting sins, says : " Not only when they baptize, but also after Baptism, they are able to remit sins ; for S. James says : ' Is any sick among you ? let him call for the Elders of the Church ; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the Name of the LORD,' " etc. Here S. Chrysostom is referring, not to the confession enjoined in the following verse of S. James, but clearly to the remission of sins through Unction.

**S. Innocent I.** S. Innocent I., in his Epistle to Decentius, Bishop of Eugubinum (epistle i., al. xxv., n. 11), speaks very fully of the Sacrament, and we have a catena of authorities on the same down to the twelfth century, when it was formally numbered among the seven Sacraments.

**IV. Matter and Form.** We shall now pass to the consideration of the Matter and Form of the Sacrament.

**1. Matter—of two kinds :** The Matter of Extreme Unction is generally considered to be of two kinds, remote and proximate.

**i. Remote Matter, olive oil—blessed by a Bishop,** The remote Matter is olive oil blessed by a Bishop. There is no controversy in regard to the Matter itself, although there has been some dispute among theologians as to whether it is actually necessary that it should have been consecrated by a Bishop. Some theologians consider that this benediction arises only from ecclesiastical precept, although the more common opinion teaches that it is essential to the validity of the Sacrament, and it has been practically so declared for the Roman Church by decrees of Paul V., 1655, and Gregory XVI., 1842.

**or a delegated Priest,** This, however, does not forbid the consecration of the oil by Priests who have received delegated power to do so—from their Bishops, in the Greek Church, or from the Pope, in the Roman Church.

Suarez, who lived before the above-mentioned de-

crees were promulgated, held that not even the Pope could delegate to a Priest the power to consecrate the oil ; but in the Greek Church this is frequently done. Indeed, the present practice in the East seems to imply that the blessing of the oil may be considered as part of the ordinary jurisdiction committed to every parish Priest, like the hearing of confessions in the Anglican Communion.

or (in the East)  
by a parish  
Priest having  
ordinary juris-  
diction.

The theory that seven Priests are required to consecrate the oil finds no support in the practice of the East to-day, one Priest frequently doing it in case of need. From which we may perhaps infer that amongst ourselves, when oil blessed by a Bishop cannot be obtained, necessity may justify a Priest in blessing the oil.

It may therefore be useful to give the form for the blessing of the oil in the Pontifical of Egbert (died 766), which is as follows :

Pontifical of  
Egbert.

" Send, O LORD, from Heaven Thy HOLY SPIRIT the Paraclete, upon this fatness of the olive, which Thou hast deigned to bring forth from the green wood for the restoration of the body; that by Thy holy benediction this unguent may be to every one who touches it for protection of mind and body, for the driving away of all pains and all infirmities, every sickness of body ; with which Thou didst anoint Priests, Kings, Prophets, and Martyrs ; Thy perfect chrism, O LORD, blessed by Thee, remaining in their bowels : In the Name of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, through Whom," etc. This, which is the oldest extant form in use in the English Church, differs but slightly from that in the present Roman Pontifical.

The proximate Matter of the Sacrament is its use, that is, the act of anointing the sick person with the consecrated oil. S. Thomas and S. Bonaventura refer

ii. Proximate  
Matter,  
the act of  
anointing :

the Matter the oil itself, an opinion rejected by SS. Thomas and Bonaventura.

to an opinion (which they reject as improbable) that the consecrated oil itself is the Sacrament, and therefore both remote and proximate Matter. But this is most unlikely, since no Sacrament, except the Eucharist, exists *as a Sacrament* apart from its use.

If we take, for example, the words of our LORD in S. Matt. xxviii. 19, "baptizing them," etc., we understand the proximate Matter of Baptism to be the action of immersing in water or of aspersion or ablution with water, but we do not consider the water itself to be the Sacrament.

In the same way, the words of S. James, "anointing him" clearly point to the act of anointing with oil (and not to the oil itself) as the proximate Matter of Extreme Unction.

Besides, if the unction were not the proximate Matter of this Sacrament, the Form could not be the words uttered by the Priest when he anoints the sick with the consecrated oil, but would have to be the prayer which was said by the Bishop at the blessing of the oil, which is most improbable.

What parts are to be anointed—

Since S. James in his Epistle does not say what parts of the body are to be anointed, and the Church has never put forth any authoritative decree on this subject, theologians have often disputed as to how many anointings are required for the validity of the Sacrament.

two opinions:

There have been generally two opinions held.

a fivefold,

One teaches that the necessity of the Sacrament requires the anointing of the five senses; and in the Sacramentary of S. Gregory the Great we find directions for this anointing.

or a single anointing;

The alternative opinion is that the fivefold unction is only of ecclesiastical precept, and not of the necessity of the Sacrament, and that therefore a single

anointing is sufficient for the validity of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction. This view is held by most theologians in the present day.

According to the Latin rite there is a sevenfold unction; namely, upon the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, the lips, the hands (if a layman, the palms of the hands, but if a Priest, the backs of the hands—which difference has been supposed to have arisen from the Priest having already, at his ordination, been anointed in the palms of his hands), the feet, and the loins. (This latter anointing is in practice almost always omitted.)

The *Rituale Romanum* requires a sevenfold anointing.

Following the second opinion—that one anointing is sufficient—the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. has this rubric: “If the sick person desire to be anointed, then shall the Priest anoint him upon the forehead or breast only, making the sign of the cross, saying thus, ‘As with this visible oil thy body outwardly is anointed: so our Heavenly FATHER, Almighty GOD, grant of His infinite goodness, that thy soul inwardly may be anointed with the HOLY GHOST,’ ” etc.

The rubric in Edward VI.’s First Prayer Book.

We may conclude the discussion of this point by saying that it is evidently sufficient to use the Form prescribed in the Prayer Book of Edward VI.

The Form of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction is the prayer which is pronounced by the Priest whilst he is anointing the sick person with the consecrated oil, and which signifies that the soul of the sick person receives an unction of grace thereby.

2. Form.

In the Roman Church the Form is: “By this holy unction and by His most tender mercy may the LORD forgive thee whatever thou hast sinned through sight (through hearing [etc.]). Amen.”

The Roman Form;

In the Greek Church the Form is: “Holy FATHER, Physician of souls and bodies, Who didst send Thine

the Greek Form;

only-begotten SON, our LORD JESUS CHRIST, healing all manner of sickness and redeeming us from death, do Thou heal also Thy servant N. from the sickness of body and soul that oppresseth him, and quicken him through the grace of Thy CHRIST : by the intercessions of our exceeding-holy Lady, the Mother of GOD and ever-Virgin Mary, by the virtue of the precious and quickening Cross, by the protection of the honoured incorporeal Virtues, of the honoured and glorious Prophet and Forerunner, John the Baptist, of the holy, glorious, and all-praiseworthy Apostles, of the holy, glorious, and victorious Martyrs, of our pious and GOD-bearing Fathers, the holy unmercenary physicians, Cosmas and Damian, Cyrus and John, Panteleëmon and Hermolaus, Sampson and Diomedes, Mocius and Anicetus, Thalelæus and Tryphon, of the holy and just Ancestors of GOD, Joachim and Anna, and of all the Saints. For Thou art the Fount of healing, O GOD, my GOD, and to Thee do we ascribe glory ; to FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST, for ever and ever. Amen."

Form in the  
Sacramentary  
of S. Gregory ;

In the Sacramentary of S. Gregory the Great we find this Form :

" I anoint thee with holy oil, as Samuel anointed David to be King and Prophet. Work, O creature of oil, in the Name of the Almighty FATHER, that here may lurk no unclean spirit, whether in his members, or in his marrow, or in any joint of his members, but in thee the virtue of GOD most High and of the HOLY SPIRIT may dwell ; through the same," etc.

Form from old  
English Pontifi-  
cal ;

This prayer is found also in the old English Pontifical, in which, however, besides what we have quoted from the Sacramentary of S. Gregory, these words are added :

" So that by the operation of this mystery, and

by this unction of consecrated oil, and our prayer, thou mayest be healed and made whole by the virtue of the Holy TRINITY, and be worthy to receive thy former and improved health."

The Form prescribed by Edward VI.'s First Prayer Book is as follows :

Form in Prayer  
Book of 1549.

"As with this visible oil thy body outwardly is anointed : so our Heavenly FATHER, Almighty GOD, grant of His infinite goodness, that thy soul inwardly may be anointed with the HOLY GHOST, Who is the SPIRIT of all strength, comfort, relief, and gladness : and vouchsafe for His great mercy (if it be His blessed will) to restore unto thee thy bodily health, and strength, to serve Him ; and send thee release of all thy pains, troubles, and diseases, both in body and mind. And howsoever His goodness (by His Divine and unsearchable Providence) shall dispose of thee : we, His unworthy ministers and servants, humbly beseech the Eternal Majesty to do with thee according to the multitude of His innumerable mercies, and to pardon thee all thy sins and offences, committed by all thy bodily senses, passions, and carnal affections : Who also vouchsafe mercifully to grant unto thee ghostly strength, by His HOLY SPIRIT, to withstand and overcome all temptations and assaults of thine adversary, that in no wise he prevail against thee, but that thou mayest have perfect victory and triumph against the devil, sin, and death, through CHRIST our LORD : Who by His death hath overcome the prince of death, and with the FATHER and the HOLY GHOST evermore liveth and reigneth GOD, world without end. Amen."

A Priest alone is the Minister of Extreme Unction. This we learn from S. James, and also from the universal custom of the Church.

V. Minister,  
a Priest.

Like almost every doctrine of the Church, this has been assailed by heretics, who say that inasmuch as S. James uses the word *πρεσβυτέρους*, it simply means "elders"—those who are seniors in either age or position.

The answer, however, is very simple: that this is the word which is generally used for "Priest" in the New Testament, and that it has been so used up to the present day in the Roman Ordinal; that S. James does not merely say "presbyters," but "*Presbyters of the Church*," and this addition clearly defines who are meant; and further, as we have said, that the unvarying custom of the Church has been to consider a Priest the proper Minister of this Sacrament.

Methods of  
administra-  
tion of this  
Sacrament.

In the Eastern Church Extreme Unction is *administered* by seven Priests according to the Greek Euchologion, or if seven Priests cannot be obtained, at least by three. A similar custom in the Latin Church is indicated in the Sacramentary of S. Gregory and confirmed by many of the ancient ritual books. The Constitutions of Odo of Paris, in the twelfth century, speak of it; but it never was a universal practice in the West, and we may therefore say that one Priest is the sufficient Minister of the Sacrament.

VI. Subject.

The Subject of Extreme Unction is a baptized man or woman, not merely sick, but suffering from dangerous disease. Children who have not reached the age of reason, and those who are permanently insane, are incapable of receiving Extreme Unction; and adults are incapable of receiving it, unless, as we have said, they are suffering from some dangerous sickness.

VII. Effects:

S. James describes the effects of Extreme Unction in these words: "The prayer of faith shall save the sick,

and the LORD shall raise him up ; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him."

From this may be gathered that the first effect of the Sacrament is the increase of sanctifying grace, with a right to actual graces which may avail to restore and strengthen the sick man; so that with firm hope he may bear more cheerfully the trials and pains of his sickness, and may be prepared to give back his soul to his Maker whenever it shall please GOD to require it of him, and may be enabled to overcome the temptations of the Evil One, which at such times are often very strong.

1. Primary Effects ;

The secondary effects of the Sacrament are to dispose the soul for its entrance into glory; and therefore the forgiveness of sins, if there be any unabsolved, and a diminution or remission of their penalty. And finally, where it is for the good of the soul, Extreme Unction conveys healing of the body also.

2. Secondary Effects.

We must carefully distinguish between the first and second purposes of this Sacrament. Primarily it was not instituted for the remission of sin—either mortal or venial—nor even to take away the remains of sin, nor in order to confer bodily healing. All these are secondary effects of the Sacrament.

The primary effect, as we have said, is the increase of sanctifying grace with actual grace to enable the person to bear the trials of his sickness patiently, and to resist temptations which may assault him, and further, to prepare his soul for death.

In regard to the secondary effects of Extreme Unction, it must be carefully noted that this is a "Sacrament of the living," and not "of the dead," and therefore requires the subject to be in a state of grace, and is in no sense to be considered as taking the

Some difficulties considered.



place of the Sacrament of Penance ; so that the remission of sin, whether mortal or venial, and of the remains of sin, is not absolute, but conditional.

Ordinarily the Sacrament requires that the person should be in a state of grace, and therefore should have used the Sacrament of Penance ; and theologians hold that if a man, knowing himself to be in mortal sin, were to receive Extreme Unction, it would not be efficacious for the remission of such sin.

If, however, after Confession and Communion he were to fall into mortal sin without fully realizing that he was in this condition, or if his Confession or contrition were imperfect, although not wilfully so, or if from loss of consciousness he were unable to make his Confession—in such cases Unction would avail for the removal of sin, both mortal and venial.

By “ the remains of sin ” we are to understand what is left after the other Sacraments have been used.

But not only mortal and venial sin are remitted by the Sacrament of Unction, but also temporal penalties—the debts of sins already remitted so far as their guilt is concerned. This may be fairly inferred from the purpose of the Sacrament ; for it was instituted to prepare man for entrance into CHRIST’S glorious Kingdom in Heaven, and the remission of these penalties is therefore one of the ends of the Sacrament.

And yet, here again, we cannot say that all penalty is absolutely remitted by it in the same sense as in Baptism. Therefore, as Suarez puts it, this remission will be according to the disposition and devotion of the Subject, and will not always imply the entire remission of all penalty ; since, if it did so, it would ensure the immediate entrance of the soul into Paradise, and would leave only those who had died without Unction

to be cleansed in Purgatory ; which is manifestly improbable.

It is certain that the Sacrament of Extreme Unction is not necessary to salvation, at least not "*necessitate medii*." Whether it is necessary "*necessitate precepti*" (that is, by necessity of precept, either Divine or ecclesiastical) has been disputed amongst theologians. S. Thomas, Suarez, Estius, Sylvius, Viva, and many others think that it is not, although a man who is at the point of death, out of consideration for his own soul's welfare could not safely neglect a means of grace instituted for this very purpose—namely, to help him to resist the attacks of the Evil One at a time when his natural forces are weakened, and to prepare him for the awful moment of death.

VIII. Necessity  
and iteration.

The Sacrament of Unction may be iterated, although not in the same illness, unless there be a partial recovery and a relapse, in which case the unction may be repeated.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE RULE OF FAITH.

Introductory :

**I**N the sixth and seventh chapters of the first volume of this work the criteria and sources of the Church's doctrine were treated, and much that would ordinarily come under the rule of faith was there considered.

The relation between Holy Scripture and Tradition.

In those chapters it was stated that, while truth has but one source, Revelation, it has two concurrent streams,—Holy Scripture and Tradition, the written and the unwritten Word of God—the HOLY GHOST being alike the Author of both.

Of these two streams Tradition is the older, for it existed before Holy Scripture was written, and, indeed, is referred to in Holy Scripture : " Hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by word, or our epistle " (2 Thess. ii. 15). The Church appeals to the Holy Scriptures to prove her Tradition, and declares that all things necessary to salvation are contained in or may be proved from the Holy Scriptures.

The Church asserts her ability to prove her articles of faith from Holy Scripture.

We must, however, carefully observe that this assertion of the Church's ability to prove her articles of faith from Holy Scripture does not mean that she undertakes to prove them to the satisfaction of cavillers and detractors. It means that she has proved them to

her own satisfaction, and imposes them upon her children with the assurance that she has done so. It is only another way of expressing the teaching of Article XX., where it is asserted that "The Church hath . . . authority in controversies of faith."

That Holy Scripture and Tradition cannot conflict must be self-evident, when we remember that the HOLY GHOST is the Author of both, and that He is "the SPIRIT of Truth," Who is to "guide us into all truth." It would therefore be inconceivable that He should teach one thing in the unwritten Word, or Tradition, and something contrary in the written Word, or Holy Scripture.

The reader is, however, referred to the discussion of this subject in the first volume; and under the topic of the Church's rule of faith we shall here proceed to examine more fully some matters which are there already partly treated, but especially to consider the nature and characteristics of *faith*.

Faith, regarded as a habit of the soul, has been defined as follows: "Faith is a supernatural and theological virtue which disposes the mind firmly to assent on Divine authority to all things which have been revealed by GOD." For the better understanding of this definition it will be well to examine its terms in detail.

**Preliminary considerations:**  
Faith as a habit of the soul; definition.

The word "virtue" signifies a good quality, in itself permanent, and thus distinguished from an act of faith, which is in itself transitory.

**Explanation of terms:**  
"Virtue;"

The epithet "supernatural" implies that which is superadded to the natural, and in theology means that which is above the essence and requirements of any created nature. It is to be distinguished from "præternatural," which signifies what is not neces-

"super-natural,"

sarily required by the nature, but does not transcend the order of that nature, merely perfecting the nature within its own limits, without raising it to a higher order.

As applied to faith, the term "supernatural" may be regarded from three points of view.

(1) as to the object of faith, As the *object*, the supernatural is that which has been revealed, and embraces mysteries beyond the reach of unaided reason.

(2) as to the motive or ground of faith, As the *motive*, or ground, of faith, it is the authority of GOD Who reveals; and therefore for us a means of knowledge altogether unmerited and freely bestowed upon us.

(3) as to the origin of faith in the soul. As the *faculty* in which faith has its origin, it is not the intellect alone, but the intellect strengthened by supernatural assistance.

A "theological" virtue. A "theological" virtue is that which has for its material object GOD, and for its formal object, or motive, one of GOD's attributes. Therefore the primary object of faith is GOD Himself, and the motive, the authority of GOD in revelation.

The "mind." "Which disposes the *mind*"—that is, the whole soul, both intellect and will; for faith is indeed elicited by the intellect, but only under the influence of the will.

"Firm assent." "*Firmly* to assent." This implies the exclusion of all doubt.

"Divine authority." "On *Divine* authority." This indicates the formal object, or motive, of faith, which is not the intrinsic evidence of things, nor the testimony of men, but the authority itself of GOD, which can neither deceive nor be deceived.

"Revelation," the material object of faith. "To all things which have been *revealed* by GOD." This declares the material object of faith, and em-

braces all the truths, and those alone, which have been revealed by GOD, in the sense which we shall explain later.

From these considerations it follows that faith differs (1) from opinion ; in that opinion lacks certainty, while the assent of faith is most certain.

Difference between faith and opinion ;

It differs (2) from a religious feeling, which relies rather on imagination and emotion than on reasonable grounds.

between faith and feeling ;

It differs (3) from science, or knowledge, which is acquired by reason alone, has for its sphere the natural order, and rests upon natural evidence ; whilst faith is supernatural, in regard alike to its origin, object, and motive.

between faith and knowledge ;

It differs (4) from the Beatific Vision, in which we see clearly and immediately those things which faith perceives only obscurely and mediately ; " for now we see through a glass, darkly ; but then face to face " (1 Cor. xiii. 12).

between faith and the Beatific Vision.

Faith is of various kinds. In reference to its *object*, faith is (1) simply " Divine," when that which is believed has been revealed by GOD, but has not yet been authoritatively defined by the Church. (2) It is " Catholic," when what is believed has not only been revealed by GOD, but also defined by the Church.

Different species of faith : In reference to the object, faith is " Divine " and " Catholic ; "

In reference to its *subject*, faith is divided into (1) *Fides Formata*, or *living* faith, " informed by," that is, joined with charity, or sanctifying grace ; and (2) *Fides Informis*, or *dead* faith, existing in sinners who are without charity or sanctifying grace.

in respect to the subject, faith is " living," or " dead ; "

In respect to the *manner* in which we believe, faith is (1) *explicit*, when we assent to a truth which is formally known in itself ; as, for example, when, knowing the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, we give our assent to it.

in respect to the manner, faith is " explicit," or " implicit."

It is (2) *implicit*, when we assent to an article contained in another article of faith, which latter is explicitly believed. For example, anyone who *explicitly* believes in the authority of the Church, *implicitly* believes in all the truths which are taught by the Church.

Three main divisions of the subject.

With this preliminary consideration of the definition and species of faith we are now in a position to pass to the three main divisions of our subject : first, the object of faith ; second, the act of faith ; third, the relation between faith and reason.

I. The object of faith.

The object of faith may be regarded from two standpoints : as the object of material faith or Revelation, and as the object of formal faith, that is, the grounds on which our faith rests.

1. The " material " object of faith.

The material object of faith, as we have seen, has two main divisions: the object of *Divine* faith, and the object of *Catholic* faith.

i. The material object of " Divine " faith.

The material object of *Divine* faith is all that is believed on the authority of GOD, Who reveals it; the general principle being that every truth (and that alone), which has been revealed by GOD, must be believed on the authority of GOD.

Truth, however, may be revealed in two ways, formally or virtually.

(1) Truth "formally" revealed.

Truth is *formally* revealed, when it has been declared by GOD directly, immediately, and in its own proper notion ; as, for instance, when we read in S. John's Gospel, " The WORD was made flesh," the Incarnation of the WORD is formally revealed.

(2) Truth "virtually" revealed.

Truth is *virtually* revealed, when it is declared by GOD only mediately, and therefore is not directly revealed, but is truly deduced from another proposition, which has been formally revealed, and in which it is contained, as it were, in principle ; as, for instance,

that our LORD has a human will, which truth is contained in the above revelation, "The WORD was made flesh," since our LORD, being made Man, has all the properties of Humanity.

Such a conclusion is called a *virtual* revelation, because, although not directly declared by GOD, it is contained in another proposition, which latter has been declared by GOD, and from which it can be deduced.

Truths which are formally revealed fall into two classes, those which are *explicitly* and those which are *implicitly* revealed.

Truths are *explicitly* revealed, when they are revealed by GOD in their proper terms. Thus the dogma of creation is contained explicitly in the words: "In the beginning GOD created the heaven and the earth."

Truths are *implicitly* revealed, when they are revealed by GOD, not in their own proper terms, but only in equivalent terms; as, for instance, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no GOD," contains *implicitly* a revelation of the existence of GOD.

Truths which are only virtually revealed are generally called *theological conclusions*, because they are deduced by way of a conclusion from principles formally revealed, in which they are included. A theological conclusion, strictly defined, is a proposition certainly and evidently deduced from two premises, one of which is formally revealed, and the other naturally known, but not formally revealed.

There is among theologians a controversy whether truths virtually revealed, or theological conclusions, are *de fide*, or not. There are three opinions on this matter.

Melchior Canus and others hold that a theological conclusion is *de fide* before its definition by the Church.

(1) Of truths which are formally revealed:

(i) "explicitly" or in their proper terms;

(ii) "implicitly" or in equivalent terms.

(2) Of truths which are virtually revealed; these called "theological conclusions."

Definition.

Is a theological conclusion the object of faith?

(i) View of Melchior Canus;



Their reason for this opinion is that GOD knows the necessary connection between the revealed premise and the conclusion, and therefore cannot reveal one without revealing the other.

(ii) and of the Thomists ;

The Thomists, with many theologians of every school, however, deny that a theological conclusion is *de fide*, and answer Melchior Canus by saying that GOD is able to reveal the premise without the conclusion ; for He may reveal the one, and leave the other for the investigation of human reason.

(iii) of Suarez, De Lugo, and others.

Still another class, with Suarez and De Lugo, hold that theological conclusions are not indeed the object of faith before their definition by the Church, though of course they are after such definition.

Conclusion.

We may conclude, therefore, that we are not obliged to believe theological conclusions as *de fide* before they are defined by the Church. Nevertheless, he who denies such conclusions probably errs, and a proposition which is directly the opposite of a theological conclusion is deservedly called erroneous.

(3) Private revelations.

Thus far we have been speaking of that public revelation which tends to the edifying of the whole Church. Now we must say a few words in regard to those revelations which are given to individuals, primarily for their own good, although sometimes indirectly they may be for the good of the whole Church ; and which are called *private revelations*.

Many examples in the Bible,

We find many examples of these in the Bible ; as when Noah built the ark in obedience to a private revelation, and Abram left his own country to go into Canaan on the same authority.

and in the lives of the Saints.

These private revelations are also frequently found in the lives of the Saints, and devout readers of these lives are often perplexed to know how they ought to

regard them. We are certainly not bound to receive these revelations as matters of faith, since there is scarcely ever certainty in regard to their truth ; and even the approbation of the Church does not declare them to be truly Divine, but only assures us that there is nothing in them which conflicts with faith or morals.

The Church, therefore, allows them to be published, because they contain many things which are edifying. And they should moreover certainly not be lightly rejected as untrue, since there is the possibility that they may be indeed Divine.

A person who has received a private revelation in regard to any subject may, and indeed ought to, believe it as soon as he is certain in regard to the fact of the revelation.

For example, a theologian, by his intellectual acuteness, may feel certain in regard to some truth really contained in Divine revelation, although the Church has not yet explicitly promulgated it as an article of faith. In this case the theologian would be justified in believing it on the authority of GOD, Who has revealed it to him ; although, because it lacks definition, others may not as yet believe it ; and indeed may even deny it without the sin of heresy.

In dividing the object of faith into *Divine* faith and *Catholic* faith we must point out that the division is not strictly logical, since Catholic faith is Divine faith, but Divine faith which has been defined by the Church. The distinction is moreover of modern date.

In order that a certain truth may be the object of Catholic faith two conditions only are required—that it be formally revealed by GOD, and that it be declared as so revealed by the Church, either in the solemn or ordinary exercise of her teaching office.

Not "de fide;" the approbation of the Church only witnesses that they are not contrary to faith or morals.

They should not be rejected as untrue.

The person who receives such a revelation, if convinced of the fact, ought to believe it ;

but it may be doubted, or even denied, by others without heresy.

ii. The material object of "Catholic" faith.

This division not strictly logical.

For Catholic faith two conditions—formal revelation, and declaration by the Church.

The Church  
unable to put  
forth any new  
article of faith.

In speaking of Catholic faith we must clearly bear in mind that the Church is unable to put forth by her definitions any *new* article of faith. The whole objective faith was committed to the Church, as a sacred *deposit*, given her once for all at Pentecost in the gift of the HOLY GHOST, that SPIRIT of Truth, Who should lead the Church into all truth.

To this faith "once delivered unto the Saints" (S. Jude, verse 3) there can be no addition ; so that a new article of faith is an impossibility.

It is the office  
of the HOLY  
GHOST to un-  
fold this truth  
as the growing  
needs of the  
Church  
require.

In this deposit all truth is *implicitly* contained. It is the office of the HOLY GHOST, working in the Church, to unfold this truth as the growing needs of the Church require ; when, therefore, the Church defines a truth, she is simply, under the guidance of the HOLY GHOST, explicitly setting forth what had always been implicitly contained in the Pentecostal Gift.

The Church  
exercises her  
office in two  
ways: "ex-  
traordinary,"  
and "ordi-  
nary."

The Church exercises her teaching office in two ways : the one *extraordinary*, which she uses only on rare occasions and when compelled by serious necessity ; the other *ordinary*, which she is constantly exercising in her continuous teachings.

(1) The "ex-  
traordinary"  
teaching office  
of the Church.

The *extraordinary* exercise of her teaching office is seen in the definitions of her Œcumenical Councils, and in her decrees and professions of faith. Her *ordinary* method of promulgating truth is through the consentient and continuous teaching of her pastors and the ordinary practice of the Church herself.

It would be a grave error, however, to suppose that only those things need be believed which were proposed for belief in the solemn manner first described ; for on this hypothesis scarcely anything would have been believed in the first ages of the Church, since before the

Council of Nicæa almost all doctrines lacked this extraordinary definition.

It may be observed, moreover, that all things contained in the decrees and canons of Œcumenical Councils are not equally matters of faith, but that only those are *de fide* which are directly and immediately defined. And further, it has been laid down that in the decrees and definitions of a General Council regard must be had to the *purpose* of the council. The words of the definition are to be interpreted *strictly*, and those matters which were used by way of illustration or proof do not fall under the head of what is *de fide*. When grave theologians differ among themselves in regard to the exact meaning of a definition, then neither party can claim its view to be *de fide*.

We have seen that the solemn, or extraordinary, teaching of the Church is exercised by definitions and decrees of Œcumenical Councils, and professions of faith.

There have been seven Œcumenical Councils recognized by the whole Church. They are: (1) Nicæa I., 325; (2) Constantinople I., 381; (3) Ephesus, 431; (4) Chalcedon, 451; (5) Constantinople II., 553; (6) Constantinople III., 680-681; and (7) Nicæa II., 787.

Since this date an Œcumenical Council has been rendered impossible by the divisions of Christendom.

An attempt was made at the Second Council of Lyons, 1274, and at the Council of Florence, 1438-45, to overcome this difficulty by inviting the Greeks to be present at these councils; but their decrees were afterwards rejected by the Greeks, and as no council is œcumenical until its decrees have been received by the whole Church, these, which failed of this essential condition, were therefore not œcumenical.

The Church has put forth three *Credo*s which are uni-

(i) Councils. All things contained in decrees and canons of Œcumenical Councils not equally matters of faith.

The Seven Œcumenical Councils:  
 1<sup>o</sup>. Nicæa I., 325;  
 2<sup>o</sup>. Constantinople I., 381;  
 3<sup>o</sup>. Ephesus, 431;  
 4<sup>o</sup>. Chalcedon, 451;  
 5<sup>o</sup>. Constantinople II., 553;  
 6<sup>o</sup>. Constantinople III., 680-681;  
 7<sup>o</sup>. Nicæa II., 787.  
 Lyons and Florence not œcumenical, though Greeks were present.  
 (ii) The three *Credo*s:

versally accepted : namely, the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed.

1°. The  
Apostles'  
Creed.

The *Apostles'* Creed is so called because, so far as concerns the doctrine which it contains, it was certainly derived from the teaching of the Apostles.

Some would even say that it was drawn up by the Apostles, each one contributing one article of the Creed, and that this was done before they separated upon the death of S. James.

It is, however, much more probable that this Creed was simply the rule of faith put forth for catechumens before they were baptized, the substance of which was derived from the Apostles, but which little by little received additions in order to guard against and refute heresies as they appeared.

The principal articles of this Creed are found now in the epistles of S. Ignatius and the works of S. Irenæus and Tertullian, but only substantially ; and during the period from the Apostles' time to the end of the fifth century some words were added. Whatever be its history, its authority is undoubted, since the substance of it comes from the Apostles, and the additions have received the approval of the Church in all its parts.

2°. The Nicene  
Creed (so  
called).

The *Nicene* Creed is sometimes called " the Creed of the Fathers," to distinguish it from the Apostles' Creed. It was formulated in the First Council of Nicæa, 325, added to by the First Council of Constantinople, 381, approved by the Council of Ephesus, 431, and completed in the ninth century by the addition of the words *Filioque*.

The Creed was compiled as far as and including the phrase " I believe in the HOLY GHOST " at the First Council of Nicæa.

At the First Council of Constantinople it was com-

pleted, with the exception of the words *Filioque*. These seem to have been added by a council at Toledo, but which council of that place is disputed, Baronius thinking that it was the Second Council of Toledo, held in 447, while others refer it to the Third or the Fourth, held respectively in 531 and 589. The last date has the best authority.

It was not, however, until the ninth century that these words *Filioque* received the formal sanction even of the Roman Pontiff, and then not by a solemn decree, but only by permission being given to use the Creed in this form in the Mass.

The *Athanasian* Creed is so called because for many centuries it was attributed to S. Athanasius. Few, however, in the present day think that he was its author. It was not set forth by authority or by any council until the seventh century; although before that date the doctrines contained in it were often controverted by the Arians. The formulas used in treating of the Mystery of the Incarnation can be traced to the Council of Chalcedon, which, however, was not held until seventy-eight years after the death of S. Athanasius.

3°. The Athanasian Creed.

Its author and date remain uncertain, although it is very probable that it was put forth in the sixth century, under the assumed name of Athanasius, in order to gain greater authority for it.

Whatever may have been its origin, it has been approved by the Church and set forth as a rule of faith, and it is accepted by every branch of the Church. It contains in clear and philosophical terms an exposition of the two great Mysteries of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation.

As we have already observed, the Church teaches

(2) The "ordinary" teaching office of the Church—exercised in various ways, but especially:

not only by solemn definitions and Creeds, but also daily in her *ordinary* teaching office. This is exercised in various ways, but especially: (1) by the expression of her dogmas in her Liturgical uses, (2) by the morally unanimous consent of Fathers and theologians, (3) by the common consent of the faithful, and (4) through the various historical documents which bear witness to the faith of the Church. Each of these ways we must briefly consider.

(i) in her Liturgies;

Under the first head are placed the public Services used in the solemn celebration of the Mass and in the administration of the Sacraments, and the forms of prayer instituted for the different feasts and offices of the Church.

In her Liturgies the Church clearly witnesses to her faith, so that they can often be used in proof of the doctrines of the Church; and this gave rise to the aphorism of S. Celestin: *Lex supplicandi statuit legem credendi*.

(ii) in the consent of Fathers,

In the second class we should place ecclesiastical writers in their different ranks: first, the Fathers. There is some difference of opinion concerning the period which should be assigned to the Fathers; some limiting it to the period from subapostolic times down to the seventh or the eighth century, while others, and perhaps the majority, extend it to the twelfth century; so that S. Bernard is generally considered by these to be the last of the Fathers.

Among the Fathers, speaking in a loose sense, several writers of the earlier ages are generally included, some of whom were tainted by heresy or schism, such as Tatian, Tertullian, Origen, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Theodoret, etc. While their authority is not that of the true Fathers, yet their writings are

often of the greatest value as bearing witness to what the Church taught or condemned in the times in which they lived.

Amongst ecclesiastical writers, too, some few have been decorated with the title of "Doctor of the Church." Among these there are eight especially celebrated as the Greater Doctors of the Church. Four of these—S. Athanasius, S. Basil, S. Gregory Nazianzen, and S. Chrysostom—belong to the East; and four others—S. Ambrose, S. Jerome, S. Augustine, and S. Gregory the Great—to the West. Doctors,

Among the Lesser Doctors of the Church are counted S. Hilary of Poitiers, S. Cyril of Alexandria, S. Cyril of Jerusalem, S. John Damascene, S. Isidore of Seville, S. Bernard, S. Thomas Aquinas, etc.

When the consent of the Fathers is morally unanimous in regard to any matter of faith or morals, it is considered as a certain proof of its Divine tradition. When, however, the Fathers really differ, it may only show that the matter in regard to which they differ had never been explicitly defined.

To the Fathers succeeded the Schoolmen, or scholastic theologians, who took the immense mass of material which had been collected by the Fathers in their various works, and applying to it the principles of philosophical analysis and arrangement, produced the science of theology. Of these S. Anselm was perhaps the first, S. Thomas much the greatest. and theologians;

As in regard to the Fathers, so we may say of this class, that when theologians of all schools unanimously teach a certain thing to be not only true, but that it should be held as *de fide*, such consent approaches to certainty. When, however, they differ among themselves, it is clear that the truth cannot be *de fide*.



(iii) by the  
general sense  
of the faithful ;

The faith of the Church is manifested not only by the teaching of her pastors, but also by the *general sense of the faithful*, for the HOLY SPIRIT pervades and illuminates the whole body of the Church, in order that the doctrine taught by pastors may be rightly understood and faithfully preserved by the flock.

This is sometimes called the *passive* infallibility of the Church, or the infallibility *in credendo*, as distinguished from infallibility *in docendo*.

This witness of the whole body of the Church to Catholic truth is valuable only in the greater matters of faith and morals, and cannot be safely applied to subtle distinctions of theology.

(iv) through  
historical  
documents.

*Church History* is also a means by which the Church exercises her ordinary teaching office, and it is most valuable as showing what the faith of the Church has been at different times, the progress of various doctrines, the causes of heresies, etc.

That it may be of real value the documents used must be genuine, and the history itself free from serious error. In this department, therefore, critical principles must be used to sift statements and to distinguish between what is clearly true and what is doubtful.

(3) What is  
meant in the  
Roman Com-  
munion by the  
authority of  
the Church.

Before we leave this part of the subject it will be well briefly to discuss a source of theological truth which exists more in the realm of imagination than of fact. It is generally spoken of under the designation of "authority," and is supposed to belong peculiarly to one branch of the Church, that is, the Latin Church, and to be a faculty by which infallible decisions can always be obtained upon all doubtful questions.

Two channels  
of authority  
peculiar to  
Roman  
Church :

The Roman Church possesses two channels of instruction which are essentially its own—the one, the rulings of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition

or Holy Office ; and the other, the decrees of the Roman Pontiffs. Neither of these claims exemption from error, for the Pope is *ex hypothesi* infallible only when he speaks *ex cathedra*, and in promulgating decrees this is not held ordinarily to be the case.

decrees of S. C.;  
decrees of the  
Pontiffs ;  
neither infal-  
lible.

As Tanquerey says : " The decrees of the Sacred Congregation, even in matters of faith and morals, are not infallible, either in themselves . . . or from the ordinary approbation given to them by the Pope, who by a general approbation, or by permitting decrees of this kind to be issued, does not act as the supreme Doctor of the Church, but only as the head of the Congregation. Hence these decrees are not irreformable " (Tanquerey, *Syn. Theol. Fundament.*, tom. I., p. 562).

Tanquerey's  
statement  
of this.

We have had examples of the truth of this in the history of the Abyssinian matter quoted above (pp. 96-192), and in the contradictory decrees of four Popes in regard to the question of the Matter in Holy Orders (pp. 109-112). These decrees, therefore, are only opinions of theologians, and vary in value as the constitution of the Sacred Congregation varies, and as the Pope of the day happens to be a theologian or not.

Instances of  
error in both  
these  
channels.

They have a value, in that they generally represent the opinion of good theologians on minor points of doctrine and discipline, and their utility is chiefly manifested in checking rash theological speculation. This utility is, however, largely counterbalanced by the possibility of error in their decisions.

Since 1870 the opinion that the Roman Church has a channel in the *ex cathedra* decrees of her supreme Pontiffs has been received as *de fide*. Taking into consideration the very large number of questions in dispute among theologians, and even among ordinary Christians, it might naturally have been supposed that in the

twenty-eight years which have elapsed since that date many, if not all, of these questions would have received an *ex cathedra*, and therefore infallible, decision, and that (at least for those who recognized Papal infallibility) there would no longer be any important questions left undetermined.

This, however, is not the case, since many Roman theologians tell us—and doubtless truly—that there never has been since that year a single *ex cathedra* decision given, and very probably never will be.

We may be tempted to ask why, with so many important questions undecided, this great power has never been exercised.

Past experience has shown that the decrees of Popes are often inaccurate, and an “infallible” decree which happened to be wrong would do so much harm to the Roman See, that this may possibly account for the hesitation in using a weapon so powerful but so entirely untried.

We have seen, therefore, that apart from the powers of the Pope speaking *ex cathedra*, which have possibly never been exercised, the Roman Church really possesses no channel of authority not equally within the reach of all Churches; and, further, that in the Roman Church there are quite as many undecided questions, and quite as much difference in theological teaching, as can be found elsewhere.

Truth is not to be attained without difficulty and struggle; and the theory of an infallible voice solving all questions of doubt, while it is very beautiful as a theory, cannot be put into operation in solving the difficulties of faith.

If we desire to know whether any matter is *de fide*, there is only one way in which we can decide the

question. It is the laborious process of examining the Church's teachings promulgated in the various ways which we have enumerated in this chapter.

We pass now from the *material* to the *formal* object of faith, that is, to the grounds on which our faith rests. And, first, we must observe that the assent which we give to truths revealed by GOD is not a mere blind motion of the mind, but is founded on truly reasonable grounds.

2. The "formal" object, or grounds, of faith.

The basis of faith, technically called *formal faith*, is that which causes us directly to assent to revealed truth, or, in other words, it is the reason which impels the mind to assent, the moral *objective* cause which induces us to believe.

This must be carefully distinguished from the *habit* of faith, which is the *subjective* cause of acts of faith thereby *immediately* elicited ; so that the grounds of *faith* must be distinguished from the grounds of *credibility*, which latter only in a remote degree impel the intellect to believe.

Distinction between grounds of faith and of credibility.

The ground, or basis, of all true faith, is the authority of GOD, which implies infallibility in knowledge and truth in utterance. But among theologians it is disputed whether revelation is not itself a partial motive of faith, or whether it is only a condition *sine qua non* ; and further, whether the grounds of faith are to be believed through faith itself, or are to be received on account of their intrinsic evidence.

The ground of faith the authority of GOD.

As regards the first question, all theologians admit the fact of revelation to be at least a condition *sine qua non* of faith ; for, that we may believe, it is not sufficient that GOD is Infallible, and True, but it is necessary also that He should have revealed something as an object of faith.

Dispute between Thomists and Scotists.

The dispute, however, is whether revelation *together with* the authority of GOD is not a partial motive of faith.

Many Thomists, with Suarez, De Lugo, etc., teach that revelation is a partial motive of faith, so that an act of faith ought to be thus expressed : " I believe, because GOD is true *and* has revealed it."

The Scotists, however, say that revelation *alone* is the condition *sine qua non* of faith, and therefore that an act of faith should be expressed thus : " I believe, because GOD, Who has revealed it, is true." For they hold that what does not move the intellect to assent to revealed truth is not a partial motive of faith ; but the fact of revelation *per se* does not move the intellect to assent, since the assertion alone that a certain truth has been revealed is not proof, as the assertion may be untrue.

They therefore reply to the Thomists that the fact itself of revelation is not, indeed, sufficient *per se*, or the total ground of faith, but is taken together with the fact that GOD is true in order really to move the intellect to faith ; for the affirmation of a truthful person certainly impels us to believe what he tells us. Hence it follows that the authority of GOD, Who reveals truth, is the motive of faith.

But this authority can be recognized by the processes of reason as well as by revelation ; so that theologians dispute as to whether the authority of GOD, so far as it is the ground of faith, can be and ought to be believed through revelation alone, or to be recognized through reason as well.

The Thomists teach that the authority of GOD, Who reveals, naturally known by intrinsic evidence, is sufficient, at least for the first act of faith ; which opinion seems most probable.

A further question discussed among theologians, suggested by this, is, whether faith is discursive or not ; that is, whether it involves reasoning or is intuitive.

Is faith discursive ?

Some would say that faith is discursive, because an act of faith (for instance, in the Incarnation) can be reduced to the following syllogism : That which is revealed by GOD, Who is the Highest Truth, must be believed ; and the Incarnation is revealed by GOD ; therefore it must be believed.

Hence, De Lugo and others consider that the assent of faith is formally discursive, since we are able separately and successively to enunciate these two propositions : GOD is in the highest sense true ; and GOD has revealed the Incarnation ; and from our knowledge of these two propositions the truth of the Incarnation is inferred ; which, therefore, is believed partly on account of the necessity of the inference, or discursively.

Some, on the other hand, with Suarez, consider that the assent of faith does not depend *per se* on the processes of reasoning as a basis, but only supposes them as a condition *sine qua non*. For immediately upon our recognition that GOD has revealed the Incarnation, we do not use the processes of reasoning, but on His authority alone give a simple assent. Therefore, while the processes of reasoning are indeed a means which we may use to know that a certain mystery falls under the authority of GOD's revelation, yet those processes are not even a partial motive why we believe. This opinion is generally accepted as most probable.

We approach now the second main division of our subject, the *act* of faith. It falls naturally into four divisions : the preparation of an act of faith, its production, its properties, and its subject.

II. The act of faith.

Three things seem especially required for the prepa-

1. The preparation of an act of faith :

ration of an act of faith : first, the revelation of some truth ; second, its proposition or declaration ; third, the grounds of credibility by which the first and second points are established.

i. The revelation of a truth ;

The first point we have already discussed under the title of the material object of faith. It only remains for us, therefore, to consider the other two.

ii. The proposition or declaration of such revelation.

The proposition or declaration of a revelation has also been indirectly treated under the subject of the extraordinary and the ordinary methods by which the Church exercises her teaching office. We need, therefore, only add that the proposition of a truth of revelation may be public, or private; that is, through the regular pastors of the Church, who possess the higher teaching authority; or through those who possess it only in a much less degree; as, for instance, catechists, parents, etc.

For an act of *Catholic* faith it is, as we have seen, necessary that a truth should have been authoritatively set forth or defined by the Church, at least implicitly.

For an act of *Divine* faith this public proposition is not required, but a private revelation is sufficient, or even that anyone should in himself certainly know that the truth has been revealed. For one can know some truths to have been revealed by GOD, and assent to them on GOD's authority, even though they have not been explicitly declared by the Church ; for instance, by private study of the Holy Scriptures, or of the theologians of the Church, an individual may arrive at a feeling of certainty in regard to many things which have not been formally defined.

Indeed, the very act of faith by which we receive the definitions of the Church as infallible implies the acceptance of the infallibility of the Church; and this accept-

ance can logically, in the first act of faith, only be the result of private study and private judgment.

Otherwise we should have a "vicious circle," for we should accept the decisions of the Church because we believed the Church to be infallible, and we should believe the Church to be infallible because the Church had defined its infallibility.

The grounds of *credibility* are the reasons by which we can judge that any truth has been revealed and is therefore credible; for example, the evidence of miracles, prophecies, etc.

iii. The grounds of credibility.

They must, therefore, be distinguished from the grounds of *faith*. For the motive of faith is the authority of GOD, which is the reason why we believe; but the grounds of credibility are the motives by which we are convinced that GOD has revealed a truth, so that it is credible, or even indisputable.

Thus we see that the grounds of credibility must precede the act of faith, though the grounds of faith concur to the production of the act itself.

Two questions may here be asked: first, whether evidences of credibility are necessary, and second, what kind of certitude they ought to produce.

First, grounds of credibility are certainly required for an act of faith—generally, external grounds, which make the revealed truth evidently credible.

Secondly, the certitude which is produced by evidences of credibility can only be a moral or historical certitude, since it is grounded on human testimony.

Moral certitude, however, is of two kinds: absolute, which rests on evidence so strong as to satisfy even the acutest intellect; and relative, such as the authority of parents, of pastors, etc., which, although it may leave some doubt in the minds of the more learned, never-

Moral certitude, absolute and relative.



theless suffices to produce certainty among simpler persons.

Here, however, we come to a point which is disputed among theologians; namely, whether this relative certainty is sufficient for an act of faith. Some few of the older theologians teach that more than this is required. Most theologians in the present day, however, hold that relative certainty is sufficient.

2. The production of the act of faith.

In order to understand in what manner an act of faith may be *produced*, we must examine the various causes which concur to its production. In other words, we must analyze an act of faith.

These causes are of two kinds: first, effective or subjective, by which the act of faith itself is effected; second, evidential or objective, by which the mind is moved or impelled to believe.

1. The subjective or effective causes.

The *subjective* or *effective* causes are three: first, the *intellect*, which elicits the act of faith; second, the *will*, which commands the assent of the intellect; and third, *actual grace*, which illuminates the intellect and moves the will, so as to impart a supernatural character to the act of faith; besides which it must be remembered that in those who in Baptism have received the infused virtue of faith, the *habit* of faith concurs with the intellect to the production of the act of faith.

We must now briefly examine each of these three subjective or effective causes of faith.

(1) The intellect.

The first cause is the *intellect*, and about this there can be no question, since Holy Scripture abundantly proves our position. S. Paul says: "Now we see through a glass, darkly" (1 Cor. xiii. 12), but this act of vision certainly refers to knowledge, and therefore to the intellect.

And again: "Bringing into captivity every *thought*

to the obedience of CHRIST" (2 Cor. x. 5), where the "thought" evidently is to be referred to the intellect. Faith is therefore called "the obedience of the intellect."

Reason, too, teaches us the same, for if we assent to a truth on the authority of GOD, the faculty which perceives the truth and gives assent to it is the intellect.

The second subjective cause of an act of faith is the *will*; for such an act is elicited not only by the intellect, but also by the dominion of free will, which can command assent or not. (2) The will.

This, too, is taught in Holy Scripture; as, for instance: "If thou . . . shalt believe in thine heart, . . . for with the heart man believeth unto righteousness" (Rom. x. 9, 10). The word "heart," as used in Scripture, does not designate the seat of the affections (which is spoken of as "the bowels;" Gen. xliii. 30; 1 Kings iii. 26; Phil. i. 8), but is often used of the will.

Reason teaches us the same, since the intellect as a faculty is indeterminate in itself, and has to be set in action by some cause, either external or internal; but the internal cause in an act of faith can only be the will.

An act of faith cannot be perfected without *actual grace*, which illuminates the intellect and inspires the will. Here again Holy Scripture clearly witnesses to our position; for CHRIST said: "No man can come to Me, except the FATHER Which hath sent Me draw him" (S. John vi. 44); and S. Paul also says: "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of GOD" (Eph. ii. 8). (3) Actual grace.

In one sense, too, this may be inferred from reason, since the very definition of a supernatural act demands

that it should be above the capacity of nature, which condition can only be attained by the aid of grace.

When we consider that an act of faith is often rendered especially difficult by man's three foes, the world, the flesh, and the devil—by which we mean, the materialistic spirit of the world, the oppositions of the passions, and the subtle temptations of the Evil One—it will be evident how large an element actual grace must be in most acts of faith.

ii. The evidential or objective causes of faith:

(1) The evidences of credibility ;

We have now briefly to consider the *evidential* or *objective* causes which impel the mind to believe. These also are three.

First, the *evidences of credibility*, which may be called the *disposing* causes of an act of faith, since, by proving the fact of revelation, they assure us that GOD has revealed such a mystery, and therefore dispose or induce us to assent to it.

(2) the infallible authority of the Church ;

Second, the *infallible authority of the Church*, which is the *directive* cause of an act of faith, though not the essential cause ; for this authority is the proximate rule of faith, declaring authoritatively to us what truths we must believe. It is not, however, an essential cause, because we are able to know some of these revealed truths apart from the authority of the Church.

(3) the authority of GOD.

Third, and finally, the *authority of GOD*, as revealing truth, is the formal cause, or true basis, of faith ; for when the fact that a certain truth has been revealed by GOD is established by evidences of credibility or by the proposition of the Church, it still remains for us to assent to it.

We are now in a position to understand in what manner an act of faith is ordinarily elicited. Pious thoughts and desires, prayers and aspirations precede it.

Then the intellect, prevented by supernatural illumi-

nation, recognizes the authority of GOD, Who reveals the truth, and perceives the weight of the arguments by which the existence of the revelation is proved.

Next the will, by the inspiration of the HOLY SPIRIT, conceives the desire of freely believing, and inclines the intellect to assent to the fact of revelation. The intellect finally gives assent to the revealed truth on the authority of GOD, Who reveals it ; but that assent is elicited by grace, which simultaneously enlightens the intellect and inspires the will.

An act of faith is said to possess four principal *properties* : stability, infallibility, obscurity, and liberty.

3. The properties of an act of faith.

We need only remark that *obscurity* has reference to what S. Paul teaches us when he says, " Now we see through a glass, darkly ; " namely, that faith and knowledge are of different spheres ; although some modern theologians hold that there are matters of knowledge which can also be objects of faith.

By *liberty* is meant that, although an act of faith is elicited by the intellect, it is ruled by the will, and on this account is free ; and it is because faith is a free act of the will that so many do not believe, even though sufficient grounds of credibility are set before them.

We also observe under this head that all have not equal faith, since its perfection depends chiefly on the dispositions of the will.

The Apostles said to CHRIST : " LORD, increase our faith " (S. Luke xvii. 5). For the intellect, enlightened by grace, can comprehend more perfectly the grounds of credibility and the truths of revelation ; and the will also, strengthened by grace, has more power to adhere firmly to revealed truth ; so that the Apostles' prayer was for that enlightenment of intellect and inspiration of will which would lead to greater faith.

4. The subjects  
of an act of  
faith:

i. The Holy  
Angels and the  
Saints ;

ii. the holy  
souls in  
Purgatory ;

iii. the devils  
and the lost ;

iv. those in  
the Church  
Militant—

(1) the  
righteous,

(2) infidels,  
(3) sinners,

(4) heretics.

By the *subjects* of faith we mean those who are able to elicit an act of faith.

The Angels, and the Saints in glory, do not, properly speaking, elicit an act of faith—not, at least, in regard to those things which they clearly behold in the Beatific Vision.

The holy souls in Purgatory retain the habit of faith, and therefore are able to make acts of faith, although these are, of course, no longer meritorious.

The devils and the lost are not able to elicit an act of faith, properly so called, since an act of faith implies grace, and they have lost all grace.

Those who are still in the Church Militant may be divided into four classes: the righteous, infidels, sinners, and heretics.

About the righteous there can be no question, since “without faith it is impossible to please” God (Heb. xi. 6). And it seems equally clear from the very term “infidel” that such are wanting in the habit of faith.

In regard to sinners we may say that the habit of faith can remain in those who are in mortal sin, or, in other words, that faith is not lost by the loss of charity, or sanctifying grace; although Lutherans and other Protestants, who teach that faith is essentially connected with justification, hold that true faith is lost when grace is lost. But this can be refuted from the words of S. Paul: “Though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing” (1 Cor. xiii. 2), which text would be entirely meaningless, if faith were unable to exist without charity.

In respect to heretics, while the habit of faith is destroyed by the *formal* sin of heresy, yet it is not destroyed by the *material* sin. Heresy is formal, when a person,

knowing the truth, denies it ; it is material, when a person ignorantly and in good faith rejects truth. But the state of grace, and therefore faith, can only be lost by mortal sin, and material sin is not mortal. Therefore the habit of faith can exist in those who are in material heresy.

Much is said in our days of the conflict between faith and reason. This is due largely to faults on both sides. On the side of the Church there have been those who have erred in unduly depreciating the office and vigour of reason, teaching that by the Fall reason was so impaired as no longer to be a trustworthy guide in anything relating to the moral order. On the other hand, among sceptics we find those who so exaggerate the functions and powers of reason as to make it the sole guide in all human affairs. In considering the relation of faith to reason care must be taken to avoid both these extremes.

Faith and reason are two clearly distinct means of knowledge, and both are entirely necessary and legitimate. We must first realize that faith and reason (or natural science) differ altogether in respect of their evidence, their principle, and their object.

They differ in respect of *evidence* ; for the evidence on which the reason accepts natural truths is clearly natural evidence—internal, when discussing the truths of natural science ; external (that is, depending on human testimony), when dealing with historical science. While, on the other hand, the evidence on which we believe is always supernatural evidence ; that is, it rests upon Divine testimony.

They differ in respect of *principle* ; for the principle by which we know the truths of the natural order is the intellect alone, but the principle by which we know

III. The relation of faith and reason.

i. Faith and reason two clearly distinct means of knowledge—

i. in respect of evidence ;

ii. in respect of principle ;

the truths of faith is the intellect indeed, but aided by supernatural grace and illuminated by the special light of revelation.

iii. in respect  
of the object.

They differ in respect of the *object*; for human reason is only able to reach truths which are within its own proper sphere, while faith occupies itself about things which are beyond the reach of reason—and so are mysteries, to which reason alone could never attain.

Again, both reason and faith are entirely necessary and legitimate. Every one would admit this in regard to reason, whether he were a believer or not; but unbelievers are not equally ready to grant it in regard to faith. And yet reason itself demands this admission. For reason clearly shows that there are many things which man does not and cannot of himself know, and that GOD is able to reveal such things to us.

2. No real conflict possible  
between  
reason and  
faith.

Between faith and reason there can be no real conflict, since they have the same Author, GOD; and while truth may sometimes be paradoxical, it is not possible that it should ever contradict itself. When, as sometimes happens, there is an apparent contradiction between some principle of science and some revealed truth, the contradiction arises from one of two causes: either from the fault of theologians, who are teaching as revealed truth what is not *de fide*, and perhaps not even true (as when the Sacred Congregation in Galileo's case condemned him for denying the Ptolemaic System); or from the fault of scientists, who often set forth mere theories as though they were proved facts—especially when they seem to be contrary to Holy Scripture. Of this we have had innumerable examples of late.

3. Faith and  
reason are  
allies and co-  
workers.

Not only is there no conflict between faith and reason, but they are, and ought to be, allies and co-workers.

In the first place, reason is of the greatest assistance to faith. Before the act of faith, reason demonstrates the grounds of faith, and helps us to a knowledge of its mysteries. And also after the act of faith, reason continues to help us by investigating revealed truth and applying to it the principles of philosophy, and further, by arranging and systematizing it. Of this we have perhaps the greatest example in the *Summa* of S. Thomas Aquinas.

On the other hand, faith is of the greatest help to reason ; for where reason stops, having reached the boundaries of her realm, there faith becomes the guide, and lifting reason into faith's higher sphere, the two together proceed on their path of conquest.

VOL. II.—13



## CHAPTER VII.

### THE LIMITS OF THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION.

Introductory:  
The rule of  
faith imposes  
limits to  
theological  
speculation.

**T**HE rule of faith and the teaching office of the Church, which we discussed in the last chapter, not only afford a means of setting forth the doctrines of the Church, but also impose limits to theological speculation.

A person may hold, without being guilty of heresy, any opinion which has not been explicitly condemned by the Church. Yet it is extremely rash to hold, and involves the gravest responsibility to teach as truth, an opinion which, although not explicitly condemned by the Church, is evidently contrary to some of her teachings, or entails consequences practically contradicting them.

Rash speculation a danger in times of religious revival.

The great religious revival of the century in which we live has brought with it a danger common to times of special spiritual activity, the danger of rash theological speculation on the deep mysteries of our faith.

I. Some canons limiting speculative theology:

It is, therefore, of great importance in our own day to study carefully the limits of theological speculation imposed by the Church. We should do this not only in order that we may ourselves avoid any transgression of these limits, but also that we may be on our guard against new dogmas—dogmas attractive perhaps in themselves, and supported by the authority of men

blameless in life and earnest in Christian work, but which nevertheless violate these canons.

The Church's first appeal is to Holy Scripture ; and under this head we must carefully bear in mind that in the interpretation of Holy Scripture no one passage may be so interpreted as to contradict other passages, or that, in the words of Article XX. : " It is not lawful . . . so [to] expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another ; " and yet more, that an interpretation which has received the practical sanction of the Church must not be lightly ignored, since " the Church hath authority in controversies of Faith," and " no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation."

An opinion which has not the explicit authority of the Church may be held and taught provided it does not, either in itself or in its necessary consequences, contradict :

First, the Church's definitions of truth extraordinarily promulgated ; that is, the decrees of Œcumenical Synods, and the Creeds.

Second, those truths which are explicitly set forth through her ordinary teaching office, that is, through her Liturgies, Fathers, and theologians.

It is not enough to examine whether an opinion *in itself* contradicts these rules ; we must go further, and consider whether the *consequences* which necessarily flow from that opinion in any way fall under the Church's condemnation.

Doctrines whose origin can be traced to schismatics and heretics must always be looked upon with suspicion, for it is difficult to suppose that the HOLY GHOST uses such means to unfold truth not yet made manifest to the Church, and so teaches the Church through those who are violating both its unity and its doctrine.

1. In regard to Holy Scripture ;

2. in regard to the Church's authority—

i. extraordinarily expressed, by Councils and Creeds ;

ii. ordinarily, by Fathers, theologians, etc.

3. Not only the opinion, but its consequences, must not conflict with the Church's teaching.

4. Opinions emanating from schismatical or heretical sources should be suspected.

II. The modern "Kenotic" theory tested by these rules. Its elements of danger.

Among the many instances of rash theological speculation which threaten the integrity of Christian doctrine to-day, perhaps none is so dangerous—because none is so subtle and so attractive—as a doctrine in regard to our LORD'S limitations during His life on earth, based largely upon a misinterpretation of a passage in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Philippians, and known, from a notable word in that passage, as the *Kenotic* theory.

An examination of the modern Kenotic theory by the rules just laid down will be useful not only as illustrating the limits of theological speculation, but also as pointing out the very serious consequences involved in that theory.

No attempt here to discuss this theory exhaustively.

It must be clearly understood at the outset that it would be quite foreign to the purpose of this chapter to attempt a full discussion of Kenotism. For such a discussion the reader is referred to Gifford's work, *The Incarnation*, and to Powell's *Principle of the Incarnation*. In Gifford's book the question is admirably treated from an exegetical point of view. In the third and fourth books of Powell's treatise it is most satisfactorily and exhaustively treated from a theological standpoint. An account of the various modern Kenotic views will be found in Bruce's *Humiliation of CHRIST*. All that is here proposed is to take some of the leading principles of Kenotism and test them by the Church's standards.

Its introduction into England traced to Godet's works.

It has been suggested, with considerable probability, that the introduction of this theory into England may be traced to the great popularity of the biblical writings of the Swiss Protestant, Professor Godet. It will, therefore, be well first to state the doctrine, as nearly as possible in his words. In his Commentary on S.

John's Gospel, Godet, in treating of the clause "The WORD was made flesh," explains his conception of "the idea which the Evangelist [S. John] formed of CHRIST's Person." This clause, he says, "evidently signifies that the Being Whom he called 'the WORD' *stripped Himself of His Divine state and of all the attributes which made it up*, to exchange it for a completely human state, with all the characteristics of weakness, ignorance, sensibility to pleasure and pain, which make up our manner of life here below."

His statement  
of the theory.

The theory of Godet is little more than a reproduction of that of which Gess, a German Lutheran divine, is the principal exponent. Gess teaches that the Incarnation was an outgoing of the SON from the FATHER, "having for its result . . . a suspension of the influx of the eternal life of the FATHER, Who 'hath life in Himself,' into the SON, in virtue of which the SON *pro tempore* ceased to have life in Himself. The SON in becoming Man lost the consciousness, and with the consciousness the activity, and with the activity the capacity to receive into Himself the influx of the FATHER's life, and to cause that in-streaming life to flow forth from Himself again" (Bruce, p. 145).

The theory of  
Gess;

Thomasius, another German Lutheran divine and one of the earliest advocates of the Kenotic theory in the present century, does not go so far as Gess, and, indeed, is anxious to be considered orthodox. His view, however, "strips our LORD of Omnipotence, Omniscience and Omnipresence, the Redeemer being, during His earthly state, neither Almighty, nor Omniscient, nor Omnipresent."

of Thomasius;

"But these, Thomasius affirms, are not essential attributes of GOD; they are only attributes expressive of His free relation to the world which He has made; at-

tributes, therefore, *not* of the immanent, but only of the œconomical TRINITY, with which GOD can part and yet be GOD, retaining all essential attributes of Deity, absolute Truth, absolute Holiness, and Love. These last the SON of GOD did retain when He parted with the other relative attributes" (Bruce, pp. 143, 144).

of Ebrard ;

Ebrard, a member of the Reformed Protestant body, who teaches a distinct type of this doctrine, agrees with Gess in making the Incarnate LOGOS take the place of a human soul. This, of course, seems to be, and, indeed, is, in direct contradiction to the decree against Apollinaris, although Gess and Ebrard attempt to justify it by saying that the LOGOS in undergoing Incarnation *became* a human soul.

According to Ebrard the *Kenosis* does not mean that CHRIST laid aside His Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnipresence, but that He retained these in such a way that they could be expressed or manifested, not in reference to the collective universe, but only in reference to particular objects presenting themselves to His notice in time and space.

of Martensen.

The Danish Lutheran Bishop, Martensen, the most orthodox of the Kenotic theorists, is an advocate of a real, yet only relative *Kenosis*, which might, perhaps, be summed up as the theory of the *double life* of the WORD. He considers that the entire movement of the Incarnation "takes place within the circle of the TRINITY itself. At the same time it must be allowed that the SON of GOD leads, in the economy of the FATHER, a twofold existence, as He leads a double life in His world-creating and world-completing activity. As the pure LOGOS of Deity He works through the kingdom of nature by His all-pervading presence, creates the pre-suppositions and conditions of the revelation of His all-

completing love. As the CHRIST He works through the kingdom of grace, of redemption and perfection, and points back to His pre-existence" (Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 193).

Thus far we have summed up the four principal forms of the Kenotic theory in the briefest possible words. Before proceeding to discuss it, we desire to recognize, with much thankfulness, that up to the present day the more extravagant views of the theory have not made much progress among its English adherents. This is doubtless on account of the conservatism and respect for the Church's authority which markedly distinguish English theologians from the Protestant writers of the Continent. Over the latter, unfortunately, the Church's teachings exercise no restraint.

The more radical forms of Kenotism have few followers in England;

On this account the form of Kenotism adopted in England seems to be that which we have described as the Martensen theory—an attempt to hold the definitions of the first four Œcumenical Councils in regard to our LORD'S Person, together with some parts of modern Kenotism; to which position Canon Gore thinks "there is no objection except the difficulty of conceiving it,"—to some simple minds a very serious objection. Indeed, it seems scarcely worth while to run perilously near to heresy for the sake of a view which it is difficult to conceive.

Martensen's view apparently the most popular there;

the objection to it.

The supporters of the Kenotic theory in our Church in America, however (apparently agreeing with Canon Gore as to the difficulty of conceiving the Martensen theory, and having less knowledge of Catholic theology), have for the most part adopted the more dangerous speculations of Thomasius or Gess,—a course which has led some of them practically to surrender the

In America the theories of Thomasius or Gess have more followers.

doctrine of the HOLY TRINITY. The prevalence of Unitarianism in the New England States, while it renders this easier, makes it, of course, far more perilous for the Church.

The moderate Kenotists compared with the Semi-Arians.

The English Kenotists remind us of what has been said of the Semi-Arians, whose views were merely "a series of modifications of the Arian system. The Semi-Arian party had not one uniform definition of faith, but differed from each other on many important points. The only real bond of agreement was their opposition to the term which unequivocally expressed Catholic doctrine. . . . But there was not only little union as regards their theory amongst the Semi-Arian party ; it was also composed of men of widely different principles and character. Although some merely sought to veil under vague and ambiguous terms their heretical belief, there were many others, holding substantially Catholic doctrine, who disliked the Nicene symbol *ὁμοούσιον* . . . as being destitute of scriptural sanction or authority. Some of the Semi-Arian party have even been revered as saints and confessors, and S. Athanasius does not hesitate to speak of them as brothers, really holding the true faith, though for one reason or another stumbling at the Nicene definition.\* The various creeds put forth by the party show the subtle ingenuity with which a distinct expression of the Catholic doctrine was evaded, especially by the use of vague terms admitting a double meaning, and which might be understood either in an orthodox or heretical sense." †

A change of tense and the alteration of a very few

\* Newman's *Arians of the Fourth Century*. (The Semi-Arians.)

† Blunt's *Theological Dictionary*. (Semi-Arians.)

words in this extract would make it a fair description of modern Kenotism, which may be said to be "a series of modifications of the [Kenotic] system. The [members of the Kenotic] party [have] not one uniform definition of faith, but differ from each other on many important points. The only real bond of agreement [is] their opposition to the terms which unequivocally express Catholic doctrine [in regard to our LORD's knowledge]. . . . But there [is] not only little union as regards their theory amongst the [Kenotic] party ; it [is] also composed of men of widely different principles and character. Although some merely [seek] to veil under vague and ambiguous terms their heretical belief, there [are] many others, holding substantially Catholic doctrine, who dislike the [Chalcedonian decree] . . . as being destitute of scriptural sanction or authority. Some of the [Kenotic] party [are] even revered as saints and confessors. . . . The various [theories] put forth by the party show the subtle ingenuity with which a distinct expression of Catholic doctrine [is] evaded, especially by the use of vague terms admitting a double meaning, and which [may] be understood either in an orthodox or heretical sense."

When we remember the very serious trouble which Semi-Arianism caused the Church, the strange way in which the poison of this heresy infected even the holiest Bishops, and how many years it took the Church really to throw off the effects of the disease, we may well look with suspicion at the revival in our own day of a heresy in regard to our LORD's Person having such striking affinities, not so much indeed with Arianism as with Apollinarianism.

The Arians pleaded that there were passages of Scripture which (they thought) favoured their views ;

The parallel a warning to the Church to-day.

The appeal to Holy Scripture.



and there probably has never been a heretical theory started which did not claim to have found some support in Holy Scripture.

The assumption that the question has never been really faced by the Fathers and theologians.

The Kenotists, likewise, think that their view harmonizes many difficult passages of Scripture, which, they assume, have not been fairly studied by the Fathers and theologians of the Church. Thus, while constrained to admit that these writings give no support to their views, they seem to claim that it is because the question was never fairly before the Church.

This is not the case.

But this is not the case, since most of the Fathers and theologians of the Church *have* faced and treated with more or less fulness all these passages of Holy Scripture and the questions which they raise. Doubtless they do not so fully explain all the mysteries connected with the Hypostatic Union as to leave in it no mystery, but that their teaching is clear and practically uniform cannot be denied.

The teaching of theologians in regard to our LORD'S knowledge.

The theologians—certainly since S. Thomas—have taught that our LORD as Man had three kinds of knowledge: beatific, infused, and experimental, and that it was this last which "increased" (S. Luke ii. 52). They recognize, too, that at times He veiled the Beatific Vision from the inferior part of His Soul, as, for instance, in the dereliction on the Cross; and some point out that His Human Intellect (perfect as it was) could not contain all the Divine knowledge. But certainly none thought of saying that *He, the WORD Incarnate*, was limited in knowledge.

The Fathers indirectly confirm this.

When we say "the theologians from the time of S. Thomas," we do not mean to imply that the Fathers taught differently, but only, as we shall show presently, that they used different terms, and discussed the subject less systematically.

But to return to modern Kenotism. In the brief description we have given of its principal tenets we see that according to it the Incarnation involved a change in the Being of GOD.

The principles involved in Kenotism : Change in the Being of GOD ;

This change is expressed in its most radical form by Gess, where he says that there was " a suspension of the influx of the eternal life of the FATHER, Who ' hath life in Himself,' into the SON, in virtue of which the SON *pro tempore* ceased to have life in Himself ; " and further, that the Incarnation involved the laying aside of certain attributes, which Thomasius calls " relative attributes," but to which Gess added some that Thomasius admitted were immanent attributes of Deity.

the surrender of some attributes of GOD ;

We may take Omniscience as an example of what Thomasius calls a " relative " attribute. The Kenotists not only hold that our LORD'S *human* knowledge was limited, but that He, the WORD, the Second Person of the Ever-Blessed TRINITY, was *ignorant and limited in knowledge*.

They also teach that during our LORD'S life on earth there was a real *separation* between the FATHER and the SON. They do not, it is true, always see that this involves a destruction of the HOLY TRINITY, such a separation being an interruption of the procession, or eternal generation, of the SON. By the term " eternal generation " is meant, not only that the SON was generated by the FATHER from all eternity, but that the act of that generation is perpetual. An interruption of the act would postulate that the FATHER no longer continued to generate the SON ; and therefore there would be no SON ; and, the relation of filiation ceasing, that of paternity would cease with it.

separation between the FATHER and the SON, which destroys the doctrine of the HOLY TRINITY.

While the advocates of this theory expressly state

1. Kenotism  
and Holy  
Scripture.

that it is not founded on one text, yet, as a matter of fact, they make it depend very largely on a misinterpretation of a part of the second chapter of the Epistle to the Philippians, in which S. Paul describes our LORD'S humiliation.

The exegesis of  
Phil. ii. 5-8.

Without going with any fulness into the exegetical questions involved, it may be well to point out what S. Paul does say in this passage, with a view to demonstrating that the laws of grammar and exegesis neither require *nor even admit* such an interpretation as the Kenotists give to it. The text reads as follows :

The text of the  
passage.

Τοῦτο γὰρ φρονείσθω ἐν ὑμῖν ὁ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, οὐχ ἄρπαγμον ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, μορφὴν δούλου λαβὼν, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος, καὶ σχήματι εὔρεθεις ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἐταπείνωσεν ἐαυτὸν, γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ (Phil. ii. 5-8).

The context.

S. Paul has been exhorting his beloved Philippians to add to their faith and courage the graces of humility and self-denying love. He expresses this in the fourth verse in these words : " Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others," and then passes on to set before them the perfect example of self-denial and humility as manifested in the Incarnation and human life of our LORD.\*

The phrase  
" Who, being  
in the form of  
GOD,"

In the first phrase, ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, the ὃς refers without dispute to CHRIST JESUS, the subject of the sentence, of Whom the Apostle asserts something which He did in a state of existence described as " being in the form of GOD."

Ἐπάρχων is undoubtedly correctly rendered as in

\*The exegesis of this passage is substantially taken from Gifford's *The Incarnation*.

the margin of the Revised Version, "being originally." An examination of the passages in S. Paul's epistles where it is used clearly shows, first, that it refers to our LORD'S *pre-existence*; cf. 1 Cor. xi. 7; 2 Cor. viii. 17; Gal. ii. 14. To take the last text first, "If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles," certainly does not imply that S. Peter only became a Jew on that particular occasion, but emphatically means that he was born and bred a Jew.

*ὑπάρχων* implies  
(1) pre-existence—

Gal. ii. 14,

Or, if we examine the passage 2 Cor. viii. 17, we find that "Being more forward, of his own accord he went unto you," does not imply that Titus became earnest only on this particular occasion, never having been so before, but, on the other hand, that, zeal being one of his characteristics, it caused him to volunteer for the service mentioned.

2 Cor. viii. 17;

An examination of these passages excludes the attempts which have been made to limit the description "being in the form of GOD" to the time of CHRIST'S sojourn on earth.

Secondly, *ὑπάρχων* also, even by mere force of the tense, implies *continued existence*. Many people have looked upon the "point of time," as they call it, indicated by *υπαρχων*, as being necessarily either before the Incarnation or during the state of the Incarnation. But *ὑπάρχων* does not imply a point of time at all, but *continuance of time*, and it is quite unnecessary for those who have taken it as referring to our LORD'S condition before the Incarnation to *limit* it to that period, as though He ceased to be in the form of GOD when He became man; for all the principles of grammar, and S. Paul's usage of the word also, are against them.

(2) continued existence—

We will notice two instances in which S. Luke uses

S. Luke xxiii.  
50,

the word in this sense. The first is in S. Luke xxiii. 50: "And, behold, there was a man named Joseph, a counsellor [βουλευτῆς ὑπάρχων]. . . . This man went unto Pilate, and begged the Body of JESUS." The other is in Acts ii. 30: "Therefore being a prophet [προφήτης ὑπάρχων] . . . he . . . spake of the Resurrection of CHRIST."

Acts ii. 30,

In both these passages ὑπάρχων certainly implies *continued* existence, for in them the word assuredly does not convey to us the idea that Joseph, when he begged our LORD'S Body of Pilate, then ceased to be a counsellor; nor that, when David prophesied of our LORD'S Resurrection, he thereupon ceased to be a prophet; but suggests exactly the opposite.

2 Cor. viii. 17,

S. Paul also uses the word in 2 Cor. viii. 17; 2 Cor. xii. 16; and Rom. iv. 19. The first of these texts we have already examined in reference to the force of ὑπάρχων as implying pre-existence, but it applies equally well to continued existence; for as Titus did not *begin* to be zealous only at the moment of starting to visit the Corinthians, so we have no reason to suppose that he *ceased* to be zealous immediately after he started. In the next passage, where S. Paul ironically says that "being crafty" he "caught" the Corinthians "with guile," we are not led therefore to infer that having effected his purpose, he ceased to be crafty.

2 Cor. xii. 16,

Rom. iv. 19.

The passage in the Epistle to the Romans is perhaps still more conclusive: "And being not weak in faith, he considered not his own body now dead, when he was about an hundred years old [ἑκατονταέτης που ὑπάρχων]," etc. Here it would be manifestly absurd to suppose that ὑπάρχων implied that he ceased to be a hundred years old immediately after this act of faith.

The most misunderstood term, however, is in the

phrase *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*. Even among those who agree that it describes something which CHRIST possessed before the Incarnation, there are two distinct and opposite interpretations of it: first, that it is limited to "the Divine appearance," of which CHRIST by His Incarnation "divested Himself" (Meyer); and second, that it "denotes the one *form* which is proper to the thing as such and cannot change so long as the nature is the same" (Lightfoot).

The exact force of *μορφῇ*.

Bishop Lightfoot, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians, p. 127, examines and contrasts the use of the words *μορφῇ* and *σχῆμα*.

Observations of Bishop Lightfoot.

He shows that while *σχῆμα* denotes the figure, shape, fashion of a thing, and altogether suggests the idea of something changeable, fleeting, and unsubstantial; *μορφῇ* on the other hand (even in its original meaning, as applied to things visible) denotes the one form which is proper to the thing as such, and cannot change so long as the nature is the same. The *μορφῇ* of a definite thing as such (for instance of the leaf of a tree) is one only, while its *σχῆμα* may change every minute.

Quoting two passages from the *Phædo* of Plato, the Bishop shows that in Plato's language the *μορφῇ* is the impress of the idea on the individual, or, in other words, the specific character. In Aristotle the use of *μορφῇ* is frequent and its philosophical meaning clearly defined. It is the nature or essence, not in the abstract, but as actually subsisting in the individual, and retained as long as the individual itself exists.

Usage of Plato and Aristotle.

Thus, in the phrase we are considering, *μορφῇ Θεοῦ* is the Divine Nature, actually and inseparably existing in the Person of CHRIST.

This sense of *μορφῇ* was familiar to the contempo-

raries of S. Paul, as is proved by passages quoted by Bishop Lightfoot from Plutarch and Philo Judæus.

From this it follows that to say that *μορφή* is separable from *φύσις* and *οὐσία*, and that they can exist without it, is as manifest an error as to say that the abstract can exist without any concrete, the universal without any individual, goodness without any good thing, the Nature and Essence of GOD without any GOD.

Hence the SON of GOD could not possibly divest Himself of the form of GOD at His Incarnation without thereby ceasing to be GOD. Consequently, in all interpretations which assume that the form of GOD was laid aside when the form of a servant was taken, it is in fact, however unintentionally and unconsciously, denied that JESUS CHRIST during His life on earth was really and truly GOD.

The full phrase then describes CHRIST JESUS as pre-existing and continually subsisting in the form of GOD.

"Ὅς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, therefore, describes CHRIST JESUS as pre-existing and *continually* subsisting in the form of GOD.

In the next clause, *οὐχ ἄρπαγμόν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*, two special points have to be considered. What is the meaning of the words *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*, and their relation to *μορφή Θεοῦ*? Further, what is the meaning of *οὐχ ἄρπαγμόν ἡγήσατο*?

*ἴσα Θεῷ.*

In the Revised Version the words *ἴσα Θεῷ* are translated "on an equality with GOD" instead of "equal with GOD" as in the Authorized Version. The latter rendering would require the Greek to be *τὸ εἶναι ἴσος Θεῷ*. "*ἴσα*", as may be found by its frequent use in the LXX. and elsewhere, is adverbial, so that while *εἶναι ἴσος* would denote the quality of nature, *εἶναι ἴσα* points to the mode of existence—that is, to the state and circumstances which are separable from the essence, and therefore variable, or, in a logical sense, accidental.

Thus the distinction is well marked in the difference between the translation of the Authorized Version, "equal with GOD," and that of the Revised Version, "on an equality with God."

Bishop Westcott on S. John i. 14, "The WORD was made flesh," writes: "S. Paul describes it as an 'emptying of Himself' by the SON of GOD, . . . a laying aside of the *mode* of Divine existence (τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ), and this declaration carries us as far as we can go in defining the mystery."

The verb *κενοῦν*, therefore, refers to *εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*, so that it does not say that our LORD emptied Himself of the form of GOD, but that "in the days of His Flesh" He laid aside the being on an equality with GOD. It must be carefully borne in mind that this has nothing to do with GOD's attributes, but refers to those circumstances of glory which have been called the "insignia of majesty." That this is correct is incidentally shown by our LORD's prayer in S. John xvii. 5: "And now, O FATHER, glorify Thou Me with Thine Own Self with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." He prayed to be restored not to the "form" which He had before, but to the glory.

The next word, *ἀρπαγμόν*, is one about which *ἀρπαγμόν.* much has been written. Is it active, and therefore does it denote a "robbery," as the Authorized Version translates it; or is it the object of an action, "a prize," as the Revised Version renders it? A full discussion of it will be found both in Lightfoot and in Gifford.

The majority takes the view that it is passive, but it does not affect the doctrine of the passage in reference to our LORD's Person, if we retain the right meaning for *μορφή Θεοῦ* and *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*.

In the next clause, *μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*, the



Action of  
λαβών coincides  
with that of  
ἐκένωσε.

action of the participle λαβών, as also of the following γενόμενος, coincides entirely with that of the verb ἐκένωσε. It is of importance that we should observe this, for it necessarily fixes the action of ἐκένωσε at the first moment of the Incarnation, and excludes attempts like those of Luther and his followers to assign it to some later period of our LORD's life. It also forbids the inaccurate translation, "He emptied Himself, and took\* upon Him the form of a servant," conveying the idea (required by the Kenotic theory) that the "emptying" and the "taking" were two different things.

If the aorist participle is to be translated as a finite verb at all, it would indicate that the "taking" preceded the "emptying;" which might give some slight support to the old Lutheran view that it was after our LORD's Incarnation—after the Divine attributes and powers had been communicated to His manhood, which had received them for the period of His earthly course. But this contradicts the Kenotic theory that He first laid aside the form of GOD, and then took the form of a servant.

μορφῇ δούλου.

We shall, of course, observe that the term μορφῇ δούλου is antithetical to μορφῇ Θεοῦ, and that the word "form" must, therefore, have the same sense in both. This corresponds exactly with the exegesis we have been following. As S. Chrysostom points out, if the one (μορφῇ δούλου) is true, the other (μορφῇ Θεοῦ) is true; the form of a servant, man by nature—therefore the form of GOD, GOD by nature.

It is often asserted that in taking the form of a servant, it was necessary to be divested of the form of GOD; in other words, that the two natures in their fulness

\* The actual translation of Mr. Gore in his *Bampton Lectures*, no. 4, p. 122.

and perfection could not exist together in one person. This assumption, however, is entirely gratuitous, and, indeed, contrary to the force of *ὑπάρχων*. "Being in the form of God," He "took the form of a servant," without in any sense surrendering the form of God, though He did lay aside during His life on earth the insignia of majesty (*τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*).

For our purpose it is not necessary to pursue the exegesis of this passage further, although for a full understanding of the teaching of the Church on the subject the whole context should be read to its conclusion. We, however, are concerned only with the misinterpretation of the part just discussed, on which the various Kenotic theories are founded, and probably enough has been said to point out just where the misinterpretation lies, and to demonstrate that there is no conflict between this passage and the Church's teaching.

One of the principal difficulties we have to meet in dealing with the Kenotic theory is that its exponents do not agree in any one statement of it. Some reject what seem to be its logical conclusions, because they conflict with the teachings of Holy Scripture and the Church. Others carry it to its logical conclusion and boldly confessing this discrepancy, say that the teachings of the Church are wrong. Others again strive to explain away the Church's definitions and to show that, while apparently contradictory, the Kenotic views in *just the form* in which *they* teach them were not before the Church, and were therefore not formally included in the condemnation of views very like them, and proceeding from the same principle.

As we have shown, the first and principal tenet of this school is the introduction into the Godhead of a

The modern Kenotic view finds no support from this passage.

2. Kenotism and the teaching of the Church. Absence of a uniform theory among Kenotists.

Thomasius' attempt to distinguish between GOD'S relative and essential attributes.

metaphysical, if not a moral change—the laying aside of certain attributes of Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., which, following Thomasius, it is pleased to call the “relative attributes” of GOD, and to distinguish from His “essential attributes.” The second tenet (and that which gave rise to the theory) is the assumption of a real ignorance in our LORD, the result of His pretended self-emptying.

The attributes of GOD not assigned by arbitrary speculation, but necessary in thought.

As regards the attributes of GOD, we must carefully observe that they are not arbitrary, but necessary; which means that they have not been assigned to GOD by the speculations of theologians, but that human thought cannot conceive of GOD apart from these attributes, if once it admits GOD to be self-existent and infinite. Accordingly the term “attribute” is used, not as implying something added to GOD, but as describing certain qualities which are revealed to us, although we must always remember that there is no distinction between the absolute attributes of GOD and His Essence. GOD does not merely *possess* Love, and Goodness, and Omnipotence; He *is* Love, He *is* Goodness, He *is* Omnipotence.

The term as applied to GOD.

The human intellect as an instrument for the apprehension of truth.

While the human intellect is not in itself infallible, yet it is the faculty given us by GOD Himself to enable us to know Him, and though it has limits, beyond which it cannot go, yet within those limits there is no reason whatever to distrust its conclusions. And not only is this true, but when such conclusions have received the approval of the Church in her teaching office, they become the *highest authority we possess*, and to us infallible truth, since in that approval the HOLY SPIRIT, working in the Church, has set His seal upon them and marked them with the stamp of absolute truth.

The Church's approval gives its conclusions the highest authority.

When, therefore, we are asked to accommodate our views of GOD to the theories of this new school of Kenotists, the demand is that we surrender truth which bears for us the stamp of the highest possible authority; and more, that we abandon as untrustworthy the only faculty we have for the discernment of truth. Then, in exchange for what we have relinquished, we are offered a theory concerning which its supporters cannot agree, and which seems to strike at the very root of the Christian religion. For there can be no question that the Church, in all ages and in all its parts, has held and taught, both in its œcumenical decisions and in its ordinary teachings, that GOD is Perfect, Infinite, Immutable, Omnipotent, etc.

1. Kenotism and the Church's extraordinary teaching.

Among the attributes of GOD attacked by the Kenotists is His Immutability. The last words of the Creed as drawn up at the Council of Nicæa are: "For them that say . . . that the SON of GOD is subject to conversion or mutation [ἡ τρεπτόν, ἡ . . . ἀλλοιωτόν τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ], the Catholic and Apostolic Church saith, let them be anathema."

(1) Kenotism destroys the attribute of Immutability, and thus conflicts with the Creed of Nicæa.

The reply of the Kenotists to this is that the Arians (against whom this definition was set forth in the Creed) taught a *moral* change in the SON of GOD, and not, as the Kenotists, a *metaphysical* change; and that therefore, by the rule to which attention was drawn in the last chapter (p. 157), their doctrine does not fall under this anathema.

The answer of Kenotists to this charge.

If, however, we turn from the definition of Nicæa, and consider the consequences of this surrender of GOD's attribute of absolute Immutability, we shall observe that it at once destroys other attributes. GOD is Immutable, that is, He cannot change, for if He could change, He must change from a more perfect to a less

Surrender of Immutability involves that of other Attributes.

perfect state, or *vice versa*.\* That is, change would imply some imperfection in GOD, and so would contradict His attribute of absolute Perfection.

Immutability, too, proceeds necessarily from Simplicity and Unity, for a thing is said to be changed either in regard to time or form, and neither of these enters into the account of the Divine Essence, which is absolutely simple and one. If GOD, then, be not Immutable, He is not Perfect; but if He is not Perfect, He is not Infinite, for infinity, considered positively, postulates that every perfection is possessed by GOD absolutely and exhaustively. If He is not Perfect, it also follows that He is not Omnipotent, since imperfection necessarily implies some lack of power.

The consequences, then, which flow from the denial of GOD's Immutability practically destroy that conception of the Being of GOD which the Church has always set forth, and evolve for us a GOD Who is impossible, because unthinkable.

Kenotists tell us that we ought not to cling to *a priori* views of GOD, where revelation requires them to be given up. We reply that we have reached our views of GOD by the exercise of that reason which GOD Himself implanted in us that we might know Him, under the direction of the HOLY GHOST, which our LORD affirmed should guide the Church into all truth. Further, we are quite unable to see anything in revelation which conflicts with these views. The difficulties which the Kenotic theory is supposed to solve have been recognized by the theologians of the Church and solved at least as satisfactorily by them as by the Kenotists, and that without giving up the Church's teaching in regard to the Person of CHRIST.

\* Cf. S. Thomas, *Summa*; I., q. ix., art. 1.

The consequences of the surrender of Immutability destroy our conception of GOD.

Kenotists object to what they call "a priori" views of GOD.

Of the four modern fathers of the Kenosis two—Ebrard and Gess—teach that in our LORD the Incarnate LOGOS took the place of a human soul.\*

Ebrard and Gess teach Apollinarianism.

In the Second General Council, that of Constantinople, the two principal heresies condemned were those of the Apollinarians and the Macedonians. The Apollinarians taught that while our LORD assumed a human body of the Blessed Virgin, He did not assume a human soul, the Divine Nature *supplying the place of the soul*. This view is found in two stages of development. In the earlier it was contended that nothing of the human soul was assumed by the SON of GOD ; in the latter, that with the body He assumed the sensitive soul, *ψυχή*, but not the rational soul, *νοῦς*, and that the LOGOS took the place only of the rational soul.

(2) The Council of Constantinople condemned the Apollinarians.

This view found in two stages of development.

There were other heretical views associated with Apollinaris and his followers, with which, however, we are not now concerned.

This view was explicitly condemned by the Second General Council in its first canon. In the seventh it describes the mode of reception of these heretics on returning to the Church.

Ebrard and Gess both agree that the Church in opposition to Apollinaris quite properly affirmed that CHRIST has a true human soul, but they allege that the Church did not deny what they hold to be the truth, that the LOGOS Himself is that soul. They teach that He did not assume, but that He became a human soul, and that thereby the presence of another soul was rendered entirely superfluous.†

It is not worth while to waste time in comments on this juggling with words. We may thankfully admit

\* Bruce, pp. 149, 153.

† Bruce, p. 149.

that among Anglican theologians there are probably few, if any, who follow Ebrard and Gess in this particular aspect of the Kenotic doctrine. Nevertheless, it is held by Ebrard and Gess as part of the Kenotic theory.

The history of the Semi-Arians after the Council of Nicæa, and of the trouble which they gave the Church, should be a warning to those who, although they reject such radical contradiction of the Church's teaching, still strive to retain parts of a false view of our LORD'S Person.

(3) The Council of Ephesus and the Kenotic view of our LORD'S miracles.

All the various divisions of the Kenotic school agree in teaching that our LORD'S miracles were not worked by His own power, but by the operation of the HOLY GHOST, and did not differ in kind from those worked by Moses, Elisha, S. Peter, and S. Paul. It is pointed out that we have no record of miracles performed before the descent of the HOLY GHOST upon our LORD at His Baptism, and the conclusion drawn is that His miracles were wrought, not by His Divine power as the SON of GOD, but by virtue of the unction poured upon Him as the Son of Man, the Messiah.

The Ninth Anathema of S. Cyril in regard to those who say that CHRIST "received from the HOLY SPIRIT the ability to work miracles."

The Ninth Anathema of S. Cyril—which, with the eleven other anathemas, was adopted by the Œcumenical Council of Ephesus and reaffirmed by that of Chalcedon and by other councils, is as follows: "If any man saith that the one LORD JESUS CHRIST was glorified by the SPIRIT, and used the power that came by Him as a power that was not His own, and received from Him the ability to work miracles against unclean spirits, and to perform Divine signs among men, instead of saying that the Spirit through Whom He wrought the signs was His own Spirit, let him be anathema."

Here, again, we have something perilously like a conflict with an Œcumenical Council, or rather with

two Œcumenical Councils. The explanation given by the Kenotists is similar to that presented in the case of the conflict with the Nicene Creed. They say that their doctrine is not *exactly* that of Nestorius, and therefore does not necessarily fall under the condemnation ; that when the anathema says, " used the power that came by Him as a power that was not His own " (*ὡς ἀλλοτρίᾳ δυνάμει*), it does not apply to their teaching, since they consider that the HOLY GHOST was not *ἀλλοτρία δύναμις*, but was His own.

The explanation the Kenotists give.

This, however, does not cover the second part of the anathema, touching those who teach that our LORD *received from the HOLY GHOST the ability to work miracles.*

It is unnecessary to discuss the subject further. Each must reach his own conclusion as to how far this doctrine falls under the anathema of Ephesus.

The Council of Chalcedon drew up a confession of faith in regard to the Incarnation as follows : " We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent teach men to confess one and the same SON, our LORD JESUS CHRIST ; the same, perfect in Godhead and also perfect in Manhood ; truly GOD, and truly Man, of a reasonable soul, and body ; consubstantial with the FATHER according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the Manhood ; in all things like unto us without sin, begotten before all ages of the FATHER according to the Godhead, and in these latter days for us and for our salvation born of Mary, the Virgin Mother of GOD, according to the Manhood, one and the same CHRIST, SON, LORD, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two Natures inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably [*ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως*], the distinction of Natures

(4) The Council of Chalcedon (451) defined the relation of the two natures in the Incarnation.



being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each Nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same SON and Only-begotten, GOD the WORD, the LORD JESUS CHRIST, as the Prophets from the beginning have declared concerning Him, and the LORD JESUS Himself has taught us, and the Creed of the holy Fathers has delivered to us."

In this Creed of the Fourth General Council we have probably the fullest definition of the relation between the Divine and Human Natures of our LORD that we ever shall have.

As we shall see later on, when Beron taught that by the Incarnation "a limitation and circumscription was introduced into GOD which had not previously existed," the unknown writer who answered him appealed to the Church's doctrine in regard to the distinction of the two Natures. And if we remember that our LORD is to be acknowledged in these two Natures "inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably" (*ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως*), we shall be saved from Kenotic speculation. For "the difficulty of conceiving how human modes of thought and what must be called (for want of a better term) Divine modes of thought could subsist and act together without confusion of one with the other, no doubt offers a strong temptation to relax the principle of the *ἀσυγχύτως* in this one particular, but if the temptation is yielded to, it is not easy to see where a stand can be made. Neither Beron in ancient times nor Godet in our own have found any halting-place on the inclined plane on which they placed themselves when they abandoned the ground taken by the Church at Chalcedon.

The acceptance of this definition is consistent with Kenotism.

And though the more moderate English theory of the Kenosis at first sight seems less exposed to this danger, it is hard to see how in any sound judgment it can really be so regarded, for it rejects the integrity of the *ἀσυγχύτως* as much as the Continental form does. It would, in all probability, never have seen the light if its advocates had been able to believe that the *ἀσυγχύτως* could apply as truly to the point of contact of Omniscience and human consciousness as to any other point at which the two Natures touch one another. They could not conceive how this could be, and therefore they affirmed this hypothesis as a means of getting over the difficulty. But in so doing they clearly gave up the principle of the *ἀσυγχύτως*, and, the principle once given up, how and when are you to stop? " \*

We may sum up our examination of the teaching of the first four General Councils which bears on Kenotism, by observing that a doctrine which is plainly condemned by one (Constantinople), and comes perilously near being anathematized by two others (Nicæa and Ephesus), and practically ignores the definition of the fourth (Chalcedon), may fairly be classed among speculations which are rash and dangerous.

We come next to the consideration of the Kenotic theory in its relation to the Church's ordinary teaching office, as found in the Fathers and theologians, using these terms as we defined them in the last chapter; the Fathers extending to S. Bernard, and the theologians from S. Anselm to the present day.

The most industrious examination shows—on the admission of the Kenotists themselves—that from the time of S. Augustine to the close of the patristic period there is not the slightest support to be found for this

ii. Kenotism  
and the  
Church's or-  
dinary teach-  
ing.

\* Powell, p. 299.

No Father or theologian since S. Augustine's time countenances Kenotism.

An examination of four Fathers before S. Augustine claimed as favourable to Kenotism.

Gore admits, however, that they do not teach a "limitation of knowledge,"

but their reference to the self-emptying without this gives no support to Kenotism.

(1) The passage quoted from S. Irenæus considered.

view; and, on the other hand, that there is much which is entirely inconsistent with it. It is also admitted that from the time of S. Anselm to the present day no support for this theory can be found in the writings of *any theologian of the Church*, either East or West—its only supporters being heretics and schismatics, mostly of the Lutheran body. As no one (even with the greatest stretch of charity) would call these persons theologians of the Church, we have left for our consideration only those Fathers who lived before the time of S. Augustine.

From four of these the Kenotists claim some slight support. Among the Greek Fathers they cite S. Irenæus, Origen, and S. Cyril of Alexandria; and of the Western Fathers only one, S. Hilary of Poitiers. An examination, however, of the writings of these Fathers will show upon how slender a thread the claim hangs. Indeed, one of their most brilliant but most moderate disciples naïvely says: "S. Cyril and S. Hilary supply us with admirable formulas for the 'self-emptying,' *though without applying it to the limitation of knowledge.*" \*

One can get "admirable formulas for the 'self-emptying'" from almost every writer and theologian of the Church, for that is not peculiar to the Kenotic theory; the self-emptying being only of the *insignia majestatis*,—not of Omniscience, not the limitation of knowledge.

However, we will briefly examine the passages quoted; and, first, that from S. Irenæus. The passage to which Canon Gore refers is as follows: "For as He was Man that He might be tempted, so was He also the WORD that He might be glorified, the WORD remaining

\* Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 286. (The italics are ours.)

inactive in His temptation, and dishonour, and crucifixion, and death, but going along with the Man, in His victory, and endurance, and works of goodness, and Resurrection, and Ascension."

What we have here is a doctrine as unlike the Kenosis as possible. While S. Irenæus regarded "the Divinity and Humanity, the WORD and the Man, as being alike present in every part of our LORD's life and work, yet he describes the Divinity as being inactive, 'taking no part' in those things which belonged exclusively to the second Adam's part, at the same time rendering that help to 'the Man' which man must always obtain from GOD if he is to be victorious over evil; whilst putting Itself forth in that which was Its own proper sphere, i. e., in the works of goodness, or the miracles. . . . There is here no trace of an idea of the Divinity having been modified on account of Its conjunction with the Humanity, and the difficulties connected with the relation of Omniscience as conjoined with human consciousness do not seem, at this time, at any rate, present to the mind of S. Irenæus at all." \*

The next Father referred to by Canon Gore is Origen. In the homily on Jeremiah x. 14, in which Canon Gore thinks that Origen speaks of the self-humiliation of the SON to a Divine folly, i. e., to a human mode of wisdom, Origen refers expressly to 1 Cor. i. 25. He quotes the very words, and this Divine folly is in reality the expression in that verse τὸ μωρόν τοῦ Θεοῦ, "the foolishness of GOD."

(a) The teaching of Origen on this subject.

Origen seems to have intended to say much the same as S. Paul said to the Corinthians. He does not seem to be speaking of our LORD personally, but of the reve-

\* Powell, p. 284.

lation made in and by Him through the Cross. This was the *κένωμα*; this was Divine Wisdom emptied, that is to say, not showing itself as it really was. There is certainly nothing stated in any way distinctly in the passage about our LORD's humbling Himself to a human mode of wisdom. If "the foolishness of God" in 1 Cor. i. 25 can be so understood, then Origen's use of the expression may be justified in the same way; but this is obviously not S. Paul's meaning, and no interpreter so understands it.

In the latter part of the homily, so far from contemplating our LORD as having come down *in Himself* from being divinely wise to "a human mode of wisdom," Origen speaks expressly in his concluding words of the wisdom (*σοφία*) and the might (*ισχύς*) which were in Him, and to which men were to be lifted up.

We may place side by side with this passage another, taken from Origen's commentary on S. John's Gospel: \* "If it be asked whether our Saviour knows absolutely everything which the FATHER knows, or if, with the idea of glorifying the FATHER, it should be suggested that some things which the FATHER knows are not known by the SON, let such a querist remember that the Saviour is the Truth, and moreover, that He is the absolute and perfect Truth; He cannot be ignorant of any truth." †

(3) The teaching of S. Cyril of Alexandria.

We pass to the passage quoted from S. Cyril of Alexandria: *'Ηφίει δὴ οὖν οἰκονομικῶς τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ κρατεῖν*. Canon Gore translates this, "Suffered the measures of our manhood to prevail over Him." But is this a correct translation of the last two words? The Latin transla-

\* Origen *in Joann.*, Migne, P. G., 1473.

† Powell, pp. 285, 286.

tion in Migne is *Humanæ itaque naturæ leges æconomice etiam IN SE valere voluit*, and what S. Cyril really said was that our LORD suffered the measures of our manhood to prevail in Himself, that is, in His own case. This gives quite a different sense; namely, that our LORD permitted His manhood to fulfil its law unhindered and unaided by his Godhead, whensoever and in whatever particulars the purpose of the Incarnation required this; and S. Cyril expresses the same thought in other places.

We will place by the side of this passage another from S. Cyril in which he treats of the question at issue in the Kenosis. He says that our LORD "thought it not robbery to be equal with GOD, but came down, in a manner, to that which was not in glory, in that he appeared as Man. Therefore also He said, 'The FATHER is greater than I,' although it was His right, as being always GOD—as He is regarded, and is, and is naturally begotten of Him—to be unchanged under all circumstances and to rejoice in the glory of the Godhead. It was therefore imperative that He, Who for our sakes descended to the level of humanity, should be seen not to have slipped out of the splendour and excellence which were His essentially by nature, but—as possessing divinely in His exinaniation the plenitude of the Godhead, and in His humiliation its loftiness, and that which pertained to His human Nature as bestowed and received for the sake of mankind—should be worshipped by all." \*

While S. Cyril and S. Irenæus may and do "supply admirable formulas for the self-emptying," there is certainly not the slightest support of the limitations of our LORD's knowledge, or of the theory which the Keno-

Not the slightest support for Kenotism in any of these three Fathers.

\* S. Cyril, Migne, P. G., LXXV., 1348; Powell, pp. 290-292.

tists teach. Indeed, again and again S. Cyril uses the canon *ἔμεινεν ὅπερ ἦν*, which surely no Kenotist would accept.

(4) S. Hilary of Poitiers

S. Hilary of Poitiers is the solitary Latin Father whom the Kenotists claim as supporting their views. There are isolated passages in S. Hilary which might seem to lend some sanction to this claim. For instance : *Haurienda fuit natura cœlestis, ut exinaniens se ex Dei forma in formam servi hominisque decideret*. But it has been conclusively shown that in S. Hilary the word *forma* does not mean the internal Essence of the Godhead, but its external semblance, or manifested glory ; and indeed S. Hilary frequently and in express terms states that our LORD laid aside nothing but this. We quote three passages :

uses " form " for the manifested glory, not for the Essence of the Godhead.

Three passages inconsistent with Kenotism.

*Demutationem Deus nesciens, nihil ex substantiæ bonis caro factus amisit (De Synodis, 48).*

*Evacuatio formæ non est abolitio naturæ : quia qui se evacuat, non caret sese ; et qui accipit, manet (De Trin., ix. 14).*

*Non virtutis naturæque damno, sed habitus demutatione (De Trin., ix. 38).*

S. Hilary on our LORD'S miracles ;

on His being in Heaven whilst on earth ; and on His Omniscience.

In other places S. Hilary insists that our LORD'S miracles were wrought by Him as GOD the SON, and not by a power communicated to Him as Man (*De Trin.*, vii. 21 ; also ix. 20 ; ix. 45). He dwells upon His being in Heaven whilst He was on earth (*De Trin.*, x. 54 ; x. 16), and on the subject of His Omniscience he is very emphatic and distinct, the whole drift of his examination of the question respecting the day and hour of the Judgment being to rebut the supposition of His ignorance (*De Trin.*, ix. 58-75 ; also x. 37).\*

There are many other passages in S. Hilary which

\* Powell, pp. 293, 294.

might be examined, but these are surely enough to show how little ground there is for supposing that he had any sympathy with the views of our Kenotists.

There is one writer, however, who lived probably in the sixth or seventh century, to whom we do not find that Kenotists are anxious to refer, although he really seems to have held their views. Perhaps it was because he was not a Father of the Church, but a heretic. We mean, of course, Beron. Our knowledge of him, or rather of his teaching, is gained from some eight fragments of a treatise *Contra Beronem*, which at one time passed under the name of S. Hippolytus. This authorship, however, has been abandoned, and it is now generally considered from internal evidence that Beron lived in the fifth, sixth, or seventh century.

His theory is very fully propounded. We are, however, concerned only with that part which relates to the Kenotic view and which is thus described by Dorner\* : "As Beron held that an individual man, JESUS of Nazareth, a limited personality (*περιγραπτός*), was thus brought into being, so also did he conceive the act of Incarnation to introduce limits into GOD Himself; that is, by His own act a limitation and circumscription was introduced into GOD which had not previously existed. In CHRIST, therefore, GOD was self-emptied, and had acquired an *ἰδία περιγραφή*. To this the writer of the treatise replied that our LORD as GOD remained after the Incarnation as unlimited as He was before. He was at the same time Infinite GOD (*ἄπειρος Θεός*) and circumscribed Man (*περιγραπτός ἄνθρωπος*)."<sup>1</sup> The Chalcedonian definition by the term *ἀσυγχύτως*, while not telling us how human and Divine modes of thought could subsist and act together

The only ancient writer who teaches Kenotism is the heretic Beron about the 6th century.

His theory that the Incarnation introduced limits into GOD Himself.

The Chalcedonian decree is the answer to this.

\* *The Person of CHRIST*, div. I., vol. ii. 33, et seq.



without confusion of one with the other, asserts that they do so.

The earliest attempt to misrepresent Phil. ii. 5-8 was that of Marcion in the interests of Docetism.

Before we close this division of the subject we may call attention to the fact that apparently the earliest attempt to misrepresent the meaning of S. Paul's words in Phil. ii. was that of Marcion, A.D. 150, although this was directed, of course, against the reality of CHRIST'S Human Nature.

Tertullian writing *Adversus Marcionem*\* asserts that Marcion says of CHRIST that "subsisting in the form of GOD, He thought it not robbery to be on equality with GOD, but emptied Himself by taking upon Him the *form* of a servant," not the *reality*, "and was made in the *likeness* of man," not *a man*, "and was found in *fashion* as a man," not in *substance*, "that is to say, flesh, just as if there were not also a substance to which fashion and likeness and form are attached."

3. The modern view of the Kenosis may be traced to Luther, who, however, confined it to our LORD'S Humanity.

Luther was the originator of the modern Kenotic view, although he confined the Kenosis to a period in our LORD'S historical life when He took "the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men;" from which we must conclude that between the times of His Incarnation and this exinanition He had not *been made in the likeness of men*. The *μορφή δούλου* which He assumed was not the *essence*, but merely the *appearance* and form of a servant. Melancthon was afraid that Luther's view would lead to Docetism, and exclaimed, "Marcion is breaking into your house!" So that we see that Lutheran Kenotism has also affinities with Docetism, Melancthon being the judge.

Melancthon thought this savoured of Docetism.

Lastly, we must endeavour to trace the origin and development of this doctrine, that we may see whether

\* *Adv. Marcion.*, v. 20.

we can reasonably suppose it to have been developed under the guidance of the SPIRIT of Truth.

Previous to the work *Contra Beronem*, of which we have spoken, we find various aspects of Kenotism held more or less clearly by different heretics and condemned more or less fully by the first four General Councils. We find it in the writings of Beron very much in its modern form, evidently repudiated by the Church, and we scarcely come across the doctrine again until the Reformation, when we find quite a different form of it put forth by Luther, who, as we have observed, strictly confined his Kenosis to our LORD'S Humanity.

In the early years of this century it was suggested by Zinzendorf in the form of devout sentimentalism, which brought the Divine CHRIST down to the closest intimacy with men. It was scientifically developed, though with various modifications, by a number of Lutheran divines, Thomasius and Gess, etc.; and some Reformed divines, Ebrard, Godet, etc. Dorner calls it a revival of Apollinarianism and Patripassionism; but while it resembles both in some features, it differs from them somewhat in assuming a truly *humanized* LOGOS dwelling in a human body. Martensen, a Danish Lutheran, should be added to the list, since he teaches a modified form of the Kenosis, holding that the SON of GOD leads a double life.

Such is the origin of this theory. There is no question whatever that from the time of S. Augustine until this century it was not only absolutely unknown to the Church, but that the Church's teaching in regard to our LORD'S knowledge was diametrically opposed to it. And when we say the Church's teaching, we mean both the doctrine of every theologian of the East as well as the West, and the Church's interpretation of Holy

The source of this theory entirely schismatic or heretical: difficulty of this.

Zinzendorf the father of the Kenotism of to-day.  
The Lutherans: Thomasius; Gess.  
The Reformed: Ebrard; Godet.  
Dorner's view of Kenotism.

The Danish Bishop, Martensen.

Summary of argument against Kenotism.

Scripture as found in the Fathers. We have shown that in its consequences it destroys the doctrine of the HOLY TRINITY and attacks the very Being of GOD as the Church has always received and taught the same.

If this theory be true, has not the Church been in error, at least since the first Ecumenical Council? Is this consistent with our LORD'S promises that the gates of Hell should not prevail against the Church, and that the HOLY GHOST should lead the Church into all truth?

Is it conceivable that the HOLY GHOST, Whose office it is to guide the Church into all truth, has given to schismatics and rationalists a new revelation which contradicts in so many points the teaching of the Church, and that the Church has, therefore, for at least fourteen hundred years been in error? Is this consistent with our LORD'S promises that the gates of Hell should not prevail against the Church, and that the SPIRIT of Truth should guide the Church into all truth? And further, on this hypothesis that the Church has erred for so many centuries and has needed to be enlightened by schismatics who are outside her unity and reject her doctrine, may it not be asked by some whether there is left any real basis of Christianity, any serious reason for believing that Christianity is the *full* revelation of GOD in CHRIST JESUS?

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

**H**OLY Scripture is the written Word of GOD. It is a collection of books which have GOD for their Author, inasmuch as they were written under the inspiration of the HOLY GHOST. They were entrusted by GOD to the Church, and received by it as His Word.

Introductory:  
Definition.

Holy Scripture and Tradition are the two principal channels of the Church's doctrine. They are the written and the unwritten Word of GOD, both alike having the HOLY SPIRIT as their Author. Tradition comes first in the order of time, but Holy Scripture is first in the order of dignity, for between the Incarnate WORD of GOD and the written Word the closest analogy may be traced.

The relation  
between Holy  
Scripture and  
Tradition.

As by the operation of the HOLY GHOST upon the substance of the Blessed Virgin "the WORD was made flesh," so the written Word of GOD was produced by the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit, acting upon the wills and minds of chosen men.

Analogy be-  
tween Holy  
Scripture and  
the Incarnate  
WORD;

In the Incarnate WORD two elements are found, the one Human and the other Divine—the Human serving as a veil for the Divine. So in the written Word of GOD may these two elements be recognized. It is perfectly human, inasmuch as it was written by man; it is perfectly Divine, in that it was inspired by GOD.

two elements,  
Human and  
Divine, in  
each.

In the Incarnate WORD dwelt "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. ii. 9). In the written Word may be found all the treasures of wisdom and truth.

As CHRIST was "unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness, but unto them which are called . . . the Power of GOD, and the Wisdom of GOD" (1 Cor. i. 23, 24), so to the unbelieving Holy Scripture is a stumblingblock and full of difficulties, while to those who read it under the guidance of the HOLY SPIRIT it is indeed the Word of GOD, "able to make" them "wise unto salvation" (2 S. Tim. iii. 15).

I. The Canon  
of Holy Scrip-  
ture.

Since Holy Scripture is a collection of books, it is necessary to consider, in the first place, on what principle this collection has been made; in other words, what do we mean by "the Canon of Holy Scripture?"

Meaning of  
word "Ca-  
non;"

its application  
in theology.

The Greek word *κανών* in its first meaning signifies a carpenter's rule, an instrument of measurement, and in this sense it is metaphorically applied, in theology, to that which, perfect in itself, becomes the rule of faith by which other things may be measured.

Thus, the Scriptures are said to be *canonical* because, having first been tested by the Church's standard of doctrine, they have been found true, and then have themselves become a standard of truth. Hence the term *Canon* is now applied to the whole collection of books which form the written Word of GOD.

Distinction  
between can-  
onicity and  
inspiration.

From this it is evident that there is a very real distinction between *Canonicity* and *Inspiration*, since a book is said to be *inspired* which is written under the guidance of the HOLY SPIRIT, and therefore has GOD as its Author; but it is said to be *canonical*, when it is not only thus inspired, but has been acknowledged as such by the Church and placed authoritatively in the Canon.

For, speculatively at least, we could imagine that some books might be inspired which are not canonical, though all books which are canonical, must by this very fact be inspired. The two words are often used indiscriminately, but it is well to bear in mind that such use is inaccurate. And the distinction is not a needless one, for it is much easier to prove the *external* fact of the canonicity of a book (which attests its inspiration) than its *internal* quality of inspiration.

We see this practically in the different lines of argument used by the theologians of the Church and by Protestants. The former have only to show that a book has been authoritatively received as canonical by the Church. The latter have to prove the internal inspiration of each book separately, which is often a very difficult task.

When we come to examine the books of Holy Scripture, we find that they may be arranged in several different classes.

Classifications  
of the books of  
the Bible.

The first division, of course, is that into the Old and New Testaments, the former being God's revelation to the chosen people, and the latter His revelation to the world at large.

Into Old and  
New Test.

Again, they may be divided into *protocanonical* and *deuterocanonical*. The *protocanonical* books are those concerning whose Divine origin and authority there has never been any doubt, and which from the first have been received by the whole Church as inspired, and therefore placed in the Canon.

Into proto-  
canonical and  
deutero-  
canonical.

The *deuterocanonical* books are those concerning which in some parts of the Church there was at some time more or less doubt, but which after careful examination have been received by the whole Church. The protocanonical books of the Old Testament are

Hebrew Canon contained only the proto-canonical.

The deutero-canonical books of the Old Test. ; of the New Test.

The authority of the deutero-canonical books.

The term "apocryphal" misleading,

those which are found in the Hebrew Canon, as that Canon was finally accepted among the Jews. The deutero-canonical are those which do not occur in the ordinary Hebrew Canon, and those portions of Daniel and Esther which occur only in the Greek.

The deutero-canonical books of the New Testament are the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Second and Third Epistles of S. John, the Second of S. Peter, S. James, S. Jude, and the Revelation.

The acceptance given to the deutero-canonical books of the Old Testament has been very varied, some books having been much more commonly received than others, while all of them have been at times rejected by councils and doctors. The Third and Fourth of Esdras and the Prayer of Manasses are generally rejected at the present time.

The acceptance of the deutero-canonical books of the New Testament has been very different. While the Church's Canon was in process of formation doubts were expressed in regard to them, but after it had really become fixed they ranked with the other Canonical Scriptures.

The deutero-canonical books of the Old Testament are sometimes, and unfortunately, called "apocryphal." This term is misleading, since its application to the apocryphal books of the New Testament (such as the Gospel of the Infancy, and of S. Peter, the Acts of Paul and Thecla, etc.) implies that they are not genuine—an inference which certainly cannot be extended to those of the Old Testament, since Article VI. says of them: "The other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners ; but yet doth it not apply them to establish any doctrine."

The Anglican Church has never authoritatively used the term *apocryphal* to designate these books. In the Article, as we see, they are called "the other books." In the Homilies they are spoken of as the Word of GOD, and not only are they appointed as lessons, under the title "Holy Scripture," but also in the offertory sentences we find quotations from them classed, without any distinction, among passages of Holy Scripture.

and not authoritatively used in the Anglican Church.

The protocanonical books of the Old Testament were anciently divided by the Jews into three classes: the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa—a classification which seems to be recognized by our LORD (S. Luke xxiv. 44).

Jewish division of Old Test.: into Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa.

The first part, the Law, contained only the books of Pentateuch.

The Law.

The second had two subdivisions. In the first were placed the earlier prophets, under which head came the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings; in the second, the later prophets, namely: Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve Minor Prophets.

The prophets, earlier and later.

The third class contained Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles.

The Hagiographa.

The most ancient division of the New Testament was into two parts, which were distinguished as the Evangelical Writings and the Apostolical.

Twofold Division of New Test.

Another classification distributes the books of *both* Testaments into four classes: the Legal books, which in the Old Testament are the five books of Moses, and in the New Testament the four Gospels.

A fourfold division of the whole Bible into: Legal Books;

The Historical books—in the Old Testament sixteen in number, namely: Joshua, Judges, Ruth, I. and II. Samuel, I. and II. Kings, I. and II. Chronicles, Ezra,

Historical;



Nehemiah, Tobit, Judith, Esther, I. and II. Maccabees ; in the New Testament only one, the Acts of the Apostles.

**Sapiential ;**

The Sapiential books, whether didactic or doctrinal—in the Old Testament seven, namely : Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus ; in the New Testament, all the Epistles of S. Paul, and the Catholic Epistles.

**Prophetical.**

The Prophetical books—in the Old Testament, sixteen : Isaiah, Jeremiah (with Baruch and Lamentations), Ezekiel, Daniel, and the Minor Prophets ; in the New Testament, the Apocalypse only.

**A threefold division.**

The books might be more conveniently grouped under the three heads: Historical, Didactic, and Prophetical.

**Difference between the Palestinian and Alexandrian Canons of the Old Test.**

The Church from the first has received as canonical at least those books of the Old Testament which form the Canon of the Palestinian Jews. The Canon of the Alexandrian Jews apparently included the deuterocanonical books, but it is to the ordinary Hebrew Canon that Josephus refers in his work *Contra Apion.*, I. 8, when he numbers these books at twenty-two in all ; and says that they are recognized by every Jew from his birth ; and that for them, if there were need, every Jew would willingly die.

**Canon finally determined before the close of the 4th century.**

The Canon of the New Testament was gradually determined during the first four centuries of the Church. There was probably never any doubt about the protocanonical books, and the doubts about the deuterocanonical books little by little disappeared ; and we find that in a series of African councils, held towards the close of the fourth century, the Canon of the New Testament was exactly as we have it now ; while that of the Old Testament, in addition to our protocanonical

books, included six of the deuterocanonical, namely: Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, Judith, and the two books of the Maccabees.

Until lately it was supposed that the earliest explicit recognition of the Canon by conciliar action was to be found in a council at Carthage, held in 397, which is by some authorities reckoned as the Second, and by others as the Third Council of Carthage; and that the list of books contained in the 47th canon of this Council was again set forth in a council held in the same place in 419.

More careful research, however, has shown that the 47th canon of the Third Council of Carthage was simply a repetition of the 36th canon of the great Council held at Hippo in 393.\* We may therefore probably consider this as the first conciliar action in regard to the Canon of Holy Scripture. It is interesting to observe that S. Augustine was present at all three of these councils—at the first two as a Priest, at the last as a Bishop.

Council of Hippo, 393.

We may remark, however, before passing from this subject, that the Canon has never been determined by any Œcumenical Council, and so rests on the ordinary authority of the Church.

In the present day the Bible is divided into chapters and verses, but this division is of comparatively modern date. The earliest division—that of the Gospels (in the third century) into the Ammonian Sections—was not made for the purpose of quotation, but to demonstrate the harmony between them.

Divisions of the text.

The Ammonian Sections.

It was not until the fifth or the sixth century that the Gospels were divided into 218 titles, the Epistles into 245 chapters, and the Apocalypse into 24 sermons and 72

Andrew of Caesarea's division.

\* Hefele, *History of the Councils*; vol. II., pp. 394-402.

chapters. This division was made by Andrew of Cæsarea. Cassiodorus tells us that a similar division into titles was made of some books of the Old Testament.

Cardinal Hugo  
a S. Charo first  
divides the  
Bible into  
chapters;

The above divisions, however, were found very inconvenient for purposes of reference, and in the thirteenth century Cardinal Hugo a S. Charo, a Dominican, first divided the Bible into chapters as we have it now. Cardinal Hugo only made the division into chapters, indicating the lesser sections of the chapter by marginal letters. Our present division into verses was made by Robert Stephanus in 1548.

Robert  
Stephanus,  
1548, into  
verses.

These later divisions into chapters and verses, while used in every part of the Church to-day, have never been authoritatively recognized; and in some places are made with such poor judgment as greatly to obscure the sense.

II. The In-  
spiration of  
Holy Scrip-  
ture.  
Origin of the  
term.

The term *inspiration* probably comes to us from the Vulgate rendering of S. Paul's words *πᾶσα γραφή θεόπνευστος* (2 S. Tim. iii. 16)—*Omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata*; and again, when S. Peter (2 S. Pet. i. 21) speaks of the prophets as *ὑπὸ Πνεύματος Ἁγίου φερόμενοι*, "moved by the HOLY GHOST," the Vulgate has *Spiritu Sancto inspirati*.

*Θεόπνευστος* is a passive verbal, and may fairly be translated "inspired (breathed into) by GOD;" and S. Paul's expression, "Every Scripture inspired by GOD," etc., certainly seems distinctly to imply that every separate portion of the Word of GOD is inspired, and forms an integral portion of the living and organic whole.

Definition of  
inspiration.

Inspiration may be defined as a supernatural impulse by which GOD directed the authors of the canonical books to write down certain matters predetermined by

Him. Inspiration is a grace *gratis data*, and is bestowed upon the writer for the edification of others, and, like all graces, it is especially attributed to God the HOLY GHOST.

It is a grace  
"gratis data."

The Old Testament clearly claims to be inspired, for the prophets constantly represent their own words as being in reality the oracles of GOD, and our LORD and His Apostles confirm this claim. CHRIST, for example, declares that David spoke in the SPIRIT (S. Matt. xxii. 43), while S. Peter (Acts i. 16) and S. Paul (Acts xxviii. 25) use similar language. Ecclesiastical writers, from the time when the New Testament Canon was first recognized by the Church, speak in the same way of the books contained in it.

The Old Test.  
prophets  
claim to be  
inspired.

The Fathers express their belief in the inspiration of the Scriptures by calling them "the Divine Scriptures," "the Divine oracles," "the Scripture of GOD," "the Scriptures of the LORD;" but the term *inspiration* itself is rarely met with in the early ages.

Perhaps the first instance of it we can find is in the acts of the martyrs S. Speratus and his companions, commemorated July 17th. In the year 180, under the Emperor Commodus, Saturnian, the proconsul, stirred up a violent persecution of Christians in Africa, and on the 16th of July three men, SS. Speratus, Nazalis, and Cythinus, and three women, SS. Donata, Secunda, and Vestina, were arrested and brought before the tribunal of the proconsul. S. Speratus was the spokesman.

The earliest  
use of the term  
"inspiration,"  
180.

They were cross-examined that day and then conducted back to prison. On the following day they were again brought before the proconsul, and in answer to the question, "What are the books which you read with adoration?" the saint replied that they were

the four Gospels, S. Paul's Epistles, and all the divinely inspired teaching (*omnem divinitus inspiratam doctrinam*).

Difference between inspiration and revelation.

We must here observe that *inspiration* differs entirely from *revelation*; for by revelation GOD makes known to the soul truths which it did not know before, but without necessarily prompting the recipient to commit the revelation to writing. On the other hand inspiration is the impulse which causes an inspired author to write, and directs him in his work, but it is not at all necessary that any new truths should be communicated to him by way of revelation. For example, there is no reason to suppose that the author of the Book of Esther received any revelation.

Inspiration does not preclude the ordinary labours of an author.

Moreover, inspiration does not preclude the ordinary labours of an author in the collection of materials relating to the subject of which GOD wills him (and therefore inspires him) to write. S. Luke implies that his Gospel is based on information given him by those who "from the beginning were eyewitnesses, and ministers of the word" (S. Luke i. 2).

Inspiration differs from assistance.

Again, inspiration differs from the mere *assistance* of the HOLY GHOST, this term conveying only the idea of negative help, while inspiration involves positive suggestion. Thus, Œcumenical Councils have the *assistance* of the HOLY GHOST in that He protects them from error in their decrees, while inspiration implies, over and above this protection, a special *impulse* of the HOLY GHOST to write, and to write on particular subjects.

The Church has never defined the method of inspiration;

While the Church in every age has most distinctly witnessed to her belief in the inspiration of Holy Scripture, she has never defined the *method* of such inspiration; so that, within certain limits, the manner of

inspiration is still an open question. This does not, however, imply that the many lax or insufficient theories which have been put forth in regard to inspiration come within these limits.

For example, some have thought that inspiration merely required the assistance of the HOLY GHOST so far as to prevent error. Others, with Lessius, have thought that for inspiration it was enough that a book written with ordinary care and diligence, but without Divine aid, should be declared free from error by subsequent Divine approbation.

Some inadequate views.

Some, carrying this still further, have thought that certain writings have been placed in the class of inspired books by the subsequent approbation of the Church.

Others have thought that inspiration did not extend to everything that is read in Scripture, but only to matters of greater importance, especially those which pertain to faith and morals.

Again others have taught that inspiration, while it extended to all things written, has not always secured the sacred writers from error, especially in matters of history and science.

None of these views, however, seems to supply an adequate theory of inspiration.

In an inspired book there are evidently two factors; the natural powers of the writer on the one side, and the impulse and direction of the HOLY GHOST on the other. The Church has not laid down where the one factor ceases and the other begins to operate, but any adequate theory of inspiration must allow for the working of both.

Two factors in inspiration : the natural powers of the writer; and the Divine impulse.

Hence, it is evident that the books of Holy Scripture are inspired (and therefore Divine) not only on account of the matter which they contain, but by reason of their

Holy Scripture not only contains, but is the Word of GOD.

GOD the efficient Cause, man the instrumental cause.

Divine Author, so that they not only *contain* the Word of GOD, but they *are* truly the Word of GOD, in that GOD is indeed their Author—that is, their principal efficient Cause—while the human writer is their instrumental cause; not, indeed, in a merely mechanical sense, but as a free and intelligent agent.

For, as we have seen in the case of S. Luke, inspiration does not exclude such labour as is proper in writing a book. The HOLY GHOST by supernatural power Himself impels the sacred authors to write; and so assists them that they, rightly apprehending all those things (and those alone) which He commands, faithfully will to write them, and so aptly express infallible truth. It is evident that, if this were not so, the HOLY GHOST would not be the Author of all Holy Scripture.

Three steps in inspiration :

Three elements, therefore, seem to be required to complete the idea of inspiration.

(1) The movement of the will to write ;

First, a motion of the will to write. But this motion is the impulsion of the HOLY GHOST; so that, when a sacred author is apparently led to write by some external circumstances (as when S. Paul wrote to Philemon about the return of Onesimus), GOD wills him so to write, and by His Providence orders the circumstances to that end.

The author, indeed, also willed to write, but it was the special impulsion of the HOLY GHOST which prompted him. GOD, therefore, remains always the principal Cause of Holy Scripture, efficiently moving the writer, who is the free instrumental cause.

(2) Illumination of the intellect ;

Second, a certain illumination of the intellect, by which the writer clearly apprehends all those things, and those alone, which GOD desires should be written.

We must, however, bear in mind that this does not

necessarily imply revelation; for revelation, properly so called, is a supernatural manifestation of a certain truth of which the recipient was before ignorant, and supposes in him only a passive reception of that truth. Inspiration, however, does not necessarily imply such a manifestation of truth previously unknown to the writer, but rather regards things already known.

It is not necessary that an author should be conscious of inspiration, since a man may be unconscious of supernatural motions. Nevertheless, many theologians consider that the inspired writers did know that they were inspired; for this seems to agree better with the idea of a rational instrument.

Third, Divine assistance, that the writer may neither omit anything that GOD wills to be written, nor add to it what is foreign to GOD's purpose. Furthermore, this Divine assistance saves the writer from falling into any real error.

(3) Divine assistance.

Before we pass from this point, we must emphasize the fact that any adequate theory of inspiration must leave room for that human element which is so obviously present in every book of the Bible. No one can read Holy Scripture intelligently without being struck by the fact that the individuality of the various writers is preserved, not only in style and diction, but also in thought and in manner of treatment of the subject.

The individuality of the writers preserved.

From what we have said it follows that Divine *assistance alone* is not adequate to account for inspiration, since the word used by Holy Scripture, *θεόπνευστος*, signifies an antecedent impulse to the writer, and not merely a negative assistance.

Some inadequate views examined: Divine assistance only;

Again, the approbation of a book after it has been written cannot confer inspiration upon it, for the Church

approbation of the Church;



is unable to create inspiration ; she can only declare it in those books in which she recognizes its presence.

mechanical  
theory ;

The old theory of inspiration held by most Protestants at the Reformation, and by some Catholic theologians also, is generally called " the mechanical theory." It was that the authors of the various books had really no share in their composition beyond the mere mechanical act of writing ; that every word, syllable, and letter was directly dictated to them ; that they were, in fact, the mere passive instruments, the pens, not even the penmen, of the HOLY GHOST.

reaction from  
this ;

To this mechanical and exaggerated theory is largely due a reaction of the present day which would admit only an inspiration so general and vague that it can be as well attributed to poets and orators, and, in fact, to any writers. This later theory would say that the Bible was inspired in a greater *degree* than Shakespeare, but only with the same *kind* of inspiration. Fortunately, this view is chiefly confined to the school of higher critics, composed for the most part of German schismatics and rationalists.

dynamical  
theory.

Another view of inspiration, more in accordance with the general teaching of the Fathers and with the phenomena of Holy Scripture itself, is sometimes known as " the dynamical theory." This leaves room for the individual peculiarities of style, diction, thought, and manner of treatment ; and, while recognizing Divine energy in inspiration, does not exclude human co-operation.

As Archdeacon Lee\* says : " The HOLY GHOST employs man's faculties in conformity with their natural laws, at the same time animating, guiding, moulding them so as to accomplish the Divine purpose ;

\* *On Inspiration*, p. 144.

just as in nature the principle of life, where annexed to certain portions of matter, exhibits its vital energy in accordance with conditions which that matter imposes, while it governs and directs at the same time the organism with which it is combined."

Thus "the human element becomes an integral part of the agency employed; nay, more, the peculiar type of each writer's nature was even essential to the due reception of that particular phase of truth presented by his statements, and his characteristic form of expression was absolutely requisite for the adequate conveyance of his Divine message."

It is by steadily keeping before us this fact of the two-fold agency in Holy Scripture that we are able to account for the various phenomena which Holy Scripture manifests. Like the Incarnate WORD, it is not partly human, partly Divine, but perfectly human in that it was written by a human instrument, and perfectly Divine in that it was inspired by GOD.

The twofold agency in Holy Scripture accounts for its phenomena.

We began this chapter by drawing attention to the close analogy which may be traced between the written Word and the Incarnate WORD of GOD, and in this is to be found the key to many of the difficulties in regard to Holy Scripture.

The Bible resembles, and yet differs from, other books, just as the Flesh of CHRIST resembles, and yet differs from, the flesh of other men. If those who can see in Holy Scripture only the dead letter to be examined and dissected—much as the anatomist in the interests of science dissects a human body—had been able (if one may suggest it with reverence) to dissect that dear Body which was taken down from the Cross, marked with the scourge and nails and spear—would they have found in It anything which seemed to them

The analogy between the Bible and the Incarnate WORD.

more than human ? And yet, even as It lay there still and dead, there was hypostatically united to that Body the Person of the WORD, the SON of GOD.

So in Holy Scripture, those who approach the examination of the letter under the guidance of human science rather than of the SPIRIT of GOD, will find in it the marks of a perfect human work, and will probably get no further than the dead letter which they examine and criticise. Those, however, who approach it under the guidance of the HOLY SPIRIT, will be led by the letter to recognize the Divine truth which it enshrines.

Holy Scripture both a revelation and a veiling of Divine truth.

Again, as our LORD's Human Body was in one sense the instrument by which He revealed His Divine Person, so from another point of view it was the veil which concealed His Divinity. The same is the case with the letter of Holy Scripture. Its purpose is to reveal to those who have been prepared by the HOLY GHOST the deep things of GOD, but to conceal them from those who approach its study in the mere power of natural gifts.

Some corollaries :  
A book need not be in all its parts the work of its reputed author.  
Existing documents may have been used ;

Some few corollaries may be added. First, that from the recognition of the co-operation of two agencies in Holy Scripture, an inspired book need not be in all its parts the work of its reputed writer. Not only may he have used existing documents and authorities, but there was nothing to prevent him from incorporating portions of such existing material into his work.

Cardinal Newman reminds us\* that " it is not against the Faith to hold that a canonical book may be composed, not only from, but even of, pre-existing documents ; it being always borne in mind as a necessary condition that an inspired mind has exercised a

\* *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1884.

supreme and an ultimate judgment on the work, determining what was to be selected and embodied in it in order to its truth in all matters of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine and its unadulterated truth."

but the inspired mind must have passed judgment on them.

Hence, if it be true that Moses incorporated into the Pentateuch portions of earlier documents, it does not in the least militate against the inspiration of the Pentateuch; since those earlier documents—whatever they were—passed through the mind of one who was inspired; and the same may be true of any other book of the Bible. It is not at all necessary that a book should be homogeneous throughout; all that is necessary is that the whole material should have passed through the mind of the inspired writer.

Again, it is not necessary to maintain that the titles of the various books and their reputed authorship are in all cases correct, or to be taken literally. These, as not being integral portions of the books, do not come within the scope of inspiration.

It is not necessary that the titles of books or their reputed authorship be correct.

It is not necessary, for instance, to maintain that the Book of Job was the work of him whose name it bears; nor, if it could be proved that the Second Epistle of S. Peter was not written by S. Peter, would its inspiration and authority be any the less.

That this is not a canon invented to meet the difficulties of the present day may be shown from the fact that Melchior Canus says\*: "It does not matter to the Catholic faith that a book was written by this or that author, so long as the SPIRIT of GOD is believed to be the Author of it;" which, he says, is the teaching of S. Gregory in the Preface to his Commentary on Job. Again, Canus says: "It matters not with what

This canon not invented to meet difficulties of to-day; found in S. Gregory and in Melchior Canus.

\* *Loci Theol.*, lib. II., cap. xi., p. 34.

pen a king has written his letter, if it be true that he has written it."

There is no authoritative system of chronology.

Again, we may bear in mind that we are not bound to any particular system of chronology; for none is laid down in the sacred books, and no system can have any more weight than it obtains from the authority of the commentator who proposes it, or its own intrinsic merits.

Errors may have crept into MSS.

Again, the principle laid down by S. Augustine in his letter to S. Jerome is as valuable an answer to many objections in our own day as it was in his. Certain difficulties may be due to errors in the manuscript, for when we speak of there being no errors in Holy Scripture, this applies only to the original autographs of the sacred authors. We have no reason to suppose that God would work a perpetual miracle to preserve all scribes and copyists from mistakes.

Difficulty about numbers often due to this.

As a matter of fact, we know from the numerous variations in the manuscripts that He has not done so. Many of the difficulties connected with numbers in Holy Scripture are, no doubt, due to this cause; they are errors of transcribers in copying earlier manuscripts, in which numbers are expressed by letters often so nearly alike as to be easily confounded.

Received interpretation often erroneous. Dr. Whewell on the influence of current philosophy on interpretation.

In other cases, if the text itself be not in error, it is our translation of it, or perhaps our interpretation, that is at fault.\* Dr. Whewell† says: "The meaning which any generation puts upon the phrases of Scripture depends, more than is at first sight supposed, upon the received philosophy at the time. Hence, while men imagine that they are contending for revelation, they are in fact contending for their own interpretation of revelation, unconsciously adapted to what they be-

\* See *Inspiration and Other Essays*, pp. 32-38.

† *Inductive Science*, vol. I., p. 403.

lieve to be rationally probable. And the new interpretation, which the new philosophy requires, and which appears to the older school to be a fatal violence done to the authority of religion, is accepted by their successors without the dangerous results which were apprehended. The advance of science is often most useful in its criticism of Holy Writ, in overthrowing these merely human philosophic opinions."

It is said that in 1863, in the American Civil War, when Fort Sumter was bombarded by Federal war-ships and the fortifications rapidly reduced to ruins, it seemed as though the fort must soon surrender. But the more the walls were battered down, the stronger the fortress became, and when the fortifications had been practically demolished by the bombardment, the fort was impregnable.

Illustration  
from Fort  
Sumter.

So when the attacks of rationalists and others have completely battered down the bulwarks of human opinion and philosophy which well-meaning Christians have, with mistaken zeal, erected in defence of Holy Scripture, we may well believe that Holy Scripture itself will then be found to be impregnable.

Again, we must remember that no Scripture "is of any private interpretation," and until the Church—the only authorized infallible interpreter of the Word of God—has definitely and authoritatively declared a given interpretation to be the true one, it is useless to talk of science contradicting the Bible, although it may seem opposed to our own interpretation, or even to that hitherto generally accepted.

No Scripture is  
of any private  
interpretation.

Again, many facts of physical science are simply recorded as they appeared to the writer, and inspiration would not, in such a case, convey a knowledge of scientific truth in regard to such matters.

Facts of  
science re-  
corded as they  
appeared to  
the writer.

III. The interpretation and use of Holy Scripture.

Having treated of the Canon and inspiration of Holy Scripture, we must now pass to a consideration of the various methods of interpretation, and the subsidiary helps which may be used in the study of Holy Scripture.

Hermeneutics sets forth certain rules, which the art of exegesis then applies. Hermeneutics is like the key which unlocks the treasures of Scripture. By its help exegesis discovers these riches, and the theologian uses them to prove and illustrate the dogmas of the faith.

The various senses of Holy Scripture.

We must first consider the various senses, or meanings, which are to be looked for in the interpretation of Holy Scripture. By the *sense* of Holy Scripture we mean the truth which the HOLY GHOST wills to teach either directly or indirectly in any particular passage.

First division, twofold: literal, and spiritual.

The *sense* is generally twofold, literal and spiritual. The *literal* sense is that which the words immediately express, and is sometimes called the historical sense. The *spiritual* sense is that not immediately suggested by the letter, but by the persons or things mentioned, which are so ordained by Divine Providence as to signify other persons or objects. Thus, Hagar and Sarah in the literal sense are the wives of Abraham, but in a spiritual sense they signify the two Testaments, as S. Paul tells us (Gal. iv. 24).

All the Scriptures refer directly or indirectly to CHRIST, and the Old Testament sets forth the figure or type or prophecy of those things which come to pass under the New Dispensation; so that S. Paul says: "Now all these things happened unto them for examples: and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come" (1 Cor. x. 11). Many things, therefore, related literally of the patriarchs, kings, and prophets, are to be understood typically or spiritually of CHRIST and His Church.

The literal sense may be twofold: either that which is proper, or that which is metaphorical. The *proper* sense is that immediately suggested by the words taken in their natural signification. The *metaphorical* sense is that suggested by the words taken not strictly, but figuratively; and on this account it is also called the *figurative* sense.

The literal sense is twofold: proper, and metaphorical.

S. Thomas illustrates this by the following examples: "When Scripture says, JESUS ascended, it is to be taken in the first or proper sense. But when it is said that He sits at the right hand of GOD, it is evidently to be understood metaphorically."

The *spiritual* or *typical* sense divides itself into three distinct branches. One of these treats of individual human action, and is technically called *tropological* (or the *moral* sense); the second applies the passage of Scripture to the Church on earth, and is spoken of as *allegorical*; and the third refers the text to the life and conditions of glory in the world to come, and is called *anagogical*.

The spiritual sense has three subdivisions: tropological, allegorical, and anagogical.

These are summed up in the old Latin couplet:

*Litera scripta docet; quid credas, allegoria;  
Quid speres, anagoge; quid agas, tropologia.*

Or, as it is sometimes written:

*Litera gesta docet; quid credas, allegoria;  
Moralis, quid agas; quo tendas, anagogia.*

The most common illustration of these various senses of Holy Scripture is found in the word "Jerusalem;" which literally signifies the city in Palestine, allegorically the Church Militant, tropologically or morally the soul of a righteous man, and anagogically the Church Triumphant.



The mystical interpretation has the authority of CHRIST.

To some the mystical or spiritual interpretation of Holy Scripture seems far-fetched and unreal. But it must be borne in mind that our LORD and His Apostles continually used Holy Scripture in this way.

The accommodative sense.

Another sense in which Holy Scripture may be used is sometimes called *accommodatively*, when a phrase is used by way of illustration; as when a sinner uses the words of Eve, "The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat."

We must next briefly consider some of the canons of the interpretation of Holy Scripture.

Two sets of canons of Scriptural interpretation, the Bible being human and Divine.

Since Holy Scripture is at once both human and Divine, a double set of canons is required for its interpretation. On its human side we must apply to it the historical and grammatical rules which would govern the interpretation of any other book. On its Divine side the Church supplies us with certain special rules.

On the human side :

Under the first head, the student will use all helps of grammar, history, archæology, palæography, etc., to determine the text, and exactly what the author had in mind in writing the passage. That is, he must study text, context, parallel passages, and commentaries on the text.

(1) The exact meaning of the text to be sought;

Then the text must be accurately examined, that the exact signification of the words may be clearly apprehended. This involves lexical study of the text in its original language, Greek or Hebrew, for the meaning of a word is often obscured, sometimes entirely lost, in the translation. Nor must we stop at the text itself. Frequently it will be necessary to consider oriental customs which throw light upon a particular use of the word.

(2) the context to be observed;

Then the context must be carefully observed, in order that we may grasp what the author has in mind ;

and under this head we have to consider the occasion on which the words are spoken, and the general argument of which they perhaps form a part.

Parallel passages must be examined, and that in two ways. First, comparison of the author's use of a particular word in other places will often determine its exact force in that under consideration. Then, reference to a parallel passage will sometimes throw light on the subject generally, and so clear up what is obscure in the one in question.

When we have settled the text and context, and considered the parallel passages, so that we have a good understanding of the author's meaning, then we may with advantage use commentaries for the elucidation of the passage.

So far, these rules would apply to the interpretation of any book, since they are merely the application of the laws of history, grammar, etc. Since, however, Holy Scripture is not only human, but Divine, it not only falls under the rules of ordinary criticism, but under the infallible teaching of the Church.

Hence, we must endeavour to discover what interpretation the Church has put upon the passage. This is especially the case if there be any controversy in regard to it. The Church's interpretation of the passage is to be found sometimes in her use of it liturgically, but more often in the writings of the Fathers and theologians.

When we find among these a moral unanimity of interpretation in regard to any matter of faith or morals, whether it be explicitly or implicitly taught, then we are practically bound to accept that interpretation.

Where there is no unanimity, we are free to seek other testimony, since, while the authority of the

(3) parallel passages to be considered ;

(4) the opinions of commentators to be weighed.

On the Divine side :

The Church's interpretation to be followed ; this may be sought in Liturgies, Fathers, and theologians.

Fathers is great, it is not infallible. And further, we must remember that the literal or proper sense of the passage must always be considered first, although the spiritual sense must not be neglected.

IV. Another theory of Holy Scripture, advanced by H. C.

Thus far we have considered the Church's theory of Holy Scripture, its inspiration and authority. In the present day, however, we find another and very different account of Holy Scripture, which comes to us on the authority of a body of men known as "higher critics." They disregard the conclusions on this subject which the Church has reached under the guidance of the HOLY SPIRIT, and starting from the opposite pole of investigation, under the guidance of unaided human reason, reach results which in many respects seem to be diametrically opposed to the teachings of the Church.

under the guidance of unaided human reason.

While it would be quite impossible in this chapter to give an adequate account of Higher Criticism, or to treat its principles with any fulness, it may nevertheless be well to point out, as briefly as possible, some reasons why its conclusions carry but little weight.

I. The methods by which the Church and the critics respectively reach conclusions. The Church's method.

In the first place, when we contrast the processes by which the Church and the higher critics arrive at their respective positions, we observe that while the Church's method *may* lead to absolute truth, that of the critics *cannot* possibly do so. For the Church's teaching *hypothetically* rests on the conclusions reached by a body not only specially trained to consider the subject, but under the promised guidance of the SPIRIT of Truth; and these teachings, as we should have expected, are always one and the same.

The method of H. C.

The Higher Criticism, on the other hand, represents the opinions of a very much smaller number of independent investigators, who, trusting only to human

reason, and making no claim whatever to supernatural guidance, cannot be expected to reach any uniform conclusion; nor, as a matter of fact, have they done so.

In other words, if the Church be infallible, its teaching in regard to Holy Scripture must be absolutely true. But since the opinions of a number of individuals have not the slightest claim to infallibility, the probability that they should reach absolute truth is extremely small; and inasmuch as they do not agree in the results reached by their method, it is evident that those results are not absolute truth.

The Church's method may reach absolute truth in the premises; the critics' cannot.

Of course, the guidance of the HOLY SPIRIT, and the consequent infallibility of the Church, which we have assumed in our argument, demand independent proof. This proof for Christians has already been given, resting as it does upon our LORD'S promises, and upon the experience of the witness of the HOLY SPIRIT in the Church for nearly two thousand years. The tendency to error of individual judgment needs no proof; but, if it did, the diverse conclusions which higher critics have reached would abundantly furnish it.

The infallibility of the Church here assumed, but elsewhere discussed.

As we have said, we receive the Bible simply on the authority of the Church, which assures us of its inspiration. If, however, we put this aside and consider what other testimony there is to the authenticity and genuineness of Holy Scripture, we find three special lines of evidence bearing on the subject.

2. Apart from the authority of the Church, three lines of evidence for Holy Scripture :

They are, first, the evidence of archæology, or the testimony of contemporary history; second, internal evidence of a literary character, which may be obtained from the study of the text itself; and third, internal evidence of a moral character, or the appeal which Holy Scripture makes to our own spiritual nature. Of these three the first and the last are against the higher

(1) Archæology;  
(2) internal literary evidence;  
(3) internal moral evidence.

critics, and it is with the second that Higher Criticism *chiefly* deals.

The testimony of archæology shows the narrative of the Pentateuch to be true to the life and customs of its assumed date.

Without insisting on all that has been claimed for archæology (namely, that it proves such parts of the narrative as the story of Melchisedek, of Abram's conquest of the four kings, etc.) we may assert without fear of contradiction that it shows the narrative of the Pentateuch to be true to the life and habits of the time in which it claims to have been written. That part, for instance, which can be verified by comparison with recent Egyptian discoveries, proves that the customs, names, and even peculiar words were exactly as described by the writer.

That Higher Criticism finds no support from archæology may be gathered from the following words of the preface to one of the most recent works on the subject :

" Over against the facts of archæology stand the subjective assumptions of a certain school, which now that they have ceased to be prominent in the higher latitudes of scholarship are finding their way into the popular literature of the country. Between the results of Oriental Archæology and those which are the logical end of the so-called ' Higher Criticism ' no reconciliation is possible, and the latter must therefore be cleared out of the way before the archæologist can begin his work " (*The Early History of the Hebrews*, by Prof. Sayce, Preface, p. vi.).

The testimony of moral sense is altogether contrary to H. C.

If we take the third line of evidence—the appeal which Holy Scripture makes to man's spiritual nature and experience—most unprejudiced minds will feel that the position of the higher critics is inconceivable. That a book which is such a mere patchwork, and written so much later than the events it pretends to recount,—a book in which romances flattering to Hebrew pride are

mingled with a few genuine facts,—should not only have exercised the influence it did upon the Jewish race, but, through Christianity, upon the world at large, makes too great a demand upon our credulity.

“The ‘Higher Criticism’ is a system of critical analysis by which the critic professes to be able to take the Books of Scripture which have come down to us in a certain traditional form—known as the Canon of the Old Testament—and to break them up into their component parts. In sifting and separating these parts he determines by the light of his own intelligence which of them have any historical truth at all in them, which have none; he determines the age in which each was written, and the exact motives of each writer in the statements which he makes; when there is any historical truth at the bottom of any statement, the critic produces such truth in the form in which it really happened three or four thousand years ago, and explains to you the motives of the writer in presenting it to the reader in the widely different form in which it has been received as history through successive ages. These motives are sometimes comparatively innocent, as, e. g., when a false name, such as that of Moses, is assigned to certain useful laws to give weight and authority to them; but sometimes they are purely corrupt, as when interested priests write spurious histories like the Books of Chronicles for the purpose of enhancing their own dignity and securing their own emoluments.” \*

3. H. C.  
described.

Higher Criticism is more than one hundred years old, and may be traced, perhaps, to Astruc, a French physician of considerable learning, but of profligate life, who in 1753 put forth a treatise entitled “Conjectures Con-

Its origin and  
history.

\* Lord A. C. Hervey: *The Books of Chronicles in Relation to the Pentateuch and the “Higher Criticism,”* pp. 7, 8.

cerning the Original Memoranda Which It Appears Moses Used to Compose the Book of Genesis." This and other theories, however, were gathered into a system by Eichhorn in a work published in 1782. The name "Higher Criticism" was coined by him to describe the system, which may therefore be considered to have had its origin in a land which since the days of Luther has been the birthplace of almost every heresy that has disturbed Christendom.

Strauss, 1835 ;  
Baur, 1844.

Little was done, however, until 1835, when Strauss's *Life of JESUS* appeared, followed, in 1844, by Baur's *Paulus*,—these two works representing respectively the Mythical and the Tendency Schools. But Baur's position as regards the four epistles which he holds to be genuine overthrows Strauss's theory, since it does not give time for the myth of the Resurrection to develop, and Baur's theory has in turn been displaced by later critics. His theory in regard to the late date of S. John's writings, 170, has been disproved by finding quotations from them, until the date has gradually been moved backwards to the closing years of the first century.

The three  
premises of  
H. C.

Since Baur's time a host of critics has appeared upon the field, agreeing in the main on three points : first, the elimination of the supernatural from the Bible ; second, the comparatively late dates of most of the books ; third, their composite character. These three weapons were first used in an attack upon the New Testament, and resulted, according to the critics, in leaving us only four authentic works—four epistles of S. Paul, namely, I. and II. Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans. The other books were held to be mostly of a late date, some of them, like the Acts of the Apostles, having a teleological character ; while the Gospels were

The attack first  
on the New  
Test. ;

found to be of an extremely composite character, some critics, like Dr. Abbott, undertaking to reduce them to their exact component parts.

Since 1878, however, all this has been practically given up; the conclusions which were so laboriously reached and so industriously propagated having in most cases been proved false by unanswerable arguments.

since 1878 shifted to the Old Test., but on the same lines.

Defeated in their attack on the New Testament, the higher critics have transferred their weapons and methods to the books of the Old Testament; their two main contentions being the same which they unsuccessfully tried to use against the New Testament : namely, the late date of most of the books, and their composite character.

The late date of the books was argued from the assumed fact that at the time of Moses there was absolutely no literary activity. For until quite lately the exploration of Eastern lands failed to reveal any inscription in the letters of the Phœnician alphabet going back even to the time of Solomon ; and as the Hebrews, like other nations of Syria, were known to have used a form of the Phœnician alphabet, to the critics the conclusion seemed certain that there could have been no literature as early as the time of Moses.

4. The late date of books argued from absence of literary activity in Moses' time.

So, with this assumption (to confine ourselves to the Pentateuch alone), the higher critics first divided the Pentateuch into its component parts.

Alleged component parts of the Pentateuch :

The first, P, the Priestly Code, which contains the Levitical Law, they tell us is the work of the Exilic period, and was put into action by Ezra and Nehemiah. The movable tabernacle, the wandering camp, and other archaic details, with a legislation strictly confined to the situation in the wilderness, were so skilfully contrived as to conceal the true date; and so all these

(1) Priestly Code;



passed as real history until the higher critics arose to detect the imposture.

(2) the  
Narrative;

The second, J-E, the narrative, comprising the history down to the occupation of Canaan, they tell us was composed in the time of the Assyrian monarchy with the help of history and some old documents. But J-E is capable of subdivision into E, the Elohist, and J, the Jahvist, E being the older of the two.

(3) the Deuter-  
onomist;

The third, D, comprising Deuteronomy, or the bulk of it, the critics decided was composed in the reign of Josiah, when Hilkiab pretended to have found it in the Temple, some seven centuries after the death of Moses.

(4) Subdivi-  
sions of each.

If this were all, the system would be comparatively simple, but unfortunately it does not square with the facts. So E, J, J-E, P, and D have each of them to be subdivided, because the theory on which they were constructed will not work in some places. Therefore P is found to be very complex, and P<sup>1</sup>, P<sup>2</sup>, P<sup>3</sup> . . . P<sup>x</sup> are substituted, and D in the same way is broken up into D<sup>1</sup>, D<sup>2</sup>, etc. Even then the theory often will not answer, and so a large number of R's ("redactors") has to be kept on hand.

(5) Redactors  
required;

but no agree-  
ment as to  
how many  
sources—  
Driver requires  
six;

But even here there is no agreement among the critics, working on the same system and with the same materials to examine. For Dr. Driver demands for the Hexateuch (excluding Deuteronomy) three primary sources (two of which he acknowledges it is often impossible to distinguish from each other), one supplemental source, and probably two redactors, *only* six in all. But Dr. Cornill, one of the most eminent contemporary critics in Germany, requires some fifteen hands at least to account for the same phenomena. And yet for this "exact science" we are to give up the Church's teaching about the Bible!

Cornill fifteen.

The critics assign the following approximate dates to the different divisions : P, B.C. 450; D, 640; J-E, 800; all this resting on two grounds : first, the entire absence of any literature as early as the time of Moses; second, the internal evidence of the books themselves.

5. Dates assigned are P, 450; D, 640; J-E, 800.

Until a very few years ago the archæological discoveries in the East were of small value in determining these questions. But just when the higher critics had to their own satisfaction arrived at the above conclusions, in the providence of GOD some discoveries throwing very great light on the subject were made—the most important at Tel-el-Amarna, where what we might call the records of the Foreign Office of the time of Khu-n-Aten or Amenophis IV., the tenth king of the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty, were dug up. These records consisted partly of cuneiform inscriptions brought from Thebes, but chiefly of the official correspondence with the kings of Babylonia and Assyria, Mesopotamia and Cappadocia, and of despatches from the Egyptian governors and vassal princes in Syria and Palestine; furnishing us with a living and unexpected picture of Canaan about the year 1400 B.C.

Recent archæological discoveries at

Tel-el-Amarna,

Other discoveries, made in Babylon, have enabled us to carry its history back to Sargon of Accad, about the year 3800 B.C., the founder of the first Semitic empire and of one of the most famous libraries of Chaldea.

and in Babylon, trace literature back to Sargon, 3800 B.C. H. C. therefore 2500 years out.

Thus the ground on which the higher critics base one part of their decision,—that there was no literature in the time of Moses, about 1290,—is cut from under their feet by the fact that 2500 years earlier than that date great literary activity existed, and that about the time of Moses there was a perfect Renaissance both of prose and poetry. These discoveries, of course, absolutely destroy the first premise of the argument, and a mis-

take of 2500 years is likely to shake the faith of *some* in Higher Criticism as an exact science.

Examination  
of date as-  
signed to J-E  
Babylonian  
affinities of J ;

To glance for a moment at the date assigned to J-E, we may observe that archæology has shown strong Babylonian and Egyptian affinities in certain parts of the Pentateuch. For instance, the account of the Creation and the Flood, both as regards the names and the outline of the story, show marked traces of Babylonian influence, while the story of the sojourn of Joseph and Moses in Egypt is found to be absolutely true to the language and habits of Egypt at that time.

Egyptian affin-  
ities of E ;

but little inter-  
course with  
either country  
between 1290  
and 586.

But the critics assign J-E, which contains these histories, to the seventh or the eighth century B.C.,—a most unfortunate date for them, because from 1290 to 586, a period of seven hundred years, there seems to have been very little intercourse with Babylon or Egypt. No one has suggested that J-E is as late as the Exilic period, and if it is as early as 1290, which is now thought to be the date of Moses, there seems to have been no one so likely to have had a knowledge of the details of Egyptian life as one who had lived there and was “learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians;” which perhaps included acquaintance with some Babylonian documents.

On this ground  
Moses the most  
probable  
author.

Recent discov-  
ery at Sippara  
of a J-E tablet  
of the 14th cen-  
tury destruc-  
tive to the lit-  
erary analysis  
of H. C.

A Mosaic authorship, therefore, would seem the most probable and natural under the circumstances; but this is sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of higher critics.

One of the latest discoveries of archæology throws considerable light upon J-E, the so-called “Story-book” of the Pentateuch, showing how very probable is its Mosaic authorship, and completely overthrowing the late date of the higher critics.

“At the recent meeting of the Oriental Congress in Paris, Dr. Scheil stated that among the tablets recently

brought from Sippara to the museum at Constantinople is one which contains the same text of the story of the Flood as that which was discovered by George Smith."

"But whereas the text found by George Smith was written for the library of Nineveh in the seventh century B.C., the newly-discovered text was inscribed in the reign of Ammi-zadok, the fourth successor of Khammu-rabi or Amraphel, in the Abrahamic age. And even then the text was already old. Here and there the word *khibi*, 'lacuna,' was inserted, indicating that the original from which it had been copied was already illegible in places."

"Since this text agrees, not with the 'Elohists' or the 'Yahvists' separately, but with the supposed combination of the two documents in the book of Genesis, it is difficult to see, as the discoverer remarked, how the 'literary analysis' can be any longer maintained. At all events, the discovery shows the minute care and accuracy with which the literature of the past was copied and handed down. Edition after edition had been published of the story of the Deluge, and yet the text of the Abrahamic age and that of the seventh century B.C. agree even to the spelling of words."

It will be interesting to examine now the method by which the higher critics have so accurately and confidently assigned the text of the Pentateuch to its various authors P, D, and J-E.

Having decided that the books are the work of different writers, they begin by a careful comparison of two sections, supposed to be from different documents, such as the first two sections in Genesis. All differences of thought and language between them are carefully noted, and the comparison is then extended to contiguous sections, and so on gradually to

V. Examination of method by which the different sections are determined.

the rest of the Pentateuch, all being assigned to one or other document on the basis of the criteria already gathered.

The method plausible, but a vicious circle.

But this method, notwithstanding its seeming plausibility, and the apparent scientific caution and accuracy with which it is applied, is essentially a fallacy — a vicious circle ; for the differences are first created and then argued from. The documents are first affirmed to correspond with certain assumed characteristic differences, and then their correspondence with these characteristics is urged as a proof of their objective reality.

All paragraphs, clauses, etc., in which certain criteria occur, are systematically assigned to one document, and those having another class of criteria are with like regularity assigned to another document ; and when the process is complete all the criteria of one class are in one document, and those of the other class are in the other, *simply because the critic has put them there*. The documents agree with the hypothesis, because they have been constructed by the hypothesis.

The criteria derived from diversity of diction,

The criteria, in the first place, are derived from diversity of diction, a standard well known to be most unreliable. That a certain word or phrase happens to occur in J and another word or phrase in E in the first chapters of Genesis is no reason why J should never in any other part use E's words, or E use J's words.

and an arbitrary assumption of independent authors.

But what is even worse, first the entire ritual law is given to P and the narrative and all poetical passages to J-E ; and then the corresponding differences of diction and style are pointed to as a proof of the accuracy of the division !

These differences of diction and style necessarily result from diversity of theme, the ritual law naturally requiring very different diction from the poetical

passages or the narrative. We might as well, for example, compare Lord Macaulay's history, his essays, and his poetry; and because the poetry was not in exactly the same style as the prose, insist that it was written by a different person.

Illustration  
from Macau-  
lay's works.

But even after the critics have made this arbitrary division, the alleged criteria frequently conflict with each other and with the criteria derived from the Divine Names.

How the fre-  
quent conflicts  
between the  
criteria are  
met.

Words or phrases supposed to be characteristic of one writer meet in the same section, or even in the same sentence, with those said to characterize the other; and critics have to resort to all sorts of subterfuges to escape the difficulty.

Sometimes they admit that what has been considered characteristic of one document is found likewise in another. This, of course, is equivalent to a confession that it is not a distinctive criterion at all. More often, however, they fall back upon the friendly and ever-ready "redactor," R.

In fact, the critic is engaged in solving an indeterminate equation. The line of partition depends upon the criteria, and the criteria depend upon the line of partition, and both of these are unknown quantities. The work, therefore, is of necessity purely hypothetical from first to last. The liability to error increases with every step. A mistake in the assignment of the criteria will lead to a wrong partition, and this to further false criteria, and so on indefinitely.

H. C. an at-  
tempt to solve  
an indetermin-  
ate equation of  
two unknown  
quantities;  
the whole  
theory purely  
hypothetical.

The complexity of the problem becomes more obvious the further the critic proceeds. At the outset his work is comparatively simple; by the aid of such ingenious devices as we have mentioned, the critic makes his way through Genesis with tolerable ease. But in

Difficulties increase in the Pentateuch and culminate in Joshua.

Two causes why people accept H. C.

the middle of the Pentateuch difficulties crowd upon him, as is shown by the wide divergence of the critics in meeting them; and in the Book of Joshua the work becomes a veritable medley.

Here we may perhaps point out two causes why many people accept the conclusions of Higher Criticism.

First, because the theory, *as applied to the beginning of Genesis*, seems so simple. The start is made with the two Names of GOD, JEHOVAH and ELOHIM, and without any labour a mere novice is able to understand it.

The other reason is that before the middle of the Pentateuch is reached the theory has become so complex that very few master it. Because the beginning is so simple they suppose that the full theory *can be explained*; but when they come to the tangle, (say, of the Book of Joshua) they simply take it for granted that the masters of the system have penetrated the labyrinth and have come out all right, and they do not venture in themselves.

The theory works only for a few chapters of Genesis.

The theory, as we have observed, seems quite simple in the beginning of Genesis; but it is only of a very few chapters that this can be said, for soon we find P using J, and E doing the same, while J uses E. We fly to a higher critic for an explanation, and the answer is that this is the work of a bungling redactor, R. For where facts are at variance with the hypothesis (as they frequently are) the facts, and not the hypothesis, are generally corrected by the higher critics.

An example of its inconsistency in the account of the Flood.

We have space here only for one simple instance. If we take the account of the Flood, in the seventh chapter of Genesis, Higher Criticism demands two sources, J and P blended together. In the ninth verse we read: "There went in two and two unto Noah into the ark, the male and the female, as *GOD* had commanded

Noah." This belongs to J's account, and yet the name ELOHIM is used. How is this to be accounted for? Kautzsch claims that it must have been originally JEHOVAH. Dillmann, however, insists that it was inserted by R. Why? Only because the facts do not fit the hypothesis. In the sixteenth verse we read: "And they that went in, went in male and female of all flesh, as GOD had commanded him: and the LORD shut him in." This verse belongs to the P section, but, alas! it has JEHOVAH in it as well as ELOHIM. Of course another R is needed.

The number of instances of this is simply enormous. In some places the verse is on this account rejected by the critics; in the majority of cases R<sup>1</sup>, R<sup>2</sup>, R<sup>3</sup> . . . R<sup>n</sup> are introduced to account for the difficulty. Indeed, Dr. Harper, one of the higher critics, in his *Hebraica* says: "The language is but a poor guide, owing, probably, to R's interference. Not even the Names of the Deity are to be relied on implicitly, being mingled." *And yet the Names of the Deity are the basis of the entire hypothesis.*

Dr. Harper's admission on this point.

To sum up, we may observe: first, that an examination of the *method* of Higher Criticism shows that it is inherently vicious, and therefore that its conclusions are not trustworthy. Secondly, that an examination of the *conclusions* derived from it leads to the same result. We find that its supporters disagree on many points; and, as we look back upon the history of the system during the past hundred years, we again and again see positions, once deemed impregnable, abandoned or overthrown by succeeding schools. Indeed, as some of the more candid higher critics admit, there is every reason to suppose that its present conclusions will not last.

A summary: The method being vicious the conclusions are not trustworthy;

the history of H. C. shows that the ground has been frequently shifted.



VI. Illustrations of the viciousness of the method of H. C.

1. From the criticism of the Catilinarian Orations of Cicero.

We will conclude this chapter with some illustrations of the viciousness of the system: first, an account of its application in secular literature; and secondly, examples of the facility with which the same results of composite authorship may be obtained in narratives about the unity of which there is not the slightest doubt. Under the first head we will take the history of the systematic attack made upon Cicero's Orations against Catiline, of whose genuineness there is the strongest proof.

The discussion "began with F. A. Wolf,\* who cast doubt in a general way upon several of Cicero's Orations. Following Wolf came Eichstaedt, who reviewed Wolf's book in 1802, and took the position that at least one of the Catilinarian Orations ought to be included in the condemnation bestowed upon the other Orations. Wolf quickly followed Eichstaedt and condemned the Third Oration, and in subsequent comments and remarks stated the question in such a way as to leave it uncertain which Oration he meant, or whether it was one of two Orations, and so, in 1826, Clude, thinking he was following out the opinion of Wolf, proved to his own satisfaction and the satisfaction of some others, that it was the Second Oration which was spurious. But shortly afterwards (in 1827) Benecke, by producing the very words of Wolf from one of his letters, showed that Wolf meant the Third Oration. In the meantime the Fourth Oration had fallen under the displeasure of other critics, notably Zimmermann and Bloch, and so Ahrens, in 1832, passed sentence on the unfortunate oration, embracing the Third Oration at the same time in his condemnation. Finally came Orelli, in 1836,

\* The critic of Homer and the father of destructive literary criticism.

and fearing, I suppose, that such inconsistencies of opinion would end in contempt and ridicule, decided that all three were spurious."

"In addition to other evidence from ancient writers which was easily answered, there stood opposed to this conclusion the authority of Cicero himself, who in the First Epistle of the Second Book of his Letters to Atticus makes abundant reference to his own consular orations, and enumerates one by one the four Orations against Catiline."

"And so no other course was left the critics except to come to the incredible conclusion that genuine Orations of Cicero, delivered on a most famous occasion, had so faded out of remembrance by the time of Augustus (for Ahrens admits that the Orations we possess are as old as this) that spurious orations could be put in their place and meet with acceptance, without any contemporary objection, in spite of the fact that one genuine oration out of the four still remained, and was put together with the three false ones. Orelli met the emergency heroically (*forti remedio*), for he cut out the whole of this passage from the middle of Cicero's Letter to Atticus. Consequently no statement remained regarding the various Catilinarian Orations published by Cicero himself. Thereupon Orelli excogitated a pleasant hypothesis (*fabulam lepidam*) to the effect that a forger first supplied the three Orations, and then, in order to insure their acceptance, inserted in the letter of Cicero a forged statement in regard to these same orations. But inasmuch as Cicero's Letters were then in circulation, we might ask, How was it that this forger inserted his forgery not only in his own copy of Cicero's Letters, but in the copies of all other readers whom he wished to deceive, and so managed it

that no other copy of this Letter should remain extant written in any other manner? But the same critical shrewdness helps the critics at this juncture. The forger is that very man who edited the volume of Letters after Cicero's death, namely, Marcus Tullius Tiro, the freedman. What! Tiro, the faithful freedman to whom Cicero entrusted his Letters, and who wrote the life of his dead patron accurately and affectionately, and upon whom no suspicion ever fell, was he a forger? 'Yes, indeed,' they answered, 'and he did it with good intention.' Orelli says, 'He thought that he would honour his noble patron most if Cicero's illustrious performance were made celebrated not merely by one but by four orations.' What a marvellous license of imagination and credulity of doubt! So, then, Tiro did not think the matter would be famous by reason of his narrative of Cicero's life, but, although he had never uttered a word in a public assembly, or written even a short oration, he yet thought that the glory of his patron, the greatest orator of Rome, would be increased by Tiro's forging orations under Cicero's name. Yet why not? For the very critic, who is everywhere finding fault with the wretched inconsistencies of Tiro's writings, yet in former times had actually admired Cicero on account of these false orations." \*

2. Application  
of the method  
to certain  
parables.

As our second illustration we shall quote from Professor Green's book the application of the higher critical method to the parables of the Prodigal Son and the Good Samaritan.

\* Madvig, *Opuscula Academica*, pp. 671 sqq., quoted from Green.

## "THE PRODIGAL SON, Luke xv. 11-32.

## A

"11. A certain man had two sons: 12. and the younger of them said to his father, Father, give me the portion of thy substance that falleth to me. . . . 13. And not many days after the younger son gathered all together, . . . and there he wasted his substance with riotous living.

14b. and he began to be in want.

16b. And no man gave unto him.

20. And he arose, and came to his father; . . . and he ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him. 21. And the son said unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and in thy sight: I am no more worthy to be called thy son. 22. But the father said to his servants, Bring forth quickly the best robe, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet: . . . 24. for this my son was dead, and is alive again. . . . And they began to be merry.

## B

"(A certain man had two sons:)

12b. and he divided unto them his living.

13b. And (one of them) took his journey into a far country.

. . . 14. And when he had spent all, there arose a mighty famine in that country. . . .

15. And he went and joined himself to one of the citizens of that country; and he sent him into his fields to feed swine. 16. And he would fain have been filled with the husks that the swine did eat. . . .

17. But when he came to himself he said, How many hired servants of my father's have bread enough and to spare, and I perish here with hunger!

18. I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and in thy sight:

19. I am no more worthy to be called thy son: make me as one of thy hired servants. . . .

20b. But while he was yet afar off, his father saw him, and was moved with compassion:

. . . 23. and (said) Bring the

25. Now his elder son was in the field ; and as he came and drew nigh to the house, . . . 28. he was angry, and would not go in : and his father came out, and entreated him. 29. But he answered and said to his father, Lo, these many years do I serve thee, and I never transgressed a commandment of thine : and yet thou never gavest me a kid, that I might make merry with my friends : 30. but when this thy son came, which hath devoured thy living with harlots, thou killedst for him the fatted calf. 31. And he said unto him, Son, thou art ever with me, and all that is mine is thine. 32. But it was meet to make merry and be glad : for this thy brother was dead, and is alive again."

fatted calf, and kill it, and let us eat, and make merry. . . . 24b. he was lost, and is found. . . . 25b. (And the other son) heard music and dancing. 26. And he called to him one of the servants, and inquired what these things might be. 27. And he said unto him, Thy brother is come ; and thy father hath killed the fatted calf, because he hath received him safe and sound. . . . 32b. and he was lost and is found."

" There are here two complete narratives, agreeing in some points, and disagreeing in others, and each has its special characteristics. The only deficiencies are enclosed in parentheses, and may be readily explained as omissions by the redactor in effecting the combination. A clause must be supplied at the beginning of B, a subject is wanting in ver. 13b, and ver. 25b, and the verb ' said ' is wanting in ver. 23. As these omissions occur exclusively in B, it may be inferred that the redactor placed A at the basis, and incorporated B into it with only such slight changes as were necessary to adapt it to this purpose."

" A and B agree that there were two sons, one of

whom received a portion of his father's property, and by his own fault was reduced to great destitution, in consequence of which he returned penitently to his father, and addressed him in language which is nearly identical in both accounts. The father received him with great tenderness and demonstrations of joy, which attracted the attention of the other son. The differences are quite as striking as the points of agreement. A distinguishes the sons as elder and younger; B makes no mention of their relative ages. In A the younger obtained his portion by solicitation, and the father retained the remainder in his own possession; in B the father divided his property between both of his sons of his own motion. In A the prodigal remained in his father's neighbourhood, and reduced himself to penury by riotous living; in B he went to a distant country and spent all his property, but there is no intimation that he indulged in unseemly excesses. It would rather appear that he was injudicious, and to crown his misfortunes there occurred a severe famine. His fault seems to have consisted in having gone so far away from his father and from the holy land, and in engaging in the unclean occupation of tending swine. In A the destitution seems to have been chiefly want of clothing; in B want of food. Hence in A the father directed the best robe and ring and shoes to be brought for him; in B the fatted calf was killed. In B the son came from a distant land, and the father saw him afar off; in A he came from the neighbourhood, and the father ran at once and fell on his neck and kissed him. In B he had been engaged in a menial occupation, and so bethought himself of his father's hired servants, and asked to be made a servant himself; in A he had been living luxuriously, and while confessing

his unworthiness makes no request to be put on the footing of a servant. In A the father speaks of his son having been dead because of his profligate life ; in B of his having been lost because of his absence in a distant land. In A, but not in B, the other son was displeased at the reception given to the prodigal. And here it would appear that R has slightly altered the text. The elder son must have said to his father in A, 'When this thy son came, which hath devoured thy substance with harlots, thou didst put on him the best robe.' The redactor has here substituted the B word 'living' \* for 'substance,' which is used by A ; and with the view of making a better contrast with 'kid' he has introduced the B phrase, 'thou killedst for him the fatted calf.' "

"THE GOOD SAMARITAN, Luke x. 29-37.

A

B

"29. But he (the lawyer, ver. 25) desiring to justify himself, said unto JESUS, And who is my neighbour? 30. JESUS made answer and said, A certain man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ; . . . and they beat him, . . . leaving him half dead. 31. And by chance a certain priest was going down that way: and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. . . .

"30b. And (a certain man) † fell among robbers, which both stripped him . . . and departed. . . .

32. And [in like manner] ‡ a Levite, [also] ‡ when he came to the place, [and saw him, passed by on the other side.] ‡

33b. and when he saw him,

\* No scholar will need to be informed that 'living,' ver. 13, has a different sense and represents a different word in the original from 'living,' ver. 12.

† Omitted by R. ( ).

‡ Inserted by R. [ ].

33. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: . . .

34. and came to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring on them oil and wine, . . . and took care of him.

36. Which of these [three],\* thinkest thou, proved neighbour unto him? . . . 37. And he said, He that showed mercy on him."

was moved with compassion. . . .

34b. And he set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn. . . . 35. And on the morrow he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, I, when I come back again, will repay thee.

37b. And JESUS said unto him . . . that fell among the robbers, . . . Go, and do thou likewise."

"Both these narratives are complete; only a subject must be supplied in B, ver. 30b, the omission of which was rendered necessary by its being combined with A. 'Three' is substituted for 'two' in A, ver. 36, for a like reason. R has tampered with the text and materially altered the sense in ver. 32, from his desire to put the Levite on the same plane with the priest in ver. 31, the language of which he has borrowed; the genuine text of B will be restored by omitting the insertions by R, which are included in brackets. He has likewise transposed a brief clause of B, in ver. 37b, and added it at the end of ver. 36. These changes naturally resulted from his making A the basis, and modifying what he has inserted from B into accordance with it. Hence the necessity of making it appear that it was not the Levite, but the Samaritan, who befriended the injured traveller, and that JESUS spoke not to the traveller, but to the lawyer. In all other respects the original texts of the two narratives remain unaltered."

"Both narratives agree that a man grievously abused

\* Inserted by R. [                      ].



by certain parties was treated with generous kindness by a stranger ; and that JESUS deduced a practical lesson from it. But they differ materially in details."

" A relates his story as a parable of JESUS in answer to a lawyer's question. B makes no mention of the lawyer or his question, but seems to be relating a real occurrence."

" The spirit of the two is quite different. A is anti-Jewish, B pro-Jewish. In A the aggressors are Jews, people of Jerusalem or Jericho or both, and a priest pitilessly leaves the sufferer to his fate ; while it is a Samaritan, with whom the Jews were in perpetual feud, who takes pity on him. In B the aggressors are robbers, outlaws whose nationality is not defined, and it is a Levite who shows mercy."

" Both the maltreatment and the act of generosity are different. In A the sufferer is beaten and half killed, and needs to have his wounds bound up and liniments applied, which is done by his benefactor on the spot. In B he was stripped of all he had and left destitute, but no personal injury was inflicted ; accordingly he was taken to an inn, and his wants there provided for at the expense of the Levite who befriended him."

" The lesson inculcated is different. In A it is that the duty of loving one's neighbour is not limited to those of the same nation, nor annulled by national antipathies. In B it is that he who has been befriended himself should befriend others." \*

#### Conclusion

Surely Catholics cannot be charged with mere bigotry and prejudice because they prefer the Church's theory in regard to Holy Scripture to the conclusions reached by a method so inherently vicious that whether it be

\* Green, *The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch*, pp. 119-124.

applied in secular or sacred literature, almost any results (excepting those that are certain) can be obtained.

It is not that we do not fully recognize the importance of the study of the internal evidence of the text itself, and the need of employing in such study every help which history, grammar, or archæology can afford. This, however, is something very different from a system which, instead of trying to find out what the text does say, tries to find support for an arbitrary theory of what the text ought to say.

Importance of internal evidence recognized.

It should be carefully borne in mind that our quarrel is not with the *results* of Higher Criticism (although we believe those results to be almost entirely untrustworthy), but with its *methods*. If higher critics can really prove any of their discoveries to be true, we must, of course, accept what is proved to be true.

The quarrel not with the results but with the methods of H. C.

We do not mean to deny that there are many matters on which they have thrown great light by their investigations; but, as it happens, none of these in the least contradicts the Church's teaching. Those conclusions of higher critics which seem to do so have been answered again and again in detail by orthodox writers, whose works should be studied by those who have difficulties in regard to Higher Criticism.

Recognition of discoveries made by critics, but such not contrary to the Church's teaching. The conclusions of H. C. which contradict the Church's teaching have been answered in detail by many writers.

Among such works we may mention Baxter's *Sanctuary and Sacrifice*, a reply to Wellhausen's *Prolegomena*; Green's *The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch*, and *The Unity of the Book of Genesis*; *Lex Mosæica*, edited by French; *The Permanent Value of Genesis*, by Body; *Christus Comprobator*, by Ellicott; and *The Books of Chronicles*, by Lord A. C. Hervey.

## CHAPTER IX.

### JUSTIFICATION.

Introductory :

**T**HE doctrine of justification was the main point of contention between the Protestants and the Church in the sixteenth century, so much so that Luther in his *Table Talk* says: "If this doctrine falls it is all over with us."

The importance of right views of justification.

The importance, moreover, of a clear grasp of the teaching of the Catholic Church on this subject will be realized when we consider that on the view which we take of justification depend three of the most important questions of the soul's life: first, the relation of man as a sinner to GOD as his Saviour; second, the whole Sacramental system of the Church; and third, the entire basis of Christian morals.

I. The Protestant doctrine.

It will be well at the outset to state the Protestant position, in order that we may understand the Catholic doctrine with greater clearness.

The Lutheran view.

By "justification" is meant the manner in which sinners are justified before GOD. Protestants and Catholics alike agree that this process begins with the mere grace of GOD, and so excludes all merit on the part of the sinner. But here they part company. Luther maintained that man "could contribute absolutely nothing to his own conversion;" that "faith in CHRIST, regeneration, renewal" are to be ascribed

"solely to the working of GOD and to the HOLY SPIRIT." \* He compared man under the action of grace to the trunk of a tree, or a stone ; and further, by justification he understood, not the *renewal* of man's moral nature by Divine grace, but the remission of sins and the *imputation* of the justice or righteousness of CHRIST ; faith being the condition on which these benefits are given.

By justification Luther meant not renewal of man's nature, but imputation of CHRIST'S righteousness.

The Calvinists differed from the Lutherans in that they held man to be active, as well as passive, under the influence of grace.† But as they held grace to be irresistible, they could not, of course, allow that man is *free* to accept or reject the invitation of God.

The Calvinistic view.

Thus, while the Church, as we shall presently show, regards justification as an act by which a man is really *made* righteous, Protestants look upon it as one by which he is only declared and *reputed* righteous, the merits of CHRIST being made over to his account by what we may term a legal fiction. By the Catholic doctrine, justification is effected by grace inherent in the soul ; with Protestants it is something external to the soul altogether, a sentence which is pronounced by the Divine Judge.

Difference between the Church's view and these.

From this it follows, first, that, according to Lutheran theology, man is not made righteous, but simply reputed to be righteous, as we have said, by a sort of legal fiction ; his sinfulness remaining, but being covered, as with a cloak, by the righteousness of CHRIST.

Under the Protestant system:  
(1) Man is not made, but imputed, righteous ;

Secondly, that Sacraments, under this system, are comparatively unimportant ; being rather in the nature of rewards than means of grace.

(2) the Sacraments are unimportant ;

And thirdly, that good works, or Christian morals,

\* *Solid. Declar. de Lib. Arbitr.*, sec. 20.

† *Confess. Helvet.*, cap. ix.

(3) and good works unnecessary.

Three extracts from Luther's works.

are entirely unnecessary, and, indeed, dangerous if the slightest reliance be put upon them as a means of pleasing God.

Three quotations from Luther's works will be sufficient to show clearly the relation of his system of "justification by faith only" to Christian morals. The first is as follows: "Now thou seest how rich is the Christian, or the baptized man; for though he will, he cannot lose his salvation, *however great his sins may be*, unless he refuse to believe. No sin can damn him, but unbelief alone." \*

The second quotation is from the celebrated letter which Luther wrote in 1521 from the Wartburg to his friend Melancthon:—" *Esto peccator et pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in CHRISTO. . . . Sufficit quod agnovimus . . . agnum qui tollit peccata mundi: ab hoc non avellet nos peccatum, etiamsi millies millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus.*"

The third quotation is: " *Si in fide fieri posset adulterium, peccatum non esset.*" †

Luther's doctrine compared with St. Paul's.

With such teaching, we can understand the statement that Luther has done more to corrupt the morals of Christendom than all other heretics put together. We may compare his view of the Pauline doctrine of justification, expressed as above, with S. Paul's own statement: "This is a faithful saying, and these things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they which have believed in GOD might be careful to maintain good works. These things are good and profitable unto men" (S. Tit. iii. 8).

The effects of this doctrine in our day.

While, of course, many Lutherans are, and have been, far better than their theology, yet it has been this doc-

\* *De Captiv. Bab.*, tom. II., fol. 264.

† *Disput.*, tom. i., p. 523.

trine which has led to the disregard of the Sacraments, to the neglect of penitence, and to the corruption of Christian morals.

Before stating the Catholic view of justification, it will be well to observe that in Holy Scripture the term is used in more than one sense. *Δικαιοῦν* in the New Testament does often mean, not to make, but to pronounce, just, by legal sentence, and it is on this philological argument that the Protestants base *their* doctrine of justification, that GOD declares the sinner to be justified or just or righteous.

Now, as the Psalmist says, "The voice of the LORD is mighty in operation: the voice of the LORD is a glorious voice" (Ps. xxix. 4). That is, GOD's voice effects what it says, for again we read: "He spake the word, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created" (Ps. cxlviii. 5). So that this imputation of righteousness to the sinner, or *declaring* him to be just, *makes* him just; for when GOD declares a fact, He makes it a fact by declaring it.

This, surely, is the characteristic teaching of all Scripture. In the beginning He said, "Let there be light: and there was light." Word and deed went together in creation, and so in the new Creation of grace. He said, "Be thou clean," and the leprosy departed; He commanded the evil spirits, and they fled away. GOD's word is in all cases the instrument of His deed. When He utters the command, "Let the soul be just," it becomes just; by what means we shall see hereafter.

The Lutheran school of theology teaches the strange paradox that GOD's calling us righteous, implies, not only that we are not, but that we never shall be righteous; that is to say, that a thing is not, because GOD says it is; that the solemn averment of the Living

II. The meaning of *δικαιοῦν*.

1. To declare righteous.

GOD'S declaration effects what it declares.

The Lutheran view contradicts this.

and True GOD is inconsistent with the fact averred ; that the glory of GOD's pronouncing us righteous lies in His leaving us unrighteous ; and this in spite of His statement, "I will not justify the wicked" (Ex. xxiii. 7 ; cf. xxxiv. 7). Surely it would be impossible to invent a doctrine more dishonouring to GOD, and more inconsistent with His truth.

While, then, there is a sense in which righteousness is *imputed* (or reckoned) to us, it is because it is also *imparted* to us. The merits of CHRIST are the meritorious cause of our righteousness, but they are *really* ours by impartation, not *fictitiously* ours by imputation only.

Newman's  
Lectures on  
Justification.

As Newman\* points out, the declaration of righteousness "precedes the gift which it declares ; it is the 'Voice of the LORD,' calling righteous what is not righteous, when He calls it so," but what thereupon becomes righteous by the gift which He imparts. Justification, then, "is an announcement or fiat of Almighty GOD, breaking upon the gloom of our natural state as the creative word upon chaos ; . . . it declares the soul righteous, and in that declaration on the one hand conveys pardon for its past sins, and on the other *makes* it actually *righteous*." †

2. Justification  
used also for  
sanctification.

In a derived sense, but a most true one, the term *justification* is used for actual righteousness, since this is the result of being justified. For, since justification consists in the renewal of the soul of man, that renewal is justification. Thus justification and sanctification are substantially the same thing, though the same thing viewed from two different standpoints.

III. Definition  
of justification.

We may now give a brief definition of justification and proceed to discuss it. Justification is not only the

\* *Lectures on Justification*, pp. 77-84.

† *Ib.*, p. 90.

remission of sins, but also sanctification or the renewal of the inner man by voluntary acceptance of grace and of the gifts which it imparts. So that a man from being unrighteous becomes righteous, from being at enmity with GOD becomes the friend of GOD, and "an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven."

Here we notice four things. First, that the *negative* element of justification is the remission of sins.

Second, that the *positive* element is sanctification and inward renewal.

Third, that the *means* of justification is the voluntary acceptance of it.

And fourth, that its *effect* is to make a man righteous, the friend of GOD, and an inheritor of Heaven.

Hence we may say that there are five causes of justification :—

First, the *final* cause. This is threefold, viz., the glory of GOD, the glory of CHRIST, and the salvation of the justified.

Second, the *efficient* cause, which is the Mercy of GOD, Who freely cleanses and sanctifies us, sealing and anointing us with the HOLY GHOST, the pledge of our eternal inheritance.

Third, the *meritorious* cause, which is the Passion of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, Who on the Cross redeemed us, making satisfaction for our sins to GOD the FATHER.

Fourth, the *instrumental* cause, which is primarily the Sacrament of Baptism, but does not exclude other Sacraments as instruments of justification.

Lastly, the *formal* cause, which is the righteousness of GOD ; not the righteousness by which GOD is righteous, but that by which He makes us righteous, that which He imparts to us.

1. Four points:  
i. the negative element, remission of sins;  
ii. the positive, sanctification ;  
iii. the means, free acceptance ;  
iv. the effect, righteousness.

2. Causes of justification, five :  
i. the final cause ;

ii. the efficient cause ;

iii. the meritorious cause ;

iv. the instrumental cause ;

v. the formal cause.



3. The dispositions required for justification.

Infants, who are justified by Baptism, require no antecedent disposition, since they are capable of no rational act. But adults need to prepare themselves by acts of faith, fear, hope, and the beginnings of love and contrition.

Art. XI. and the Homilies.

In Article XI. it is stated: "That we are justified by faith only, is a most wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification."

In the Homily of the Passion we find it stated that faith is "the only mean and instrument of salvation required of our parts." In that of Salvation, Part I, we read that faith "doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of GOD, to be joined with faith in every man that is justified; but it shutteth them out from the office of justifying."

Relation of faith and the Sacraments as instruments.

Here an important conclusion must be drawn,—that the instrumental power of faith cannot interfere with the instrumental power of Baptism; because faith is the sole justifier, not in contrast to all *means* and *agencies* whatever, but to all *other graces*. When this faith is called the sole instrument, it means the sole *internal* instrument, Baptism being the sole *external* instrument. The Sacraments are the immediate, faith the secondary, subordinate, or representative cause of justification; or we may say that the Sacraments are its instrumental, and faith its sustaining cause.

What kind of faith is required?

But what do we mean by faith? Certainly not barren assent to the theological dogma that CHRIST died to save us. For, as we have just seen in the Homily of Salvation, faith "doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of GOD."

4. In what does justification consist?

Justification consists, first, in the remission and blotting out of all sins, so far, at least, as their guilt

and the eternal punishment due to them are concerned, although some temporal punishment often remains.

i. In the remission of sins ;

Justification consists, secondly, not in the external imputation of the merits of CHRIST, but in the inward bestowal of the grace of CHRIST ; that is, in the infusion of sanctifying or habitual grace, which inheres intrinsically in the soul.

ii. in the bestowal of habitual grace.

This is clearly shown by S. Paul's words : " For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of One shall many be made righteous " (Rom. v. 19). Here, we see, S. Paul parallels the sin of Adam, which we inherit, with the righteousness of CHRIST, which we possess. He says, " By one man's disobedience many were made sinners,"—not were accounted or imputed, but actually became sinners. Therefore, it is clear that by the obedience of One, CHRIST, the many shall not be imputed or accounted, but actually made righteous. And this righteousness is the renewal of our soul through the operation of the HOLY GHOST, the imparting to us the merits of CHRIST. It is the beginning of that work of sanctification which is to go on in us until, as S. Paul says, " we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the SON of GOD, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of CHRIST " (Eph. iv. 13).

Since justification consists not only in the remission of sins, but in the infusion of sanctifying grace, we must ask, what are the effects of this sanctifying or justifying grace ?

5. The effects of justification.

First, it renders us pleasing to GOD, and makes us His friends. For our LORD said : " Henceforth I call you not servants ; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth : but I have called you friends ; for all

i. It renders us pleasing to GOD, and makes us His friends.

things that I have heard of My FATHER I have made known unto you " (S. John xv. 15).

Characteristics  
of this friend-  
ship.

Friendship is said to imply three things. First, a love which is called the love of benevolence, and which makes us unselfishly desire our friend's good for his own sake, and not merely for ours.

Second, a reciprocal love ; for to return love for love is of the essence of friendship.

Third, a sort of community of ownership, or common use of goods, which establishes a certain equality or similitude between friends. For our LORD said of him who has love (and therefore sanctifying grace) : " If a man love Me, he will keep My words : and My FATHER will love him, and We will come unto him, and make Our abode with him " (S. John xiv. 23).

In this passage these three characteristics of friendship are illustrated. There is, first, the love of benevolence, the love which constrains us to keep CHRIST'S words because we love Him. Then there is the return of love for love, for we are told that the FATHER loves those who love Him. Finally, there is the communication of goods, for GOD cannot come and take up His abode in us without imparting to us His gifts.

ii. It makes us  
GOD'S  
children by  
adoption.  
Meaning of  
"adoption."

Justifying grace makes us children of GOD by adoption, and therefore inheritors of Heaven. By the term " adoption " we distinguish between ourselves and our LORD, Who is the only-begotten SON of GOD by generation. We are accepted in Him, and therefore, as it were, adopted into the family of GOD. But in a Divine sense adoption is something far higher than its human meaning implies, since by adopting us GOD imparts to our soul a special quality, grace, by which we are made like Him. The act by which we are adopted is called " spiritual birth " or " regenera-

tion," because to a certain extent it produces the effects of true generation.

This is the teaching of many passages of Holy Scripture. For example: "Behold, what manner of love the FATHER hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the *sons of GOD*" (1 S. John iii. 1). "For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the SPIRIT of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, FATHER. The SPIRIT Itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of GOD: and if children, then heirs; heirs of GOD, and joint-heirs with CHRIST" (Rom. viii. 15-17).

Justifying grace makes us partakers of the Divine Nature. For in Holy Scripture we read: "Beloved, now are we the sons of GOD, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is" (1 S. John iii. 2).

iii. It makes us partakers of the Divine Nature.

Again: "Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises: that by these ye might be partakers of the Divine Nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust" (2 S. Pet. i. 4).

And again: "Whosoever is born of GOD doth not commit sin; for His seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of GOD" (1 S. John iii. 9). Here grace is spoken of as "the seed of GOD," or "seed of Divinity;" and as a seed virtually contains a new plant like the first, so grace has in itself the virtue of making us GOD-like.

By justification the righteous man is made the temple of the HOLY GHOST and of the whole TRINITY. While GOD is everywhere as regards His Presence, Operation and Essence, and therefore in some sense

iv. We become the dwelling-place of GOD.

may be said to dwell in every creature, yet besides this common presence there is a special indwelling of God in the soul of the righteous, which consists in God's coming to the soul and remaining in it, as an intimate friend who is dearly beloved, so that the soul enjoys His presence and friendship. Thus the soul becomes truly the temple of the HOLY TRINITY, because it is truly a holy place in which the three Divine Persons dwell.

This indwelling in us is common to the three Persons of the HOLY TRINITY, but attributed especially to the HOLY GHOST.

This indwelling is common to the three Persons of the HOLY TRINITY, but nevertheless in a special mode it is referred to the HOLY GHOST, because the work of sanctification, which is common to all three Persons, is attributed particularly to Him Whose special mission it is to sanctify the soul. For CHRIST said: "If a man love Me, . . . My FATHER will love him, and We will come unto him, and make Our abode with him" (S. John xiv. 23). And again we read: "What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the HOLY GHOST Which is in you, Which ye have of GOD?" (1 Cor. vi. 19). And: "If any man defile the temple of GOD, him shall GOD destroy; for the temple of GOD is holy, which temple ye are" (1 Cor. iii. 17).

Having described the nature and effects of sanctifying, justifying or habitual grace, we are now in a position to consider its theological definition.

#### IV. Definition of habitual grace.

Habitual or sanctifying grace is a supernatural quality, intrinsically and permanently inhering in the soul, by which we are made partakers of the Divine Nature.

##### 1. It is a "quality;"

First, it is a "quality," and therefore not a substance, nor an act, but a certain created and finite accident, which we call a habit and which perfects the

soul directly in the order of its being, and indirectly in that of its operation. It is said in a loose sense to be created, that is, produced, but strictly speaking the term "creation" applies only to substances.

Some theologians of old, with Peter Lombard, thought grace was nothing else than the Person of the HOLY GHOST dwelling in us, but this cannot be admitted, since the presence of the HOLY GHOST is indeed one of the prerogatives of grace, but is not its essence.

Sanctifying grace is "supernatural." By this we distinguish it from natural qualities and præternatural gifts. It is also a quality divinely infused, since GOD alone can essentially communicate to us a supernatural quality.

2. it is "supernatural;"

The words "intrinsically inhering in the soul" are necessary in the definition in order to exclude the Lutheran view of grace, that it is an external imputation of the righteousness of CHRIST. According to Catholic teaching it is a quality divinely infused, which truly equips the substance of our soul with spiritual endowments and inheres in it.

3. it "inheres in the soul,"

By the word "permanently," habitual grace is distinguished from actual grace, since actual grace is transitory, while habitual grace is permanent from the fact of its being a habit, and in the sense that it remains in our soul until destroyed by mortal sin.

4. "permanently;"

In the words "by which we are made partakers of the Divine Nature," we have the true essence of grace, and therefore should most carefully consider them. As we have seen, grace is a quality, not a substance. The Divine Nature therefore is communicated to us, not substantially, as it is communicated to GOD the WORD by true and proper generation, nor person-

5. it "makes us partakers of the Divine Nature."

ally, as in the Incarnation, but accidentally, in the sense that a Divine quality and likeness is impressed upon our soul.

Some illustrations of this.

Some illustrations may help us to see this more clearly. As iron put into a furnace is so permeated by the fire that it becomes, not, indeed, substantially fire, but like fire, that is, fiery, so our soul is united to GOD by grace, and is penetrated by it, so that its substance does not, indeed, become substantially GOD, but God-like.

Hence the Fathers compare a soul in a state of grace to wax impressed with the royal signet ; to crystal through which the sun's rays pass, and which, like the sun itself, radiates light ; or to a mirror in which the Divine Essence is reflected.

This participation is more than "moral," and is, in a sense, "physical;"

This participation of the Divine Nature is more than moral, it is in a sense *physical* ; for it would be moral only if our souls became like GOD merely by way of imitation of His perfections, but it is physical if a real perfection is communicated to us, rendering us like GOD. Now this is what grace does, for it is a real quality, elevating our nature to a superior order, communicating to us a new degree of intellectual life described as a "new generation" or "new birth," and as "the seed of GOD."

This therefore implies a physical participation in the Divine Nature. "Grace communicates a new quality to the soul, by which it is transformed to the Image of GOD. This new quality is called the new higher nature of the soul. . . . As a tree of ordinary kind by the inoculation of a superior bud takes the nature of this bud and brings forth its blossom and fruit, so our soul is in the highest manner ennobled by the communication of GOD's grace, which is called in Holy Writ 'the

seed of God,' and, filled with the power of GOD, it assumes the Divine Nature." \*

While this participation is not virtual, but formal, we must remember it is only by analogy, because the *identical* life which is in GOD is not communicated to the righteous, but only a life which is similar and analogous. And again, it is not communicated, of course, in the same degree as it is in GOD, but in a finite degree, proportionate to the capacity of the creature.

and yet this is only by analogy.

The properties of justification are three in number. First, its *uncertainty*, for no one can be certain in regard to his own justification with the certitude of faith, unless by special revelation. This does not mean that a man may not have moral certitude that he is in a state of grace, and there are certain means by which we may be morally assured of this; but moral certitude differs altogether from the certitude of faith.

V. The properties of justification.

1. Its uncertainty.

The signs that we are in a state of grace are chiefly three.

Its signs :

First, the testimony of conscience,—that we are not conscious of having any mortal sin upon our soul.

i. the testimony of conscience ;  
ii. love of GOD ;

Second, a sincere love of GOD, earnestness in prayer, and a firm resolve to avoid sin, together with zeal for souls; for all these imply charity, and therefore habitual grace.

Third, contempt for the things of the world, and the practice of mortification.

iii. contempt for the world.

While these signs may make us feel morally sure that we are indeed justified, they fall short of the certitude of faith.

Even S. Paul said of himself: "I know nothing by

\* Scheeben, *Glories of Divine Grace*, pp. 66, 67.



[i. e., against] myself ; yet am I not hereby justified " (1 Cor. iv. 4).

Some have had special revelations of their justification.

Some have had special revelations of their justification. The Angel Gabriel was sent to the Blessed Virgin to reveal to her in the salutation that she was "full of grace ;" and in the cases of the paralytic and the woman who was a sinner, our LORD Himself said, "Thy sins are forgiven thee."

The first property is denied by Lutherans and Calvinists.

This first property of justification is denied by Lutherans and Calvinists, who hold the doctrine of *Assurance*, and not only teach it as a theory, but practically profess to know themselves to be saved, often resting this opinion on very slender grounds.

We are to hope for our salvation, and we are not to doubt that GOD wills to save us ; but there is much difference between hope and presumption. Hope will act as a stimulus, impelling us to "work out our salvation with fear and trembling," while the Protestant doctrine of assurance often leads to the neglect of the means of salvation and to the most extreme forms of spiritual pride.

2. The inequality of justification.

The second property of justification is its *inequality* ; that is, habitual grace is not given to all, even of the righteous, in the same measure, and it is able to increase in those who are justified.

Scriptural proof of this.

This is evidently the teaching of Holy Scripture, for we read : "Unto every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of CHRIST" (Eph. iv. 7). And again : "I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think ; but to think soberly, according as GOD hath dealt to every man the measure of faith. . . . Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to

us," etc. (Rom. xii. 3, 6). And again: "Unto one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one; to every man according to his several ability" (S. Matt. xxv. 15).

That grace may increase in those who are justified is also evident, for in the parable of the Pounds, in the nineteenth chapter of S. Luke, we find that the different servants, each of whom had received one pound, gained in different proportions, one having increased his pound to ten, another to five, while the third had made no increase whatever.

Besides, S. Peter exhorts us to "grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our LORD and Saviour JESUS CHRIST" (2 S. Pet. iii. 18); and S. Paul exhorts us to "grow up into Him in all things, Which is the Head, even CHRIST" (Eph. iv. 15).

This second property of justification is denied by the Lutherans, who say that all Christians have equal grace, and deny that grace increases. This, of course, is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine of habitual grace being the imputed righteousness of CHRIST. Indeed Luther goes so far as to say: "All we Christians are of equal greatness with the Mother of GOD, and of equal holiness with her." \*

The second property is also denied by the Lutherans.

The last property of justification is that *it may be lost*, and, in fact, is lost by any mortal sin. This, again, is the plain teaching of Holy Writ, for "When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned: in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die"

3. Defectibility.

Testimony of Scripture.

\* *Serm. de Nativ. B. M. V.*

(Ezek. xviii. 24) ; " Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall " (1 Cor. x. 12) ; " If man abide not in Me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned " (S. John xv. 6).

We have, too, the examples of David and Solomon, of S. Peter and others, who, after having certainly received justification, lost it by sin.

This property  
denied by Lu-  
therans and  
Calvinists.

This property is also denied by the Lutherans and Calvinists, who teach what they call "indefectible grace." The texts of Scripture which we have quoted are a sufficient answer to this heresy.

Amongst theologians there has long been a controversy as to whether habitual or justifying grace, which we have been describing, is really distinct from the virtue of charity.

The Scotists say that there is no real distinction between the two, because Scripture assigns the effects of grace to charity, and habits producing the same effect are not really distinguishable from one another.

The Thomists, however, and the majority of theologians of all schools hold that grace really differs from charity, because grace is an essential habit perfecting the essence itself of the soul, while charity is an operative habit perfecting one of the faculties of the soul, that is, the will.

And Scripture carefully distinguishes grace from charity, as when we read : " The grace of the LORD JESUS CHRIST, and the *love* of GOD, and the communion of the HOLY GHOST, be with you all " (2 Cor. xiii. 14). And again : " The love of GOD is shed abroad in our hearts by the HOLY GHOST Which is given unto us " (Rom. v. 5). In these texts, as we see, charity is clearly distinguished both from grace

and from the HOLY SPIRIT, Who dwells in us through grace ; so that charity and grace are really to be distinguished from one another.

We may also observe that habitual grace is so opposed to mortal sin that it cannot subsist in a soul in which this is present. This we have already shown in treating of the third property of habitual grace.

Before we finish this chapter we may observe that habitual grace, the infused virtues which accompany it, and the actual graces by which it is preserved and increased, constitute the *new* or spiritual life.

Three things are required for life : the vital principle, the operative faculties, and the vital actions.

But we find these three in spiritual form in the gift of habitual grace. For, first, habitual grace is like a new vital principle raising us to a new plane of intellectual life which far exceeds our merely rational life, and is a communication from God Himself.

Secondly, the infused virtues which accompany habitual grace are like new faculties by which the powers with which we are naturally endowed are perfected and elevated, so that they are able to elicit supernatural acts.

And finally, the actual graces which are given to the righteous stimulate us and aid us to perform supernatural and meritorious acts.

S. Leo says : " Recognize, O Christian, thy dignity, and that thou art made partaker of the Divine Nature. Do not return by degenerate conversation to thy former vileness. Remember of Whose Head and Whose Body thou art a member. Remember that thou art plucked out from the power of darkness and translated into the light and Kingdom of God." \*

\* *Serm. I. in Nativ.*

Habitual grace and mortal sin mutually exclusive.

Conclusion. Habitual grace, and the virtues and gifts which it infuses, constitute the spiritual or " new " life.

S. Leo's exhortation.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE ENDOWMENTS OF MAN—THE CARDINAL VIRTUES.

Introductory :  
S. Paul's de-  
scription of the  
effects of justi-  
fication.

" **I**F any man be in CHRIST, he is a new creature : old things are passed away ; behold, all things are become new " (2 Cor. v. 17). In these words S. Paul describes the effect of justification ; the justified man becomes a new creature.

I. The endow-  
ments of man.  
The change  
made by justi-  
fication implies  
certain endow-  
ments of the  
spiritual man.

And what does this marvellous change imply ? Not only the negative removal of sin, but the positive bestowal of certain endowments of the life of grace. To this the Fathers apply the promise in Ezekiel : " I will give them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within you ; and I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh " (xi. 19).

These are  
called " vir-  
tues " and  
" gifts."

This is the result of grace. For as sanctifying grace, which is the life of GOD, flows into the soul, certain endowments of the spiritual man accompany it. These are called in theological language *infused virtues* and *gifts*. We shall now proceed to treat of these endowments of the justified soul.

Virtue a habit.  
Examination  
of the term,  
" habit."

Since virtue is a *habit*, we must first explain this term. Habit has been defined as a quality which is permanently in a thing and is not easily liable to change, in virtue of which a man is better or worse.

Distinction be-  
tween habit

The distinction between a *habit* and a *disposition* is indicated in this definition, in that a habit does not

easily change, while a disposition may be easily changed by an influence in the opposite direction.

and disposition.

Habits are sometimes divided into *essential* and *operative* habits; the former class comprising those qualities which affect a thing as it is in itself, such as health, beauty, etc. But ordinarily the term *habit* is confined to the latter class; that is, to those qualities which dispose the subject immediately to action, and are therefore called *operative*.

Habits are essential, or operative.

Habits may be either good or bad by reason of their origin. They fall into three classes: habits which are *natural*, *acquired*, and *infused*. The first belong to us as human beings; the second are acquired by repeated acts; and the third are supernaturally communicated to the soul by God.

Three classes of habits: natural, acquired, infused.

These infused habits are not *powers*, like the will and the understanding, for they presume the existence of these powers in the soul; but they differ from other habits in that they give *ability* to act, and not mere *ease* in acting. Some theologians think that these habits also give ease in acting, as well as the ability to act; but this is doubtful.

Infused habits are not "powers" of the soul, but qualities.

Having now a clear idea of the term *habit*, we may proceed to a definition of *virtue*. Virtue is that quality of the soul which makes a man good and makes him do good.

Definition of "virtue."

In the last chapter we pointed out that by *quality* is meant, not a substance, nor an act, but a certain created and finite accident which belongs to the genus *habit*.

Virtues may be distinguished by reason of their origin, as *natural*, *acquired*, and *infused*; which terms are used in the same sense as in the explanation of habits.

Virtues also are natural, acquired, and infused.

Man may be considered in the natural, or the supernatural order. In both he has certain endowments. While the same virtues exist in both orders, they are different in their "end."

Infused virtues imply natural virtues, raised to the supernatural order.

Virtues are divided into : intellectual, and moral ; theological, and moral. Theological virtues have GOD as their object ;

moral virtues have the perfection of the act itself as their end.

Man as a creature of GOD may be considered from two points of view : in the order of nature, or as living in the order of grace. The difference between the two is simply grace. In both conditions GOD has bestowed upon man certain endowments called virtues and gifts, the purpose of which is to perfect the faculties or powers of the soul. While these virtues exist alike in the natural and the supernatural man, they are altogether different in their order and their end ; since those virtues which exist only in the natural order have for their end the good of this present life, while the corresponding supernatural virtues have for their end the fulfilment of the Divine Law and the good of the life to come.

Hence we see that infused virtues are not new virtues so much as old ones raised to a new order and given a new end. For, as grace does not create the intellect which it illuminates, or the will which it inspires, but acts upon existing powers of the soul ; so the infused virtues transform the natural virtues of the soul, raising them to a supernatural order.

Virtues considered in regard to the power which they perfect are divided into two classes : intellectual, and moral. Looked at by reason of their object they also fall into two divisions : theological, and moral.

The *theological* virtues are those which have GOD Himself as their object and end. Their immediate effect is to unite man to GOD in a supernatural end, and so to order and direct man in his life that he may become more and more GOD-like. The *moral* virtues, on the other hand, have for their end the perfection of the act of virtue itself. We must, however, remember that infused virtues do not *remove* depraved habits ; so that even a righteous man may have to struggle against temptation to old sins.

With these preliminary explanations we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of the four moral or Cardinal Virtues—Fortitude, Prudence, Justice, and Temperance ; and the three theological virtues—Faith, Hope, and Charity.

The four virtues : Fortitude, Prudence, Justice, and Temperance—are termed *cardinal*, because they are the hinges (*cardines*) or pivots on which practical holiness of life may be considered to turn.

They exist both in the natural and in the supernatural order ; and are the foundation of the active life of the Christian in the world, as distinguished from the theological virtues, which form the basis of the contemplative life. And, as the term *cardinal* implies, all the virtues of this class are to a great extent present in each distinct human act which aims at perfection. That is to say, every act of virtue should bear the stamp of these four characteristics, in order that it may pass current as the coinage of the Kingdom of Heaven.

The Cardinal Virtues were well known in Greek philosophy, and from it have been translated into the theological system of the Church. They are mentioned by Plato as recognized heads of virtue, and less clearly by Xenophon in reporting the conversations of Socrates ; and it is probable that Socrates derived them from an earlier source, perhaps from Pythagoras. They are treated as the moral virtues in Aristotle's *Ethics*, and are mentioned in Holy Scripture—Wisd. viii. 7 ; cf. Prov. viii. 14.

Philosophically they may be thus described. Virtue is a habit which gives a man readiness in behaving according to the reason that is in him. Such a habit may be fourfold.

## II. The four cardinal virtues.

1. The cardinal virtues generally considered.

Meaning of the term "cardinal."

The cardinal virtues are the foundation of the active life of the Christian. They must all be present in each human act which aims at perfection.

These virtues were well known in Greek philosophy,

and are mentioned in Scripture—Wisd. viii. 7 ; (Proverbs viii. 14).

The moral virtues philosophically examined :



A virtue may  
reside in the  
intellect as  
Prudence ;

in the will as  
Justice ;

in the concu-  
piscible appe-  
tite as  
Temperance ;  
in the irascible  
appetite as  
Fortitude.

These virtues  
existed in a  
high degree  
among the  
heathen.

The difference  
between them  
in the natural  
and super-  
natural order  
is found in  
their "mo-  
tive" and  
"end."

First, it may reside in the reason or intellect itself ; enabling it really to discern the reasonable thing to do according as particular circumstances occur. That habit is the virtue of Prudence.

Secondly, it may reside in the rational appetite, otherwise called the will ; disposing a man to act fairly and reasonably in his dealings with other men. This is Justice.

It may reside in the irrational or sensitive appetite ; which is twofold, having a concupiscible and an irascible part.

And so, thirdly, in restraining the appetite in its concupiscible part from immoderate eagerness after pleasure, we have the virtue of Temperance.

And, fourthly, in inciting the appetite in its irascible part not to shrink from danger when there is reason for perseverance in spite of danger, we have Fortitude.

These Cardinal Virtues existed in a very high degree of perfection amongst the heathen ; for Solon was prudent, Aristides was just, Leonidas exhibited fortitude, and Socrates was temperate. Hence it is evident that they do not depend entirely upon supernatural grace. Some theologians have doubted whether they are infused into the soul at justification ; though certainly the more probable opinion, and that held by the majority of theologians, places them among the infused virtues.

The difference between these virtues in the natural and the supernatural man may be seen especially in the *motive* which stimulates them and the *end* toward which they are directed. In the natural order both motive and end are purely natural, and concern the affairs of this life. In the supernatural order grace moves the will to elicit supernatural acts of moral virtue, and acts so elicited tend to a supernatural end.

GOD has given us three gifts by the use of which our daily life may be sanctified.

Three gifts  
to sanctify  
daily life :  
Reason ;

First, the light of *reason* ; by which we gain a knowledge of the principles of the Cardinal Virtues.

Second, *free will* ; by which we make choice whether to do or to leave undone that which reason teaches us in regard to the action of the Cardinal Virtues.

free will ;

And third, *sacramental grace* ; by which we obtain power to act as reason dictates and free will decides in the exercise of the Cardinal Virtues.

grace.

The Cardinal Virtues brought to bear upon the ordinary details of daily life result in the conformity of the human will to the Divine. They enable us to do all that GOD would have us perform, to bear all that He wills us to endure, and to act as we are bound to act in order to please Him. And the motives for this conformity must be the glory of GOD, our own salvation, and the good of others.

The cardinal  
virtues enable  
us :  
to do all our  
duty ;  
to bear our  
cross ;  
to act rightly.

Each of these virtues may be exercised in a threefold manner : actively, passively, and in a manner which combines both. Thus, the *active* exercise of Fortitude is courage ; its *passive* exercise, patience ; and the manner in which *both are combined*, perseverance.

These  
virtues may be  
exercised  
actively, pas-  
sively, and in a  
combination of  
these two.

A perfect act of virtue consists in three factors : the *motive*, of which we have already spoken ; the *rule*, to avoid excess or defect, exaggeration or imperfection ; and the *test*, by which we know whether the act is perfect or not, the pleasure or pain which each act of virtue causes us in and after its performance.

A perfect act of  
virtue has  
three factors :  
the motive,  
rule, and test.

Besides these factors there are four conditions of perfection in an act of virtue. First, that it be done *consciously*, that is, with a full knowledge of the deed. Second, *deliberately*, with free moral choice. Third, *unselfishly*, for the glory of GOD, or the good of others,

The four condi-  
tions of perfec-  
tion in an act  
of virtue.

or for our own salvation. And lastly, *upon principle*, and not merely casually.

There are four elements in a moral choice : the wish, the deliberation, the decision, the will.

Further, we must observe that there are four elements in a moral choice. First, an end to be aimed at, something which we *wish* to do. Second, a consideration of the means, *deliberation*. Third, a choice of the means, *decision*. And fourth, a *will* to act. We must not only wish, but will to do a thing.

An act of virtue, to be perfect, must pass through four stages : viz., the cardinal virtues.

An act of virtue, or moral act, in order that it may rise from the level of a mere natural act to that of a supernatural one, must pass through the four stages of the Cardinal Virtues. By *Fortitude* the irascible appetite must be regulated, that it may not warp the judgment ; by *Prudence* the understanding guided, that no mistakes may be made ; by *Justice* the will controlled, so that we may give to every one his due ; by *Temperance* the fleshly appetite restrained, so that the action may be uninfluenced by mere sensual gratification.

Plato's illustration of the four virtues.

Plato describes the rational soul of man as a charioteer driving two horses ; one representing the concupiscible, the other the irascible part of the sensitive appetite. He draws a vivid picture of the resistance of the concupiscible part, which is gradually tamed by the virtue of Temperance. The irascible steed has two faults : over-venturesomeness, and shying or turning tail. The charioteer is Prudence, and, for external action, Justice. Or man's moral being may be described as a government, in which Temperance and Fortitude are at the head of the Home department, Justice is Foreign minister, and Prudence is Premier.

Another illustration.

2. The card. virtues considered.  
1. Fortitude.

We shall now examine these virtues separately and more fully, applying to each the above principles. We first consider Fortitude; since this virtue is the primary stage in the upward course of an action,

whereby it rises from a natural to a supernatural state of existence.

Fortitude may be said to be that virtue which regulates the irascible appetite of man, and enables him to surmount all obstacles and to overcome all difficulties, by giving him courage to choose a lesser evil or harm in order to avoid a greater.

Fortitude regulates the irascible appetite.

Fortitude is the mean between cowardice and rashness ; to which opposite extremes we are carried by the contrary passions of fear and desire respectively. This virtue will make a man circumspect in his ventures and moderate in his fears ; which, however, implies that he will have fears. He will fear the judgments of God ; he will fear disgrace, and still more, sin ; he will fear to die in an unworthy cause ; and he will be circumspect in his ventures. The recklessness of an angry man is not Fortitude. The brave man looks a real danger in the face and goes on because it is right to go on.

It is the mean between cowardice and rashness, between fear and desire.

As Temperance is the curb which restrains the animal nature in the pursuit of the good to which it goes out most eagerly (namely, life and the means of continuing life), so Fortitude is the curb which prevents irrational flight from the evil which that nature most dreads.

Fortitude compared with Temperance.

Fortitude may be exercised towards our neighbour in the performance of duty, towards ourselves in cultivating self-control, towards God in obedience to His Laws.

Fortitude may be exercised towards our neighbour, self, and GOD

Like all the moral virtues, it may be exercised actively, passively, and in a manner which combines the two. We see its active exercise in courage, presence of mind, and general manliness. It is manifested passively in patience, endurance, and contentedness ; and in a manner which combines both in perseverance, constancy, and resoluteness.

actively, passively, and in combination of these two.

The golden mean is to avoid excess or defect.

The mean for Fortitude, its excess, and defect.

ii. Temperance. This virtue governs the fleshly appetite, inducing moderation in the lawful use of GOD'S gifts.

Temperance implies the neglect of a lesser good to gain a greater.

Here a contrast to Fortitude, which endures a lesser evil to avoid a greater. Fortitude like the spur ; Temperance, the curb.

In each of the moral virtues, as we have seen, the rule is to avoid excess or defect, exaggeration or imperfection ; in other words, to observe the just or golden mean.

In the virtue of Fortitude considered actively, this will be courage, its excess being carelessness, and its defect cowardice. If the virtue be taken passively, the mean will be patience, the excess being insensibility, and the defect excitability. In a combination of these two, the golden mean will be perseverance, its excess obstinacy, and its defect fickleness.

Next to Fortitude in an ascending scale comes Temperance ; which may be described as the virtue which governs the fleshly appetite of man, inducing moderation in the *lawful* use of all GOD'S gifts and creatures, and developing a spirit of detachment from the things of this world. In this definition the emphasis must be placed on the adjective *lawful* ; for there can be no such thing to a Christian as moderation in the employment of things *unlawful*.

Temperance as a Cardinal Virtue is, therefore, the power by which we obtain grace to neglect a lesser good in order to gain a greater ; both the thing we abstain from, and the thing we aspire to, being in themselves good.

In this, Temperance is a contrast to its companion virtue, Fortitude ; which, as we have seen, demands that we shall sometimes endure a lesser evil or harm in order to avoid one that is greater. Fortitude, then, incites the irascible part of our nature to face difficulty and to conquer it, while Temperance restrains the concupiscible part from inordinate pursuit of pleasure.

Temperance in a wider sense holds sway not only in eating, drinking, sleeping, and bodily pleasures, but

in all work or relaxation, in things which must be done and things which may be done ; it claims supremacy over all man's appetites and passions, over all his desires and senses, all his inclinations and wishes. Nothing is so large or so important in man's life as to be free from its influence ; nothing so small or insignificant as to escape the operation of its laws.

**Temperance claims supremacy over all man's appetites.**

By the exercise of Temperance we acquire (perhaps gradually and with pain, perhaps after disappointment and relapse, yet surely and certainly) the power of detachment from the things of sense.

**By it we acquire detachment from creatures.**

The forms of Temperance are manifold, and each has its own name. It may be acquired under any circumstances, and this is called by the general name of self-mastery. If exercised with respect to the senses, it is called self-control ; in relation to food, temperance ; to drink, soberness ; to both, abstemiousness. In relation to sexual indulgence, it is designated continence ; to anger, forbearance ; to temper, self-command. In action, it manifests itself as modesty ; in success, as humility ; in defeat, as hopefulness ; in desire, as self-conquest ; in pleasure, as self-denial ; in all things, as moderation.

**Temperance has many forms.**

The virtue of Temperance may be exercised in three ways. First, physically—through the medium of the five senses, sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Secondly, intellectually—in speaking and reading. Thirdly, in a manner which combines both—in the use of money or the employment of time, and in the choice of occupations and amusements.

**Temperance has three modes of exercise : physically ; intellectually ; in combination.**

The rule of Temperance, as the golden mean, is self-mastery or moderation ; which is the middle term between insensibility and absence of self-control.

**Its mean, excess, and defect.**

We now come to the virtue of Prudence ; which has

iii. Prudence.  
This virtue  
governs the  
intellect.

Illustration of  
the way in  
which all four  
virtues must be  
present in a  
perfect act of  
virtue.

been defined as right reason applied to practice, or that habit of intellectual discernment which enables one to find the golden mean of moral virtue and to see the way to acquire it.

In treating of Prudence we have a good opportunity to illustrate the statement that all four Cardinal Virtues must be present in each distinct human act which aims at perfection. It is clear that no moral virtue can come into an act without Prudence ; for it is the judgment of Prudence which must in each case decide that golden mean in relation to self and to others, at which every moral virtue aims. Thus, without Prudence, Fortitude passes into rashness, Justice into harshness, clemency into weakness, religion into superstition, and so on.

And if it be objected that a man, without Prudence to guide him, may hit upon the golden mean by some happy impulse and thus do an act of virtue, the reply is that he may thus do a good act, but not an act of virtue ; that is, not an act proceeding from a pre-existent habit in the doer. Such an act is like a good stroke made by chance, not by skill ; and, like such a stroke, it cannot be readily repeated at the doer's pleasure.

Prudence is  
both an intel-  
lectual and  
moral virtue.

Prudence in its essence is an intellectual virtue, being a habit resident in the understanding. But, as it deals with the subject-matter of the moral virtues, pointing out the measures of Temperance, the bounds of Fortitude, and the part of Justice, it ranks also among the moral virtues. It is that habit of intellectual discernment which must enlighten every moral virtue in its action, since no virtue can go blundering and stumbling in the dark.

As an infused virtue it has special regard to worthy

ends of human endeavour. If unworthy ends are deliberately followed, however sagaciously they may be pursued, this is not Prudence.

As a virtue it must look to a worthy end.

While, as we have shown, no moral virtue can come into act without Prudence, it is also true that Prudence will fail if it be not supported by the presence of the other virtues. For instance, Prudence may be blinded in the presence of passion, unless Fortitude and Temperance be present to restrain passion. And in the same way Justice may be necessary in order to rectify inordinate action in dealing with others.

Prudence needs the support of the other moral virtues.

Thus we see that the virtues cannot be separated. If we possess one, we possess all. The rudimentary forms of the virtues, of course, can exist separately ; they are a matter of temperament and inherited constitution ; but one perfect habit of any one of the four Cardinal Virtues (that is, with grace attached to it), acquired by repeated acts and available at the call of reason, involves the presence of the other three habits also.

Prudence is a composite and many-sided virtue, and its elements are four : wisdom, judiciousness, vigilance, and perseverance. In regard to the last we may remark that its essential ingredients are firmness, diligence, and promptness, and of these promptness has been said to be the *soul* of perseverance.

Prudence has four elements : wisdom, judiciousness, vigilance, and perseverance.

If we examine Prudence in its threefold manifestation we find that its golden mean, regarded actively, is judiciousness ; regarded passively, vigilance ; and taken in combination, perseverance. Its faults, if we consider it actively, are timidity, which is the excess of judiciousness, and thoughtlessness, which is its defect. If we take it passively, they are scrupulosity, the excess of vigilance ; and negligence, its defect. Or, if we re-

Its golden mean, its excess and defect.



gard these two in combination, the faults are pertinacity, which is the excess of perseverance, and vacillation, which is its defect.

Prudence sometimes seems, but never is, akin to cowardice; like Fortitude it includes perseverance.

Prudence sometimes seems akin to cowardice, but not if it be the Cardinal Virtue. For supernatural Prudence forbids cowardice and obliges us to use perseveringly the means to attain our end; which is GOD's glory, our own salvation, or our neighbour's good. And both Prudence and Fortitude have one element in common—that *perseverance* which forbids us to abandon a good work which we have begun.

iv. Justice. This virtue governs the will.

The last of the Cardinal Virtues is Justice. As Temperance and Fortitude restrain man's sensitive nature, and Prudence guides his intellect, so Justice is the Cardinal Virtue which governs man's will. It makes us give to every one his due, teaching us to restrain every thought, word, and deed which may tend to do harm to others, injury to ourselves, or dishonour to GOD.

The functions of Justice are threefold, according to its object: towards GOD, towards our neighbour, and towards self;

The functions of Justice are threefold, according to the objects of its exercise. Towards GOD it is exercised under the name of *devotion*, towards our neighbour under that of *equity*, towards self under that of *consistency*. Of the first two we may say that they are co-ordinate virtues and mutually dependent; for Justice towards GOD, as the Creator, involves of necessity in its development Justice towards the created works of His hands. On the other hand, Justice towards man is incomplete without Justice towards GOD, and also thus attains its highest perfection.

It is important to be just to our neighbour; it is needful to be just to ourselves; it is essential to be just towards GOD.

Justice towards GOD demands that we should love

our neighbour *as* ourselves—not more, not less ; since we, as well as our neighbour, are creatures of God's Hand.

The virtue of Justice may be exercised positively, in acquitting ourselves of what we owe ; negatively, in abstaining from doing what we ought not to do ; mentally, or intellectually, in holding our judgment in suspense, or keeping our mind unbiased by prejudice.

Justice may be exercised : positively, negatively, and intellectually.

To consider a little more fully the threefold object of Justice, we may observe, first, that Justice towards God may be exercised by His creatures in many ways : by conformity of the human will to the Divine ; by the dedication of our persons to His service as Priests or Religious ; by payment in time, money, or service, of our dues to His worship, His power, and His Church ; in a word, by devotion to God.

Methods in which Justice may be exercised : towards GOD ;

Justice towards GOD is based on a very definite faith, and applied in practice in a definite manner. The faith on which it depends is the absolute and infinite Justice of God, and the practice consequent on this faith is twofold, and may be exercised in deed and word.

In deed we must boldly act up to our faith in God's absolute and infinite Justice, and in word we must not be ashamed to confess on certain occasions, when necessity demands it, our faith in God's Justice—that it is invariable and certain, if sometimes inscrutable ; that in human terms it is retributive, even though we cannot always see that this is for man's moral good.

A not uncommon opportunity at the present day of confessing our faith in God's Justice is an expression of our full belief in God's revelation in regard to everlasting punishment, and, indeed, the punishment of all sin.

towards our  
neighbour ;

Secondly, we must treat of Justice to our neighbour, or equity. Its principle is expressed in the formula, "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise" (S. Luke vi. 31), and its exercise involves giving our neighbour his due, whether such neighbour be our inferior, our equal, or our better. It teaches us to keep in check every thought and word, every desire and judgment, all bodily or mental action, which may inflict or tend to inflict injury, pain, distress, or harm upon others.

The three forms of Justice towards our neighbour are: towards our subordinates *affability*, avoiding the fault, in excess, of familiarity, or in defect, of haughtiness ; towards our equals *courtesy*, avoiding the extremes of flattery and rudeness ; to our superiors *obedience*, refraining from the extremes of obsequiousness and disrespect.

towards  
ourselves.

Thirdly, we must remember that Justice towards self, or consistency, is the golden mean between selfishness and a love of our neighbour which exceeds the command to love him as ourselves. To be just to self is to be unselfish ; but it is also to remember that we are sent into the world for the single purpose of glorifying GOD and saving our own souls, and that these two are really inseparable.

The golden  
mean, its  
excess, and  
defect in  
Justice  
towards GOD,

The law of the golden mean of Justice will be, first, towards GOD, a belief and practice founded upon GOD's absolute Justice as the mean between GOD's wrath apart from man's free will—which is the exaggeration of GOD's Justice, seen in Calvinism ; and His love apart from His Justice—which is its defect, seen in Universalism. The Catholic doctrine on this point saves us from these two extremes.

our neighbour,

Secondly, towards our neighbour, Justice is the

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middle term between prejudice, which is the exaggeration of our duty, and indifference, which is its defect.

Thirdly, towards self, Justice is the mean between selfishness and a philanthropy which neglects self. and ourselves.  
The middle term, therefore is to glorify God by saving our own souls. ,

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE ENDOWMENTS OF MAN—THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

Introductory :  
The endowments of the soul which accompany sanctifying grace.

The  
Theological  
Virtues.  
I. Some  
preliminary  
considerations.

The likeness  
and difference  
which may be  
traced in  
natural and  
supernatural  
virtues ;  
illustrated by  
the process of  
grafting.

IN the last chapter we began to discuss those endowments of the soul of man which are bestowed at the time of justification and which accompany justifying or sanctifying grace. After a brief treatment of the virtues in general we turned our attention to the moral or Cardinal Virtues, and examined them somewhat in detail.

There are, therefore, left for our consideration in the present chapter the Theological Virtues : Faith, Hope, and Charity. But before we proceed to their treatment there are some few points to which attention must be called in order that we may clearly understand the relation between the endowments of the natural and of the supernatural man.

We find in the natural man habits, qualities, and virtues,—*natural* and *acquired*—possessing a kinship and likeness to the corresponding *infused* virtues which are the especial portion of the supernatural man. For a wild olive tree is like a cultivated olive tree *except in the fruit* which they respectively produce. The form of the tree, the shape of the leaf, and many other characteristics show the relationship between the two ; yet the wild tree produces no fruit, or at best only that which is very imperfect, while the cultivated tree brings forth “ fruit to perfection.” (St. Luke, viii., 14.)

But fruitfulness may be imparted to the wild tree by engrafting upon its stock a scion from another tree of superior quality, and the tree will then produce the fruit, not of the stock, but of the graft. Now the relation between the natural, or acquired, and the infused virtues is similar to this.

We have already pointed this out in regard to the moral virtues, when we drew attention to their existence among the heathen.

We then also showed that the difference between the acquired and the infused moral virtues was chiefly in the *motive* which stimulated them, and the *end* towards which they were directed; these virtues among the heathen being confined to the sphere of mere natural life, while in the Christian the motive and the end are supernatural, and the sphere is enlarged and extended to the life of the world to come.

The difference between natural and supernatural virtues is chiefly in their motive and end;

Let us take another illustration of the relation between the natural and the supernatural virtues. Wrought iron is tempered by the fire and the hammer, and it can afterwards be magnetized by friction upon a magnet. The iron thus tempered is far stronger and harder than ordinary cast iron, but its nature is not changed. Magnetized iron has, however, a property imparted to it of an altogether different nature. It loses its inertia and immovability, and acquires a new power of attraction, and is itself attracted in a mysterious manner by the poles of the earth; so that iron thus magnetized is used in that most delicate instrument, the compass, for guiding a ship across the ocean.

illustrated by the process of magnetizing iron.

Natural and acquired virtues are like iron in its natural and in its tempered state respectively. As the frequent blows of the hammer temper the iron, so the

frequent performance of acts of virtue develops what we call the acquired habit of that virtue, and then by its aid a man may do what is naturally good.

Sanctifying grace, however, *magnetizes* the virtue as by a mysterious touch of Divinity, and imparts to it a Divine power. The virtues that have thus been transformed by grace are attracted in a manner and by objects hitherto unknown to them, and elevated into mysterious regions by invisible hands.

GOD Himself is the Pole, the Centre, and the Source of our life—the Pole to which it tends, the Centre around which it revolves, and the Source from which it draws its force and nourishment.

In a word, by grace we become partakers of the very life of God. The participation in the Divine Life which is produced in us by infused supernatural virtues principally consists in this, that it enables us to copy the activity of the Divine life, to unite our own activity with it, and so, in knowledge, love, and confidence, unite ourselves with GOD as He is One with Himself.

Thus we see that the relation between the natural and the supernatural virtues is very real, although they themselves are so different.

For instance, to take the Theological Virtues, there is a virtue of faith in the natural man. Without its exercise the ordinary affairs of human life could not go on. It has often been demonstrated that the conduct of man's ordinary life is influenced, not by proofs of mathematical certainty, but by such moral assurance as belongs to the natural virtue of faith.

But while there is a striking *likeness* between this and the supernatural virtue of Faith, the *differences* between them are enormous ; for by Christian Faith we receive a supernatural and Divine knowledge. By uniting our

II. The relation between natural and super-natural virtues:  
1. Faith, in the natural man ;

in the super-natural man.

knowledge with the Divine Knowledge, and supported by it, we know GOD—with a knowledge similar to that by which He knows Himself,—and know all that He reveals, with the absolute certainty belonging to infallible truth.

Moreover, the motive of Faith is different. Instead of being human testimony, it is the authority of GOD Himself. The end or object of Faith is also different. Instead of the opinions of men, it is the revelation of GOD ; and the sphere of Faith, instead of being confined to this present life, is enlarged to comprehend eternity.

Difference of motive and end in natural and supernatural faith.

If we pass to the second of the Theological Virtues, Hope, we find that this also exists in a most real sense in the natural man ; since the virtue of hope is the spring of all human action, and it is this virtue which has been the stimulus of successful effort in every department of human activity.

2. Hope, in the natural man ;

But magnificent as have been the triumphs of natural hope, they sink into insignificance in the presence of the supernatural virtue, for in Christian Hope we rest immediately upon the infinite power of GOD as if it were our own, and thus acquire a sublime confidence, which enables us to overcome all difficulty.

in the supernatural man.

In the same way we find Love as a natural virtue (and undoubtedly the most beautiful of all the natural virtues), and in it we recognize almost a spark of Divinity. In the love of the parent and child, of the husband and wife, in the love of one's country we have manifestations of the most sublime virtue which human nature possesses.

3. Love as a natural virtue ;

And yet again, while it is *like* the supernatural virtue, the *difference* is clearly defined, for in Christian Charity the same love for GOD which He has for Himself is in-

as a supernatural virtue.



fused into us ; so that we are enabled to unite ourselves intimately with Him and to be absorbed in Him, as if we possessed His own Nature.

Natural love spurs man on to acts of self-sacrifice and heroism, but, alas ! seldom satisfies. It changes, disappoints, wanes, grows cold ; for in the object of our love on earth we are almost always disappointed, and see our ideals shattered. Our bleeding hearts crave for what this world cannot give,—the good, the beautiful, the true, the changeless, the absolute.

But this absolute Perfection is the object of Divine Love, GOD Himself, Who is all Goodness, all Beauty, all Truth, Who cannot change or disappoint, Who alone can satisfy all the cravings of our immortal nature by giving us Himself as our possession.

The endowments of Faith, Hope, and Love enable man to live as the child of GOD.

With these three Divine virtues, then, GOD endows His children, that they may lead a life worthy of their exalted regeneration, and may—even on earth, in the land of their exile—unite themselves with Him as their FATHER, and the object of their happiness.

By these virtues alone, therefore, are we enabled to prepare ourselves for that eternal life which one day we shall enjoy in the bosom of our Heavenly FATHER. For the life which the children of GOD lead, even now upon earth, must be the same kind of life that awaits them in Heaven.

In Heaven they will know GOD in the same manner (though not in the same degree), as He knows Himself, and possess Him as He possesses and enjoys Himself. But, for such a knowledge, such a possession, such an enjoyment, it is indispensably necessary that the light of glory should transform the faculties of our soul, should elevate our virtues and make them and us GOD-like.

Thus we see the likeness and the difference which exist between the natural and the supernatural endowments of man.

Let us examine a plant. It has its roots, with which it digs into the earth and thence seeks such properties of the soil as are necessary for its nourishment and sustenance. It has its stem, which ceaselessly tends towards the light, the source of its warmth and vigour, and through which it is enabled to assimilate from the air what is necessary to its development.

The theological virtues in man illustrated from a plant.

Does not this represent the soul in a state of grace? Is it not like a wild olive tree, engrafted with the very Nature of JESUS CHRIST the true olive? It has its roots in *Faith*, and these roots penetrate into the very depths of the Divinity, and draw thence the nourishment of the Divine Life; *Hope* is its stem, by which it raises itself to the Sun of Righteousness to find there light and warmth; while *Love* is the power of attraction by which it apprehends God, and receives His own life, and immerses itself in Him.

We have said enough to demonstrate the very real relationship traceable between the Theological Virtues and their corresponding natural virtues, and also the enormous difference existing between them.

III. The theological virtues, considered in themselves.

We shall now proceed to a somewhat fuller consideration of the Theological Virtues themselves. And first, of Faith.

I. Faith.

Much that would naturally come under this head has been anticipated in the treatment of Faith in the sixth chapter, but there are still some matters to be considered in regard to it.

As we have seen, each virtue perfects principally some one power or faculty of the soul, and Faith has for its subject our reason. Faith supernaturally en-

Faith has for its subject the reason, which it perfects.

lightens and strengthens reason, and enables it to unite our knowledge with that of GOD. By its aid we perceive and know with infallible certainty mysteries concealed from every created eye, and naturally open only to GOD, but revealed by GOD through Faith.

As partakers of the Divine Nature through grace, we become by Faith partakers in a measure also of the Divine Knowledge. One day, S. Paul tells us, we shall know even as we are known ; and although in its fulness this can only be realized when the light of grace has been perfected in us by the light of glory, yet even now, in our pilgrimage here, GOD reveals Himself to us more and more, as we exercise the supernatural virtue of Faith.

When our LORD says, " No man can come to Me, except the FATHER Which hath sent Me draw him " (S. John vi. 44), He is teaching us that it is by the gift of GOD alone—that is, through supernatural Faith—that we can transcend the limits of our nature and comprehend the revelation of GOD.

Faith bestows  
on the reason  
(1) strength,

The Theological Virtue of Faith bestows on us especially two things : *strength* and *light*. Man's natural gifts have indeed to be strengthened by grace, that they may exercise the virtue of Faith—that the intellect may wing its way far above the things of earth, and rest in the very life of GOD.

" O that I had wings like a dove : for then would I flee away, and be at rest," said the Psalmist (Ps. lv. 6) ; and it is through the operation of the Dove—the HOLY GHOST—that we receive the grace which enables our intellect to wing its way into GOD's presence, gaze upon those mysteries which Faith reveals, and rest in the very Knowledge of GOD.

(2) and light.

Divine Faith not only strengthens our intellect, but

*enlightens* it ; and this enlightenment enables us to understand and appreciate that which is revealed. A man born blind may hear a very accurate and perfect description of various objects seen by other people, and yet these objects will always remain strange and incomprehensible to him ; his ideas of them will not only be imperfect, but probably in many cases quite incorrect.

Illustration of  
a man born  
blind.

So it is with the mysteries of revelation ; the natural reason may attain a considerable knowledge *about* them, and yet that knowledge will always be imperfect, and is liable to be very misleading.

We do not forget that one of the properties of Faith is its *obscurity* ; as S. Paul says, " Now we see through a glass, darkly " (1 Cor. xiii. 12) ; and yet this obscurity is like the glow of the midday sun, compared with the darkness of mere natural reason. Obscurity of Faith is like the twilight which indicates the dawn of day and the approaching splendour of the sun. It is like the darkness of a starry night, which reveals greater mysteries to us, and gives greater scope to our vision, than even the brightest day ; for in the day-time we can see a comparatively small portion of earth's surface, while night carries our vision into immeasurable distances, to constellations which the natural day hid from our view.

(3) " Obscurity,"  
a property of  
Faith.

Faith is obscure in comparison with the brightness of the day of eternal glory, but it is brilliant light compared with the lamplight of reason and sense.

We must, however, clearly bear in mind that the infused virtue of Faith which accompanies justification, or habitual grace, is given to us *potentially*, and needs to be exercised in order that its magnificent possibilities may be realized.

The theological virtues  
given to us  
potentially,  
and therefore  
need to be  
exercised.

Unfortunately, while every one understands this in

regard to the natural intellect, and prepares to put forth much toilsome effort in order to acquire knowledge, yet few consider that the virtue of Faith must be *exercised* in order that it may attain its full development. And still fewer, perhaps, have ever seriously asked in what manner Faith can be systematically trained so that its full powers may be unfolded and perfected.

"Meditation"  
is the exercise  
of Faith.

The answer is simple. Faith is exercised, trained, developed, and perfected by the practice of *meditation*. It is in meditation that the HOLY GHOST teaches us "the deep things of GOD;" bringing home to our soul, not the mere conclusions of the intellect, but those overwhelming convictions of GOD's revelation by which our whole life is ruled and perfected.

Some think  
they cannot  
meditate.

There are many who think that they are not so constituted intellectually as to be able to meditate. But no special character of intellect is suited to meditation, any more than any special character of intellect is suited to Faith; and it is by meditation that our capacity for the knowledge of GOD is developed and our Faith increased.

2. Hope.  
It has its seat  
in the will.

The second of the Theological Virtues is Hope; and Hope, like Charity, has its seat, not in the intellect, but in the will. The will has two different acts. By the one it takes pleasure in a good, so as to love it; and by the other it pursues that good with earnest activity and firm confidence.

Hope rests on  
GOD'S  
Omnipotence;

In the same manner as Faith communicates to our reason a supernatural power of understanding, so the infused virtue of Hope bestows upon our will a Divine power and a supernatural confidence, that it may actively pursue and securely attain the highest and infinite Good. Hope rests upon GOD'S Omnipotence as upon an immovable rock, and has for its object nothing

less than the possession of GOD Himself in eternity. Hope fills the soul with joyous consciousness of its power, and more than anything transports it with an enduring happiness.

its fruit is joy.

Hope is the intermediate virtue between Faith and Love, not by arbitrary position, but by necessary sequence, since it is through Hope that Faith passes into Love ; for those eternal verities in which we believe we first hope to attain, and Hope stimulates us to use every means for their acquirement, and thus, in longing for and reaching after them, we come to love them.

(1) Hope is intermediate between Faith and Love ;

Again, Hope is intermediate between the two great dangers of the soul, presumption and despair. It is our safeguard in passing between these, the Scylla and Charybdis of the spiritual life.

(2) between presumption and despair.

Most of those who suffer shipwreck will be able to trace their loss ultimately either to that *presumption* or spiritual pride, which made them think that they were justified when they were not—like the man who confidently went in to the marriage feast without a wedding garment ; or to that *despair* or spiritual sloth, which made them consider " the prize of the high calling of GOD " to be so far beyond their powers that, like the man who wrapped his talent in a napkin, they made no effort to gain it.

And we may further observe that Hope is the special virtue of the Intermediate State. The holy souls in Purgatory are spoken of as " prisoners of Hope " (Zech. ix. 12); and as Faith is the special virtue of the Church Militant, and Charity that of the Church Triumphant, so Hope is that of the Church Expectant.

(3) It is the special virtue of the Intermediate State.

The part which the supernatural virtue of Hope plays in the ordinary life of the Christian is much more im-

Hope the stimulus of all spiritual effort. To its neglect may be traced most of our sins.

An examination of the three kinds of sins :

(1) of the fallen angels ;

(2) of Adam ;

(3) of fallen man.

portant and practical than most people realize ; for not only is Hope the stimulus of spiritual effort, and the pioneer of Love, but it is to the neglect of the virtue of Divine Hope that we may trace most of our sins. Indeed, this is so universally the case that we might almost venture to say that *every* sin is a sin against Hope ; for every sin is a giving up of future Beatitude for some mere present enjoyment.

If we examine the three kinds of sins, the sin of the Angels, who had no evil tendency in their nature, and no external tempter ; the sin of Adam, who had no evil tendency in his nature, but had an external tempter ; and the sin of fallen man, with a tendency to evil within his nature, and a tireless tempter without, we shall find this illustrated in each case.

If we take the sin of the fallen Angels, it seems probable that they were not content to wait and hope for the revelation of their King. They cast away GOD's promise for the future to gratify self in the present ; they worshipped their own perfections, were content with natural gifts, found their joy in the present, and so lost that for which they were created, and which it was the law of their being to hope to attain, —lost GOD. Their sin was essentially against Hope.

So, too, with the sin of Adam. Eden was beautiful, but it was not his home. He was probably to look forward to a further revelation of GOD connected with his translation to another world ; he was to wait and hope. In the Tree of Knowledge he thought that he saw the possibility of possessing at once that mysterious knowledge which GOD was to reveal, and so he sinned against the law of Hope.

The same is true of fallen man now. Instead of hoping for " the glory that shall be revealed " in an-

other world—instead of placing all our hopes beyond the grave—we yield to the temptation to fix our hearts on the possession of things in the present. In fine, almost every sin is against Hope, for it is a giving up future Beatitude for present enjoyment.

Hope, like Faith, as an infused virtue, needs to be *exercised*, that its powers may be developed. Holy Scripture tells us that we are to “abound in Hope, through the power of the HOLY GHOST” (Rom. xv. 13); and we may ask in what way Hope may best be systematically exercised.

Hope is exercised especially by prayer, which is the operation in us of the HOLY SPIRIT.

There can be no doubt as to the answer,—that prayer is the exercise of Hope. We are to abound in Hope through the power of the HOLY GHOST, Who in prayer “helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the SPIRIT Itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered” (Rom. viii. 26).

Prayer is the most fundamental function of the spiritual man. It is the very atmosphere breathed by the soul, and it has been said that we might as well expect to find a living man who does not breathe, as a living Christian who does not pray. And prayer—whether it be verbal, or vocal, or mental; whether it be in Church, or in our closet, or as we walk the streets of a busy city—is the operation of the HOLY GHOST in our soul, and the exercise of the supernatural virtue of Hope. That we may develop this glorious virtue we must, as S. Paul says, “pray without ceasing.”

Prayer is the fundamental function of the spiritual man.

The last of the Theological Virtues is Charity. This is the last and the greatest, for S. Paul says: “Now abideth Faith, Hope, Charity, these three; but the greatest of these is Charity” (1 Cor. xiii. 13). It is the greatest because it is the complement and perfection

3. Charity.



of the other two ; for by Charity we embrace that highest Good which we know by Faith, and by Charity we are united on earth already with that which is the object of our Hope in Heaven.

Faith and Hope can co-exist with mortal sin ; Charity cannot.

Faith and Hope can co-exist in us with mortal sin—that is, without uniting us in a living and perfect manner with GOD ; but Charity is altogether lost when sanctifying grace is lost, and can only exist in the soul through which the life of GOD flows by grace. That Faith can remain in us without grace is evident from S. Paul's words : “ Though I have all Faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not Charity, I am nothing ” (1 Cor. xiii. 2).

The relation of Charity to sanctifying grace,

Charity, however, is inseparably connected with sanctifying grace ; so much so indeed that some theologians, as Scotus and Bellarmine, have thought the two to be identical. But this, as we have seen, is not the case.

and to the HOLY SPIRIT.

S. Augustine says it is as great as the gift of the HOLY SPIRIT, Who is given us in and by it. For as GOD unites Himself in a supernatural and indescribable manner with our soul by grace, so we unite ourselves, by supernatural Love, in a mysterious manner with GOD, and thus complete the wonderful circle, that golden ring which embraces GOD and the creature and makes both one. This circle is the image of that Divine Union which unites GOD the FATHER with His Only-Begotten SON, and the SON with the FATHER and the HOLY SPIRIT.

Why Charity is called a theological virtue.

Charity is called a Theological Virtue not only because it has GOD for its object and end, and unites us with GOD, but because by it we so love GOD as He alone, in virtue of His Divine Nature, can love Himself. As grace is a participation of the Divine Nature,

so is the Charity which proceeds from grace a participation of the Divine Charity. Hence some theologians have supposed this Charity as a virtue to be identical with the Person of the HOLY SPIRIT Himself. This, indeed, is not correct ; since, according to the words of S. Paul, " the Love of GOD is shed abroad in our hearts by the HOLY GHOST Which is given unto us " (Rom. v. 5).

Charity is a holy flame which the sacred fire of the HOLY GHOST kindles in our soul, an image of that Divine Charity from which He Himself proceeds.

Charity is altogether supernatural ; for though in the order of nature we can and must love GOD as our Creator and LORD, Whose natural image man is, yet this natural love is as different from the Divine Love as the nature of the creature is from that of the Creator.

Natural and  
supernatural  
Charity.

The natural knowledge of GOD in the image of His creatures differs from the immediate vision of His Nature as an earthly fire differs from the light of the sun. Both are related to GOD, yet these relations are very different. As the love of a servant and of a child may have the same person for their object, yet the one loves him as a master, the other as a father ; so does the supernatural virtue of Charity differ from the mere natural virtue of love.

Of this Charity Thomas a Kempis writes : " Nothing is sweeter than Love, nothing stronger, nothing higher, nothing wider, nothing more pleasant, nothing fuller or better in Heaven or earth. For Love proceeds from GOD, and cannot rest but in GOD, above all things created. Whosoever loves knows the cry of this voice ; a loud cry in the ears of GOD is the ardent affection of the soul which saith, O my GOD, my Love, Thou art all mine, and I am all Thine."

What Thomas  
a Kempis says  
of Charity ;

what S. Paul  
says of it.

What this Love is S. Paul tries to show when he tells the Ephesians that he prays for them "that ye, being rooted and grounded in Love, may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height ; and to know the Love of CHRIST, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of GOD" (Eph. iii. 17-19).

Charity  
enables us to  
possess GOD.

Since this Charity alone can make us love GOD as He loves Himself, it alone makes us possess GOD in truth. For by it we possess Him not only in affection, but also in reality, in our heart ; by it we enjoy His Divine sweetness at its very fountain ; by it we embrace GOD as our FATHER, as He by grace embraces us as His children ; by it we approach Him ever nearer, we become ever more like unto Him, until we are entirely transformed into His Image, and behold Him face to face.

The effect of  
Charity in  
regard to our  
neighbour.

The effect of this Divine Charity is also seen in our Love of our neighbour, which it ennobles and elevates. For the Love of our neighbour is part of our Love of GOD ; we love him, not because he is intrinsically lovable, as GOD is, but because our neighbour, like ourself, is the object of GOD's Love, and we are members together of the Body of CHRIST, and children alike of our Heavenly FATHER.

Charity needs  
to be exercised :

If it is true that the infused virtues of Faith and Hope need to be exercised in order that they may attain to their full development, this is still more true of Love. For as a fire cannot burn without fuel, so Love cannot live without exercise ; and its exercise in this world will often involve acts of self-sacrifice, painful in themselves, but transformed into the holiest joy by the power of love. Indeed, self-sacrifice is the fuel on which love feeds. It is so of mere natural love, and far more is it true of Divine Charity.

by self-  
sacrifice ;

We read the following account of Solomon's dedication of the great Temple which he had built for the service of Almighty GOD : " Now when Solomon had made an end of praying, the fire came down from Heaven, and consumed the burnt offering and the sacrifices ; and the Glory of the LORD filled the house " (2 Chron. vii. 1).

The fire, which filled the material Temple of GOD, was the emblem of the Divine Charity which fills the soul of the righteous. It came down from Heaven to consume the sacrifices and the burnt offering, and the glory of the LORD accompanied it, and filled the courts of the house.

That fire existed only to be fed by the sacrifices, and when in the reign of Manasseh it was allowed to go out, the life of the Jewish nation practically expired.

So the Divine fire of Love, which is shed abroad in our hearts by the HOLY GHOST, may be fed with the fuel of sacrifice, and is accompanied by the glory of GOD ; and thus the Saints, who were on fire with the Love of GOD, radiated, as it were, from their lives some rays of the glory of sanctity, the very glory of GOD.

We have seen in regard to Faith and Hope that there was a special way in which each must be exercised. Faith is exercised in meditation, and Hope in prayer. We may ask whether there is some special means by which we may exercise the virtue of Charity. The answer is, in the *worship* of Almighty GOD, and especially in that supreme act of the Christian Religion, " by which GOD is most glorified, and man most blessed,"—in the offering of the Holy Eucharist.

but especially  
in worship.

This exercise  
seen in the  
offering of  
the Holy  
Eucharist,

Then, in the sacramental presence of our LORD and GOD, we pour out the treasures of our Love, we make our acts of adoration, we offer to the Eternal FATHER

the Sacrifice of Love, identical with that Sacrifice by which Love redeemed us on the Cross ; and with it we offer, as " a living sacrifice," "our selves, our souls and bodies."

in which the law of sacrifice is fulfilled.

We have said that Love feeds on sacrifice, and on no sacrifice can love feed more sumptuously than on that Sacrifice which day by day the Church pleads, as she offers upon her altars to the Eternal FATHER " the memorial [His dear] SON hath commanded [her] to make ; having in remembrance His blessed Passion and precious Death, His mighty Resurrection and glorious Ascension ; rendering unto [GOD] most hearty thanks for the innumerable benefits procured unto us by the same." \*

IV. In addition to the virtues, justification bestows the Gifts of the HOLY SPIRIT, which produce the " fruits " and the " beatitudes."

In addition to the infusion of the moral and theological virtues, justification conveys to us the Seven Gifts of the HOLY GHOST, with the Fruits of the SPIRIT, and the Beatitudes which they produce. These Gifts of the HOLY GHOST, however, were treated with some fulness in the first volume of this work in connection with the Sacrament of Confirmation,† and to that treatment the reader is now referred.

Christians should recognize the richness of their endowments and use them.

We may conclude our consideration of the endowments of the spiritual man with an earnest exhortation to all Christians to recognize the dignity and riches of the grace which they possess, and so to use these powers that they may bring forth fruit to the glory of God, the edification of the Church, and the salvation of their own souls.

v. The doctrine of merit.

Before ending this chapter a few words may be in place in regard to the doctrine of Merit, so often misunderstood and misrepresented among Protestants.

\* Consecration Prayer (American Prayer Book).

† Vol. I., pp. 148-159.

In its strict theological sense Merit has been described as a quality which belongs to the moral actions of free and responsible agents, and makes these actions worthy of reward. Merit, therefore, implies a proportion between the work done and the reward given. A servant who does his work well deserves or merits the wages which his master has engaged to give him, while a beggar who comes to receive an alms which he has been promised cannot be said to earn or to merit it. Hence a man who merits can claim his reward as a matter of justice, but one who has been promised a reward out of all proportion to the work done may appeal to the fidelity and kindness, but not, strictly speaking, to the justice of the donor.

Merit  
described.

In order to merit a man must be free, since he cannot claim reward for a service which he has no power to withhold, and which therefore is not his to give ; and what he does must obviously be good. It must also be done in the service of the person who is to confer the reward, and who must have agreed to accept the work done and to reward it, since no one is bound to pay for work, however excellent, which he does not want.

Thus far we are speaking of merit as between man and man, and both Protestants and Catholics would probably agree in what we have said.

At the Reformation Luther denied that the good works of the just merit an eternal reward. His theory of imputed justification, of course, logically compelled him to do so, since he taught that men are justified solely by the imputation of the merits of CHRIST to them. Luther emphatically rejected the Catholic doctrine of Justification, that in counting sinners righteous GOD makes them righteous by imparting to them the grace of CHRIST and certain spiritual

Protestant  
denial of merit  
the logical  
result of  
Luther's view  
of justification.

endowments making them what GOD declares them to be, just in His sight and pleasing to Him. Hence Luther taught that the best works of good men are actually sinful. "Every work of the just man," Luther writes, "is damnable and a mortal sin, if it be judged by GOD's judgment."

Though Calvin is more moderate in his language, he maintains with Luther that the "good works of the faithful lack such perfect purity as can endure in the sight of GOD, and are in a manner defiled."

Merit depends  
solely upon  
GOD'S merciful  
promise.

The Catholic doctrine of Merit carefully lays down that the righteous have no claim for a reward apart from GOD'S merciful promise. This follows from what we have said, for even with men we cannot in strict justice claim a reward for service done, unless they have expressly or by implication agreed to remunerate us.

No injustice,  
had GOD  
promised no  
reward.

But besides this, we cannot profit GOD by our service. His bliss is complete in itself, and He has no need of us or of our works. Besides, our service is already due to GOD by other titles. A slave claims no reward from his master, and any recompense he may receive comes from his master's generosity, not from his justice; and man belongs to his Creator more absolutely than any slave can belong to his master. There would, therefore, have been no injustice had GOD called us to serve Him without reward, and our service at the best would be imperfect.

Our LORD  
tells  
us how GOD  
might have  
dealt with us,

Hence our LORD reminds us of the manner in which GOD might have dealt with us when He says: "Which of you, having a servant plowing or feeding cattle, will say unto him by and by, when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat? and will not rather say unto him, Make ready wherewith I

may sup, and gird thyself, and serve me, till I have eaten and drunken ; and afterward thou shalt eat and drink ? Doth he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him ? I trow not. So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants : we have done that which was our duty to do " (S. Luke xvii. 7-10).

If this were the only text bearing on the subject the Protestant rejection of Merit would be justified, but, as usual in Protestant theology, one text is distorted and misapplied and made to contradict a large number of other passages.

For in the first place our LORD distinctly promises to do the very thing which the master in the parable does not do. He says, speaking of those servants who are watching for His return : " Blessed are those servants, whom the LORD when He cometh shall find watching : verily I say unto you, that He shall gird Himself, and make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth and serve them " (S. Luke xii. 37).

but distinctly promises that He will not do so.

There are many other passages of Holy Scripture which are inexplicable apart from some theory of reward or merit. Without going through them all, let us examine a few.

Many passages of Scripture teach this doctrine :

S. Paul says : " I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith : henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the LORD, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day : and not to me only, but unto all them also that love His appearing " (2 S. Tim. iv. 7, 8). And here we must remember that the original word for *righteousness* signifies *justice*. S. Paul, therefore, claims that because he has done his part in fighting the good fight

2 S. Tim. iv. 7, 8 ;



and keeping the faith, he is to receive a crown of justice, which the LORD, the *just Judge*, is to give to him and to others as a matter, evidently, of justice.

Heb. vi. 10;

So again we read: "God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love" (Heb. vi. 10), which certainly implies that if God did forget this work He would be unjust; and the justice in this case consists in giving the reward of salvation, as the preceding verse shows. The same truth is proved by the reiterated assurance that God "will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life" (Rom. ii. 6, 7).

Rom. ii. 6, 7;

S. Matt. v. 12.

Our LORD in His Sermon on the Mount distinctly says: "Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your *reward* in Heaven" (S. Matt. v. 12). Here the word *reward* is *μισθός*. And again He exhorts His Disciples to lay up for themselves treasures in Heaven; which, according to the Protestant theory, seems to be the last thing that anyone should be exhorted to do; since all their good works being sinful, as Luther says, they cannot possibly be laid up in Heaven, where nothing sinful can enter.

The conditions of merit. Only works done in grace are meritorious. This excludes works of the law, and those done through natural virtue.

We must here, however, carefully draw attention to the conditions of Merit. Only those works are meritorious which are done in the friendship and by the grace of GOD. S. Paul constantly asserts that no man can be justified by the works of the law. In this he is, of course, referring to the Jewish law, and it is also true that no work can be meritorious which is done in man's mere natural power.

To be of any efficacy good works must be done through the grace of CHRIST, so that they are really the fruits of that grace in our lives. This is clearly

proved by S. Paul's words : " ' Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not Charity, it profiteth me nothing " (1 Cor. xiii. 3). Good works must be the effect of the love of GOD in our heart. Hence no one can merit who is not in a state of grace, and all works, however good in themselves, done when in mortal sin, are absolutely valueless and wasted.

In Articles XII. and XIII. of Religion reference is made to this subject, and we are told, first, in Article XII., that " good works, which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after Justification," though they " cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of GOD's judgment ; yet are they pleasing and acceptable to GOD in CHRIST, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith."

The teaching  
of Articles xii.  
and xiii.

In Article XIII. we are told that " works done before the grace of CHRIST," that is, before Justification " are not pleasant to GOD, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in JESUS CHRIST ; neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the School-authors say) deserve grace of congruity." This Article is directed against a theory prevalent in the sixteenth century, that works done *before* Justification, while they cannot claim a reward from the justice of GOD *de condigno*, still have some claim upon GOD *de congruo*. This, however, the Article rightly rejects, since all first motions of grace come from GOD, and can in no sense be merited by man.

It may be well here to explain these two technical terms. *Meritum de condigno* is that merit to which we have been referring as founded upon GOD's Justice in that He has promised to reward every man according to his works. *Meritum de congruo* is not, properly

" Meritum de  
condigno."

" Meritum de  
congruo."

Things we  
cannot merit :  
justification,  
and final  
perseverance.

speaking, merit at all, but rather a right founded on friendship and liberality, and not on strict justice. No man, therefore, can merit the first grace, or justification, nor, if he fall into mortal sin, can he merit a recovery from that state. Nor can he merit final perseverance.

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE MYSTERY OF SUFFERING.

**O**F all the various mysteries of life that which meets us most often (if, perhaps, we except sin) is the mystery of suffering. Sorrow is the universal monarch of this world, and sooner or later every one must bow before his throne. Sin is a universal fact in human life, but suffering is still wider reaching, since beneath its sceptre not only man, but all creation toils ; for, as S. Paul says, " the whole creation [every creature] groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now ; and not only they, but ourselves also " (Rom. viii. 22, 23).

Of so undoubtedly universal a fact in human life theology must take account, since upon our view of suffering must depend our explanation of many other mysteries of life. Passing over the phenomena of suffering in the brute creation, and confining ourselves to its manifestation in human life, and without pretending to offer a solution of the mystery, we shall in this chapter endeavour to gain some idea of the *purpose* of suffering by considering carefully its effects in the training and development of man.

Pessimists, looking out upon the world of suffering, draw from it an argument against the existence of a benevolent Creator. Making a superficial study of the

**Introductory :**  
The universality of suffering ; unlike sin it extends even to the brute creation.

Upon right views of suffering depends our explanation of other mysteries.

Without pretending to solve this mystery, its purpose may be learned from its effects.

Pessimists use the existence of suffering as an argument

against a  
benevolent  
Creator.

This requires  
suffering to be  
purposeless,  
and therefore  
useless ;

shown to be  
a beneficent  
factor in man's  
development,  
pessimism is  
overthrown.

I. Human life  
is developed in  
three spheres :  
the physical,  
moral, and  
spiritual.  
In each, suffer-  
ing is a neces-  
sary agent of  
progress.

1. Suffering in  
physical life.

Pleasure and  
pain the two  
guides of life—  
acting as a  
spur and as  
a curb.

pain and misery of life both among men and the lower creatures, they use the universal phenomena of suffering as evidence against the Justice and Love of an Almighty God.

Undoubtedly in the present day this argument appeals to a school of shallow thinkers who are ever striving to find weapons with which to attack Christianity. Their conclusion, however, requires that suffering should be *purposeless*, and therefore *useless* in human life ; and if it can be shown, on the other hand, that suffering is not only a *beneficent* factor in man's development, but that, so far as experience goes, it is an absolutely *necessary* agent in the progress both of the race and of the individual, then the position of the pessimist is absolutely overthrown.

The development of human life may be traced in three different spheres : in the region of physical life, in the realm of morals, and in the spiritual domain. And in each case we shall find that suffering is not only a prominent, but, so far as we are able to see, a necessary agent in the progress of life towards perfection. Let us, then, briefly glance at some of the effects of suffering in each sphere of human life, reserving a fuller discussion of the subject until after we have thus answered the accusation of pessimism.

It must be evident to every one that in physical life pain plays a most important and a most beneficent part. In fact, pleasure and pain are the two guides of physical life. The first, acting as an incentive, moves man to those acts, and urges him in those paths by which physical life is unfolded and developed ; while the second, acting as a curb, restrains man from straying into paths of danger and destruction.

Indeed, in physical life pain is almost the only safe-

guard man has to prevent him from losing life itself in the pursuit of pleasure. We see this best, perhaps, in the matter of health. Pain, as sentinel, warns man of the beginnings of internal ailments, which, if not checked, might become fatal.

**Pain a safeguard in the pursuit of pleasure, and forewarns man against disease.**

We see it also in the ravages of contagious disease ; as suffering drives man to discover and to observe the laws of sanitation. and so not only leads to the preservation, but to the improvement of the race.

**In epidemics suffering leads to preservation and improvement of the race.**

Without pursuing the subject further in the sphere of man's physical life, we may assert that pain is man's best friend, warning him of many a pitfall, preventing many an irretrievable mistake, remedying many an evil—in a word, that the purpose of physical pain is altogether benevolent.

If we turn from the region of physical life to that of morals, we find that suffering here plays a part which is even more important. For not only does it punish man for transgression of the moral law, and so warns him from forbidden paths of sin, but, when man has fallen, moral suffering is the great factor in his restoration. The misery of remorse, the sting of conscience is often the first beginning of that repentance by which the sinner regains not only his peace with God, but his own self-respect and self-mastery.

**2. Suffering in moral life.**

**Pain not only warns man from paths of sin,**

**but is a great factor in his restoration after a fall.**

And after the moral nature has been weakened by indulgence in sin, the suffering which comes from the effort to resist returning temptation restores strength to the wounded part. Just as when a man breaks his arm, it is bound up in splints for some weeks, and the bone knits. When the splint is taken off, however, the arm at first is so weak as to be useless. The physician comes and begins to work those muscles which have been weakened, in order to bring them back gradually

to their strength ; but as he exercises them, the pain is often greater than it was at the first setting of the bone, and yet this painful process is necessary to restore to the weakened arm its power.

So in the sphere of man's moral nature suffering is necessary, not only to warn him from the path of sin, but, when he has fallen, to bring him back to penitence, and more, through the penance which the sin involves, to restore completely the weakened part.

Under this head, then, we may say suffering is preventive, is remedial, has the power of developing moral strength, and, in what it teaches man, is the greatest educative factor in his moral life.

When we pass from the realm of morals to the higher domain of the spiritual life, we find that suffering, while fulfilling all the various functions which we have traced in the two lower spheres of physical and moral being, adds to them certain special powers.

For it is in this sphere that suffering becomes *sacramental*, that is, a means of uniting the soul to GOD. In the furnace of affliction the soul, relying upon GOD's grace, and enduring chastisement as from the hands of a loving father, becomes, as it were, welded to GOD beneath the constant blows, and thus united to GOD, attains a knowledge of the fellowship of the sufferings of CHRIST.

Another stage is reached when suffering becomes *sacrificial*; that is, when, united to CHRIST, the soul joyfully offers to GOD all its pains and sorrows in union with CHRIST's one Sacrifice upon the Cross. So S. Paul says : " [I] now rejoice in my sufferings for you, and fill up that which is behind of the afflictions of CHRIST in my flesh for His Body's sake, which is the Church " (Col. i. 24). Here suffering becomes both

It is preventive, remedial, strengthening, and educative.

3. Suffering in the spiritual life adds to its other functions by becoming

sacramental,

sacrificial,

*sacrificial* and *meritorious*, being borne in the grace of GOD and in union with the merits of CHRIST.

and meritorious,

Enough has probably been said to show with how little reason suffering is used as evidence against the Justice and Love of GOD. As well might a father who corrects his wayward child be accused of cruelty as our Heavenly FATHER, Who by the agency of suffering is training us, His children, for that life of eternal happiness where "there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain" (Rev. xxi. 4).

and is the agency by which GOD trains man for eternal happiness.

Thus far we have briefly indicated some of the functions of suffering as a benevolent factor in the threefold sphere of man's life on earth. Let us now approach the question in a more general way.

II. The subject treated more generally.

The origin of suffering is a question of absorbing interest, but one which is steeped in mystery. For with the exception of telling us that death came into the world by sin, revelation is silent as to the *origin* of suffering.

1. The origin of suffering not revealed;

That it is often caused directly by sin is certain. That in some mysterious way it is always related indirectly to sin is probable. And yet nothing could be more untrue than to say that an individual's suffering can always be traced to the same individual's sin.

but related generally to sin.

In any practical treatment of this mystery we must bear in mind that the question from man's point of view is the relation of suffering to human life, in the development of man's moral being and character *in the presence and under the influence of sin*. Whether there would be any suffering in the world if there were no sin, is a question which we have not here to consider. In another world, whence all sin will be shut out, we are distinctly told that there will be no more pain.

Pain as a factor in the development of character in the presence of sin.



But here suffering is a most potent factor in the development of man's moral nature in an atmosphere of sin ; and, so far as we are able to judge, there is no other means by which the same beneficent result could be accomplished in the development of what is good in man, and the conquest of all that is evil.

2. Sin is transgression of law ; pain is the penalty of this disobedience, but also the antidote.

Sin has been most generally defined as disobedience, or transgression of the law. Suffering is the penalty of this transgression or sin ; and not only a penalty, but it is almost always intended to be an antidote,—to be *preventive*, as we have seen, of transgression in the future, and *remedial* for that of the past.

3. Suffering is evidential :  
i. As punitive, an evidence of GOD'S Justice and Holiness and of His hatred of sin ;

In many ways suffering is *evidential*. In that it is often *punitive*, it is an evidence of GOD's hatred of sin itself, and a witness to the Holiness of GOD. Then, while suffering is punitive, it is not so much vindictive as vindicative, being the manifestation of GOD's Justice in the presence of moral evil.

Suffering, as we have seen, has been considered by some an evidence of GOD's injustice and cruelty. The very opposite is the truth, for GOD being what He is, absolute Righteousness, Justice, and Truth, it is impossible that He can do otherwise than manifest His Justice wherever sin comes into His presence. For GOD's attributes are His Essence ; they cannot be laid aside at times, as in the case of the attributes of man. GOD's Justice, therefore, is no mere transient feeling, but a permanent and necessary hostility towards that sin which is so infinitely abhorrent to His Divine Nature.

ii. as revealing to us GOD'S Compassion,

Suffering is evidential also in revealing to us that aspect of GOD's Love which we call the love of Compassion, for He suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should follow in His steps. How little could

we ever have known of this love of Compassion, if it had not been for the sufferings of our LORD upon the Cross !

And His Apostle tells us that in those sufferings He leaves us an example, by thus calling us to the practice of that sympathy with others in suffering which has such enormous power to develop what is good in our own souls, to lighten the sorrows of the world, and through sympathy to make man GOD-like. Sympathy takes us out of ourselves, teaches us to be unselfish, brings sunshine into the clouded hearts of our fellow-men, makes us the ministers of love, and enables us, by bearing one another's burdens, to fulfil the law of CHRIST.

and by our  
LORD'S exam-  
ple teaching  
us sympathy ;

Again, suffering is evidential in revealing GOD as man's only Refuge in time of trouble. Suffering has a twofold effect upon man, as we learn on Calvary itself. It mellows, and develops, and purifies, and leads him to GOD ; as in the case of the Penitent Thief—who by the experience of his own suffering and by witnessing the sufferings of our LORD, was driven to GOD in penitence and emboldened to pray, " LORD, remember me when Thou comest into Thy Kingdom." Or, on the other hand, suffering hardens, and embitters, and drives man into rebellion and despair ; as in the case of the impenitent thief.

iii. as reveal-  
ing GOD to be  
man's only  
refuge.  
Its twofold  
effect is seen on  
Calvary in the  
two robbers.

There are many who have never thought of GOD in the days of health and prosperity, but who have been brought to GOD by suffering and can say with the Psalmist : " It is good for me that I have been in trouble : that I may learn Thy statutes " (Ps. cxix. 71).

Then again, suffering is not only sacrificial in the sense that we offer it to GOD in union with the merits of the sufferings of CHRIST, but it is sacrificial in its

iv. Suffering  
as a witness  
to truth.

efficacy as a witness to truth. In the hour of His Passion our LORD teaches us this when He says : " To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth " (S. John xviii. 37 ; see 1 S. Tim. vi. 13).

The power of  
martyrdom.

Many a preacher has met with nothing but opposition to his teaching, but when the seed sown has been watered with his blood, it has sprung up and produced a glorious harvest. The history of the Christian Church in the first three centuries of its life is a proof of the dignity and power of martyrdom, and our LORD tells us of its happiness when He says : " Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake : for their's is the Kingdom of Heaven " (S. Matt. v. 10).

4. Not only is  
deserved suf-  
fering effica-  
cious, but  
undeserved  
has still  
greater power.

Indeed, while the sinner's conscience bears witness to the power of suffering as the penalty of sin, when he confesses in the words of the Penitent Thief : " We receive the due reward of our deeds ; " yet its greatest power is in the sufferings of those who have " done nothing amiss."

We see this in  
the attraction  
of the Passion,

Our LORD prophesied of Himself : " Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone : but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. . . . I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me " (S. John xii. 24, 32). And, though nearly two thousand years have passed since then, the fulfilment of the prophecy goes on in the attractive power of the Cross of CHRIST, the magnet of souls, which year by year draws round it the sorrowing, suffering and sinful children of men.

which still  
lives on.

5. The vicari-  
ous suffering  
of CHRIST.

To the superficial thinker the vicarious suffering of CHRIST has ever been a stumbling-block, something irreconcilable with his view of justice. And yet is not the Passion, which redeemed the world, rather the

climax of that method of operation to which may be traced all the progress of humanity? For man's sorrows, not his joys, are the seed, not only of glory in the life to come, but of many blessings to humanity in the life on earth.

the climax of the suffering by which man has progressed.

When we try to trace the fruit which has sprung from the legacy of pleasure and joy left to us by the individuals of the race, how little do we find! Pleasure and joy seem to be a seed which is sterile and unproductive. All the abundant fruit of the experience of centuries has sprung from seed sown in tears, the seed of labour, sorrow, and pain.

Pleasure and joy leave no legacy to the race;

its riches spring from suffering.

"Man learns wisdom by experience," says the proverb; but, it implies *bitter* experience. And so, our LORD's last act of self-sacrifice, by which He made satisfaction for the sins of the world and won for man eternal life, was surely the splendid climax to which all that was great and unselfish in the history of the race had been pointing.

Man comes into the world through the travail of another. The life which was brought forth with such pain is largely supported by food gained by the death of many a creature. The comforts and even the necessities of life are purchased for us at the price of the labour and often the suffering of numbers of our fellow-men. Indeed, all that makes life worth living, —liberty, law, art, literature,—all is inherited from others who won it through toil and suffering, through disappointment, and often death.\*

Man's whole life demands vicarious suffering.

Vicarious suffering, then, seems to be the law of human progress, pointing to the solidarity of the race and enforcing the lesson of unselfish labour and suffering for others. Was it not fitting, then, that He Who

Vicarious suffering points to the solidarity of the race.

\* J. R. Illingworth, *The Problem of Pain*.

was the Head and Representative of humanity should gather up in His life those marvellous sorrows and pains by which He showed the evil and broke the power of sin,—by which He manifested the mercy and proved the love of GOD for sinners?

The teaching  
of Heb. ii. 10.

As the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews tells us :  
“ It became Him, for Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings ” (Heb. ii. 10).

All suffering,  
rightly borne,  
is gathered up  
and sanctified  
in the Cross.

We are familiar with the thought that from the Fall all things pointed to redemption through suffering. But may we not go a step further, and see how all suffering, rightly borne, is gathered up and sanctified in the Cross of CHRIST?

Pain as a gift  
to be accounted  
for.

An important practical lesson follows from this ; namely, the value of pain in our lives as one of the gifts for which we must give an account, and which we are in great danger of wasting.

The danger of  
wasting it.

When we read the parable of the steward who had wasted his lord's goods, we all feel most keenly that in many ways it represents our own case. Conscience reproaches us in regard to wasted time, wasted opportunities, wasted talents ; but few ever examine themselves about wasted suffering. Our LORD tells us to lay up for ourselves treasures in Heaven, good works done and sufferings endured in reliance upon and through the power of His grace.

Rightly used,  
pain becomes  
the gold of  
heaven.

Suffering is our lot in this world ; we cannot escape it ; but we can either transmute it into the gold of GOD's Kingdom in Heaven, by bearing it in the power of grace and offering it in conscious union with the sufferings of CHRIST, or we can waste it through sheer thoughtlessness. The pain will be just as severe, the

grief just as poignant, but the result in eternity altogether different.

Hitherto we have considered suffering almost entirely in its effect upon our life here in time. Our last thought, however, suggests that there is still another aspect in which suffering should be regarded, and it is to this view of suffering that S. Paul draws our thoughts when he says : " Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory ; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen : for the things which are seen are temporal ; but the things which are not seen are eternal " (2 Cor. iv. 17, 18).

III. Suffering in relation to eternity.

S. Paul's teaching :  
2 Cor. iv. 17, 18.

In these words S. Paul teaches us that present suffering is the raw material of future glory, and that the result is so disproportionate to the toil that he speaks of our affliction as " light " and " but for a moment."

Present suffering the raw material of future glory.

When S. Paul speaks of " our light affliction " being " but for a moment," we might have thought that his sorrows and labours, immense though they were, were summed up in some one splendid action, as has been the case in the history of many a martyrdom. But no ; his " moment " reached almost the ordinary span of human life, and from early manhood to old age it was crowded with experiences of sorrow and suffering, and yet he says of them in another place : " I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us " (Rom. viii. 18).

S. Paul's "moment."

And again, when he speaks of our affliction as being " light," we shall realize the full force of his words when we remember by whom they were uttered,—by

S. Paul's "light affliction."

one who more than most of the children of men had drunk to its very dregs the bitter cup of woe, and who describes his "light affliction" in these words: "In labours more abundant, in stripes above measure, in prisons more frequent, in deaths oft. Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one. Thrice was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I have been in the deep; in journeyings often, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by mine own countrymen, in perils by the heathen, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren; in weariness and painfulness, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness. Beside those things that are without, that which cometh upon me daily, the care of all the Churches" (2 Cor. xi. 23-28).

With magnificent boldness his thought sweeps at once from the means to the end, from the seed to the harvest, from the cause to the result, from the sufferings of this present time to that "eternal weight of glory," which the light afflictions of this life produce.

The condition  
on which the  
glorious result  
depends.

But he adds a caution. He points out the condition on which this glorious consequence depends. He does not say that "our light affliction . . . worketh for us" always and absolutely "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory," but only "while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen."

The danger of  
self-pity.

He warns us against the danger of looking upon our own sorrows and sufferings as though they were isolated experiences. He tells us that we must keep steadily in view, not the suffering, but its purpose, its effect in eternity, in the glories of that Kingdom of

Love where those who have sown in tears shall reap in joy.

He warns us that we must be careful to see things in their true relation to one another, in their eternal synthesis; otherwise we shall be in danger of making mountains of molehills, of thinking that our light afflictions are unbearable because they are so great, or, on the other hand, of losing our presence of mind and so making mistakes in meeting suffering.

The importance of seeing things in their true relation to each other. The danger of exaggerating suffering.

When we are standing on the edge of a precipice, if we look down and contemplate the awful depth, we are in danger of becoming dizzy and falling; if, however, we look up, we can often walk safely on the brink. When our LORD called S. Peter to come to Him on the water, as long as the disciple's gaze was fixed on CHRIST he was able to walk upon the sea, but when he looked away from our LORD and saw that the wind was boisterous, he was afraid and began to sink.

of letting it make us dizzy from fear.

This is what S. Paul would teach us when he says: "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen." If we keep our gaze steadily fixed on the purpose and end of suffering, it will lose its bitterness.



## CHAPTER XIII.

### DEATH.

Introductory :

**I**N approaching the solemn questions of Catholic Eschatology we must at the outset remember that in regard to this mysterious, though fascinating, subject but little more is revealed to us than the fact of the reality of Death, Judgment, Heaven, Hell, and the Intermediate State.

Eschatology belongs largely to speculative theology.

In striving to give some answer to the many anxious questions which man with passionate curiosity asks in regard to the great future for which he feels that this life is but a preparation, we must bear in mind that the treatment of such questions belongs almost entirely to the department of *speculative* theology.

Its discussion valuable for exposing error.

While, therefore, we may learn much that is interesting from the opinions of theologians who have carefully considered the subject, yet these opinions can seldom be said to be *de fide*. The principal value of a treatment of these questions is, perhaps, to be found rather in the exposure of what is erroneous than in the positive statement of certain truth.

Inferences from revelation, and theological opinions not to be rashly rejected.

There are inferences from revelation and human experience which may guide us to conclusions of great probability ; and there are some theological opinions which come to us with a weight of authority so great that we should be rash indeed, if we did not accept them.

On the other hand there are popular theories which are not only unsound, but which transgress the limits of theological speculation by conflicting with received truth. Such views cannot be taught without grave responsibility, and it may therefore be useful to show on how weak a foundation they stand.

The limits of theological speculation to be here observed.

With this caution we approach the solemn subject of Death, the first of the Four Last Things.

I. Death.

Death in its most general sense may be defined as the cessation or privation of life. In Holy Scripture and in ascetic theology two kinds of death are spoken of, the one spiritual, the other corporal. Spiritual or supernatural death is also subdivided into the death of the soul, and the death of sin.

1. Different senses in which the term is used.

The death of the soul is the result of mortal sin, which deprives the soul, first, of that habitual grace which is the life of GOD in the soul, and then (unless there be repentance), of that eternal happiness in Heaven for which the soul was created.

The death of sin, on the other hand, is the result of justification or the infusion of sanctifying grace. This mystic death is the truest life, and is effected in the soul by the Sacraments of Baptism and Penance. It is to this death that S. Paul refers when he says: "We are buried with Him by Baptism into death;" and again: "Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto GOD through JESUS CHRIST our LORD" (Rom. vi. 4, 11).

But it is of corporal or physical death that we have now to treat, and this consists in the separation of the body and soul, and therefore the dissolution of their vital union, and is the beginning in the body of those processes of disintegration by which it returns to dust.

Physical death defined.

It is the act which fixes all the other actions of life,

2. Is death  
natural to  
man?

and gives them their final meaning, and it is the occasion upon which is determined for ever the state of the soul in eternity.

Among the first questions in connection with death which present themselves to us for discussion is, whether or not death is *natural* to man and other creatures. At first sight we might reply that it is, since the constitution of man's physical nature and of that of the lower creatures seems to involve the gradual wearing out by use of the organs of the body, even where death has not supervened as the result of accident or disease.

And yet there is much to be said on the other side of this question. If death were a natural process in man as originally created, like other processes of physical life, such as eating, drinking, breathing, etc., we should expect it to be painless, if not actually connected with a certain physical pleasure, as they are.

But the very opposite is the case with death. It is often extremely painful, a violent severance of body and soul, during which the sufferer groans and writhes, the features are contorted, and the form becomes wasted.

Then again, if death be a natural process it is difficult to understand the creatures' terror of it and struggle against it; and this not only in the sphere of human life, but also among the brute creation.

Even after death, in respect to the lifeless body mankind shows a horror of death as of a strange, hostile element. Among many races the repugnance to corpses is so great that both men and things which come into contact with them are considered unclean. This way of looking at death was found amongst the Jews, and received the sanction of the Mosaic Law. Even among

some of the brute creation traces of this feeling may be observed.

Again, the unwillingness of man to face the certitude of his own death, and the difficulty of *realizing*, in spite of evidence all around him, that he as an individual must die—both these facts point to something strange and unnatural in death.

If it be objected that life *as we now see it* could not go on apart from death, since creatures prey upon one another as a means of existence, the reply is that sin, which is unnatural and foreign to man as originally created by GOD, has produced this result, and that the very facts to which we have drawn attention show that the present condition of life was not its *original* condition.

This brings us to a consideration of the next question, namely, the origin of death in this world. On this point we have the testimony both of revelation and experience. Holy Scripture tells us that "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. v. 12); that "the wages of sin is death" (Rom. vi. 23); and again, that "since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead" (1 Cor. xv. 21).

3. The origin of death in the world.

In each of these passages death is spoken of as a result of sin, and this is in accordance with the general tenor of Holy Scripture. Experience leads us, though with less certainty, to the same conclusion; since we find that death is the result of the *transgression*, either by accident or disease, of some law of life—the exception, perhaps, being death from extreme old age.

But while death is thus seen to be the punishment of sin, a closer examination shows us that the punish-

Death is the penalty of sin;

not, however, arbitrary, but remedial.

4. It is the antidote of sin,

ment is not arbitrary, but remedial, and contains within itself a blessing to those who use it rightly. For death is represented not only as the result of sin, but as the great weapon of the devil, who was the cause of sin. But GOD in His wisdom and love out of evil brings good, out of the punishment brings the antidote. "For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him Who hath subjected the same in hope, because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of GOD" (Rom. viii. 20, 21). The "vanity" to which the creature was subjected by GOD is, of course, in its ultimate consequence, death.

and, like Goliath's sword, destroys him who wielded it.

But as David in his combat with the Philistine cut off Goliath's head with that enemy's own sword, so our LORD on the Cross by death destroyed "him that had the power of death, that is, the devil" (Heb. ii., 14).

And what our LORD did for all men He, in a sense, enables all who die in Him to effect in their own case, namely, the destruction of Satan's power over them, and therefore their own freedom; for, as S. Paul says, "He that is dead is freed [justified] from sin" (Rom. vi. 7).

Death is the close of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit.

Death is the close of that long and painful conflict which the Apostle so graphically describes in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, verses 15 to 25. It is the answer to the question with which the passage ends,—“O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” It is the close of the conflict, because it is the destruction of that sinful flesh through which the enemy of the soul so often tempted man.

The nature of regenerate man has been described as

a citadel captured by GOD'S HOLY SPIRIT, but surrounded by a town still in the hands of the enemy. The citadel is man in his higher spiritual life, his real *ego*, of which S. Paul says: "I delight in the law of GOD after the inward man;" while the town represents those members of sin of which he says: "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." The true *ego* leads him to will to do good; the other lies in wait to frustrate his efforts, so that the good that he would he cannot do.

An illustration from the citadel of a town.

How is the enemy to be driven out of the town, so as never more to return, never again to find a stronghold there? The surest way is to burn the town, and thereby deprive the enemy of his dwelling and his cover; and this is what death does for our beleaguered fortress, our higher self, our regenerated spiritual life, by a dissolution of the members in which the law of sin resides.\*

Here, too, we see why death brings no blessing to the unrepentant sinner. In him there is no fortress to be saved when the town is set on fire; for in him the enemy exercises sway in the fortress itself, and therefore he gains no benefit by the conflagration of the town.

Death brings no blessing to the unrepentant,

Thus to regenerate man death comes as a blessing, since at the very moment when it reveals its might it unconsciously loses this by abolishing all further occasion of sin. In death the devil seems to have conquered, as when our LORD died on the Cross, but his apparent victory, as then, is irretrievable defeat. If "the sting of death is sin," and sin in the regenerate

but to those who die in CHRIST it is indeed a blessing.

\* Dahle; *Life after Death*, pp. 55, 56.

ceases at death, we have good reason to cry with S. Paul, "O death, where is thy sting? . . . Thanks be to GOD, Which giveth us the victory through our LORD JESUS CHRIST" (1 Cor. xv. 55, 57).

II. The  
properties of  
death.

1. Its certainty.

Let us now approach our subject from another point of view, and examine the properties of death.

The first is its *certainty*. This is not a matter of faith, but of experience; indeed, death is the only absolutely certain thing in life. If we take a little child, just born into the world, how little we can foretell its future! We cannot be sure whether it will be rich or poor, learned or ignorant, happy or wretched, whether its life will be long or short, whether it will do good or evil. One thing, and one only, we are certain of,—that child will die.

2. Its uncertainty.

The second property of death is its *uncertainty*. For as death in one of its aspects is the most certain event of life, so in another is it the most uncertain; namely, as to time, place, and manner. When shall I die,—to-day, or not until after many years? Where shall I die,—at home, surrounded by loving friends, or in some far-off land, alone, with none to minister to me? How shall I die,—by the result of an accident, or of some fatal disease, or after a long life, from old age?

3. It happens  
but once.

The third property of death is that it happens *but once*, and once for all. If we make a mistake about this, we may regret it throughout eternity, but we cannot correct it. This gives to death its peculiar solemnity—that all opportunities of doing good, of meriting, are gone forever.

4. It is an un-  
known experi-  
ence to each.

The last property of death which we shall consider now is that it is an *unknown experience* for all. The priest and the physician have witnessed the deaths, perhaps, of hundreds of men, but they have not the

slightest idea what it will be like when they themselves come to die.

We pass next to what we may call some accompaniments of death, inasmuch as unlike the properties, they are not always present.

III. The accompaniments of death :

First, we may observe that this penal act of dying has ordinarily to be performed at a time and under circumstances when, humanly speaking, we are least in fit condition for grave and solemn action ; or else it takes place so suddenly that it scarcely comes under our idea of an act at all.

1. Adverse conditions

Its ordinary accompaniment is bodily and mental weakness. It appears almost an essential part of the pains of death that it takes us at a disadvantage. We seem to need a strong body, a clear mind, a collected will, to do the many things which at that supreme moment we ought to do in order to make our preparation for the great eternity. We never need to be more thoroughly alive than at the moment when we come to die, and yet, (perhaps to prevent us from putting off our preparation until that moment,) experience warns us that physical circumstances will oblige us to perform the act of dying under great difficulty.

of bodily and mental weakness ;

Again, there is little doubt that where death is busy evil spirits are busy also. It is their last chance with the departing soul, and the devil has " great wrath, because he knoweth that he hath but a short time." Even though the soul has been his willing slave for years, yet Satan knows there is a chance of its repentance ; and if death comes at the end of a long and dubious struggle between good and evil, all the more does he need to bring his forces to bear upon the soul at that supreme moment, that, if possible, the victory may be on his side.

2. the presence and activity of evil spirits ;



3. to help us—the Angel, GOD'S special grace, prayers of the Church and of friends, Sacraments of the Church.

On the other hand the hour of death is a time of great grace. There is the Guardian Angel with earnest love tendering his last ministrations. There is the special grace which GOD offers in the hour of need. There are the constant intercessions of the Universal Church, the prayers of friends, and perhaps the ministrations of the Church, and the last Sacraments, so full of power and consolation,—the Viaticum, the very Body of Him Who for our sakes conquered death, and the Last Unction, with its less defined but wonderful graces.

4. Great possibilities at the hour of death : for sinners, of repentance ; for some, apparently righteous, of a bad death.

There are great possibilities in death, possibilities even for those who have not lived well, as we learn from the Penitent Thief upon the cross ; possibilities, too, for those who have *seemed* to live well, of falling away at the last, as has been the case in some histories of martyrdom. Probably it was only a seemingly good life that had so sad an end.

5. Death an opportunity for GOD to help His child.

Then, death is not infrequently an opportunity appointed by GOD for a private and special interview with His failing creature, sometimes to cheer, sometimes to punish, mercifully and yet severely.

How often the deathbed is thus a double one ! There is the visible deathbed with the priest and the physician and the friends around the sinking body, and there is with it the deathbed in the inner chamber of the soul, where the FATHER of all creatures is alone with His child—sometimes cheering and consoling and giving a foresight of the joyous reward which is so near ; at others afflicting the soul with fear as sins imperfectly repented of rise up to accuse it, and yet by that very affliction arousing penitence and so, often, saving such a soul.

There is one great danger which sometimes accompanies death, especially in these days ; namely, that

of dying among irreligious people, who from mistaken kindness (or more often from selfish cruelty) conceal from us the fact that we are dying.

We should be told gently but plainly that the end is approaching. Those who love us make a great sacrifice of themselves in telling us this. It is the kindest of all kindnesses, as the withholding of it is a very great cruelty and a very great sin. From this many a soul has been lost ; mothers are responsible for the loss of their children's souls, wives of those of their husbands, because to spare themselves the pain of speaking, or, as they persuaded themselves, fearing the risk of hastening death by agitation, they allowed their loved one to die without any opportunity of making peace with GOD.

A mortal sin, which has never been repented of and which has been almost forgotten, in the mercy of GOD may rise before us *when we know* we are dying, and we are enabled to make the act of contrition by which our eternity may be changed.

Many doubtless have owed their salvation to the love and kindness which gave them this opportunity of repentance at the last. Many, on the other hand, have been lost through the barbarous selfishness or irreligion which withheld from them the knowledge of the crisis through which they were passing.

A further danger comes from modern medical methods, in that the sufferer at the approach of death is often drugged, that he may escape the pains of death ; but in this way he is deprived of the precious moments of consciousness on which his state in eternity sometimes depends.

It would be well in cases of serious illness for us to give distinct instructions that we shall be warned of the approach of death, and that we shall not be robbed of

6. Danger of our condition being concealed from us.

The responsibility of telling the dying of their state.

Danger of being drugged at the time of death.

Such dangers should be provided against.

our consciousness by drugs given to ease our pain. That very pain may be part of the debt of sin which God in mercy allows us to pay in this world, and which, if not paid, may involve far greater suffering in Purgatory.

IV. These considerations enforce the need of preparation for death.

All these considerations, however, lead to the one simple conclusion that we ought not to put off our preparation for death until we are face to face with our foe. In many ways we may not then have the strength or the opportunity rightly to prepare to die. We should therefore be always prepared, or preparing.

Elements of preparation :  
1. A knowledge of GOD and of His revelation ;

Let us notice here some elements of this preparation. First, we need to know much about GOD and His revelation to man before we enter His presence. We must therefore take pains to be instructed in these matters, and must not be content, as so many are, with any sort of religion, but must be certain that we hold the Catholic Faith.

2. conquest of the besetting sin ;

Secondly, we need really to conquer our besetting sin. We shall be in no condition to struggle against it on our deathbed, unless we have really striven to overcome it while in health and strength.

3. habits of prayer ;

Thirdly, we must learn habits of prayer in preparation for death. How sad to see a dying man who does not know how to pray !

4. Sacraments received with right dispositions.

Lastly, it is necessary to receive the Sacraments with right dispositions of heart ; therefore they should not be neglected and left until the hour of death.

5. What is to be desired for a good death.

In order to obtain a good death we should pray that it may be perfectly in accordance with the Will of GOD as to time, place, and circumstances ; that we may retain reason and memory to the last ; and that we may have a priest, and the consolations of the Church (but this as GOD wills) ; and, lastly, that we may die in the Faith of the Church.

We come now to consider the act of death itself, and may reverently ask, what takes place at that moment, when the last struggle is over and the heart-strings have snapped, and the soul, freed from the trammels of the body, is in the presence of God.

V. What takes place at the moment after death ?

The answer which many theologians give us is that at that moment we see our LORD face to face and are judged by Him. These two things may be but one, for probably in that first sight of the glorious Face of our LORD we shall read our sentence, and shall be ravished with love of Him Whose glory and beauty absolutely fascinate and overwhelm. If we are lost, the recollection of that Vision will be our continual torment throughout eternity. If we are saved, it will be eventually our never-ending happiness ; but first, in its revelation to us of our sinfulness and imperfection it becomes the instrument of our purification.

We see our LORD and are judged by Him.

At the moment of death, then, the *particular* Judgment of the soul takes place. This is entirely distinct from the *general* Judgment at the Last Day, and of the differences between them we shall treat more fully in the chapter on the Judgment.

The particular Judgment differs from that of the Last Day.

The evidence of the fact of a particular Judgment rests partly on revelation, but more, perhaps, upon the necessities of thought. Inasmuch as the soul is not unconscious between the moment of death and the time of resurrection, it must pass either into a place of happiness or of torment ; but this necessitates a judgment.

The evidence of the particular Judgment rests on the necessities of thought,

Our LORD reveals to us these two conditions of the soul before the Day of Judgment in the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus. And in His words to the Penitent Thief He speaks of a place of happiness where the thief shall be with Him, and calls it Paradise ;

and on revelation.

while in Acts i. 25 we are told that Judas went "to his own place," evidently meaning a place of woe.

In some of the visions of S. John in the Apocalypse we have evidence of the presence of souls in Heaven before the day of the general Judgment. Hence the fact of the particular Judgment of the soul at the moment of death is a necessary inference, and is certainly the teaching of the Church.

The fact is "de  
fide."

Different  
opinions as to  
the details.

When, however, we come to the details of this Judgment, we find some differences of opinion. While the majority probably considers that our LORD Himself in His Incarnate Nature is the Judge, since the FATHER "hath committed all judgment unto the SON" (S. John v. 22), yet there are others who object to this on the ground that the particular Judgment of many generations of souls preceded the Incarnation.

As regards the details of this Judgment nothing, of course, can be of faith. The most probable opinion is that it is effected by an internal illumination of the mind, by which the soul sees itself, and clearly apprehends itself to be judged according to its works.

Commonly  
held that it  
takes place at  
the moment of  
death, and in  
the place  
where one dies.

The most common opinion is that this Judgment takes place in the very instant of death and in the place in which the person dies. Some have thought that it is somewhat more formal than we have described, and that the Guardian Angel of the soul, and the devil are present and act as accusers; and all agree that the sentence is immediately executed.

After this Judg-  
ment, the soul  
passes into  
Heaven, Hell,  
or Purgatory.

If the soul be lost, it descends at once to Hell. If it be saved, and be entirely free from all stain of sin and imperfection, it passes immediately to the Beatific Vision of GOD in Heaven. If it be saved, but still have some remains of sin to expiate, it enters a state of purification, which is generally known as Purgatory.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

**A**T the close of the last chapter we very briefly stated that after the particular Judgment the souls of the dead enter one of three states—those who are lost passing into everlasting punishment in Hell; those who are saved, and are free from all stain of sin, being admitted to the Beatific Vision in Heaven; while those who are saved, but are not yet entirely cleansed from the remains of sin, are detained in an intermediate state of purification.

Introductory :  
On the state of  
the soul after  
death.

There are many questions in regard to each of these states which demand careful discussion, and we shall therefore consider them *seriatim*.

The first is the question, Where are the dead, and what is their condition between the moment of death and the day of the final Judgment? The question is of supreme interest to every one, and the number of works on the subject which have lately been published bears witness to its importance. The majority of these books, however, is occupied with more or less original theories, which have little or no claim to theological authority. Many of them, indeed, teach probation after death, or deny the doctrine of everlasting punishment, and so plainly conflict with what is *de fide* in the teachings of the Church.

I. Where are  
the dead, and  
what is their  
condition?

In this place we shall simply discuss various opinions

which have been held in the Church, and set forth those views which seem to be supported by the greatest authority.

To this three answers are possible :

To the question, Where are the souls of the dead ? it is evident that for those who believe in a future life three answers are possible.

First, these souls may pass the period between the moment of death and the Day of Judgment in unconscious slumber.

Second, they may go direct to Heaven or to Hell.

Third, they may enter an intermediate state of purification.

1. They sleep in unconscious slumber : An early heresy,

The first opinion was taught by some heretical sects, called Thnetopsychitæ, in the second and third centuries. Tertullian and Origen called attention to this " soul-sleep," only to reject it.

revived in the Middle Ages among the Armenians ;

The doctrine has reappeared from time to time among individuals and among some sects, as the Armenians. Those who held it were called Psychopannychians or Hypnopsychitæ.

and at the Reformation by the Anabaptists ; held by Luther ;

In the Reformation age the Anabaptists resuscitated this error, and Luther seems to have adopted it, at least in a modified form, for in a letter to Amsdorf, written in 1522, he says : " I am inclined to agree with you in the view that the souls of the righteous sleep, and do not know where they are until the Judgment Day." In our own times we find a tendency among the Irvingites to hold this view.

and by the Irvingites.

It has always been condemned by the Church, and is contrary to Holy Scripture.

The Church has always condemned this opinion, and it is plainly contrary to the teaching of Holy Scripture. For if the soul continues in unconscious slumber until the Day of Judgment, how could the Penitent Thief know " to-day " that he was with CHRIST, and what consolation would there have been in our LORD'S

promise, if both were unconscious? (S. Luke xxiii. 43.) How could Dives recognize Lazarus, and think of his five brethren still living in the world? (S. Luke xvi. 22 sqq.) How could CHRIST preach to the spirits in prison (1 S. Pet. iii. 19), or how could the souls "under the altar" have "cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O LORD, holy and true," etc.? (Rev. vi. 10.)

This view is so untenable that it is amazing that thoughtful men could ever have adopted it.

The second view, that all souls go directly to Heaven or Hell, is held by the greater number of Protestants, but it conflicts both with the teachings of Scripture and the conclusions of reason. For our LORD promised the dying thief, "To-day shalt thou be with Me in Paradise," but He did not ascend with His glorified Body into Heaven until forty-three days later.

2. All souls at death go immediately to heaven or hell. This too conflicts with both Holy Scripture

In the Epistle to the Hebrews we are told that the Saints of the Old Covenant "received not the promise: GOD having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect" (Heb. xi. 39, 40). That is, *they* did not enter Heaven until by our LORD'S triumph all humanity received the promise.

Then again, this view seems to be contrary to the conclusions of reason, for we are told that nothing imperfect can enter Heaven, and that without holiness no man can see the LORD, and yet it is a matter of experience that the majority depart out of this life very imperfect.

and reason;

We must, therefore, either believe that death itself (or something which takes place at the moment of death) is the greatest of all Sacraments, and has power to work an instantaneous revolution in the condition of the soul, so that by its agency the soul is cleansed from all traces of sin; or else we must condemn the

unless death itself has wonderful cleansing power.



enormous majority of the human race to eternal perdition. It is true that some Protestants have supposed such a cleansing to be effected at the moment of death by a special application of the Precious Blood, but this view has no support in Holy Scripture or in the teaching of the Church.

Besides, death directly affects only the body, and although separating it from the soul, so far as we know it has no power to work any change in the soul.

3. Souls not yet perfect at death enter an intermediate state of purification; this the view of the great majority of Christians.

The only admissible opinion, therefore, is that the souls of the faithful departed who are not yet perfect enter an intermediate state of purification; and this, indeed, is held by the immense majority of Christians.

For although the Greek Church *nominally* does not recognize an intermediate state, it practically regards Hell as including what the Westerns understand by Purgatory. Of this we shall treat later.

And in the present day, even among the sects, we find an increasing tendency to believe in a Purgatory of some sort or other. For example, among the Lutherans Oertel, Rudloff, Rothe, Dorner, Kahnis, Martensen, Clausen, and others, while obliged by their own "confession of faith" to reject most of the teachings which make Purgatory reasonable, still hold that "the doctrine of Purgatory has a sound kernel which remains after all that they consider to be shell has been removed." \*

II. What is the relation of the intermediate state to time and space?

If we now take the third opinion (that there is an intermediate state, in which the souls who have departed this life in grace, but with the remains of sin, are detained and purified) the first question that suggests itself is, What is the relation of this state to time and space?

\* Dahle, p. 212.

Is there any time in the Intermediate State? The answer to this must be certainly in the affirmative. A duration which has a beginning and an end is time, and these certainly are properties possessed by the Intermediate State, for in the case of the individual it begins at his death, and in the case of all ends at or before the Judgment Day.

Moreover, it runs parallel with the history of God's Kingdom on earth, which through all its course moves in time. It is, therefore, incorrect to say of the dead that *they have entered into eternity*, and Holy Scripture certainly never says so.

It is not less certain that, so far as the Intermediate State is concerned, there is a warrant for speaking of space. Every creature, whether spirit or body, must necessarily occupy its distinct place in space. Only God is independent of space.

Again, it is absolutely impossible to imagine any change which does not take place in both time and space. When anything is modified or altered in form its different parts necessarily come to occupy other positions in space than previously.

We are quite ignorant regarding how much space a human soul requires, or with what celerity it moves from place to place, but this is a different question from the fact that such souls have a relation to space.

Some people think that we have no warrant for speaking of the *place of abode* of disembodied souls, because their nature is supposed to exclude any determination of locality. This, however, is not so, and Scripture clearly shows it, for it speaks of the rich man seeing the soul of Lazarus "afar off" in Abraham's bosom, of Judas as going "to his own place," and of our LORD as going to preach to the spirits "in prison."

Hence, in our discussion of the Intermediate State we shall assume that it has an existence in time and space.

**III. Three views of the intermediate state.**

**1. The view of the Greek Church.**

**i. The doctrine of the telonies or particular Judgment.**

While a belief in an intermediate state is held by the great majority of Christians, and in some form or other by the whole Church, yet we find at least three distinct views in regard to it.

There is first the view of the Greek Church. This is so peculiar and so little known in our Church that it may be useful to describe it at some length. In order to do so we must go back to the particular Judgment of the soul, which the Greek Church teaches in common with the rest of Catholic Christendom.

The Western Church, as we have seen, asserts only the fact of the particular Judgment, and does not dogmatize in regard to the details, its theologians giving as the most probable opinion that it is effected by an internal illumination of the mind, by which the soul sees itself, and clearly apprehends itself to be judged according to its works. The Greek Church on the other hand elaborates a theory of judgment which is generally known as "the Telonies" (*τελώνια*), and which is found in substance in a sermon of S. Cyril of Alexandria on the Exodus of the Soul, ordinarily bound up in Greek prayer-books.

This theory may be stated as follows. At the moment when the soul departs from the body it finds itself in the presence of two great armies of spirits, on the one side the hosts of the powers of light, on the other those of the powers of darkness, the evil spirits who rule this world.

These hosts are the officers of the celestial custom-house (*τελώνιον*), to whom is committed the duty of examining and laying bare our works. At the sight

of these officers of Judgment the soul trembles, groans, and in consternation and affright seeks the protection of the Angels of God; but, although received and protected by the Holy Angels, it meets, in traversing ethereal space on its way heavenward, different telonies, like barriers where merchandise is searched and duties exacted. These barriers obstruct the royal highway and arrest the soul in its flight.

At each of these there is demanded of it an account of certain sins : at the first, of sins committed by the mouth and tongue ; at the second, of sins of sight ; at the third, of sins of hearing ; at the fourth, of sins of smell ; at the fifth, of all kinds of sins committed by the hands.

At other barriers the examination discloses successively other sins, such as malice, hatred, envy, vanity, pride. In a word, each passion, each sin has its own telony, its own officers and individual searchers.

The good and evil Angels both assist at this examination. The good Angels search for the virtues of the soul, while the evil spirits examine it with respect to every kind of sin which man can commit. The scrutiny over, the soul is either condemned and loaded with fetters, or acquitted and its chains knocked off ; for each sin has its own special fetter.

If the soul be justified, accompanied by the Holy Angels and freed from all further fear it wings its way direct to the Heavenly Kingdom. If, on the other hand, it be condemned, it hears a terrible voice, "Away with the wretch ! he shall not see the glory of the LORD" (Is. xxvi. 10, LXX. vers.). Abandoned by the Angels of God it is seized by frightful demons, and bound with everlasting chains it is precipitated into the regions of darkness.

Three principal points of the Greek view.

From this Macarius draws the following conclusions.

First, that the telonies represent the process by which all souls, whether good or evil, pass from this life to their eternal destination.

Secondly, that in passing these different telonies the soul is examined with searching severity (and probably under the eye of the Judge Himself, from Whom nothing is hid) with respect to all its works done in the body, whether good or evil.

Thirdly, that as a result of these examinations the holy souls, having successfully passed through all the scrutinies, are transported by the Angels of God to the joys of Paradise, while the souls of sinners, having been unable to endure the scrutiny in regard to some one or more sins, at the sentence of the Invisible Judge are dragged by the devils into their abode in Hell.

Thus we see that the telonies are none other than the particular Judgment which our LORD Himself invisibly passes on the souls of men through the agency of the Holy Angels. To this He summons as accusers of the brethren the evil spirits, and it results in a definite condition being assigned to the soul.

ii. Extracts from the Orthodox Confession.

In the Orthodox Confession of Peter Mogilas we are told that "neither the just nor the wicked receive the full recompense of their deeds before the final Judgment, nor are they all in one state, nor limited to one place" (*Conf. Orth.*, Quest. 61).

And again: "As the souls do not all go out of this life in the same degree of Divine grace, so neither after their departure are they in one and the same degree of happiness" (Quest. 62).

"Of those who depart hence under the wrath of GOD, some after the last Judgment will be punished

with greater, some with lesser torments, but both will be without end" (Quest. 63).

"Nevertheless it is certain that many sinners are freed from the chains of Hades, not by their own repentance or confession, . . . but for the good works and alms of the living, and for the prayers of the Church made in their behalf, and chiefly for the sake of the Unbloody Sacrifice which the Church daily offers up for the living and the dead. . . . It is clear that after this separation the soul can no more perform penance, nor do any other works whereby it might be freed from the chains of Hades; therefore only the Sacrifices, the prayers and alms which are performed by the living, for their sakes, do comfort and greatly benefit the souls, and free them from the bonds of Hades" (Quest. 64).

"We are therefore taught by the Holy Scripture and the exposition of this Father [Theophylact] that we ought by all means to pray for the departed, to offer the Unbloody Sacrifice for them, and to dispense our alms with a liberal hand, seeing they can no more perform these good works for themselves" (Quest. 65).

We are now in a position to form a tolerably accurate view of the teachings of the Greek Church in regard to the condition of souls after they depart from the body.

We find that they hold a very elaborate theory of a particular Judgment at which Angels, both good and evil, assist, and that they teach that only those souls which are found to be entirely free from the stain of every sin are admitted into the presence of GOD in Heaven.

They consign all other souls without distinction to Hell, to the place of torment, to the devil and his angels; but they teach that there are certain of these souls which may be released from this place of torment,

iii. Summary  
of the Greek  
view.

not by anything they can do or suffer themselves, but by the prayers and good works of their friends in the Church on earth.

They do not teach that *any* soul can thus be freed from eternal punishment, but that only "those who before leaving this present life have repented, but have not had time to 'bring forth fruits meet for repentance,' such as prayer, contrition, almsgiving, and other acts inspired by the love of God and of their neighbour, have still a possibility of obtaining an alleviation of their sufferings, and even a complete liberation from the chains of Hell." \*

iv. The Greek view compared with the Western theory of Purgatory. The differences are two:

(1) As to the cause of the suffering;

(2) as to the manner of relief.

Moral difficulties of the Greek view.

This, of course, as Macarius admits, is *practically* the Western doctrine of Purgatory with some differences. These differences are chiefly in regard to the cause of the sufferings, and the manner in which those sufferings are relieved.

First, the Western doctrine represents the sufferings of Purgatory as the temporal punishment of sin, due to the Justice of God; while the East makes the sufferings depend upon the fact that while the soul began really to do penance, it had not time to complete its works of penance before God called it from earth.

Secondly, the Western doctrine teaches that while all the souls in Purgatory sooner or later enter Heaven, they may be helped in their work of purification and satisfaction by the prayers of the Church on earth. The Easterns, however, teach that the soul must remain in Hell for eternity, unless it have the good fortune to be released by the prayers of its friends in the Church on earth.

The comparison of the differences between the Eastern and Western doctrines of Purgatory not only

\* Macarius, vol. II., p. 103.

strongly inclines one to the Western view, but fills one with amazement that the Eastern Church can hold a doctrine so immoral and so derogatory to the Justice of GOD as that which is taught in their catechism and works of dogmatic theology.

For in the first difference to which Macarius calls attention, the Easterns teach that the loss of the soul may be caused by GOD's calling it from this world before it had time to *complete* its works of penance, even though it has really turned to GOD in penitence ; thus making GOD responsible for the soul's loss by summoning it before Him at a disadvantageous moment.

The Westerns, on the other hand, teach that the moment of death is decided by the Love of GOD, and is the moment when it is best for each one to die. The soul turning to GOD in penitence, even at the very last moment of its life, will be saved, because GOD will give it the opportunity in Purgatory of *completing* what is left unfinished of its penitence.

The second difference shows the Eastern doctrine to be still more immoral, for it makes the salvation of one who has begun to repent, but has had the misfortune to die before completing his works of penance, depend, not on GOD's Justice or Mercy, but on the condition that some charitably disposed friends on earth offer prayers and Masses for him.

If, however, he does not happen to have any such friends, then he must, apparently, be lost for eternity ; except in so far as the prayers which the Church offers for all the souls in torment may be applied to his case.

As Moehler remarks in his *Symbolik*, the doctrine of Purgatory flows necessarily from right views of GOD's essential Justice and of the method by which He justifies man.

Purgatory flows necessarily from right views of justification.



Rejected by Luther, because in conflict with his theory of imputed justice.

Luther rejected the doctrine of Purgatory because, with his theory of righteousness imputed by a legal fiction to a sinner who was altogether unrighteous, there could be no need of purification; since the condition of the sinner's entrance into Heaven (where, *according to revelation*, nothing unholy or imperfect can enter) was not that he should be holy, but that the merits of CHRIST should be imputed to him.

The Easterns reject it rather in theory than in practice.

The Easterns, on the other hand, while teaching that the soul must indeed be made holy before entering Heaven, reject in terms, (though perhaps not so much in practice,) any possibility of the sinner's making satisfaction by temporal suffering to the Justice of GOD. And although they require, fully as much as the Westerns, worthy fruits of penitence, and teach that souls may be lost for lack of them, yet they are unable to assign any adequate reason why these fruits of penitence should be so essential.

2. The view of those who deny that the souls of the saints are in Heaven.

The next view of the Intermediate State which claims our attention is one which is held in the present day, chiefly by a small body of men who may be said to constitute a school in the Anglican Communion. Starting from the assumption that no souls can pass into Heaven, that is, into the Beatific Vision, before the Day of Judgment, they call the Intermediate State "Paradise," and in it place all the faithful dead. They divide it into departments, so to speak, to some assigning the greatest Saints, to others those who are only just saved, but allowing to none the sight of the Beatific Vision until after the Day of Judgment.

1. Not a modern error; Pope John XXII. its most celebrated adherent.

This is not a modern error; indeed, there have been traces of it in almost all ages; but it was reserved for a Bishop of Rome, Pope John XXII., who died in the year 1334, to promulgate it in the form of a definite

doctrine. On All Saints' Day, 1331, Pope John XXII. preached a sermon in which he said that the Saints would not enjoy the Beatific Vision of the HOLY TRINITY until after the Last Day. This sermon created a great stir among theologians, and the Pope earnestly pressed his side of the question, labouring to influence the opinion of divines by heaping preferment on those who agreed with him.

History of the controversy.

At the beginning his old Franciscan opponents Michael of Cesena, Bona Gratia, and William of Occam eagerly raised the cry of heresy, and the celebrated Durandus a S. Porciano, with many others, joined them. The doctrine was opposed by the Dominicans, and the Italian cardinals threatened to bring the Pope before a general council.

The question was preferred by Philip of Valois, King of France, before the theological faculty of Paris. The doctrine was condemned by the Doctors of the Sorbonne, who, however, suggested that perhaps the Pope might have propounded it only by way of a doubt or difficulty, and this loophole was eagerly used by John, who declared that he had only intended to state the opinion, not to decide in favour of it.

There was little doubt, however, that he continued to hold it, and the excitement burst out afresh. At last on his deathbed John was brought (chiefly, it is said, by the urgency of his nephew Cardinal Bertrand de Poyet) to profess the Catholic doctrine that "purged souls, being separated from their bodies, are in the Kingdom of Heaven and Paradise; that they see God face to face, and clearly behold the Divine Essence, in so far as the condition of separate souls permits." \* The story of the retractation has, however, been ques-

\* Mansi, XXV. 569; Baron., *Annal.*, tom. XXIV., p. 485.

tioned.\* John died the day after having made this declaration, at the age of ninety years.

If, therefore, the adherents of this view are unable, as we hope to show, to support it by Scriptural testimony, they can at least claim for it the authority of a Pope of doubtful orthodoxy.

ii. Three objections to the Catholic view.

The holders of this opinion that the Saints are not now enjoying the Beatific Vision, and that Paradise is really Purgatory, object to the Catholic view on three grounds.

First, that the soul without the body cannot enter Heaven, because without the body the soul is imperfect, and nothing imperfect can enter there.

Secondly, that if the Saints are in Heaven, this renders the Judgment of the Last Day purposeless.

And thirdly, that our LORD said to the thief on the cross: "Verily I say unto thee, To day shalt thou be with Me in Paradise," thus showing that Paradise is the Intermediate State. We will consider these objections in order.

(1) The first objection, that the soul without the body cannot enter heaven, is a mere assumption,

To the objection, that the soul without the body cannot enter Heaven, because it is imperfect, three replies may be made.

First, that the *soul* does not depend for *its* perfection upon the body. The proposition would be true if it asserted that human nature is imperfect without the body; and both the Eastern and Western Churches recognize and teach that there is an increment of happiness and glory after the Last Day, when the body, reunited to the soul, shares its bliss in Heaven.

conflicting with the teaching of the Church,

Secondly, it is *de fide* that the souls of the Saints are in Heaven, since it is taught alike by the East and the West.

\* Giesel., II. iii. 61.

Thirdly, Holy Scripture shows us that there are souls in Heaven.

and with Holy  
Scripture :

For, first, S. John tells us that he saw in Heaven "four and twenty elders sitting, clothed in white raiment ; and they had on their heads crowns of gold " (Rev. iv. 4).

Rev. iv. 4 :

And again, in the next chapter he tells us that these elders " sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof : for Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to GOD by Thy Blood " (Chap. v. 9).

Rev. v. 9.

Some commentators take these twenty-four elders as representing symbolically the twenty-four books of the Old Testament. But this interpretation is full of difficulty, for the books of the Old Testament, even if we confine them to the protocanonical books, are not twenty-four, but thirty-nine. And if it be arbitrarily claimed (as is sometimes done) that the four major prophets and the twelve minor prophets together form but two books, it may be replied that there is much more reason for counting the first and second books of Samuel as one book, or the first and second of Kings, or of Chronicles, since in each case they had but one author, while in the case of the prophets there were no less than sixteen different authors.

Objections to  
these texts  
considered.

There are, however, far more serious difficulties to be met by the supporters of this interpretation. For while it is not easy to understand the symbolism by which the books of the Old Testament are clothed in white raiment and have on their heads crowns of gold, it seems absolutely impossible to conceive that they can describe themselves as redeemed by the Blood of the Lamb.

The conclusion, therefore, seems to follow necessarily

that human souls, and human souls only, can here be meant, inasmuch as it was for them alone (so far as we know) that CHRIST died.

Some, however, would answer to this that the Book of Revelation is largely prophetical, and that what S. John saw was to take place in the future. This does not affect the argument very much. Even if the scene be prophetical, it comes in any case before the Day of Judgment, which S. John describes towards the end of the Book of Revelation; and the whole contention of those who hold the opinion we are discussing is that no souls can enter Heaven until after they have been reunited to their bodies, that is, until the Last Day.

Rev. vi. 9-11.

If we pass to the next chapter we have an even stronger statement, for there S. John says: "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the Word of GOD, and for the testimony which they held: and they cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O LORD, holy and true, dost Thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth? And white robes were given unto every one of them" (Chap. vi. 9-11). Here S. John distinctly says that he saw the souls of the martyrs, to whom white robes were given.

(2) Answer to the second objection, that the Catholic view renders the judgment at the Last Day purposeless.

The second objection which we have to meet is that, if the Saints are in Heaven, the general Judgment is purposeless.

The reply to this is that it is at the particular Judgment, at the moment of death, that the state of the soul is forever settled. This is the teaching of both East and West, and is made evident by our LORD's parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, where the rich man is already in torments—in Hell, for Abraham says, "Be-

tween us and you there is a great gulf fixed," and that it cannot be passed, which would not be true of *any* view of Purgatory.

And further, the purpose of the general Judgment would seem to be, not so much the decision of the destiny of the soul, as the manifestation of GOD's Justice to all the world. This, however, will be more fully considered when we treat of the subject of the general Judgment.

The third and last objection which the holders of this opinion advance is drawn from our LORD's words to the Penitent Thief upon the cross. The thief said, "LORD, remember me when Thou comest into Thy Kingdom. And JESUS said unto him, Verily I say unto thee, To day shalt thou be with Me in Paradise" (S. Luke xxiii. 42, 43).

(3) Answer to the third objection, drawn from the words of our LORD to the penitent thief.

Here there seems at first sight to be some ground for thinking that Paradise must be the Intermediate State, and not Heaven ; since our LORD on the next day was in the place of departed spirits, and did not ascend into Heaven until forty-three days later.

The explanation seems to be that Paradise is to be with CHRIST. The promise to the thief was not merely that he should be in Paradise, but "be *with Me* in Paradise." And when our LORD rose from the dead He broke asunder the bars of death and brought forth the "prisoners of hope," taking them with Him to Heaven. Some even suppose that the cloud which at the Ascension received Him out of sight consisted of the souls of the patriarchs of the Old Covenant, ascending with Him. And if to be in Paradise is to be with CHRIST, Paradise must be the same as Heaven, since our LORD is locally there, and there only.

S. Paul speaks of being "caught up to the Third

S. Paul's use of  
the word  
Paradise.

Heaven " and being " caught up into Paradise " (2 Cor. xii. 2 and 4), where the terms " Paradise " and " the Third Heaven " are generally, considered synonymous, and Paradise certainly to imply the Vision of God.

And we must remember that no text of Holy Scripture, referring to the condition of the Saints of the Old Testament before our LORD's Ascension, can fairly be applied to the condition of the Saints since that event.

iii. The Catho-  
lic view  
accords  
with Holy  
Scripture.

Having now shown that these three objections are unscriptural, let us point out how exactly in accord with Holy Scripture is the Catholic view that the Saints are in Heaven.

Our LORD  
locally in  
Heaven only.

At the risk of repetition it must be emphatically asserted that it is *de fide* that our LORD is locally sitting at the right hand of GOD the FATHER in Heaven, and is locally there only. Even His Presence in the Blessed Sacrament, while absolutely real, is a sacramental Presence, and supralocal. And while the substance of the Divinity is omnipresent, we must bear in mind that the Sacred Humanity of our LORD is not ubiquitous; the theory of its ubiquity being a Lutheran heresy, formally condemned.

The theory of  
the ubiquity of  
His Humanity  
a Lutheran  
heresy.

Further Scrip-  
ture proof:

With this statement let us examine some additional texts which throw light on the condition of the Saints.

2 Cor. v. 8;

(1) " We are confident . . . and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the LORD " (2 Cor. v. 8). Here, to be absent from the body is evidently equivalent to being present with the LORD; and we have a similar expression in the words " Having a desire to depart, and to be with CHRIST; which is far better " (Phil. i. 23).

Phil. i. 23;

We have shown that CHRIST is only in Heaven. " To be with CHRIST," therefore, must mean " to be in Heaven."

(2) In Phil. ii. 10 we have the statement that "at the Name of JESUS every knee should bow, of things in Heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth," and in Rev. v. 13 the song of the Lamb is uttered by "every creature which is in Heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth." Phil. ii. 10;  
Rev. v. 13.

In both these passages, written by different Apostles, we have the same threefold division of the Church, under exactly the same terms, in Heaven, in earth, and under the earth—representing the Church Triumphant in Heaven, which consists of the Angels and the blessed Saints; the Church Militant on earth; and under the earth the Church Expectant.

It is quite impossible to refer the phrase "under the earth" to the devils, as some (though very few) have attempted to do; because the devils will not join in the triumph-song of the Lamb, and this is distinctly said of those under the earth.

"Under the earth," then, is a description of the Intermediate State, where the holy souls are waiting until their purification is accomplished and they are made perfect. Heaven is the place where "the spirits of just men made perfect," that is, of the Saints, behold the Vision of God.

If we turn from the testimony of the Bible to that of the Fathers of the Church, the evidence on the Catholic side is overwhelming.

The only writers who seem to question the fruition of the Saints are Tertullian, Victorinus, Bishop of Pettau, Lactantius, and perhaps Irenæus. But Tertullian was a heretic; of Victorinus, S. Jerome says he was unlearned; and of Lactantius, Bishop Bull states that he was more of a rhetorician than a theologian, and that his want of learning led him into serious and

iv. The teaching of the Fathers. Only four writers of antiquity seem to question it.



absurd errors. Indeed, we generally find him on the wrong side in theological questions.

Authorities for  
the Catholic  
view.

On the other side we have Ignatius, Justin Martyr, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Cyril of Jerusalem, Cyril of Alexandria, Epiphanius, Theodoret, Eusebius, John Damascene, Theophylact, Cyprian, Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, Leo the Great, Anselm, Bernard, and many others.

S. Gregory the  
Great discusses  
the subject in  
his Dialogues.

Let us quote from one. We find in the Dialogues of S. Gregory the Great (book IV., chap. xxv.), the following. The pupil Peter says : " I am well pleased at what you say ; but I would gladly know whether before the Resurrection of the flesh the souls of the just are received into Heaven ? "

S. Gregory replies : " We can neither affirm nor deny this of the souls of the just *en masse*. For there are souls of the righteous kept out of the heavenly kingdom, for what reason, except that they are not yet perfected ! But nevertheless, it is clearer than day (*lucèdarius constat*) that the souls of just men made perfect after that they are delivered from their carnal prisons are immediately received to their heavenly places. Which the very Truth Himself attests when He saith, ' wheresoever the body is, there will the eagles be gathered together,' because where our Redeemer Himself is in Body, there without any doubt will the souls of the just be gathered together.

" Moreover, Paul desired to be dissolved and to be with CHRIST. Whoever then does not doubt that CHRIST is in Heaven, neither let him deny that the soul of Paul is in Heaven (*esse in cælo neget*). " It would be difficult to find anything more unanswerable or more to the point.

In conclusion we may observe that the practice of the supporters of the view we are now discussing is better than their theory, as they would probably have no hesitation in singing on All Saints' Day the glorious hymn of Bishop Wordsworth (A. and M., No. 436) :

v. The inconsistency of the adherents of the "Paradise" theory in using certain hymns.

" Now they reign in heavenly glory, now they walk in golden light,  
Now they drink, as from a river, holy bliss and infinite;  
Love and peace they taste forever, and all truth and knowledge see  
In the Beatific Vision of the Blessed TRINITY."

And also Hymn No. 234 :

" O Paradise ! O Paradise !  
Who doth not crave for rest ?  
Who would not seek the happy land  
Where they that loved are blest ;  
Where loyal hearts and true  
Stand ever in the light,  
All rapture through and through  
In God's most holy sight ? "

It is not a little inconsistent for those who would make Paradise to be practically the same as Purgatory, to sing such words as these, and yet we never hear any objections to their use in the services of the Church.

In the dense ignorance of the early days of the Catholic Revival there was great need to plead for the recognition of an intermediate state in which there was some sort of purification or development. In order, however, to avoid offense and to gain adherents to such a doctrine it was important to make it differ as much as possible from the teaching of the Church of Rome, and hence the distinction was loudly insisted on,—that it was not the doctrine of Purgatory but of

A cause of the adoption of this view by some of the Tractarians.

Paradise which was taught, and that the word, "Paradise" was to be found in the Bible, although, as we have shown, not quite in the sense in which it is used by the advocates of this theory.

vi. Summary of authorities for and against this view.

We may sum up our examination of this opinion by saying that it is not the teaching of the English Church in any of her formularies, nor of her earlier theologians; nor is it the teaching of the Roman Church, nor of the Greek Church, nor of the Protestant schismatics, but only of a comparatively small body of men, headed by Pope John XXII.; and though in a sense it may thus be called Papal, it is certainly not scriptural, and contradicts the explicit teaching of both East and West.

It is "*de fide*" that the saints are in Heaven.

It must be clearly understood, however, that the point which we are discussing now is only whether the Saints are in Heaven, and that in saying that their present enjoyment of the Beatific Vision is *de fide* we are not including under this term any views whatever in regard to the Intermediate State.

3. The faithful departed are divided into two classes: the blessed saints in heaven;

In regard, then, to the souls of the faithful departed, theology divides them into two classes.

First, the blessed Saints, who have been made perfect and have attained to the Beatific Vision (although—as S. Thomas and others point out—after the Resurrection there will be for these an increment of their bliss, when the glorified body is reunited to the soul).

and the holy souls in Purgatory.

Secondly, the holy souls, who, having died in CHRIST, but not yet being made perfect, are in a state of purification or purgation.

Objection to this term;

There are many who, while quite accepting the fact that a soul which dies in grace may still need to receive purification in the Intermediate State, yet strongly deny that there is any such place as Purgatory. To such we can only confess an inability to see the

distinction between a "state of purification" and "Purgatory." The words seem to be of exactly the same meaning.

If, however, it be objected that Article XXII. protests against "the Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory," is it not just to the Church of Rome to point out that "the Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory," to which the Article refers, was a mediæval doctrine, condemned by the Roman Church at the Council of Trent quite as strongly as by the Church of England in this Article?

said to be inconsistent with Art. xxii.

Our Articles were adopted in their present form by synod in 1562, but Article XXII. "Of Purgatory" is the same as Article XXIII. of King Edward VI., put forth in the year 1552, with the exception that instead of the expression "the Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory" Edward VI.'s had "the doctrine of the school-authors."

History of the Article,

On the 3d and 4th of December, 1563, the Council of Trent at its twenty-fifth session discussed the question of Purgatory, and passed the following decree upon it: "That there is a Purgatory, and that the souls there detained are relieved by the suffrages of the faithful, but chiefly by the acceptable Sacrifice of the Altar." \*

and of the Tridentine definition,

This is now the only authoritative definition on the subject in the Roman Church, and was promulgated more than a year after our Articles were set forth by the Synod in their present form, and more than ten years after the Article had been drafted in its original form.

now the only authoritative teaching of the Roman Church on this subject.

It is therefore not too much to say that by no conceivable process of reasoning can it be concluded that our Article refers to a decree which was not in existence

No protest against the present Roman doctrine, and

\* *Conc. Trident.*, sess. xxv.

some doctrine of Purgatory is demanded by the language of the Article.

when it was written. Further, in protesting against "the Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory" the very words imply that there was a doctrine of Purgatory against which the Article did not protest.

A Protestant would protest against the *Romish* Church; an infidel against *the* Church. The Protestant, by his protest against "the Romish Church," implies his belief in some other Church; the infidel, in protesting against "the Church" without any limiting adjective, protests against Christianity altogether.

So, surely, if language means anything, is this the case in our Article. The protest against what it terms "the Romish doctrine" leaves untouched a doctrine which is not the Romish.

What was the "Romish" doctrine against which Art. xxii. is directed?

If we ask, then, what was this "Romish doctrine" against which the Article was directed, it is not at all difficult to answer the question. It was a mediæval corruption which was thought to invalidate the power of the Passion of CHRIST, which led to the most scandalous abuses, and against which the decree of the Council of Trent was as true a protest as our Article; for we must remember that the Council of Trent did effect very great reforms in the Roman Church.

Bp. Forbes describes it.

As Bishop Forbes, in his work on the Thirty-Nine Articles, remarks: "The doctrine of Purgatory, against which the Article excepts, is that which is made patent to the eye of every traveller as he passes from Germany into Italy. The wayside shrines which so edify him still continue, but the subjects are changed. In the place of the affecting representation of the sufferings of the Eternal Son . . . which speak[s] to the soul of the wayfarer, terrible representations of the holy souls in flames appal him . . . appealing for a few pence to the awakened sympathies of the passers by."

The popular doctrine thus symbolized prevailed in England at the time of the Reformation and probably had come in the case of most men to take the place of a living faith in the eternal pains of Hell.

It was also largely mingled with interested motives on the part of the Clergy. There was a shameful traffic in Masses for these souls, and men fancied that by leaving money to the Church at the hour of death, and at the expense of their heirs, they might purchase mitigation or exemption from pains which in degree, though not in duration, were said to equal the pains of Hell.

Very different from this is the wise reserve of the definition of Trent on this mysterious subject. It simply affirms that there is a state of purification, without attempting to dogmatize on it, and adds: "Let the more difficult and subtle questions, and those which tend not to edification and from which, for the most part, there is no increase of piety, be excluded from popular discourses before the uneducated multitude. But those things which tend to a certain kind of curiosity or superstition, or which savour of filthy lucre, let them prohibit as scandalous and stumbling-blocks of the faithful." \* Are not these words quite as strong a protest as our Article?

There are some who in their blind prejudice against everything that is Roman shut their eyes to these and many equally excellent teachings of the Council of Trent, which was for the Roman Church truly a reformation. Such prejudice, however, is surely not Christian, nor is it a mark of faith in the strength of one's own position to refuse to examine fairly the authoritative teaching on the other side, and to admit what is true and good in it.

\* *Conc. Trident.*, sess. xxv.

The wise reserve of Trent on this subject.

Its denunciation of the "Romish" same doctrine.

IV. The doctrine of Purgatory considered.

We are now in a position to approach the consideration of the third view, which is the Western dogma of Purgatory.

1. Its relation to the doctrine of justification.

This, as we have already intimated, is not an isolated doctrine, but flows from the Catholic teaching of justification, of which it will be well to give a brief review.

The Catholic doctrine of justification starts from a real belief in GOD's essential Justice and Holiness. Such a belief requires that in justifying man GOD should really make man what He declares him to be, just and holy.

The method of justification.

The method by which this justification is effected is the imparting of the righteousness of CHRIST through the Sacraments ; that is, the bestowal through this instrumentality of the gift of sanctifying grace. This act, however, involves the co-operation of the will of man, who must appropriate the gift through the exercise of a living faith, thus implying other necessary dispositions.

Sin has two effects, guilt and penalty. By infusion of grace, the guilt is removed and the eternal punishment remitted.

Sin always has two effects : guilt or the alienation of the soul from GOD, and penalty or punishment. The imparting of the righteousness of CHRIST or the infusion of grace blots out the guilt of sin, and remits the eternal punishment which is due to sin. But in the case of sin committed *after Baptism* sanctifying grace, while it removes the guilt and remits the eternal penalty, still leaves a debt of temporal punishment to be paid by the sinner.

The payment of this "debt" called "satisfaction."

The payment of this debt is called in theology "satisfaction,"\* and is the third part of penitence.

\* The relation of this satisfaction to the "full, perfect, and sufficient" satisfaction which our Lord made upon the Cross is treated at length in Volume I., pp. 196-201, to which the reader is referred.

This temporal penalty, which remains after the guilt of sin has been removed by penitence, is paid either in this life, or in Purgatory. It is paid most readily in this life, because, the will being free, actions done through the grace of CHRIST are meritorious. In Purgatory, however, there can be no merit, because, the will being fixed in perfect conformity to GOD's Will, there can be no possibility of temptation or sin.

The debt must be paid ; either in this life, or in Purgatory.

Hence, while we are in this life we have the power of making satisfaction (*satisfaciendi*) to the Justice of GOD. In Purgatory, however, we have only the power of suffering (*satispatiendi*) that Justice.

According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, all that is absolutely necessary for justification or salvation is a perfect act of contrition. This, however, involves certain consequences and fruits, having regard to the sinner's knowledge and opportunity.

All that is absolutely needful for salvation is an act of contrition,

Among these consequences may be reckoned paying the temporal penalty of sin, the eternal penalty having been remitted through our LORD'S Sacrifice on the Cross.

but this involves certain results.

This temporal penalty, as we have said, must ordinarily be paid either in this life, or in Purgatory ; although in some exceptional cases it may perhaps be remitted by the *ardor caritatis*. Hence we see that a belief in Purgatory is a necessary consequence of the Catholic doctrine of justification.

We may now ask, What is Purgatory ? Purgatory is a place and state in which the souls of the holy dead who have departed this life with some traces of sin remaining or with some temporal penalties still due are detained and suffer until, the remains of sin being removed and the debt paid, they are prepared to enter Heaven.

2. What is Purgatory ?



Distinguish between what is essential, and what speculative in this doctrine.

Here we may distinguish between what is essential in the doctrine of Purgatory, and what is mere matter of opinion. Two points are essential : that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls there detained can be helped by the prayers and good works of the Church on earth. All else belongs to the realm of speculative theology, and is therefore only matter of theological opinion.

3. Three effects of Purgatory :

The remains or stains of sin which are removed in Purgatory have been thought to be of three kinds.

in regard to venial sin,

First, venial sins which have not been remitted in this life, and these, according to S. Thomas and Suarez, are completely removed by a perfect act of love and contrition, made in the first moment *after* death.

evil habits,

Second, evil habits, which are likewise expelled immediately after death by acts of the opposite virtues.

temporal penalty.

Third, temporal punishment, which cannot be removed by meriting, or satisfying the Justice of God, since the time of merit has now passed ; but by endurance, or by the suffrages of the faithful on earth.

4. Three properties of the holy souls : they are confirmed in grace ;

The holy souls in Purgatory have three properties.

First, they are confirmed in grace ; so that there can be no further increase in grace, since GOD has given them all grace. Some, however, have thought that as the capacity for grace is increased by the removal of the remains of sin, more grace flows into the soul.

are conformed to GOD'S Will ;

Secondly, they are perfectly conformed to the Will of GOD ; that is, they cannot have one thought or wish contrary to GOD'S Will.

cannot merit.

Thirdly, they cannot merit, because they can no longer sin. Merit depends upon our having power to choose good or evil. In Purgatory there is no evil possible ; therefore the souls in Purgatory cannot merit, and because they cannot merit they cannot help

themselves, but must depend upon the suffrages of the Church on earth.

In regard to the sufferings of Purgatory nothing is certainly *de fide*, but there are two views among theologians.

The one, which chiefly prevailed in the middle ages, dwelt upon the severe aspect of Purgatory and seemed to delight in exaggerating its pains.

The other (which may, perhaps, be traced to S. Catharine of Genoa's celebrated treatise on Purgatory) has rather dwelt upon the joys and consolations of the holy souls in their preparation for Heaven, and is probably best known through the writings of S. Francis de Sales.

To the exaggerations of the earlier school undoubtedly are due many of the abuses connected with the doctrine of Purgatory, against which both our Article and the Council of Trent protested.

S. Catharine of Genoa, who died in the year 1510, says: "It would be impossible to find any joy comparable to that of a soul in Purgatory (except the joy of the Blessed in Paradise), a joy which goes on increasing day by day as GOD more and more flows in upon the soul, which He does abundantly in proportion as every hindrance to His entrance is consumed away."

Again she writes: "The souls in Purgatory, having their wills perfectly conformed to the Will of GOD, and hence partaking of His Goodness, remain satisfied with their condition, which is one of entire freedom from the guilt of sin."

When the question is asked, in what the purification of Purgatory consists, one must remember that in regard to this very little has been revealed.

First, it seems certain that the holy souls suffer the

5. Two views of the sufferings of Purgatory :

i. The mediæval view ;

ii. that of S. Catharine of Genoa and S. Francis de Sales.

8. Catharine of Genoa's opinion.

6. Nature of the sufferings of Purgatory ?

i. "Pœna damni."

pain of loss (*pæna damni*), since for a time they are shut out from the Vision of GOD.

Of the greatness of this suffering we can form but a slight conception. The holy souls know the beauty and glory of GOD, and long with all the intensity possible to their nature for the time when they can enjoy the Beatific Vision ; and yet so earnestly do they desire to be entirely cleansed from every trace of sin that they would not hasten that time by one moment.

ii. "*Pæna sensus*" only an opinion.

Secondly, it is commonly taught that in Purgatory the souls also suffer pain of sense (*pæna sensus*), and some speak of the *fires* of Purgatory. Many theologians, however, hold that this does not mean material fire, since it is difficult to understand how an immaterial substance can be affected by material fire, and the tendency in the present day is to consider this an open question.

iii. Duration of Purgatory.

Thirdly, of the duration of Purgatory nothing, of course, can be known. In each case it must depend upon the spiritual condition of the soul. But when the soul has been freed from all stain of sin and has paid the debt of temporal punishment, it at once enters Heaven and attains to the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision.

7. Consolations of Purgatory.

Purgatory, too, is not without its consolations, for the holy souls detained there rejoice in the knowledge that they are pleasing to GOD. It is generally supposed that the Angels, especially their Guardian Angels, are with them, ministering to them and helping them. The holy souls have, too, the knowledge that the Saints are praying for them, and they are also helped by the prayers of the faithful on earth. There is, moreover, a consolation which comes from GOD Himself, Who inspires the holy souls with a high

degree of faith and hope and love—virtues which produce perfect conformity to GOD'S Will, and therefore perfect resignation and patience.

In conclusion it may be remarked, without going into its history, that a belief in Purgatory is of very great antiquity.

Inscriptions are constantly found in the Catacombs containing prayers for the refreshment of the souls of the dead, which certainly imply a belief that they are in suffering.

We find also in all the most ancient liturgies, both of the East and the West, similar prayers for the repose and refreshment of the soul.

The doctrine of Purgatory, moreover, like all the dogmas of the Catholic Faith, is commended to us by its reasonableness, since it removes two of the great stumbling-blocks in the way of our conception of the Justice of GOD. For if two men die, one of whom has lived the life of a saint and spent his whole strength in GOD'S service and in doing good to his neighbour, while the other has neglected GOD, committed grievous sin and lived a life of selfish indulgence, and yet at the last has turned to GOD in penitence, and has been forgiven, as all are who repent,—if these two men are immediately to enter Heaven, and to receive the same reward, our ideas of GOD'S Justice are outraged, and such a doctrine seems to offer a premium on leaving repentance to the moment of death.

If, however, we accept the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory, the difficulty is removed; for this doctrine is founded on GOD'S absolute Justice and infinite Mercy. His Mercy is so great that He will pardon the guilt of sin, even upon the deathbed, if there be true repentance; but His Justice demands satisfaction and requires

#### V. Conclusion.

1. Antiquity of a belief in Purgatory.

i. Testimony of the Catacombs,

ii. and early liturgies.

2. It removes two great stumbling-blocks in regard to GOD'S Providence :  
i. The salvation of two men, one of whom has lived a godly life, the other has only turned to GOD at the last ;

that the penalty of sin should be endured. And since in the latter case this cannot be in this life, the debt must be paid in Purgatory.

Besides, suffering is not only punitive, but remedial. A man who has lived a life of sin has been weakened in various parts of his nature by that sin, and though GOD forgives its guilt, His forgiveness does not at once remove the weakness. GOD's forgiveness bestows grace ; and suffering, borne in the power of that grace, to a great extent effects the restoration of the moral nature.

II. the unequal distribution of suffering in this life.

Then again, the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory removes what to many is a still greater difficulty,—the unequal distribution of pain and suffering in this life.

The thought is often forced upon one, Why does this good man have so much to suffer, while that wicked man is so prosperous and happy ? The man who has striven all his life to serve GOD often meets with much trial and sorrow and pain, while the sinner goes down to his grave almost without a day's suffering. Even in the act of dying the earnest Christian has, perhaps, a most painful death, while the godless man dies in seeming peace.

How can this be reconciled with the Justice of GOD ? If we take the ordinary Protestant view that everyone who has repented goes directly to Heaven when he dies, it seems impossible to offer any solution of this difficulty.

The teaching of the Church alone meets these difficulties.

But, if we accept the teaching of the Church, the difficulty disappears ; for we learn that suffering—far from being an evil—is one of the greatest blessings of life, and we see that by it the earnest Christian is sanctified and made ready for Heaven. The godless and wicked man, however, has no suffering, because

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in his spiritual state suffering would do him no good, and God does not send suffering unnecessarily. Such a man's pain may be in another world ; if he repent at the last, in Purgatory ; if not, in eternity.

## CHAPTER XV.

### PRAYERS FOR THE DEAD.

Introductory :  
Prayers for the  
dead follow  
from a belief  
in Purgatory,  
and in the  
Communion  
of Saints.

The term  
"Saints."

The HOLY  
GHOST, the  
life-blood of  
the mystical  
Body of  
CHRIST,

effects the  
unity of all the  
members.

**A** BELIEF that the souls of the faithful departed in the Intermediate State are being purified by suffering necessarily leads to the Christian practice of prayers for the dead. This practice, indeed, also follows naturally from an intelligent belief in that article of the Creed in which we profess our faith in the Communion of Saints.

In the widest sense, the Saints are all those who are living members of the Body of CHRIST. In a more restricted sense, by the Saints we mean those only who have been made perfect and so have attained to the Beatific Vision. But, when we say we believe in the Communion of Saints, we use the word *Saints* in the former sense.

The Body of CHRIST, like all living bodies, has a system of circulation throughout all its members, and its life-blood, so to speak, is the HOLY GHOST. As it is the special office of the HOLY GHOST to sanctify the elect, so we may think of the Blessed SPIRIT of GOD as circulating through all the members of CHRIST'S Body, and thus joining them together into that unity of which S. Paul speaks when he says : " We, being many, are one body in CHRIST, and every one members one of another " (Rom. xii. 5).

Our LORD in speaking of the relation of the believer

to Himself likens it to the union of the branch with the vine. (S. John xv. 5.)

We may draw a similar illustration from a tree, which has, roughly speaking, three parts : the roots beneath the earth, which we cannot see, but which are an essential part of the tree ; the trunk, which we can both see and touch ; and far above us, the topmost boughs, pointing heavenward ; but throughout the whole tree the same sap circulates, supplying life to every part.

This illustrated by the parts of a tree,

the sap circulating through every part ; so, in the Body of CHRIST, all the members are joined together by the operation of the HOLY GHOST.

So in the Body of CHRIST, the Church, there are within the apprehension of the eye of faith the Blessed Saints in Heaven ; in a place which both S. Paul and S. John describe as " under the earth," but not beyond the reach of Christian Charity, the souls of the holy dead ; and within the sphere of our senses our fellow-Christians on earth ; all bound together in the unity of the same SPIRIT, the HOLY GHOST, by His circulation through every member, so that each part of CHRIST's Body, the Church, is brought into living relationship with every other part.

And this unity involves a fellowship of interest, and therefore of prayer, so that " whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it ; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it " (1 Cor. xii. 26).

This unity involves a fellowship of interest and prayer.

We pray for one another in the Church Militant on earth ; we pray for those members who are suffering in the Church Expectant under the earth ; and we rejoice in the honour of those members who have already attained the Beatific Vision in Heaven.

It is quite inconceivable that this fellowship can temporarily cease in the case of the holy dead. If the sap ceases to flow into any branch of a tree, that

Quite inconceivable that it can temporarily cease in



the case of the  
holy dead.

branch withers and dies; and so it would be inconceivable and unutterably selfish to teach that in our prayers we were only to concern ourselves with those members of the Church who are still on earth.

I. Evidence for  
the practice.

Not only does the doctrine of the Communion of Saints necessarily require prayers for the dead, but the instincts of natural piety make the same demand; and when we realize that those instincts were implanted in us by GOD, they become a very strong witness to the Divine authority of the practice which they teach.

1. The in-  
stincts of natu-  
ral piety.

2. The witness  
of almost all  
religions.

We find the practice of prayer for the dead in some form or other almost universal amongst mankind, and especially that it had its place in the religion of the Jews.

3. Its place  
among the  
Jews.  
Belief in a  
future life  
among the  
Jews :  
testimony  
of Job ;

While it is true that in the earlier part of the history of the Jewish people the doctrine of a future life did not occupy a prominent place, yet it is quite untrue that it was not recognized amongst them, and that from the very beginning.

the case of  
Enoch ;

Not only have we the testimony of the patriarch Job on behalf of the resurrection of the body,—which indicates how vastly superior was the knowledge of the patriarchs to that which existed amongst the most elevated of heathen philosophers,—“ I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that He shall stand at the latter day upon the earth : and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see GOD : Whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another ” (Job xix. 25-27), but even before the Flood, we are told, “ Enoch walked with GOD : and he was not ; for GOD took him (Gen. v. 24), and the comment on this in the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 5, 6) amplifies and gives point to the simple testimony of Moses.

The Book of Ecclesiastes, also, speaks of "the spirit of man *that goeth upward*, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth" (Eccles. iii. 21), and says that at death, "then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto GOD Who gave it (xii. 7).

teaching of  
Ecclesiastes  
iii. 21 and  
xii. 7;

The account, too, of Samuel's appearance to Saul and prophecy of Saul's death is another instance of a belief in a future life. So that we may assert without hesitation that this doctrine was held by the Jews from the beginning, although it was not until later years that it seems to have been practically developed.

the case of  
Samuel.

We have evidence, however, that in the second century before CHRIST prayer for the dead was regarded as a pious practice among the Jews, for we read that Judas Maccabæus, after a battle in which many had been slain, gathered "throughout the company to the sum of two thousand drachms of silver" and "sent it to Jerusalem to offer a sin offering, doing therein very well and honestly, in that he was mindful of the resurrection: for if he had not hoped that they that were slain should have risen again, it had been superfluous and vain to pray for the dead. And also in that he perceived that there was great favour laid up for those that died godly, it was an holy and good thought. Whereupon he made a reconciliation for the dead, that they might be delivered from sin" (2 Macc. xii. 43-45).

Prayer for the  
dead in the  
case of Judas  
Maccabæus;  
2 Macc. xii.  
43-45.

Although this book is deuterocanonical, its evidence to the existence of the practice of prayers for the dead is unassailable; and at the present day prayers for the dead have a prominent place in the Jewish ritual, and some of the forms used are said to be as old as the time of our LORD.

Probably the reason why we find so little direct

4. The New Testament. The argument from silence applied to Holy Scripture.

reference to this practice in the New Testament is that it was universally prevalent, and unless our LORD had desired to abolish it as erroneous, there was no need of any injunction with regard to it. If there had been anything evil about prayer for the dead we must feel quite sure that our LORD would have denounced it, as he did divorce and other corrupt practices which had arisen amongst the Jews.

Example of S. Paul.

It may be said to be enjoined in S. Paul's exhortation that "supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for *all men*" (1 S. Tim. ii. 1); since we can scarcely exclude the holy dead from the scope of this universal command. S. Paul himself evidently prays for the soul of Onesiphorus when he says: "The LORD give mercy unto the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain. . . . The LORD grant unto him that he may find mercy of the LORD in that day" (2 S. Tim. i. 16, 18). From the mention in this verse, and again in chap. iv. 19, of the *household* of Onesiphorus, it seems quite clear that Onesiphorus himself was not alive at that time.

Ancient interpretations of S. Matt. v. 26 and xii. 32.

Some refer S. Matt. v. 26 and xii. 32 to the Intermediate State, and certainly the authority of ancient interpretation is favourable to the first of these texts being used in this way; an interpretation which at least shows strong conviction as to the lawfulness of the practice. But inasmuch as the practice of prayer for the dead is universal in every part of the Christian Church, it is not necessary to dwell further on its scriptural recognition.

5. Testimony of the Catacombs,

We find in the Roman Catacombs many inscriptions which bear testimony to this practice, and it has been said that there was no liturgy in use in either East or

West for 1500 years after CHRIST which did not contain prayers for the dead.

6. of ancient liturgies,

It is a sad admission to have to make that it was reserved for the age of the Reformation practically to abandon this pious custom, and to its neglect may doubtless be traced the obscuration of the doctrine of the Communion of Saints, and many erroneous views in regard to the state of the faithful departed.

We do not give a *catena* of authorities from the Fathers, because with scarcely an exception they all, from the time of Tertullian on, bear witness to this practice. We make one quotation from S. Augustine as a specimen. In his 172d Sermon he says: "There can be no doubt that the dead are helped by the prayers of Holy Church, by the life-giving Sacrifice, and by the alms which are offered for them, to such an extent that they are treated by the LORD more leniently than their own sins have deserved."

7. and of the Fathers;

8. Augustine, Sermon 172.

It is the authoritative teaching alike of East and West; for in the Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church we read: "We are therefore taught by the Holy Scripture and the exposition of this Father [Theophylact] that we ought by all means to pray for the departed, to offer the Unbloody Sacrifice for them, and to dispense our alms with a liberal hand, seeing they can no more perform these good works for themselves" (Quest. 65); and in the Council of Trent, "that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls detained there are helped by the prayers of the faithful, but especially by the acceptable Sacrifice of the Altar" (Sess. 25).

8. The authoritative teaching of the East (Orthod. Confess.).

9. and of the Latin Church (Council of Trent).

While the practice of prayer for the dead was undoubtedly discouraged at the Reformation in the Church of England on account of its connection with

10. Discouraged at the English Reformation

on account of  
gross views of  
Purgatory,  
but never con-  
demned ;

found in the  
first English  
Prayer Book,

in the Canon  
of the Mass ;

(part of which  
now in Ameri-  
can P. B.,  
Burial of the  
Dead, Addi-  
tional Prayers)

and in the  
present Book.

the particular doctrine of Purgatory condemned in Article XXII., it was never authoritatively condemned, and was always more or less used, especially by pious persons.

Moreover it found a place in the first English Prayer Book, in the Service for " the Supper of the LORD, and the Holy Communion, commonly called the Mass."

The following extract is taken from the Canon: " We commend unto Thy mercy (O LORD) all other Thy servants, which are departed hence from us, with the sign of faith, and now do rest in the sleep of peace : Grant unto them, we beseech Thee, Thy mercy, and everlasting peace, and that, at the day of the general Resurrection, we and all they which be of the mystical Body of Thy SON, may altogether be set on His right hand, and hear that His most joyful voice : Come unto Me," etc.

In the Order for the Burial of the Dead, in the same book, we find three prayers for the faithful departed, and provision for a funeral Mass.

In our own Prayer Book of to-day, in the Communion Office, we pray that " we, and all Thy whole Church, may obtain remission of our sins, and all other benefits of His Passion," which, unless we are prepared to affirm that the faithful departed have no place at all in CHRIST'S *whole* Church, certainly is a prayer for the dead.

And at the end of the Prayer for CHRIST'S Church Militant we say : " We also bless Thy Holy Name for all Thy servants departed this life in Thy faith and fear ; beseeching Thee to give us grace so to follow their good examples, that *with them* we may be partakers of Thy heavenly Kingdom." There are also other prayers which indirectly witness to this practice.

The only teaching against it is the "Sermon concerning Prayer" in the Second Book of Homilies. But, as all writers admit, the doctrines taught in the Books of Homilies are not necessarily the doctrines of the Church of England, nor are the practices therein faulted necessarily condemned by the Church of England; since, while, as Article XXXV. says, they "contain a godly and wholesome doctrine and necessary for these times," this does not assert that all their contents are equally valuable, and the limiting phrase, "necessary for these times" implies that their usefulness was but temporary.

**A Homily against it, but the Homilies not necessarily the teaching of the Church.**

This is made the more evident from the judgment delivered by the Right Hon. Sir Herbert Jenner Fust, Knt., D.C.L., in the Arches Court of Canterbury, in the case of Breeks versus Woolfrey, Nov. 19, 1838. In this case the judge stated that prayer for the dead was not in any sense contrary to the teaching of the Church of England, and gave judgment for the defendant, a Roman Catholic who, without the consent of the Rector of the Parish of Carisbrooke, in the Isle of Wight, had caused to be erected a tombstone in the churchyard of this parish with the following inscription: "Pray for the soul of J. Woolfrey. 'It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead' (2 Macc. xii. 46)."

**The judgment in its favour in 1838.**

Since this time the practice of prayer for the dead, like other Catholic practices, has grown in the Church of England until it is no longer the characteristic of any distinctive school.

**The growth of the practice among us.**

In the last chapter we discussed at some length the state of the faithful departed who have not yet attained to the Beatific Vision. Even at the risk of repetition it may be well at this point briefly to describe their condition.

**II. The practice itself.**

**1. The condition of the faithful departed.**

Those souls who have died in a state of grace, and who, while free from the guilt of sin, are not yet purified from all its stains, or who have not fully paid the debt of temporal punishment due for their sins, are detained in a place which from its effect in purifying the soul is generally called Purgatory.

Their condition may be stated in three propositions.

**i. They are confirmed in grace ;**

First, they are confirmed in the grace of God. There is, therefore, no further growth in grace for them, since GOD has bestowed upon them all the grace of which they are capable ; unless indeed we may say that grace flows into the soul in proportion as, by the removal of the traces of sin, its capacity is increased.

**ii. conformed entirely to the Will of GOD ;**

Secondly, the soul is absolutely conformed to the Will of GOD. It has no will, then, but GOD's Will. It would not, if it could, escape one suffering which is necessary to its absolute and perfect purification.

**iii. they can no longer merit,**

And thirdly, as a result of the other two propositions, the soul can no longer merit. It cannot sin, for it cannot be tempted ; it has no further choice between good and evil, and therefore can no longer merit, or help itself. It can say, as we never can in this world, the words of the Psalmist : " My heart is fixed, O GOD, my heart is fixed : I will sing and give praise " (Ps. lvii. 8).

**and must therefore depend for help on the Church Militant, and Triumphant.**

And it is because the soul cannot merit that it cannot help itself, and must therefore depend upon the good offices of the Church Militant, and perhaps of the Church Triumphant, for the alleviation of its condition or for the shortening of the time of its purification.

**We should strive to pay the debt of sin in this life.**

It has to pay the debt of sin. In this life we can make satisfaction far more effectively than in Purgatory, because we still have the power of choice, and therefore can merit. Indeed, if we will, we can do an

immense deal, before we die, to join in our LORD's work of satisfaction and to pay the debt of our sins. The holy souls, however, strictly speaking, can make no satisfaction for sin. With them (to use a Latin term for which it is difficult to find an English equivalent) it must be the *opus satisfaciendi* instead of the *opus satisfaciendi*.

It is because they cannot help themselves that they must depend so largely upon our prayers and good works ; and if it be asked, In what way can these help them ? we must reply that our prayers help them in the same way as by prayer we help one another on earth. S. James tells us that " the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much " (S. James v. 16), and goes on to speak of the wonders wrought by prayer. We are not, therefore, to doubt but that in praying for the dead we are helping them in the most effectual manner.

In what ways  
can our  
prayers help  
them ?

A further question which may be asked here is whether the holy souls know of our prayers, and whether they pray for us. S. Thomas, though with some hesitation, thinks it more probable that they do not pray for us, since those in Purgatory are not in a state of praying so much as of being prayed for. He also considers it doubtful whether they know anything about our affairs.

Do the holy  
souls know of  
our prayers  
and do they  
pray for us ?

The majority of theologians since his day, however, as Suarez tells us, have taken an opposite view and teach that the holy souls probably do pray for us, and that by the ministry of Angels and in other ways they know something of the lives of those on earth who are dear to them.

Other theologians again point out that even without this knowledge there is nothing to prevent the holy

VOL. II.—35



souls praying for us that GOD will give us those things which He knows we need. The whole question, indeed, belongs purely to speculative theology.

2. Their consolations :

- i. Their knowledge that they are saved ;
- ii. their possession of joy and peace ;

iii. angelic ministrations ;

iv. the prayers of the Church.

During this period of purification the holy souls have great consolations. They know that they are saved ; they know that the Beatific Vision of GOD awaits them. They are filled with happiness and joy, and have great peace, for, as the Psalmist says, " Great is the peace that they have who love Thy law " (Ps. cxix. 165), and surely of none can this be more true than of the holy souls, who are altogether in love with GOD's law, and would not to gain Heaven offend against it one jot or tittle.

Then it is thought that the Holy Angels, and especially their Guardian Angels, minister to these souls, that they are helped by the alms and prayers of their friends in the Church on earth, especially by the offering of the Holy Sacrifice, and by the prayers of the Saints in Heaven.

An objection noticed :

Before we pass to the practical consideration of the means by which we can best help the holy souls in Purgatory we will anticipate a somewhat common objection. Of course it is understood that we do not pray for those who are lost, nor, indeed, for those who are already enjoying the Vision of GOD ; since the latter do not need our prayers, and for the former no prayer can avail.

Are our prayers, if unavailing for the soul, therefore useless ?

But some object that we cannot know with any certainty whether our loved ones are in need of our prayers, that is, are amongst the souls in Purgatory ; and if not, they ask whether our prayers and almsdeeds and good works offered for them are all lost.

By no means. The merit of all our prayers and good works remains with us. We cannot transfer our *merits* to anyone else, as we shall show later on.

There are some words of our LORD which may help us to see that what we do for the souls of the departed, even if they should not need it, or should not be able to avail themselves of it, is not by any means lost. When our LORD sent the Seventy on their mission He said to them: "Into whatsoever house ye enter, first say, Peace be to this house. And if the son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon it: if not, *it shall turn to you again*" (S. Luke x. 5, 6).

Our LORD'S words to the Seventy; S. Luke x. 5, 6.

So if our prayers and good works do not avail for those souls for whom we offer them, they will turn again with blessing upon ourselves.

Let us now consider what we can do to help the holy souls in Purgatory. We can do four things for them: pray, give alms, fast (the Three Notable Duties), and fourth and most important of all, offer the Holy Sacrifice.

3. How can we help the holy souls?

- i. By prayer;
- ii. by almsgiving;
- iii. by fasting;
- iv. by offering the Holy Sacrifice for them.

All these four works are really included in the word "prayer;" since every good work we do, whether it be a prayer said, an alms given, or a penance done, may be done in the spirit of prayer, that is, offered to God.

Here perhaps we should pause to explain what we mean by a good work. As Articles XII. and XIII. point out, a good work, to be "pleasing and acceptable to GOD in CHRIST," must be done through grace; so that good works are really the fruits of grace in the soul.

4. What is meant by "good works."

Those works of philanthropy which are not the result of grace, but of generous impulse or of natural virtue, and have not GOD for their end, but rather the pleasure produced by the act itself, or the enjoyment of its results, are not good works in the sense of the Articles.

Every good work has three effects:  
i. Merit, which is inalienable;

Every good work of whatever kind has three effects : merit, impetration, and satisfaction.

The merit of a good work, as we have already said, is inalienable. It cannot be transferred to anyone else. We cannot assign our merits to help the dead. Our LORD said, " Lay up for yourselves treasures in Heaven," that is, merits; they are *our* treasures.

But while the merit of a good work remains our own, there are two other things connected with it which we can offer for the dead. The one is its impetratory character, the other is its satisfactory efficacy.

ii. impetration, which can be offered for others ;

*Laborare est orare* ; that is, every good work is an act of prayer ; so that if instead of spending an hour upon our knees saying prayers, we go and work for that hour, and in doing this ask GOD to accept it, it becomes impetratory and pleads with GOD. In this sense we can assign the impetratory power of our good works for the benefit of the holy souls.

iii. satisfaction, which also can be offered for others.

Then, again, every good work has a satisfactory efficacy ; that is, it enables us to pay the debt of sin, which can be discharged negatively by bearing suffering with patience, positively by working for the glory of GOD.

5. We can help the holy souls :

We shall now be better able to see how we may help the holy souls by prayer, almsgiving, fasting, and the offering of the Holy Sacrifice.

i. by prayer (some examples) ;

And first, by prayer. The best prayer to say is Psalm CXXX., " Out of the deep have I called unto Thee, O LORD." Say it for the soul of some one whom you desire to help, some one you have loved on earth, some one, perhaps, with whom you have sinned ; or say it for any soul in Purgatory that needs it,—the last soul that has entered there, or the one that is nearest to bliss.

Use often the short prayers which we find in the

Church's Offices: "Let light perpetual shine upon them;" "Eternal rest grant unto them;" "May the souls of the faithful departed, through the mercy of God, rest in peace."

Secondly, we can give alms for them. This was what Judas Maccabæus did; he gave two thousand drachms of silver and sent it to the temple at Jerusalem.

ii. by almsgiving  
(examples);

A good many of us who have benefited by legacies left us by those now dead might use for this purpose a part of what we have received. What could be better than founding a chapel for the poor in memory of one whom we have loved and who has gone before us? In that chapel the Holy Sacrifice will be offered day by day and, perhaps, hundreds of souls ministered to, among the poor and sinful and deserted; and all these good deeds will go to help a soul in Purgatory.

Do not be satisfied with prayer only; go on to alms-deeds. S. Augustine says, "prayers, the life-giving Sacrifice, and alms." Judas Maccabæus not only prayed, but he gave very large alms, and Holy Scripture tells us "it was an holy and good thought."

Again, we can help the holy souls by fasting; and this not only means abstaining from food, but includes all acts of self-denial and penance. They can all be offered for the holy souls.

iii. by fasting,  
which includes  
all acts of  
penance;

Lastly, and chiefly, there is the offering of the Holy Sacrifice. The Eastern Church in her Catechism (which we have quoted), the Council of Trent, and all the Fathers specially dwell upon this, that in no way can we help the holy souls so effectually as by offering for them the Holy Sacrifice; that is, by procuring that a Priest shall offer the Holy Eucharist for that end, and attending ourselves at the Holy Sacrifice with that intention.

iv. by offering  
the Holy Sacrifice;  
(both East and  
West dwell on  
this).

6. What motives should impel us to care for the holy souls?

What are the motives which make us do these acts of Charity?

Passing over the many visions which people have had in regard to Purgatory,—people very near to GOD, and whom the Church has recognized as Saints,—there are four further motives, not to mention yet others, which we shall briefly consider.

1. Charity—

The first is *Charity*. GOD is rich in mercy towards us, and we are so poor in our Charity to the holy souls ! We expect GOD to do so much to help us in our difficulties and sufferings, and yet selfishness causes us to do so little for them ! Our LORD says to us : “ With what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you again,” and, “ Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.”

S. Augustine ;

S. Augustine \* says in his sixteenth homily : “ One of the holiest works, one of the best exercises of piety which we can practise in this world is to offer Sacrifice, alms, and prayers for the dead.”

S. Jerome ;

S. Jerome \* says : “ The relief which we procure for the departed obtains for us like mercy in our hour of need.”

S. Francis de Sales, applying the Corporal Works of Mercy to the holy souls ;

S. Francis de Sales, referring to the works of mercy mentioned in the twenty-fifth chapter of S. Matthew, points out that we may perform these by praying for the dead.

In the parable of the Judgment in that chapter the King says to those on His right hand : “ Come, ye blessed of My FATHER, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world : for I was an hungred, and ye gave Me meat : I was thirsty, and ye gave Me drink : I was a stranger, and ye took Me in : naked, and ye clothed Me : I was sick, and ye visited Me : I was in prison, and ye came unto Me.

\* Quoted from Schouppe, *Purgatory*, p. 216.

"Then shall the righteous answer Him, saying, LORD, when saw we Thee an hungred, and fed Thee? or thirsty, and gave Thee drink? when saw we Thee a stranger, and took Thee in? or naked, and clothed Thee? or when saw we Thee sick, or in prison, and came unto Thee?

"And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these My brethren, ye have done it unto Me" (verses 34-40).

The holy souls are hungry and thirsty, as no souls in this world can be, for the Vision of GOD. They have had one glimpse of our LORD at the moment of the particular Judgment, and it has filled them with a burning desire to see GOD and to be with Him; and our prayers, in helping them to that Vision, are quenching their hunger and thirst.

"I was a stranger, and ye took Me in." These souls are poor exiles almost at the doors of Jerusalem. If we help them in, we are indeed helping the stranger to the hospitality of the heavenly city, the New Jerusalem.

"Naked, and ye clothed Me: I was sick, and ye visited Me: I was in prison, and ye came unto Me." In the prison of the Intermediate State are sick souls not yet made perfect, naked souls "earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with" their "house which is from Heaven: if so be that being clothed" they "shall not be found naked" (2 Cor. v. 2, 3).

By our prayers and works of charity for the dead, as S. Francis de Sales most beautifully shows, we fulfil every one of those acts of mercy which, our LORD tells us, are the titles by which those on the right hand have won the Kingdom of Heaven.

ii. the thought that we may need the same charity;

Another motive is the thought that some day before very long, if we die in grace, we shall be in the same condition as the holy dead, and dependent on the charity of others.

iii. its helpfulness in reminding us of our own death;

Again, to pray for the dead is a salutary act, in that it reminds us of the unseen world so near to us, and which we must so soon enter ; reminds us of our own death, a thought we are often prone to put aside.

iv. and in teaching us to make our satisfaction here.

Lastly, it suggests to us a means by which we may ourselves escape a great part of the suffering of the Intermediate State ; namely, the making satisfaction now by striving so to accept the sufferings of life and so to work for God's glory that when we are called into His Presence there may be little left to be done in Purgatory.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE INVOCATION OF THE SAINTS.

THE invocation of the Saints, like prayer for the dead, is not a doctrine, but a practice of the Church. As it is of importance clearly to grasp the difference between a doctrine and a practice of the Church, we shall therefore take this opportunity of pointing out in a few words not only the fact of this difference, but the principles on which it is based and some of the consequences which it involves.

As we have already shown in the chapter on the Rule of Faith, no doctrine can be *de fide* which did not form part of the original deposit committed to the Church at Pentecost.

The Church cannot put forth new dogmas. She can only define those which have existed from the beginning. Nor can she ever *retract* any of her teachings, since the very nature of truth implies that it cannot change.

This, however, is not the case in regard to her practices. She can at any time adopt a new practice which seems to her to be for the edification of the faithful, and she can abandon practices which, though once universal, have from some cause ceased to be beneficial.

Hence the rejection of a practice of the Church stands

Introductory:  
The difference  
between a  
doctrine and a  
practice of  
the Church.

A doctrine, to  
be "de fide,"  
must have  
formed part  
of the Pente-  
costal deposit.  
The Church  
cannot put  
forth new  
dogmas, nor  
retract those  
defined.

The opposite  
is the case  
with the  
practices of  
the Church.



The rejection of a practice very different from that of a doctrine of the Church.

Art. xxxiv., of the Traditions of the Church.

on very different grounds from that of a doctrine of the Church. The rejection of the former may be rash and lead to the forfeiture of opportunities of grace ; the rejection of the latter is heresy, and, if it be " formal," may lead to the loss of the soul.

This distinction is very admirably brought out in Article XXXIV., " Of the Traditions of the Church."

" It is not necessary that Traditions and Ceremonies be in all places one, or utterly like ; for at all times they have been divers, and may be changed according to the diversity of countries, times, and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against God's Word. Whosoever, through his private judgment, willingly and purposely, doth openly break the Traditions and Ceremonies of the Church, . . . ought to be rebuked openly. . . .

" Every particular or national Church hath authority to ordain, change, and abolish, Ceremonies or Rites of the Church ordained only by man's authority, so that all things be done to edifying."

This Article treats of two things only: the traditions, or practices of the Church, and its ceremonies, and does not refer to matters of faith.

And while it affirms that the Church can change its traditions " according to the diversity of countries, times, and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against God's Word," yet it severely condemns individuals who should presume to break those traditions and ceremonies.

That is to say, while it allows to the Church authority to change its traditions, it does not allow to the private individual any right to disregard them.

In the last paragraph of the Article it treats of the second matter, the ceremonies, or rites of the Church,

and asserts that even a national Church "hath authority to ordain, change, and abolish" them; thus claiming that the *jus liturgicum* is vested in the episcopate of a country, and not in the Church at large.

But it is most careful to exclude from the authority of the particular or national Church the matter first treated of, namely, the traditions,—as a careful reading of the Article will show.

The conclusion we may draw from these considerations is that while in the case of a doctrine we should look upon it with great suspicion, if we could find no traces of it in the early ages of the Church, yet in the case of a practice, so long as we are sure that the Church has given it her approval, it is not decisively of consequence that it cannot be traced to primitive Christianity.

Inference  
drawn from  
these facts.

For instance, it was a practice of the Church, enforced with severe penalties, never to kneel at any of the Services on Sundays, and yet we do not on that account consider it binding on us to-day.

Some  
examples.

On the other hand, we now teach that Baptism by aspersion or affusion is sufficient, although the early Church, except in case of great necessity, always practised Baptism by immersion.

We have shown that it is not of imperative necessity that we should be able to prove that the practices of the Church can be traced back to extreme antiquity. It is, however, of importance that the doctrines on which they rest and of which they are an expression should be beyond dispute.

Important that  
the doctrine on  
which a practice  
rests  
should be  
unassailable.

The practice of the invocation of the Saints, which is the subject of this chapter, follows without doubt from an Article of the Creed,—that we believe in the Communion of Saints. While this inference will not

I. The practice  
of invocation  
follows from a  
belief in the  
Communion of  
Saints.

seem strange, yet it will perhaps be new to some to be told that the insertion of the article "The Communion of Saints" in the Apostles' Creed appears to have been made expressly to teach the doctrine that the Saints pray for us.

This Article inserted in the Creed to meet the heresy of Vigilantius, who denied the intercession of the Saints ; its history ;

As many are aware, this article is the very latest addition to the Creed. It is not found in the Creed of Rufinus, nor in the African Creed expounded by S. Augustine, *de Fide et Symbolo*, nor, in short, until the end of the fifth century. It first occurs in a sermon preached about the year 490, probably by Faustus of Riez, in France, and next in the Mozarabic Liturgy ; that is to say, in southern Gaul and Spain.

Now these two countries were infected with the heresy of Vigilantius, who after living for a while with S. Jerome in his monastery at Bethlehem, left him, and, making his way to France, there propagated certain erroneous doctrines, earnestly combated by S. Jerome in his treatise, *Contra Vigilantium*. The heresy which Vigilantius taught was a condemnation of the cultus of the relics of the Saints on the ground that the Saints in glory do not pray for the living.

Vigilantius lived in the early part of the fifth century, and, as we have said, it was in the last decade of that century and in the same neighbourhood that we first find this article of the Creed.

Dr. Harnack's opinion.

This view finds support in Dr. Harnack's pamphlet, *Das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis* (Berlin, 1892), and certainly has enormous weight as bearing upon our present discussion ; since Dr. Harnack cannot be suspected of any bias in favour of Catholic doctrine.

It is true that the heresy of Vigilantius was only a denial that the Saints pray for those on earth, and of course it would be quite possible to hold, as some

have held, that the Saints pray for us, and yet to stop short of the practice of asking their prayers.

On the other hand, however, if we believe that the Saints in glory pray for us, the practice of invocation, or asking their prayers, seems a most reasonable, if not necessary, consequence of this belief. And so we find in the address to the Emperor, which is prefixed to the Canons of the Second Œcumenical Council (I. Constantinople, 381), that the prayers of the Saints are invoked on behalf of the Emperor.

The invocation follows from a belief in the intercession of the Saints.

Our subject, then, suggests two questions : First, Do the Saints pray for us ? and second, Should we invoke their prayers ? That is, we may separately trace the doctrine of the *intercession* of the Saints, and the practice of the *invocation* of the Saints.

As regards the first, the intercession of the Saints, in all probability scarcely any one doubts its orthodoxy. Both Holy Scripture and the writings of the Fathers are full of it ; and, as we have shown, it is the very doctrine the denial of which apparently led to the insertion of the article on the Communion of Saints in our Creed.

II. The intercession of the Saints.

We know that GOD has " ordained and constituted the services of Angels and men in a wonderful order," that the Angels are " ministering spirits," succouring and helping those who are heirs of salvation ; and amongst these ministrations prayer forms an important function, as the word for " ministering " in the original implies (*λειτουργικά*).

Testimony of Holy Scripture:

It is a matter of revelation that they help us, that they rejoice over our penitence, that they always behold the Face of our FATHER in Heaven ; and surely this implies that they *pray* for us.

Indeed we find in the Prophet Zechariah this prayer Old Test. ;

of the Angel of the LORD for Jerusalem : " Then the Angel of the LORD answered and said, O LORD of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem and on the cities of Judah, against which Thou hast had indignation these threescore and ten years ? " (Zech. i. 12).

And in Jeremiah the LORD declares: " Though Moses and Samuel stood before Me, yet My mind could not be toward this people " (Jer. xv. 1), and the force of the words here certainly implies that Moses and Samuel could intercede, and probably in the past had done so ; though doubtless, knowing the will of God, they did not on this occasion.

Isaiah's plea to God, " Doubtless Thou art our FATHER, though Abraham be ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledge us not " (Isa. lxiii. 16), implies the same.

And later, in the deuterocanonical books, we read that the Angel Raphael said to Tobit : " When thou didst pray, and Sara . . . I did bring the remembrance of your prayers before the Holy One " (Tobit xii. 12) ; and again, he tells Tobit that he is " one of the seven Holy Angels, which present the prayers of the Saints, and which go in and out before the glory of the Holy One " (verse 15).

In the Second Book of Maccabees we read that Judas had a vision, " and this was his vision : That Onias, who had been High Priest, a virtuous and a good man, . . . holding up his hands prayed for the whole body of the Jews.

" This done, in like manner there appeared a man with gray hairs, and exceeding glorious, who was of a wonderful and excellent majesty. Then Onias answered, saying, This is a lover of the brethren, who

prayeth much for the people, and for the holy city, to wit, Jeremias the Prophet of GOD" (2 Macc. xv. 12-14).

Both are confirmed in the New Testament, where New Test. ;  
 Heaven is opened to us and we see the Angel who "stood at the Altar, having a golden censer; and there was given unto Him much incense, that he should offer it with the prayers of all Saints upon the golden Altar which was before the Throne. And the smoke of the incense, which came with the prayers of the Saints, ascended up before GOD out of the Angel's hand" (Rev. viii. 3, 4).

And not only the Angel offered prayers, but they who are represented by "the four beasts and four and twenty elders," who "fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours, which are the prayers of Saints;" and those four and twenty elders who present the prayers of the Saints must themselves be of our race, for in their "new song" their thanksgiving is: "Thou . . . hast redeemed us to GOD by Thy Blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; and hast made us unto our GOD kings and priests" (Rev. v. 8-10).

That these are not Angels is clear, since they say that they were redeemed "out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation," and we have no reason to suppose that the Angels needed any such redemption, or could be said to belong to a kindred, tongue, people, or nation.

If we turn to the Fathers we find their testimony Testimony of  
the Fathers.  
 so clearly unanimous from the earliest to the latest that it seems hardly necessary to do more than to refer the reader to the *catena* of authorities in Bishop Forbes's work on the Articles.\*

\* P. 388 et seq.

But we may observe that in more than one place Origen quotes the texts from Tobit and Maccabees in proof of the doctrine of the intercession of the Saints, which is specially interesting as showing the interpretation put upon them by the Church even in those very early days.

### III. Invocation of Saints.

Two methods, direct and indirect ;

We may now pass to the second question : Should we invoke the prayers of the Saints ?

The prayers of the Saints may be invoked in two ways : directly, and indirectly. That is, we may say : " Holy Mary, Mother of GOD, pray for us," or we may say : " May the intercessions of the Holy Mother of GOD, of the Prophets, of the Holy Apostles, of the Martyrs help me ; may all the Saints and elect of GOD pray for me, that I may be worthy with them to possess the Kingdom of GOD."

few object to the latter.

To this second, or indirect method few, probably, have made any objection, since the prayer is addressed to GOD and asks that He will allow or direct the Saints to pray for us. Even the most anti-Roman writers of our Church in treating this subject admit that this indirect method of invocation cannot be censured.

1. Objections to direct invocation answered.

The whole force of the opposition has been against a direct invoking of the Saints. And against such invocation various reasons are given.

First, that the Saints do not know our prayers, and therefore praying to them is useless. Secondly, that as the Saints have perfect Charity, they would pray for us even if we did not ask them. Thirdly, that the time spent in invoking the Saints would be better employed in praying to GOD, and that such invocation detracts from our prayers to GOD. Fourthly, that it makes the Saints mediators, whereas there is but one Mediator and Intercessor, our LORD and Saviour JESUS

**CHRIST.** Fifthly, that dangerous abuses have arisen in connection with the cultus of the Saints.

Briefly to answer these objections, we may say in regard to the first that to suppose the Saints do not know our prayers is a mere assumption, and contrary not only to the received opinion of theologians, but to the implicit teaching of Holy Scripture ; since, while it is not *de fide* that the Saints hear our prayers, yet it is an opinion which seems to have Scriptural support. For we are told that "there is joy in the presence of the Angels of GOD over one sinner that repenteth" (S. Luke xv. 10), and again, that "joy shall be *in Heaven* over one sinner that repenteth" (verse 7). If, then, the Angels *in Heaven* are cognizant of our penitence, why should not the Saints know of our prayers? But we are expressly told in the Epistle to the Hebrews (xii. 1) that we "are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses," and the common opinion of the Church is that these witnesses are the Saints. Some would confine them to the Martyrs only, but this does not weaken the force of the argument.

And in the passages already quoted from the Revelation, where the four and twenty elders and the Angel offered the prayers of the Saints, there is clearly an intimation that they know what the prayers are, otherwise how could they offer them to GOD?

If it be asked, How do the Saints hear our prayers? we must reply, as we do to many such questions about the *manner* in which GOD effects His purposes, that we do not know.

When we use the term "hear," of course we do not for one moment mean to imply that the Saints exercise a sense of hearing, as on earth. This is evident, because, being separated from their bodies, they have no

1. That the Saints do not know our prayers, contrary to Holy Scripture and theological opinion.

We have no certain knowledge of the manner in which the Saints know our prayers; certainly not by natural hearing.



physical organ of hearing, and for many similar reasons. When we say that the Saints hear our prayers, we mean simply that they are cognizant of them.

Various theories :  
That the Saints see us "in the WORD," or in the mirror of the HOLY TRINITY ;

There have been various theories in regard to this, the most common being that the Saints see us, "in the WORD," or, as some theologians have expressed it, in the mirror of the HOLY TRINITY ; that is, beholding the Vision of GOD in Heaven, they see in GOD, (not absolutely all things,) but all that GOD wills them to know, and all that it is necessary for their happiness that they should know.

This is not a mere speculation of theology, for S. Paul says : " We know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. . . . For now we see through a glass [mirror], darkly ; but then face to face : now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known " (1 Cor. xiii. 9, 10, 12).

or by some particular manifestation from GOD.

Some have thought that the Saints know our prayers by a particular manifestation from GOD. But it is not for us to expect to understand the manner ; it is sufficient for us to know the fact.

ii. That, having perfect Charity, the Saints do not need to be asked to pray for us.

The second objection to invocation is that as the Saints have perfect Charity, they would pray for us even if we did not ask them. This objection applies equally to GOD, Who *is* perfect Charity, and Who knows all our necessities, and yet has commanded us to pray. And further, prayer may be the means by which GOD wills that the Saints should know our needs and intercede for us.

iii. That the time spent in invocation would be better spent in prayer to GOD, from

The third objection is that the time spent in invoking the Saints would be better employed in praying to GOD, and that such invocation detracts from our prayers to GOD. The answer to this is that the time spent in in-

voking the Saints, *is spent* in praying to GOD, since we are asking those who are very near and dear to GOD to pray for us, just as we may ask a Priest to remember us at the Holy Sacrifice, or a dear friend on earth to pray for us.

which it detracts.

It has probably never entered into anyone's mind that it would be better for us not to ask for these intercessions, and indeed it is a precept of Holy Scripture that we are to pray for one another (S. James v. 16), and in the Bible we find examples of the invocation of such intercession. For in the Book of Job GOD Himself says to Eliphaz : " Go to my servant Job, . . . and my servant Job shall pray for you : for him will I accept " (Job xlii. 8) ; and S. Paul says to the Thessalonians, " Brethren, pray for us " (1 Thess. v. 25), and to the Romans : " I beseech you, brethren, for the LORD JESUS CHRIST's sake, and for the love of the SPIRIT, that ye strive together with me in your prayers to GOD for me " (Rom. xv. 30).

This is true of all intercession, and yet the Scripture enjoins it both by precept and example ;

In the same way it may be shown that invocation of the Saints does not detract from prayer to GOD, any more than does the invocation of the prayers of our friends on earth.

And here we must remember that GOD sometimes hears one person's prayers when He does not hear another's. S. James tells us (v. 16) that " the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much," and we read in S. John (ix. 31) that " GOD heareth not sinners."

Besides, the prayers of the saints may be more effectual than ours.

What we may not ourselves be able to obtain from GOD by our prayers, we may by the intercession of the Saints ; for, as we have just seen in the case of Job's friends, while GOD refused to receive their prayers, He told them to seek the intercession of Job and they should be forgiven.

iv. That invocation makes the Saints mediators, and so detracts from our LORD'S mediatorship.

The fourth objection is that invocation makes the Saints mediators, whereas there is but one Mediator and Intercessor, our LORD and Saviour JESUS CHRIST.

It is true that there is but one Mediator Who shares the nature of each of the parties to be mediated between, and in this sense is also the only Intercessor. There is but one, too, Who prays for all, and for Whom no one prays, and Who relies upon no other mediator, since His own merits are the source of the grace which He bestows upon His suppliants.

In this sense there is but one Mediator, as there is but one LORD, one Master, one FATHER. And yet in a *secondary* sense, and with no derogation from this unique mediatorship, we speak of other mediators and masters and fathers, for our LORD Himself appointed the priesthood of the Church as His representatives, and as they offer the Holy Sacrifice, they are in this secondary sense mediators. Even our friends, whom we ask to pray for us, are in a still lower sense mediators. How much more, then, may we ask the Saints, who are our friends and the friends of GOD, near and dear to Him, to intercede or mediate for us, without in the slightest degree detracting from the prerogatives of our Blessed LORD. If a person has friends among a king's courtiers, he surely is not depriving the king of his rights or honour in asking the king's friends to intercede for him. Besides, the very words "pray for us" clearly show the character of the mediation we invoke.

The Church's teaching in regard to the veneration of the saints.

At this point it may be well to say a few words in regard to a kindred subject, the veneration or honour due to the Saints.

The Catholic Church both of the East and West has authoritatively defined that GOD, and GOD alone, is to

be worshipped with the worship called *latria*, this being the noun corresponding to the verb used in the LXX. version of Deut. vi. 13, which has "worship Him alone" (*αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις*), where our translation has "serve Him." This supreme worship is due to GOD alone, and could not be offered to any creature without the most terrible sin of idolatry. *Dulia* is that secondary veneration, which is given to the Saints and Angels as the servants and special friends of GOD. *Hyperdulia* is only a subdivision of *dulia*, and is the veneration which is given to the Blessed Virgin as the most exalted of mere creatures, though of course infinitely inferior to GOD, and incomparably inferior to CHRIST in His Human Nature.

Distinction between "Latria" and "Dulia,"

We may observe that the difference between *latria* and *dulia* is not a difference of degree, however great, but a difference altogether of kind. We worship GOD with adoration; to the Saints as the friends of GOD and on account of their dignity as Saints, we offer only veneration, honour.

one not of degree, but of kind;

This distinction is well illustrated by the use of the English word "worship." We speak of "the worship of GOD," by which we mean, of course, *latria*, that praise and adoration which is due to GOD from all creatures. But we also use the term for that reverential recognition of merit which we pay to those who, while they are but creatures like ourselves, yet from their position or intrinsic worth command our reverence. This use of the word "worship" may be illustrated from Holy Scripture and the Prayer Book, for our LORD says in one of His parables: "When thou art bidden, go and sit down in the lowest room; that when he that bade thee cometh, he may say unto thee, Friend, go up higher: then shalt thou have *worship* in

illustrated by the use of the word "worship."

the presence of them that sit at meat with thee" (S. Luke xiv. 10); and in the Marriage Service in the English Prayer Book the man is instructed to say to the woman: "With this ring I thee wed, with my body I thee *worship*, and with all my worldly goods I thee endow."

v. That many abuses have arisen from the cultus of the saints.

The fifth objection is that dangerous abuses have arisen in connection with the cultus of the Saints. But surely the abuse of a thing is no argument against its lawful use. One must confess with sorrow that the cultus of the Saints has been greatly abused, and that it was these abuses which led at the Reformation to the removal from our Prayer Book of the pious practice of invoking the Saints.

Extract from sermon of Abp. of York.

But the cultus of the Saints was not the only thing abused, and we have to lament much else that was given up along with it. As the Archbishop of York said in his sermon at the opening of the Norwich Church Congress in 1895: "But, after all, the Reformation was initiated and carried on by fallible men; and in the storm and stress of the sixteenth century they may sometimes have mistaken their course, and, perhaps, cast out too hastily some of the precious lading of the ship."

We shall, however, recur to the question of the dangers and abuse of this practice in the latter part of this chapter.

2. Evidences for the practice of direct invocation; authorities and examples:

*Catenæ* of authorities for the practice of direct invocation of the Saints will be found in Petavius, *de Incarn.*, lib. xiv.; Perrone, tom. V., chap. iii.; Forbes, on Article XXII.; and Percival, *Invocation of Saints*, pp. 154-182. We shall mention but one or two of the many instances there given.

First, we may observe that carved on imperishable

stone in the Roman Catacombs we have abundant witness to the practice in those early ages of the Church when these Catacombs were in use. Here are a few examples: "Lady Bassilla, we, Crescentinus and Micina, commend to thee our daughter Crescentina." "Matronata Mateona, who lived a year and fifty-two days, pray for thy parents." "Vincentia, in CHRIST, pray for Phoebe and her husband." "Anatolius made this for his well-deserving son. . . . Pray for thy sister." "Dionysius, an innocent child, now with the Saints, remember us in your holy prayers." These might be multiplied indefinitely, but are sufficient to show how early was the practice of direct invocation.

The  
Catacombs :

S. Gregory of Nyssa asks the Martyr S. Theodore : "Intercede with our common King for thy country," etc.; and he closes his panegyric on S. Ephrem : "Do thou, standing by the Divine Altar and ministering with the Angels to the Life-giving and HOLY TRINITY, remember us all, asking for us remission of sins," etc.

S. Gregory  
Nyssen ;

S. Gregory of Nazianzus prays to S. Cyprian : "Do thou look down on us propitiously from above, and direct our speech and life," etc.; and to S. Basil : "Do thou, divine and sacred one, look down upon us, and by thy intercessions either stay the thorn of the flesh given us by GOD, our discipline, or persuade us to endure it bravely," etc.

S. Gregory  
Nazianzen ;

S. Chrysostom says to the people : "When thou perceivest that GOD is chastening thee, fly . . . to His friends the Martyrs ;" and again he exhorts the people : "Not on this festival only, but on other days too, . . . let us invoke them [SS. Bernice and Prosdoce], let us beg them to be our patronesses."

S. Chrysostom ;

S. Jerome says to S. Paula : "Help with thy prayers the extreme old age of thy devotee."

S. Jerome.

Testimony of  
the Eastern  
Church.

(Orthodox  
Conf.)

The invocation of the Saints, which some persons suppose to be a purely Roman custom, is quite as prevalent in the East as in the West, and has the support of the Eastern confessions of faith. We quote from the Orthodox Confession (part iii., quest. 52) as follows : " We pray unto the Saints for their intercession to GOD, that they may sustain our cause with Him by their prayers ; but we do by no means call upon them as gods, but as the beloved of GOD, Whom they serve, Whom they worship and glorify with united hymns. And surely their assistance is very necessary for us, not, indeed, that of their own power they can help us, but because by their prayers in our behalf they may obtain the grace and favour of GOD for us."

And again : " We are far from offending against this commandment when we put up our prayers to the Saints, who, standing always like faithful servants before the Divine Majesty, can therefore become suppliants for our salvation unto that one only true GOD. On the other hand, if we despise and reject the assistance and labouring for us of the Saints, we shall most grievously offend the Divine Majesty, forasmuch as we refuse to do honour unto those who have most faithfully and most holily served Him."

Testimony of  
the Latin  
Church.  
(Council of  
Trent.)

If we take the Council of Trent as representing the Latin Church, we find that in the 25th Session it enjoins all Bishops to " instruct the faithful diligently touching the intercession and invocation of Saints, . . . teaching them that the Saints, who reign together with CHRIST, offer up their own prayers to GOD for men ; that it is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them, to resort to their prayers, aid, and help for obtaining benefits from GOD through His SON JESUS CHRIST our LORD, Who alone is our Redeemer and Saviour."

We have, therefore, to acknowledge with regret that during the past three hundred years, of the whole Catholic Church, East and West, the Anglican Communion alone has virtually abandoned the practice of the invocation of the Saints, a practice not only universal, but reaching back, as we have seen, to the very earliest days of the Church, and supported by the authority of all her theologians.

The Anglican Communion entirely alone in its neglect of invocation.

When we inquire the cause of this neglect of a practice so dear to the rest of Christendom, we find that it was doubtless occasioned by the grievous abuses which prevailed in connection with the cultus of the Saints in the sixteenth century. The shameful traffic in relics, many of them undoubtedly spurious, and the special devotion to a popular or easy-going Saint, which led to his Altar or shrine absorbing all the devotion of the faithful, are instances of this evil.

IV. The cause of its removal from our Prayer Book, its abuse.

Bishop Forbes tells us that so great was the popularity of S. Thomas's shrine at Canterbury that in one year the offerings amounted to £954 6s. 3d., while during the same period at our LORD's the offerings were nothing, and at our Lady's £4 1s. 8d. The arbitrary division of the Saints as patrons of different departments of life, so to speak, probably contributed in the same direction.

Popularity of S. Thomas of Canterbury.

The teaching still prevalent in some places among Romanists, which would make our Lady more merciful than our LORD, and direct the sinner to have recourse to Mary rather than to JESUS, is an error which cannot be denied, and whose effects are altogether deplorable.

Dangerous teaching in regard to the B. V. M.

These evils were most real, and we must be lenient in our judgment of those who thought that the only remedy was to remove the cultus of the Saints altogether. Such abuses, however, are not necessarily



"But the abuse of a thing doth not take away the lawful use of it."

To some souls invocation is especially helpful.

involved in the invocation of the Saints, and we may well desire to unite ourselves to the rest of Christendom in this practice, while keeping ourselves free from any misuse of it. As Bishop Forbes well says \*: "There are certain high-strung souls, of whose undivided and entire love to GOD there can be no doubt, whose intense personal devotion to our LORD is the warmest, and who realize His Passion in a measure into which our cold hearts cannot enter, to whom this devotion [to the Saints] is congenial. . . . There must, therefore, be some aspect of this practice which appeals to a very high part of our nature, and therefore well deserves our careful consideration."

\* P. 382.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### THE GENERAL JUDGMENT.

**I**T is an article of the Christian Faith that at the Last Day our LORD "shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead;" an article set forth in each of the three Creeds, and a special revelation of the New Testament. For although, as in the second and third chapters of the Book of Joel, the Last Judgment is foreshadowed in the Old Testament, yet we find there no direct prophecy of it; and it is nowhere clearly stated that this judgment shall take place beyond the grave, unless it be in Dan. vii. 10 and xii. 1-3.

**Introductory:**  
The judgment  
an article of  
the Creed,

In the New Testament, however, we are told with the greatest distinctness on many occasions, both by our LORD and His Apostles, of the Judgment of the Last Day.

and a special  
revelation of  
the New Test.

Lacordaire in his Conference on Reason points out that a belief in a final discrimination between good and evil, in a judgment to come, is implied in that sense of responsibility which is one of the properties of human nature. Every man, whether religious or not, believes that he is responsible for his actions; and this idea of responsibility postulates an occasion on which his account must be rendered, and one to whom it must be given.

Lacordaire's  
assertion that  
the sense of  
responsibility  
implies a  
judgment.

The judgment, like death, a most certain and a most uncertain event.

The death of the individual, and the day of the General Judgment of the world are alike in that each is a fact of absolute certainty, and yet that the time of the occurrence of each is most uncertain. Of the General Judgment our LORD says, "of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the Angels which are in Heaven, neither the SON, but the FATHER" (S. Mark xiii. 32), and S. Paul writes to the Thessalonians: "Yourselves know perfectly that the day of the LORD so cometh as a thief in the night" (1 Thess. v. 2). And on account of this very uncertainty we are constantly warned to watch, that is, to be always preparing for the coming of this great Day.

I Differences of the two judgments. If there be a particular judgment, what is the object of the general?

There is a question which is often asked in connection with the Judgment: If the fate of the soul is decided at the moment of death by the Particular Judgment, what is the object of the General Judgment? We can only answer this, of course, in part, and there may be purposes of which we have no conception; but it seems clear that, although their objects are quite different, the two Judgments are equally necessary.

1. Difference of purpose in the two judgments:—  
i. the first, to decide the destiny of the soul;  
ii. the second, to manifest three great facts:

The purpose of the Particular Judgment, as we have seen, is to decide the state of the soul for eternity; and this seems necessarily to take place at the moment of death, since the soul does not remain unconscious between death and the Last Day, and therefore its destiny must be immediately decided. But the purpose of the General Judgment is not to decide the fate of the soul, but to manifest to the whole world three great facts.

(1) The Justice and Love of GOD in His providential ruling of the world,

First, the Justice, Mercy, and Love of GOD as evidenced in His providential ruling of this world. In this life we are often unable to understand GOD's purposes when we see misfortunes happening to the good,

whilst the ungodly flourish "like a green bay-tree." But in the day of the General Judgment the reason of all these dispensations of God's providence will be made clear to the whole world, and God's Wisdom, Justice, and Love will be magnified by all.

Second, the Majesty of our Blessed LORD. At His first Advent He came among men as one Who was poor, and humble, and obedient. He put Himself into the power of man, and without resistance suffered all the indignities of His Passion, even to the death upon the Cross. And even since His Ascension into Heaven His Passion has lived on in His Church ; He has still patiently suffered the world to treat Him with contempt, to disobey His precepts, and to persecute His Church. But at the day of the General Judgment, when He shall appear with all His glory, He will manifest to all men His almighty Power, His eternal Majesty.

(2) the Majesty of our Blessed LORD,

Third, the glory of His elect. In this life the children of GOD, like their Master, often suffer injury and persecution. The world despises them. But in the day of His appearing they will receive the reward of their sufferings, the crown of glory which the LORD shall give to them that love Him. Then, too, the wicked and those hypocrites who have deceived the world by simulating virtues which they did not possess will be put to shame and confusion.

(3) the glory of His elect.

But all these things may be summed up in one, namely, that the General Judgment will be a manifestation of the absolute Justice and Love of God.

Again, we may observe that the General Judgment differs from the Particular especially in its completeness.

At the Particular Judgment the soul only is judged. In the General Judgment the body also will receive its sentence.

2. Differences in the two judgments :  
1. In the former, the soul is judged ; in the latter, body and soul.

ii. at the former, no other man present ; at the latter, every one ;

iii. the matter both of sin and of good works incomplete until the Last Day—

effects of S. Stephen's prayer,

of Boccaccio's *Decameron* ;

iv. the chief constituents of this judgment

Then, too, there is a completeness in the arrangements of the General Judgment which is wanting in the Particular. At this no one will be present to hear your sins and to know your sentence, except perhaps your Guardian Angel, and the devil. At the General Judgment all the world will be there, and the page will be opened on which your life is written, and all will be read out.

Again, there is a completeness in the matter of the General Judgment, which we do not find in the Particular. Our account is imperfect when we die, for though both our good works and our sins are ended, their consequences are not ended.

Think of the effects of the last good work in S. Stephen's life—the prayer which he said for his murderers ! To it we may trace S. Paul's conversion, and therefore all his glorious missionary work in preaching the Gospel throughout the world, and besides, all the good done to those whom his Epistles have helped in the centuries long after he had passed to his reward. How wonderful will be the fruit of some good works ! At the time when they were done they seemed insignificant, but GOD blessed them, and so they brought forth fruit in abundance.

The same is true of sins. A man writes a bad book, like the *Decameron* of Boccaccio. He may afterwards repent, as it is said Boccaccio did, but the world goes on reading the book, and souls are polluted and ruined. At the General Judgment the matter of all our sins and good works, with all their consequences, will be complete.

The constituents of the General Judgment are chiefly two : absolute truth, and entire completeness.

In the light of that great Day of CHRIST's appearing

all falsehood and deception will flee away, and every one will see himself, and be seen of all, exactly as he is.

are truth and completeness.

And besides, as we have shown, there will be a completeness in the nature of him who is judged. The Judgment will be both of the deeds done in the body and of the inmost thoughts of the soul. There will be a completeness in the matter of the Judgment ; all sins and good works, with their consequences, will be manifested. And there will also be a completeness in the arrangements of the Judgment ; all the world will be there.

In the New Testament the signs and circumstances of the Judgment are described with great minuteness.

II. The time of the judgment.

Although the time of the Judgment is hidden from us, there will be certain signs of its approach, such as the appearance of Antichrist, and a great falling away from the Faith, together with disturbances both of nature and society. It will be the Last Day, the end of the world, the end of the reign of grace, the beginning of the reign of glory.

“ And then shall appear the Sign of the SON of Man in heaven ” (S. Matt. xxiv. 30),—the Sign of that Cross on which He died to redeem mankind, that Cross the sight of which will overwhelm with confusion those who neglected so great a salvation.

Our LORD will come as the SON of Man, for “ the FATHER judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the SON ” (S. John v. 22), and will manifest to the world all the glories of that Human Nature which, hypostatically united to the WORD from the first moment of Its Conception, has been exalted to the right hand of God in Heaven.

III. The circumstances of the judgment.

The Judge will be attended by the armies of the Angels and by the glorious multitudes of the Saints.

His coming will be heralded by the Angels of Judg-

ment, who "with a great sound of a trumpet . . . shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other" (S. Matt. xxiv. 31).

Then will be set up the great white Throne, and the books will be opened, and the dead will be judged after the things which are written in the books, according to their works (Rev. xx. 11, 12).

At the sound of the Archangel's trumpet all the dead, both great and small, will arise, and in a moment those who are living will be transformed (1 Thess. iv. 16; 1 Cor. xv. 52).

A question concerning those who are living when CHRIST appears.

A question is sometimes asked concerning those who are living (and those who have but lately died) at the time of our LORD's appearing, and who, while in a state of grace, have not fully satisfied for their sins. In what way are they purified? While this is a matter of purely speculative theology, some have supposed that the fire spoken of by S. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 13), which "shall try every man's work of what sort it is" at the Day of Judgment, will be the agent of purification in such cases. Although it must be remembered that S. Paul is there speaking of the trial of the results of the work of the ministers of CHRIST, yet his words may be referred by accommodation to believers in general. This, of course, is a mere opinion in regard to a mysterious question on which we have no clear revelation.

At the General Judgment all souls will receive again their bodies—those bodies which were the instruments of their good works and of their sins.

IV. The subjects of the judgment: all men and the fallen angels.

Before the Throne "shall be gathered all nations" (S. Matt. xxv. 32); every one will be there. All will be judged, even those Angels that sinned and were cast down to hell, and delivered into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment (2 S. Pet. ii. 4).

The matter of the judgment will consist of all our deeds, for the Judge "will render to every man according to his deeds" (Rom. ii. 6); of all our words, for "every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the Day of Judgment" (S. Matt. xii. 36); and more, of even our inmost thoughts, for the LORD "will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts" (1 Cor. iv. 5).

An interesting question arises here: Do those sins which have been repented of, forgiven, and blotted out by the Precious Blood of CHRIST, form matter for the General Judgment, or are they passed over, as it were, in silence? This question seems first to have been raised (circa 1140) by Robert Pulleyne (*Sentent.*, lib. VIII., c. xxvii.), who replied that all sins, even those of the Saints, would be manifested at the Day of Judgment. Peter Lombard, however, took the opposite view. The more common opinion amongst theologians is that of Pulleyne, although they hold that such manifestation will cause no sorrow or shame to the Saints; that it will be rather a manifestation of their penitence and of GOD's Mercy.

We must remember in following the details which are so vividly described in Holy Writ, that they must not be interpreted only according to the letter and in a mere strict human sense. The images under which our LORD and His Apostles describe the Judgment are absolutely true, since they convey to our minds what the HOLY SPIRIT willed to convey, and yet they are only images of the events which shall take place in that great Day.

S. Thomas well remarks that most probably the Judgment will not be by utterance of words, but by a

V. The matter of the judgment:

1. deeds,  
2. words,

3. and thoughts.

Are the sins of the Saints known at the judgment?

Pulleyne's view;

Peter Lombard's;

the more common view.

VI. The manner of the judgment; the imagery of Holy Scripture true, but not to be taken literally.

1. The judgment probably not by words,



but by illumination.

certain illumination of the mind, and that therefore it will probably be instantaneous in its operation and in its execution.

2. The separation between the good and evil.

Then will come the separation between the good and the evil, between the sheep and the goats. "Then shall the King say unto them on His right hand, Come, ye blessed of My FATHER, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world;" and to those on the left hand: "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels" (S. Matt. xxv. 34, 41).

3. The sentence,

The sentence will be no sooner spoken than it will be executed. Immediately will come the end described in the Book of Revelation: "And the devil . . . was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, . . . and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever. . . . And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. . . . And whosoever was not found written in the Book of Life was cast into the lake of fire" (Rev. xx. 10-15).

and its execution.

Conclusion.  
The vision of heaven described by S. John.

Then, on the other hand, will be seen "the Holy City, new Jerusalem, coming down from GOD out of Heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband," and "a great voice out of Heaven" will be heard, "saying, Behold, the tabernacle of GOD is with men, and He will dwell with them, and they shall be His people, and GOD Himself shall be with them, and be their GOD. And GOD shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away. And He that sat upon the Throne said, Behold, I make all things new. And He said unto me, Write: for these words are true and faithful (Rev. xxi. 2-5).

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### HELL.

**O**F all the subjects which have to be treated in dogmatic theology certainly none is so solemn, so unspeakably awful as that which forms the topic of our present chapter.

Introductory :  
The awfulness  
of the subject.

In approaching the discussion of the doctrine of eternal punishment one shrinks from attempting to teach in a matter in which every word must be most carefully weighed, in which on the one hand one has to avoid the exaggerations that have crept into the opinions of theologians and on the other to realize the danger of diminishing aught of the awful truth revealed by our Blessed LORD to His Church and which the HOLY GHOST has unfolded in her teachings.

The general tendency in our own day is to pass over this solemn question, or where it is treated at all, to minimize or to deny the doctrine of Hell, or else to substitute for it some human theory unknown either to Scripture or the Church. This tendency naturally belongs to an age characterized by lax views of morality and extreme impatience of all restrictions of authority. Under the influence of this spirit it is easy to overlook or fail to realize the tremendous and awful responsibility incurred by those who put into the background or explain away a doctrine not only especially revealed by our LORD Himself, but which occupies so

Tendency of  
the age to pass  
over or tamper  
with this  
doctrine.

The responsi-  
bility of ex-  
plaining away  
what is clearly

revealed by our  
LORD.

prominent a position in His teachings as does the doctrine of eternal punishment.

The trend of teaching in such an age will be to dwell upon the easy side of the Gospel of CHRIST, to enlarge upon the love and mercy and long-suffering of GOD, the gentleness and kindness and sympathy of our Blessed LORD's utterances, and to forget that it was part of His kindness to foretell, as He did in words of almost exceptional sternness, the punishment which awaits the impenitent.

Nearly all we  
know of hell  
comes from  
the lips of  
CHRIST,

At the risk of anticipating what must presently be dealt with more fully, we would draw attention at the outset to the fact that nearly all we know of Hell comes from the very lips of our Blessed LORD, and that it depends not upon a forced interpretation of some one text, but that side by side with His words of pity and yearning and love are found the most uncompromising declarations of the fate of the impenitent.

Who teaches  
this doctrine  
again and  
again.

It is our LORD Who says that those on the left hand shall go "into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels" (S. Matt. xxv. 41); Who speaks, not once, nor twice, but thrice of the worm that dieth not and the fire that is not quenched, and warns us that it is better to cut off the hand or the foot, or to pluck out the eye, and enter into life maimed, than to be cast into hell fire (S. Mark ix. 43-48); Who tells us of the "outer darkness" and the "weeping and gnashing of teeth" (S. Matt. viii. 12); Who exhorts His disciples that they "fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in Hell" (S. Matt. x. 28).

Our LORD  
knew exactly  
in what sense

When we remember that our Blessed LORD knew exactly in what sense His words would be understood

by His Church, and indeed promised that the Comforter, the HOLY GHOST, Whom the FATHER would send in His Name, should teach His Apostles (and in them the Church) all things, and bring to their remembrance all things which He had spoken (S. John xiv. 26); and when we further find in both East and West an entire consent in teaching the doctrine of everlasting punishment, it does seem rashness amounting to presumption to weaken or change this teaching to suit the refined sensibilities of an age whose moral sense is not shocked at sin, but is greatly scandalized at the revelation that the consequences of sin may to the sinner be eternal.

the Church would understand these words.

Hell has been defined as the place and state in which the devils and such human beings as die in enmity with GOD suffer eternal punishment.

I. Proof of the existence of hell.

The Old Testament contains few direct and clear announcements of a life beyond the grave, so that we should not expect to find in it many proofs of the existence of Hell. Three passages, however, are quoted as bearing on this point: Isa. xxxiii. 14; lxvi. 24; and Dan. xii. 2. It is doubtful whether the first can fairly be applied to more than the temporal punishment of the Assyrians and the sinners among the Jewish nation, to whom Isaiah evidently refers. The other two are more definite, especially the last, where Daniel says that "many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt."

1. The Old Test. :

Isa. xxxiii. 14;  
lxvi. 24;  
Dan. xii. 2.

In the deuterocanonical books we find two passages in which the second text from Isaiah is applied more definitely to the future sufferings of the wicked. In Ecclesiasticus (vii. 16, 17) we read: "Number not thyself among the multitude of sinners, but remember that

Two passages in the deuterocanonical books:

Eccius. vii. 16,  
17;

wrath will not tarry long. Humble thy soul greatly : for the vengeance of the ungodly is fire and worms." Judith xvi. 17; And in Judith xvi. 17, we read : " Woe to the nations that rise up against my kindred ! the LORD Almighty will take vengeance of them in the day of judgment, in putting fire and worms in their flesh ; and they shall feel them, and weep for ever."

both applying  
Isa. lxvi. 24.

The views of  
the Talmud-  
ists.

This last passage has a special importance from an historical point of view, because, as is well known, the Talmudical Doctors disputed whether immortality and resurrection were common to the bad and good, or reserved only for the latter, and again, whether any but Israelites attained to the future life. This text from the Book of Judith speaks clearly on this question. And further our LORD evidently is referring to this passage of Isaiah in S. Mark ix. 44, 46, 48.

2. In the New Test., hell is unmistakably revealed; it has a special name, Gehenna; and a long series of passages refers to it.

In the New Testament the revelation of Hell as a place of eternal punishment is clear and unmistakable. It has a special name, Gehenna, which occurs no less than twelve times. It is not necessary here to give a list of the many passages in which it is referred to in the New Testament. Admitting that in those in the Book of Revelation it is described under poetical imagery, we have, as we have already shown, abundant teaching in the clearest terms from the very lips of CHRIST Himself.

3. The testimony of the Church : in the Athanasian Creed, which is authoritative in the Latin and English Communion ;

If we turn from the testimony of Holy Scripture to that of the Church, we find that this doctrine forms part of the Athanasian Creed : " At Whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies : and shall give account for their own works. And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting : and they that have done evil into everlasting fire." This Creed is the authoritative teaching of both the Latin and English Churches.

In the Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church, in answer to the question : " What are we to think concerning those who depart hence under the wrath of God ? " we read : " Of these some after the Last Judgment will be punished with greater, some with lesser torments, but both will be without end " (Quest. 63). And again : " Where is the place of those souls who leave their bodies under the displeasure of God ? " Answer : " Many names are given to that place which is called Hell, into which the devil, when thrust out of Heaven, was driven. To this place go down the souls of all those who die at enmity with God and under his wrath, and here are they damned " (Quest. 68).

in the Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church.

If we turn now from the fact of the existence of Hell to the nature of the punishments of Hell, we can speak with less certainty. All theologians agree that the lost souls will suffer " the pain of loss " (*pœna damni*), that is, the deprivation of the Beatific Vision and of all those good things which belong to it. This means that the souls in Hell are deprived not only of the Vision of God, but of the friendship and society of our LORD, of the Saints and Angels, of all earthly friends and relations, both natural and spiritual, who are in Heaven ; and of all those ineffable joys which GOD has prepared for those who love Him.

II. The nature of the punishments of Hell.  
1. All agree in regard to the "*pœna damni*;" what this involves.

This *pœna damni* follows with certainty from our LORD's saying, " Depart from Me, ye cursed." To realize the bitterness of this punishment one must remember that the soul by its natural constitution tends to GOD as its true and final End, and when after death all the secondary allurements of the creatures are removed, it has no other attraction but GOD alone. Then again, at the Day of Judgment it has seen our LORD in

all the Majesty and Beauty of His glorified Humanity ; it has learned, when too late, to long to possess Him Whom it has come to know as its only happiness. This insatiable craving for GOD, with the sense of separation from Him, is the chief element in the *pœna damni*.

2. The common opinion that there is a "pœna sensus."

In addition to the *pœna damni* it is the common opinion of theologians, based upon our LORD'S revelation in Holy Scripture, that there is in Hell a *pœna sensus*, since our LORD tells us to "fear Him Which is able to destroy both soul *and* body in Hell." Besides, as the body has been the instrument of many of the sins we have committed, it seems fitting that it should receive its own special punishment.

No consensus in regard to the fire, whether material, or metaphorical.

The majority of theologians consider the fires of Hell to be in some sense material. Some of the Fathers, however, as S. Ambrose, Theophylact, S. Jerome, S. John of Damascus, and others, think that the fire is metaphorical.

3. The companionship in hell.

Among the punishments of Hell must be accounted the companionship of the devils and of other lost souls. Among these the lost will perhaps find partners of their sins, those who tempted them or were tempted by them, and mutual reproaches will be among the miseries of Hell.

4. The worm of remorse.

Then again, our Blessed LORD specially calls attention to the "worm" that "dieth not,"—the worm of remorse, of self-accusation ; the constant thought, "It was my own fault, my own choice ; I might have chosen Heaven !"

5. The duration of punishment the same for all, but of unequal severity.

While as regards duration the punishment will be the same for all, since it will be eternal, it will differ in severity according to the sins of each. This is taught alike by East and West.

Some theologians, too, admit what they call an "accidental mitigation" of this punishment on several grounds; first, because the punishment for venial sins will come to an end after a certain time, and also the temporal punishment due to mortal sins which have been remitted; so that S. Thomas \* thinks it probable that there will be some diminution of the punishment required by the justice of God.

Accidental mitigations;

diminution of punishment;

Other theologians and Fathers also hold that by reason of Divine Pity, not of Justice, there will be successive mitigations of the punishment of the lost: so that though they will always remain separated from God, their condition will become more tolerable. This view is permitted by S. Augustine, hinted at by S. Chrysostom, and plainly taught by S. John of Damascus. The reader is referred to an interesting passage on this subject in Petavius,† and to Note 3 in the appendix to Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, in which a special view of this question is discussed.

theory of successive mitigations.

Zaccaria in his notes on Petavius shows that both in the East and the West prayers for the lost were said in the Mass. He cites an ancient Latin Missal which contains a touching prayer for a person taken away without time for repentance, beseeching God, if the dead man's crimes make it impossible for him to rise to glory, at least to make his torments endurable.

Prayers for the lost in old missals.

We come now to the question of the eternal duration of the punishments of the lost, and as this is the point of attack in the present day, we shall, at the risk of repetition, briefly consider some of the arguments by which the Church's view is supported.

III. The eternal duration of hell.

And first, of course, we turn to Holy Scripture. As we have seen, in the Old Testament there are three

The testimony of Holy Scripture.

\* IV. Dist. xxiii., q. 1, a. 1-5.

† *De Angelis*, iii. 7.



1. The Old  
Test. ;

the deuterocanonical  
books.

texts,—Isa. xxxiii. 14, lxvi. 24, and Dan. xii. 2,—which more or less clearly teach the eternal punishment of the wicked. In the Books of Ecclesiasticus and Judith we find the passage in the sixty-sixth chapter of Isaiah elaborated and clearly applied to the future punishment of the lost. But what gives this text and that in the Book of Daniel their special force is that they form the basis, and supply the imagery of many of the utterances of our LORD and His Apostles on this subject.

2. The New  
Test.  
Three classes  
of texts.

i. Those that  
use the word  
*αἰώνιος* :  
2 Thess. i. 9 ;

If we pass now to the New Testament we find that the texts in reference to eternal punishment arrange themselves under three heads.

First, those which in describing the punishment use the word "eternal" (*αἰώνιος*). Among these are : "Who shall be punished with *everlasting* destruction" (2 Thess. i. 9). "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into *everlasting* fire, prepared for the devil and his angels ;" and again : "These shall go away into *everlasting* punishment : but the righteous into life *eternal*" (S. Matt. xxv. 41, 46). "It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into *everlasting* fire" (S. Matt. xviii. 8).

S. Matt. xxv.  
41, 46 ;

S. Matt. xviii.  
8.

ii. Those that  
speak of the  
punishments  
as having no  
end.

S. Mark ix.  
43-48  
(five times) ;

In the second class we may place those passages which speak of the punishments of the lost as having no end. "It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into Hell, into the fire *that never shall be quenched*" (S. Mark ix. 43. This expression occurs twice and "*is not quenched*" three times in this passage). "Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the Kingdom of GOD ?" (1 Cor. vi. 9). "They which do such things shall not inherit the Kingdom of GOD" (Gal. v. 21). "He will

1 Cor. vi. 9 ;  
Gal. v. 21 ;

burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire" (S. Matt. iii. 12; S. Luke iii. 17).

Under the third head we may arrange those texts which speak of the state of the lost and of the saved as unchangeable, so that there is for the lost no opportunity of penitence. The first of these is from the Old Testament. "If the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be" (Eccl. xi. 3). "He that shall blaspheme against the HOLY GHOST hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation" (S. Mark iii. 29). "Whosoever speaketh against the HOLY GHOST, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come" (S. Matt. xii. 32). "Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence" (S. Luke xvi. 26).

S. Matt. iii. 12;

S. Luke iii. 17.

iii. Those that speak of an unchangeable state:

(Eccl. xi. 3.)

S. Mark iii. 29;

S. Matt. xii. 32;

S. Luke xvi. 26.

In regard to the first set of texts it is objected, by those who do not receive the Church's teaching, that *αἰώνιος* does not necessarily mean "eternal;" that it simply implies a duration of time, and that the substantive from which it is derived is sometimes used for "an age."

The first class of texts.  
The use of *αἰώνιος* in the New Test.

In reply to this we may observe that the adjective occurs in the New Testament seventy-one times, of which perhaps two cases are doubtful, but all the others signify eternity. It is used of eternal life forty-four times; of Almighty GOD, His SPIRIT, and His glory, thrice; of the Kingdom of CHRIST, His Redemption, the Blood of His Covenant, His Gospel, salvation, and our habitation in Heaven, seven times; of the glory laid up for us, thrice; of our inheritance, consolation, and of a sharer of eternal life, seven times; of eternal

fire, thrice ; of punishment, judgment, destruction, four times ; from which we see that it is nowhere used in the New Testament as referring to the future, except of eternal life or eternal punishment.

The parallelism of everlasting punishment with everlasting life in S. Matt. xxv. 46.

Again, it is an unvarying rule of interpretation that a word which is used in two members of a sentence must have the same force in both ; and where our LORD says : " These shall go away into *everlasting* punishment : but the righteous into life *eternal*," the adjective *αἰώνιον* must have the same force in both places ; so that if we deny that the punishment is eternal, we must give up also the belief that the reward is eternal.

The second class of texts.

However, the doctrine of eternal punishment does not depend only upon those passages in which the word *αἰώνιος* is used, for in the second class of texts we have no less than seven instances in which the punishment is said to be without end. Here again we may notice an objection, that the adjective *ἄσβεστος*, which qualifies the word " fire," does not mean " inextinguishable," but only that which *de facto* is not extinguished. We can grant this without weakening our argument, for if the fire truly is not extinguished, the torments of the lost *de facto* will not cease.

The force of *ἄσβεστος* considered.

The third class of texts.

Again, we have the third class of texts, in which the state into which the soul passes at death is said to be unchangeable. We may observe here that it is the *state* which is unchangeable, and that within that state either of salvation or loss the soul may undergo change, but that it can never pass from that state into another.

An " unchangeable state " explained.

3. Two passages adduced in favor of Universalism : Acts iii. 19-21 ;

Against this array of texts two have sometimes been quoted as implying a final restitution of all things, when all men shall be saved. The first is : " Repent

ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the LORD ; and He shall send JESUS CHRIST, Which before was preached unto you : Whom the Heaven must receive until the times of restitution of all things " (Acts. iii. 19-21).

There is some obscurity in this text, but it certainly cannot be twisted into a support of Universalism. S. Peter is exhorting the Jews to repent in order that they may be able at the Day of Judgment to enjoy refreshment when all things shall be restored, or "made new."

the exegesis of  
the passage ;

There is not the slightest sign here of a repentance after the Day of Judgment ; indeed S. Peter exhorts the Jews to repent at once, that in the Day of Judgment they may be found in a state of grace. This will be made quite clear by a comparison of this passage with Rev. xxi. 1-5. And, besides this, it is evident that S. Peter has in mind a renewal and restoration which is to take place on earth and not in Hell, and before the Judgment, not after it.

The other text is : " And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the SON also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that GOD may be all in all " (1 Cor. xv. 28). The phrase which the Universalists attempt to pervert is " that GOD may be all in all ; " but a consideration of the context will show that this does not in any sense imply the salvation of all, but only that the lost and the rebel angels shall be subject to GOD and shall recognize His dominion. GOD is not to be " all in all " to CHRIST'S enemies ; on the contrary, S. Paul distinctly says in a previous verse that CHRIST is to put those enemies under His feet.

1 Cor. xv. 28 ;  
the context  
considered.

4. The testimony of the Fathers :

S. Polycarp ;

S. Justin Martyr ;

consensus of Fathers,

except Origen, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, and a few others. Origen's views :

He, denying the restoration of Satan,

If we turn from Holy Scripture to the testimony of the Fathers, we find that among the very earliest there was a clear understanding of the doctrine of eternal punishment. "Thou threatenest me," says S. Polycarp to the proconsul, "with fire which burns for an hour and so is extinguished, but knowest not the fire of the future Judgment and of that eternal punishment which is reserved for the ungodly" (*Martyrium*, § 11). S. Justin says, "CHRIST revealed beforehand that the devil will be sent into fire with his host and the men that are his followers, there to be tormented to an endless eternity" (*Apol.*, i. 28).

We have not space to quote further examples, but we may say that this is the teaching of all the Fathers, both East and West, with the possible exception of Origen, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, and one or two others who were influenced by Origen's teaching.

In his *De Principiis* (i. 6), Origen gives it as his opinion that even the devils will undergo a long course of purification and be saved at last ; and in his commentary on Joshua (Homily viii.) he asserts the same thing of men who have been condemned at the Day of Judgment.

The book, which contains most of the heresies known under the name of Origen,—amongst them the pre-existence of souls, and their subsequent restoration,—was unknown to the Church until translated by Rufinus, 398. It was written while Origen was yet quite young and before he had left Alexandria, therefore about 231.

One heresy involved in the doctrine of universal restitution, namely the restoration of Satan, he indignantly denied at the time in a public letter, wherein he

says : " Although they say that the father of malice and of the perdition of those who shall be cast out of the Kingdom of GOD, can be saved, which no one can say, even if bereft of reason ; " and again : " Of them [Israel] there will be a conversion even at the end of the world, then when the fulness of the gentiles shall come in, and all Israel shall be saved ; but of him who was said to have fallen from Heaven, not even in the end of the world would be any conversion " (*Opp.*, t. I., p. 5 ; t. IV., p. 634).

Origen taught the orthodox belief in his popular writings, and he is careful to state that what he said in the matter of the end, or consummation, was advanced " with great fear and caution, discussing and treating rather than laying down anything certain and defined." He was, however, condemned by name in the eleventh anathema of the Fifth General Council. Some think that Origen's name was a later addition, but Hefele defends its authenticity.

generally teaches the orthodox view, and distinctly disclaims any certainty in regard to Universalism ; condemned by an Ecumenical Council.

From this we may gather how little support the doctrine of Universalism has from the Fathers. It is stated only in a hesitating way by Origen, was condemned, and has not reappeared among any of the Church's theologians. We have already, by references to the Athanasian Creed in the West and the Orthodox Confession in the East, shown it to be the authoritative teaching of both East and West that the punishment of Hell is everlasting. The only arguments which are brought against this teaching are *a priori* arguments based upon the opinion of certain individuals concerning what GOD ought to do in punishing sin, as distinguished from what GOD has revealed that He will do.

Summary of authority against Universalism.

Before we proceed to speak of some of these modern

5. A warning against unwarranted representations of the doctrine.

theories in regard to the punishment of sin in another life, a word of earnest warning may be in place against attributing to the Church views on this awful subject which, though put forth by many individual writers in the Middle Ages, have certainly not received the authoritative sanction of the Church.

Extent of what the Church teaches.

All that the Church teaches is that for some souls and for the devils there will be a state of everlasting punishment. What proportion of our race will be saved or lost is not a matter of revelation, and therefore has no place in the Church's teaching.

6. Extenuating considerations;

We may be sure that GOD condemns no single soul unless He has first bestowed upon it full opportunity of securing a life of eternal happiness. It is a matter of faith that GOD desires the salvation of all men, and that in judging He will take into consideration the advantages and disadvantages which each soul has had. It may be that only those will be lost in whom GOD sees that there is no further possibility of good.

And when we say that those who die separated from Him by mortal sin are lost, we must bear in mind that we cannot authoritatively say who these persons are. Sins which seem grievous to us and which are materially mortal sins may be excused by ignorance or want of deliberation ; and even men who seem to end evil lives with evil deaths may nevertheless at the last moment be enlightened by GOD's mercy, perhaps just as their souls are passing out of their bodies, and so die in peace with Him.

While we should be most severe in the judgment of ourselves, and so leave nothing undone to ensure our own salvation, we should be most charitable in our judgment of others, praying for all, and hoping that GOD's Mercy may devise some means not inconsistent

with His Justice of saving those who appear to have forfeited salvation.

With respect to those who have not had the opportunities of Christianity—the heathen and the unbaptized—theologians teach that if they have lived according to the light of nature they will in eternity have a natural beatitude ; that is, while they have not the capacity to see GOD in His Essence in the Beatific Vision, yet they will share in GOD's goodness, will receive the beatification of all their natural powers, and will know and praise God as their Creator, seeing Him not immediately, but as manifested in His works.

the heathen and unbaptized may attain to natural beatitude.

This, to some extent at least, answers the difficulty in regard to the salvation of the heathen. Most distinctly we may say that those who live up to the light of nature are not consigned to the torments of Hell, although they may not attain to the full joy of the Beatific Vision. They do not, however, grieve at this deprivation, since, having no capacity for the Beatific Vision, they have no sense of what they have lost.

Newman, in his *Grammar of Assent* lays down the general principle that no religion can be from GOD which contradicts our sense of right and wrong ; but, while fully admitting this, he points out that we must first be certain that we have satisfactorily ascertained what the dictates of our moral nature are in the particular case before us, and then that we are applying them rightly.

7. The moral question involved. Newman on our moral sense and everlasting punishment.

In regard to those who consider the doctrine of retributive punishment or of Divine vengeance to be incompatible with true religion, he says that in order to maintain such a position " they have first to prove that an act of vengeance must as such be a sin in our own instance ; but even this is far from clear. Anger



and indignation against cruelty and injustice, resentment of injuries, desire that the false, the ungrateful, and the depraved should meet with punishment,—these, if not in themselves virtuous feelings, are at least not vicious. . . . The rule of morals is the same for all, and yet notwithstanding, what is right in one is not necessarily right in another. What would be a crime in a private man to do is a crime in a magistrate not to have done. Still wider is the difference between man and his Maker. Nor must it be forgotten that . . . retributive justice is the very attribute under which God is primarily brought before us in the teachings of our natural conscience. . . . We all feel the force of the maxim, *Audi alteram partem*, . . .” and “we read of a day when the Almighty will condescend to place His actions in their completeness before His creatures and ‘will overcome when He is judged.’ If till then we feel it to be a duty to suspend our judgment concerning certain of His actions or precepts, we do no more than we do every day in the case of an earthly friend or enemy whose conduct in some point requires explanation. . . . Moreover, when we are about to pass judgment on the dealings of Providence with other men, we shall do well to consider first His dealings with ourselves. We cannot know about others, about ourselves we do know something, and we know that He has ever been good to us and not severe. Is it not wise to argue from what we actually know to what we do not know?” \*

We must argue from what we do know to what we do not know.

But not only is retributive justice “the very attribute under which God is primarily brought before us in the teachings of our natural conscience,” but if we argue from what we know of man’s moral nature

\* Pp. 419-421.

we have surely no reason to suppose that an arbitrary forgiveness of sin would have the effect of arresting the downward course of a soul already deeply steeped in evil. Our experience certainly shows us that there is a time in the sinner's history after which the will becomes so weakened from indulgence in sin that nothing but a miracle of grace can effect restoration.

May not, therefore, what we call eternal punishment be only the necessary consequence of sin in a being to whom GOD has given a free will? The sinner has been striving all his life to live apart from GOD, Who is his true End, and the sentence at the Day of Judgment, "Depart from Me," is simply GOD's ratification of the sinner's deliberate choice.

Do not those who say that the idea of vindictive punishment outrages man's moral sense (since punishment should always be remedial) overlook the fact that man's moral sense of justice leads him in certain cases, and those not a few, to inflict punishment which is not remedial and is vindictive?

Take but one instance, the punishment of death for murder. While it may be pleaded that this punishment is remedial in the sense that it discourages others from committing that crime, yet no one can maintain that to put an *impenitent* murderer to death is in his case remedial. His death may be to others a strong deterrent from crime, but if he dies impenitent, the punishment is surely vindictive, and vindictive only, as far as he is concerned. Our instincts of justice were implanted in us by GOD, and are they not in this case in striking analogy to what GOD has revealed of his own attitude towards sin?

The testimony of thousands is that the revelation of eternal punishment is one of the strongest deterrents

No reason to suppose that a moral nature can be arbitrarily changed.

Eternal punishment may be only the necessary consequence of sin and free will.

The choice man's, not GOD'S. Vindictive punishment and our moral sense.

The power of this doctrine as

a deterrent  
from sin.

from sin, and therefore remedial in the case of all who will allow it to be remedial, and vindictive only towards those who, knowing the consequences, deliberately incur them.

IV. The principal modern substitutes for this doctrine.

1. Universalism ;

We need now do little more than mention the principal modern theories which have been put forth in antagonism to the Church's teaching about eternal punishment. They are three. First, Universalism, or the theory of a final restitution of all things. This view affirms that in the distant future every being who possesses a moral nature will be brought into voluntary subjection to GOD ; and, while it exists in various forms, it generally teaches that Hell is a sort of Purgatory in which the souls of the lost will by suffering have their moral nature changed.

its difficulties.

This is equivalent to saying that what GOD has been unable to effect in man by His Goodness and Love and the grace which He has abundantly bestowed, will be effected by the companionship of the devils and the lost in Hell ; so that in eternity, if one may say it with reverence, instead of singing the praises of the Redeemer Who died upon the Cross to save them, such souls would proclaim the efficacy of Hell to accomplish what grace had failed to do.

A further difficulty is that we cannot conceive in what manner the companionship of the devils, and perhaps of the vilest of the human race, can work a moral improvement. Indeed, our experience in this world would lead us to the very opposite conclusion.

And yet again, this view demands the existence in eternity of both time and change, both of which are contrary to the definition of eternity ; so that, apart from its other difficulties, Universalism is simply unthinkable.

The second view, which is generally known as "Probation after death," teaches that for those at least who have had little opportunity of salvation in this life there will be a further period of probation beyond the grave.

2. Probation  
after death ;

We need only say that there is not the slightest warrant for this in Holy Scripture, and that it is contrary to the teachings of the Church ; and further, that its practical results would be most immoral, since in many cases it would encourage sinners to put off repentance and amendment of life, in the hope of some further opportunity of grace.

its immoral  
influence on  
sinners.

The third view is called by its adherents "Conditional immortality," or "life in CHRIST." According to this theory all men are naturally mortal, and their survival after death is no natural endowment of man, but is a gift bestowed on him through JESUS CHRIST. Man as originally created might have avoided death by eating of the tree of life, but this condition of things, in consequence of the sin of Adam, now no longer exists. Yet, as the result of the Incarnation, all men will be raised again in their bodies and rewarded or punished according to their works, the wicked passing into a state of suffering which will ultimately destroy them. In other words, this is the theory of annihilation.

3. Conditional  
immortality, or  
annihilation ;

While the body of man may be naturally mortal and may have needed the tree of life to preserve it from physical death, revelation gives us no reason to suppose that the soul which GOD breathed into man is also mortal. For by this gift "GOD created man in His own image," which certainly does not suggest a mere conditional immortality ; but rather, as the Book of Wisdom (ii. 23) teaches: "GOD created man to be im-

unsupported  
by revelation,

mortal, and made him to be an image of His own eternity;" and this even the heathen recognized.

and contrary to what we know of the indestructibility of both matter and force.

Moreover, the theory of annihilation is contrary to our experience of the indestructibility both of matter and force, and certainly finds no support in either Holy Scripture or the teachings of the Church.

There are various modifications of these views, which we have not space to notice here.

V. Conclusion.  
1. Misbelief and disbelief in everlasting punishment compared with the first temptation of Eve.

In conclusion we would point out that to call in question the truth of GOD's revelation of the everlasting punishment of sin is no mere modern invention. We may trace it, more distinctly than most errors, to the father of lies himself, for it was the very method by which he seduced our first parents to sin. GOD had revealed to them that in the day in which they disobeyed Him by eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, they should surely die.

Satan first suggested a doubt as to whether GOD had really revealed this. "He said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" (Gen. iii. 1). When Eve replied distinctly: "Of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, GOD hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die" (verse 3), Satan replied by flatly denying the truth of GOD's revelation, and answered, "Ye shall not surely die" (verse 4).

The method, first to doubt the fact of the revelation,

GOD reveals a truth to man, that sin will be punished; and this truth is hard and unpleasant for man to believe. Satan first suggests a doubt, that perhaps man has misunderstood GOD, and that He really has never revealed any such thing. He first of all calls in question the *fact* of the revelation:—"Yea, hath GOD said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" And when this fails and he finds man convinced of the

*fact* of the revelation, he goes on to deny its *truth*, and says, "Ye shall not surely die."

then to deny its truth ;

From the first temptation of man to the last, Satan probably finds no method so efficacious as to hide from man at the moment of temptation the consequences of sin. GOD has revealed to us that the consequences of sin, unless it be repented of and forgiven, will be eternal. Satan suggests to one class of minds a doubt whether GOD ever has revealed this, and they labour to prove that there is no such revelation in Holy Scripture, and do this by trying to force an unnatural sense into one or two passages, and to explain away the natural sense of many others.

to deceive man as to the consequences of sin is always Satan's method.

With another class Satan is bolder, and persuades them that though it is clear that GOD has revealed this, it is not true. Man "shall not surely die;" GOD could not be so cruel, so unjust. In this way the greatest deterrent from sin is removed. For there can be little doubt that when a belief in everlasting punishment is given up, the greatest hindrance to sin is removed. If there is a possibility of a future probation, or of annihilation, or of a final restitution of all things, the sinner in his folly is tempted to say, "Then I will take my chance of this."

When we remember that almost all we know of the awful doctrine of everlasting punishment comes from the lips of our LORD JESUS CHRIST Himself, Who loved us and died for us, we shall hesitate to ask, "Hath GOD said this?" we shall refuse to admit that "man shall not surely die;" we shall realize that it was part of our LORD'S kindness to reveal to us this stern truth.

2. The revelation of hell is from the lips of CHRIST ;

it was part of His kindness.

If He had not done so, many souls that are now in Heaven would never have won their crowns. Many

With many of the saints fear was the first motive of repentance.

S. Augustine on the relation of fear to love.

of the Saints tell us of themselves, that it was the fear of Hell that first led them to repentance. Fear is not the highest motive for repentance, but it is very often the first, and leads on to love.

As S. Augustine says in commenting on the passage "Perfect love casteth out fear":—And yet the needle of fear must go before the thread of love, the needle piercing the sinner's hard heart, and then the thread of love gaining its entrance into that heart. And as the needle is drawn out, leaving the thread behind to keep the work together, so 'perfect love casteth out fear,' and binds the work together, binds the soul to GOD with the cords of that love.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### HEAVEN.

“ **E**YE hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him ” (1 Cor. ii. 9). S. Paul uses these words to tell us how impossible it is for us to comprehend the glories of Heaven. And the words come to us with peculiar force and authority when we remember that S. Paul was one of the very few to whom it was permitted, even while in his pilgrimage here, to see the glories and hear the voices in Paradise ; and that he himself records how in that rapture he “ heard unspeakable words, which it is not possible for a man to utter ” (2 Cor. xii. 4). Yet, while we cannot hope to describe the good things which the Blessed enjoy in the Beatific Vision, there is much in regard to it which we may gather from revelation.

Introductory :

None can now comprehend the glories of Heaven,

but revelation tells us much about them.

Heaven will be the working out of our life here.

Heaven will be the result of the working out of our life here. It will be the Beatitude of every faculty which has been developed, of all the senses which have been disciplined in this life. It will not be the mere admission into a place of surpassing glory, but it will be such a transformation of the powers of our nature as will enable us to drink in as from a river the joys of the Beatific Vision.

Heaven is a place and a state in which Angels and men enjoy the possession of God. It is not only a

Heaven is a place, as well as a state.



state, but also a place; since it is the special place in which the glorified Humanity of CHRIST, the Blessed Virgin, the Angels, and the Saints together dwell in the enjoyment of eternal Beatitude.

**Definition of Beatitude.**

S. Thomas defines Beatitude as "a perfect good which entirely satisfies our desires," and he shows that men cannot find Beatitude in created things, but only in the uncreated Good, that is, in the possession of GOD. For GOD, and GOD alone, is at once the First Principle from which we receive our being and all other good things, and the Final End to which our intellectual powers, rightly used, ceaselessly tend. But created good things, since they are finite and transitory, can never satisfy the desires of an immortal soul.

S. Augustine, after he had vainly sought happiness in created things, addressing GOD, says: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it rests in Thee."

**The glory of Heaven is twofold.**

The happiness of Heaven, which is also spoken of as the glory of Heaven, may be considered as twofold: the glory of the soul, and the glory of the body.

**I. The glory of the soul.**  
This consists in its union with GOD by an act of the intellect and of the will.

The Beatitude or glory of the soul in Heaven consists essentially in its vital union with GOD, and this union by some is thought to be perfected by a twofold act,—by the Beatific Vision, in which the intellect immediately sees GOD, and by a beatified Love, with which the will loves Him. By these two acts the Blessed possess and enjoy GOD.

**1. Definition of the Beatific Vision.**

The Beatific Vision has been defined as a distinct and intuitive, but nevertheless not comprehensive, knowledge of GOD as He is in Himself.

**It is distinct,**

It is distinct or clear, as differing from a knowledge of GOD acquired either by reason or by faith, since such knowledge has always a certain obscurity.

It is intuitive or immediate, in the sense that GOD is seen in Himself directly, and not through the medium of creatures. And thus the Beatific Vision is distinguished from abstract or deductive knowledge, for in these GOD is apprehended by effects, whilst in the Beatific Vision we see GOD directly and in Himself, as really present to the intellect.

We are not, however, able to see GOD, even in the Beatific Vision, comprehensively, since a finite intellect cannot perfectly comprehend GOD, Who is infinite.

In the Beatific Vision we see not only GOD's attributes, but His very Essence, GOD Himself, the Ever-Blessed TRINITY.

It is, of course, with the eyes of the soul, not with the bodily eyes, that GOD is seen. This follows from the fact that GOD is incorporeal. Nor can any created intellect in its own natural strength enjoy the Beatific Vision, for there is no proportion between the Divine Nature and the highest created intelligence.

As we have said, there will be a transformation or elevation of the natural powers of the soul to enable it to apprehend the Beatific Vision. For as the natural eye requires two things to enable it to see, the presence of an object, and light in order that the image of the object may be received, so the intellect in order to see GOD requires not only the proximity of the Divine Essence, but also an interior gift by which it is elevated to an act above its natural powers.

This quality in the intellect of the Blessed, theologians call the *light of glory*, a term which is used frequently in the Fathers, and which was adopted by the Council of Vienne. The light of glory bestows three gifts upon the intellect of the Blessed.

First, it raises it to a mode of apprehension altogether

intuitive,

but not comprehensive.

In the Vision we see GOD'S Essence ;

not, of course, with bodily eyes,

but by an elevation of the powers of the soul, through the bestowal of a special gift.

i. This quality is called the "light of glory." It bestows three gifts:

(1) it elevates the intellect,

Divine, so that they are able to know GOD directly and immediately, as He knows Himself.

(2) expands it,

Secondly, it increases the *capacity* of the intellect, so that it may be capable of immeasurable and unlimited good.

(3) directs and assists it.

Thirdly, it determines and assists the intellect in its apprehension of the Beatific Vision, as light enables the eye to produce, not the object which it sees, but the vision of it.

ii. The Saints differ in capacity for the vision ;

While the Saints in Heaven *all* intuitively behold GOD face to face, they do not all apprehend Him in an equal degree. The first part of this proposition requires no proof, since we are told again and again in Holy Scripture that we shall see GOD face to face and shall know even as we are known.

That we shall not all apprehend GOD in the same degree S. Paul clearly tells us when, speaking of the state of the Blessed after the Resurrection, he says : " One star differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead " (1 Cor. xv. 41, 42). And our LORD said : " In My FATHER'S house are many mansions " (S. John xiv. 2). Besides, Holy Scripture in many places declares that GOD will render to each one according to his works (Prov. xxiv. 12; S. Matt., xvi. 27; 1 Cor. iii. 8), and that " he which soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly ; and he which soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully " (2 Cor. ix. 6).

this difference depends chiefly on faithful use of GOD'S gifts here.

And this inequality follows from that difference of capacity in the soul which depends partly upon the talents which GOD bestowed upon it in creating it, but still more upon the fidelity with which those talents have been developed.

Their inequality, however, will be no cause of envy

amongst the elect; since each one will enjoy the Beatific Vision to his full capacity, and this for him will leave nothing more to be desired.

Two objects are seen in the Beatific Vision. The first is GOD Himself, as seen in Himself. The second is the creatures, which are known in GOD.

iii. Two objects are seen in the Vision :

The first object constitutes the essential, the latter the accidental Beatitude of the Saints. In the Beatific Vision we see GOD Himself; the FATHER, the SON, and the HOLY GHOST; Truth, Justice, Love, etc.

(1) GOD Himself,

The Blessed see, besides GOD, many other things, past, present, and future, and especially those which belong to their condition. In regard to this theologians have taught that the knowledge of each of the Blessed will be threefold.

(2) and the creatures in Him. This second knowledge is threefold :

First, *as elevated to the order of grace*, they will understand in a more perfect manner the mysteries in which they believed when they were upon earth; they will know the other Saints and their fellow-citizens in Heaven, and especially those whom they knew and loved on earth with a supernatural affection.

(1) The mysteries of the faith;

Secondly, *as part of the universe*, they will know all the laws of nature; and it is thought by some that those who in their work for GOD gave themselves to the study of any particular science will probably have special joy in penetrating the principles of that science.

(ii) the laws of nature;

Thirdly, *as individuals*, holding public or private office, each will know all those things which appertain to his former state. A Bishop, for instance, will see especially all that pertains to the government of the Church. A mother will perceive those things which relate to her children. Those persons and matters in which they were interested when they were on earth will remain special objects of care to the Saints in

(iii) individual interests.

Heaven, and they will pray for them. This last, of course, is before the Day of Judgment.

2. By an act of the will the Blessed love GOD perfectly.

i. The will is attracted to the highest Good, the intellect recognizing GOD as this ;

ii. the will is enabled to love GOD perfectly ;  
iii. the effect of this beatific love is twofold :

(1) Ecstasy,

(2) and perfect union with GOD.

From the intuitive knowledge of GOD in the Beatific Vision flows a perfect and beatified love, so that the Saints love GOD fully and perfectly, for S. Paul says : " Charity never faileth ; but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail ; whether there be tongues, they shall cease ; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away " (1 Cor. xiii. 8). The will is infallibly attracted to the highest Good. In the Beatific Vision the intellect recognizes GOD as the highest Good. Therefore the will reaches out to GOD with most burning and perfect love. As the light of glory is bestowed upon the Saints in Heaven to perfect the intellect and to enable it to know GOD absolutely, so in the Blessed the will is strengthened by the habit of Charity, which enables it to love GOD perfectly as the supreme Good.

Theologians teach that the effect of this beatific Love may be regarded as twofold : ecstasy, and union with GOD.

Ecstasy may be described as a state in which a man, so to speak, passes out of himself into the possession of the object of his love. Thus the Saints are so drawn to GOD in thought and affection that all thoughts and motions of self-love become entirely extinguished in them, and they are, as it were, dead to self, and live only to GOD ; seeking nothing but His glory, as S. Paul says : " I live ; yet not I, but CHRIST liveth in me " (Gal. ii. 20).

The other effect of beatific Love is perfect union with GOD. By this union the Saints are joined so closely to GOD through the sublime and perpetual contemplation of the Divine Essence (since they always behold the Face of GOD), and by continual imitation of the Divine

character and perfect conformity with the Divine Will, that they are in a sense transformed into God. Thus the Saints are so consumed with the love of God that they all seem to be absorbed or immersed in the abyss of Divinity, and yet without any loss of individuality, for they always remain distinct from Him.

Before we pass from this point we may observe that there is a controversy among theologians in regard to the essence of formal Beatitude. There are three principal opinions.

First, that of the Scotists, who hold that formal Beatitude consists essentially in the beatific Love.

Second, the opinion of the Thomists, who teach that formal Beatitude consists in the Beatific Vision alone; so that Love, although proceeding from the Vision and pertaining to the state of happiness, yet does not pertain to its essence.

Third, the view of some of the Jesuits, of whom Lessius and Suarez were the leaders. They, following S. Bonaventura, contend that Beatitude essentially consists both in the Vision and in the beatific Love, since the ultimate perfection of a rational creature consists essentially in an act both of intelligence and of will; for both faculties essentially constitute man; therefore in order that man may be happy both faculties must be perfectly satisfied.

We may sum up this part of our subject by saying that the Beatific Vision and the beatific Love of God are to the Saints an endless source of unspeakable joy and supreme happiness. As the Psalmist tells us: "They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of Thy house: and Thou shalt give them drink of Thy pleasures, as out of the river. For with Thee is the well of life: and in Thy light shall we see light" (Ps. xxxvi.

iv. A controversy as to the essence of Beatitude:

(1) the Scotist view;

(2) that of the Thomists;

(3) a Jesuit theory combining these.

Summary of this part of the subject.

8, 9); and again : " As for me, I will behold Thy presence in righteousness : and when I awake up after Thy likeness, I shall be satisfied with it " (Ps. xvii. 16).

And this glory and happiness can never be lost, for it is eternal ; from whence it follows that the Saints in Heaven are altogether sinless and unable to sin.

II. The glory  
of the body.

i. All men shall  
rise at the Last  
Day with their  
own bodies.

When our LORD comes to judge the world, " all men shall rise again with their bodies." \* Here we may observe two things : the one, that all men, that is, both good and evil, shall rise at the Last Day ; the other, that all men shall rise with their own bodies, the same bodies which were the instruments of their sins and of their good works on earth.

With what joy will the souls of the Saints be reunited to those bodies, and in that union receive an increment of Beatitude ! With what horror will the souls of the wicked be forced to take again those bodies, which, as they were the cause of many of their sins, will have their own special suffering and punishment !

i. The resur-  
rection-body  
will be perfect  
and entire,

ii. but no  
longer depend-  
ent upon the  
functions of  
animal life ;

Here we may observe, first, that all alike will rise with perfect and entire bodies ; they will be free from the effects of disease, and no part will be wanting.

Then, that these bodies will no longer be dependent upon the functions of animal life ; they will no longer need to eat and drink and sleep, nor will they generate ; all of which pertain to the animal body and not to the spiritual.

iii. and will be  
of perfect  
development.

It is commonly taught that the bodies of the Blessed, whether they were old or young when they died, in the Resurrection will be of perfect development, as in the prime of life.

S. Paul tells us of our body that " it is sown in corruption ; it is raised in incorruption : it is sown in dis-

\* Athanasian Creed.

honour ; it is raised in glory : it is sown in weakness ; it is raised in power : it is sown a natural [ψυχικόν] body ; it is raised a spiritual body " (1 Cor. xv. 42-44). From which passage we may learn the four properties of the risen body. For as the soul in Heaven has its endowments, namely the light of glory and the increase of Charity, so will the bodies of the Saints have their special gifts.

The endowments of the glorified body are said to be four : Impassibility, Subtlety, Agility, and Clarity.

Impassibility means freedom not only from death, but from all pain and suffering. This property of the risen body follows from S. Paul's words : " It is sown in corruption ; it is raised in incorruption." And, as S. Thomas tells us, this impassibility arises from the perfect subjection of the body to the rational soul, by virtue of which the soul communicates its own impassibility to the body.\*

Subtlety is that quality by which the bodies of the Saints are able to penetrate other bodies without injury either to themselves or to those bodies through which they pass. This attribute does not arise from absence of dimension or extension in the glorified body, but rather from the fact that these properties are so suspended that it is able to penetrate other bodies. Thus we find our LORD appearing in the upper chamber at Jerusalem on Easter Day, when the doors were shut for fear of the Jews. This property of the risen body seems to be implied in S. Paul's words : " It is sown a natural body ; it is raised a spiritual body." S. Thomas says that this arises from the dominion of the glorified soul, which " informs " the body ; whence the

2. The four properties of the glorified body, 1 Cor. xv. 42-44 :

i. Impassibility,—

its cause according to S. Thomas ;

ii. subtlety,—

its cause ;

\* S. Thomas, *Summa* ; supp., quæst. lxxxii., a. 1.

VOL. II.—29



glorified body is called spiritual, since it is altogether subject to the spirit.\*

iii agility,—

Agility is that endowment by which the risen body is able to transfer itself from place to place with the swiftness of thought, at the will of the soul, which property S. Paul implies when he says: "It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power." S. Thomas tells us that "the soul is not only joined to the body as its *form*, but as its *motor*, and in both cases it befits the glorified body to be entirely subject to the glorified soul, so that it may be apt and obedient to all the motions and actions of the soul." †

its cause;

iv. clarity,—

Clarity is that property of the bodies of the just which causes them to shine with the glory and beauty of Heaven, of which the Apostles had a glimpse when our LORD was transfigured, when "His Face did shine as the sun, and His raiment was white as the light" (S. Matt. xvii. 2). To this property of the risen body S. Paul refers in the words: "It is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory." And our LORD expressly foretells this in the parable of the Tares, when He says: "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the Kingdom of their FATHER" (S. Matt. xiii. 43). This brightness will be caused, as S. Thomas thinks, by the overflow of the glory of the soul upon the body. ‡

its cause.

III. Other elements of joy in Heaven:

i. The negative joys;

So far we have spoken only of the positive joys of Heaven, but revelation reminds us that there are negative joys also; that there shall be no more sorrow and suffering, no more doubts and fears, no more sin, no more death; for "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death,

\* S. Thomas, *Summa*; supp., quæst. lxxxiii., a. i.

† Ib.; supp., quæst. lxxxiv., a. i.

‡ Ib.; supp., quæst. lxxxv., a. i.

neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain : for the former things are passed away " (Rev. xxi. 4).

Then, too, in Heaven, as we have said, there will be no loss of our individuality. We shall not be merely swallowed up in one great ocean of goodness in which all personality will be lost, but we shall each drink in the joys of that Vision and shall be individually satisfied with it. S. John describes the souls of the just as precious stones in the foundations of the walls of the New Jerusalem, and proceeds to enumerate some of those stones (Rev. xxi. 18-21). They are not all the same, but each has its own individual colour, each its own special beauty. So will it be with the Saints in Heaven. There will be no monotony there, for no two Saints will be quite alike. Each will have his own special character, and that character will be largely the result of the discipline of earth.

The precious stones of earth are intrinsically only particles of worthless matter, and owe all their beauty and value to the forces which have acted upon them. The diamond is but carbon which has been crystallized by being subjected to certain forces ; the sapphire is mere clay ; the opal only sand. So the individual beauty of the Saints in Heaven will depend much upon the struggles of earth. The brilliance of their own special colour, so to speak, may have been produced by the struggle against some besetting sin which they loathed and strove against all their lives, and that struggle developed the special beauty of the soul in Heaven.

Colour in a creature depends upon the power it has of absorbing certain light-rays and reflecting others. So the beauty of the Saints is their power of absorbing

2. the individuality of the joys in Heaven,—

this implied in the imagery of S. John ;

3. the special glory of each Saint largely the result of the struggles of earth ;

the light of God's presence and, as it were, flashing back their acts of love.

**4. Heaven is eternal :**

And lastly, Heaven is eternal. In this life, to spoil every joy, is the certainty that it will not last. Here is ceaseless change. But "of His Kingdom there shall be no end" (S. Luke i. 33).

**Eternity defined.**

Eternity is not an infinite succession of years, but that which exists necessarily and has no beginning, no end, and no change. Eternity is distinguished from immutability, too, in that immutability is only the negation of change, while eternity expresses something more, duration and perseverance in being, together with the negation of measure. As S. Thomas says, "Eternity is a simultaneously full and perfect possession of interminable life." Eternity, therefore, is to time what immensity is to space. Both belong to God necessarily, because He is infinite and self-existing, and to the Saints in Heaven by virtue of their union with God.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY.

**W**ITHOUT attempting a scientific treatment of this vast subject, it is proposed in this last chapter to consider, from a practical standpoint only, some of the difficulties which hinder the study of theology among the Clergy of our Church, to investigate their causes and suggest the means by which they may be overcome. Introductory :

We have reason to be proud of the splendid work done of late years by some of our own scholars in the department of Biblical Criticism, work in its breadth and accuracy certainly not surpassed, probably not equalled, in any other country, and resulting in the complete overthrow of that school of German rationalists which would have left us as authentic only four books of the New Testament. Much excellent work, too, has been done on exegetical lines, and the commentaries of Lightfoot, Westcott, Alford, and others, in profound scholarship, deep reverence, and spiritual discernment, leave little to be desired. Excellent work done by English scholars in biblical criticism and exegesis,

Neither do we forget how much that is valuable has been done in another department, in editing ancient manuscripts and fragments, by Routh, Cureton, and others. in editing MSS.,

And we can point back to the splendid labours of such men as Hooker, Andrews, Overall, Montague, Laud, and in other departments of theology ;

Cosin, Beveridge, Field, Thorndike, Taylor, Butler, Paley, Sparrow, Bull, Pearson, Forbes (of Edinburgh), and others, whose scholarship gave rise to the saying, *Clerus Anglicanus stupor mundi*. We must, however, lament that the marvellous stores of learning possessed by our great divines should have been expended in controversies for the most part fruitless at the time, and entirely out of date to-day.

but Dogmatic Theology neglected.

I. The lack of knowledge of systematic theology among Anglicans.

The average priest has a good education, but theology as a science omitted.

But when we turn to the study of theology, in the department either of Dogmatics or Morals, the contrast is appalling, and we are obliged to admit with shame that systematic theology has been almost entirely neglected among us.

The average priest in England has generally received a far better education than the average priest in the Roman Church, and yet when it comes to a knowledge of the Queen of Sciences, Theology, the English priest has ordinarily no scientific acquaintance with the subject, although he is expected to spend his life in instructing others in it.

The result of this.

He has, of course, views more or less accurate in regard to the principal doctrines of the Church, but they are as a rule not co-ordinated, some doctrines being given undue scope, while others are scarcely grasped at all ; and of theology as a system, as a science, of the Catholic Faith in the due proportion of its component parts, but few have any clear conception.

The necessity of facing it.

This may seem a very sweeping statement, and one which, because it is unpopular, it is unwise to make. Our aim, however, must be truth, not popularity, and unless weak points be recognized and the cause of them investigated, they are never likely to be removed.

It is in no spirit of captious criticism, but with the most earnest desire to see the Clergy of our Church as

efficient teachers as many of them are brilliant examples of self-sacrifice and devotion in pastoral work, that we shall venture to examine the causes of the lack of accurate theological knowledge in our own times ; for when the cause of a difficulty is known, it is generally easy to find and apply a remedy.

There is little doubt that the original cause may be traced back to that right (or license) of private judgment which was the mainspring of protestantism at the Reformation, and from the effects of which we are only now recovering. This necessarily led to the neglect of any scientific study of theology, since neither the teachings of the Church nor the opinions of theologians were of any weight with those who believed themselves to be quite competent to decide the nicest points of theology, but who in following Luther and Calvin were not sufficiently logical to see that the treatises of Luther and the *Institutes* of Calvin were as much an infringement of this right of private judgment as was the *Summa* of S. Thomas.

While this was the root from which all the evil sprang, in our own time we find three secondary causes which to some extent may be considered its fruits, namely, lack of method in theological study, lack of English theological works, and inability to read Latin easily, at least among the majority of the Clergy. Let us consider these in order.

In the theological course of most dioceses and schools the department of dogmatic theology was, until quite lately, chiefly covered by two books, Pearson on the Creed, and Harold Browne on the Articles. While Pearson's work is most scholarly and admirable, and, with a few notable exceptions, thoroughly satisfactory so far as it goes, yet it was never intended to be a sys-

1. The root of the evil is the spirit of protestantism, which is the right of private judgment.

From this root three fruits have sprung :

1. Lack of method in theological study.  
(1) The books mostly used.  
(1.) Pearson on the Creed.

tematic treatise on theology, but only an exposition of the Apostles' Creed. A very large number of important theological subjects are not touched upon at all, and from the nature of the work no basis or rule of faith is laid down. It is simply a commentary on the various articles of the Apostles' Creed, and while, as we have said, most excellent, it is limited with respect to the ground it covers.

(ii.) The Articles; their value.

The Articles too are in themselves most valuable, especially as a bulwark against the rationalism of the present day, and they are far more Catholic than most people are aware. For example, while they condemn thirty-one doctrines very prevalent among Protestants, they condemn but four practices and not one doctrine of the Church of Rome, and they neither teach the distinctive doctrines of protestantism nor condemn the distinguishing doctrines and ceremonies of Catholicism.\*

Their defects as a manual of theology.

But as a manual of theology the Articles labour under two fatal defects. The one is lack of method, the other that they are largely taken up with the controversies of three hundred years ago. And indeed, the first defect is probably only the result of the second.

The purpose for which they were intended.

The Articles were put forth for a certain purpose,—not to teach theology, but in a time of intense theological controversy to lay down certain principles as those of the Anglican Communion. More than three hundred years have passed, and we have to-day to meet an entirely different set of difficulties and conditions.

The conditions to be met in the 16th century;

In the sixteenth century everyone dabbled in theology. A perfect babel of opinions was to be heard,

\* For an excellent and appreciative examination of the teaching of the Articles see Appendix to Percival's *Digest of Theology*, pp. 219-253.

the clamour of different schools of protestantism, and besides this not a little both of the teaching and practice of the Church was corrupted by superstition and that which superstition fed, a spirit of gain among the Clergy. At such a time it was necessary to define the position of the Church of England with respect to these false doctrines and unedifying practices.

To-day we have to deal with an entirely different state of affairs. Instead of theology being the one science in which every one is interested, there are but few who know anything about theology. What religion there is takes largely a practical turn, and though often mistaking philanthropy for charity, yet does try to minister to the misery and suffering of the poor. Its spirit is unconsciously the very opposite to that of the protestantism of the Reformation. Instead of faith being everything and good works entirely worthless, as the reformers taught, to-day good works are everything, while theological belief is often very hazy and therefore considered as an unimportant matter. This, of course, does not hold good of well-instructed Catholics, yet there can be little doubt that it is the spirit of the age, and a much more hopeful spirit to deal with than that which it has supplanted.

The need to-day, in order to utilize what is good and true of this, and to expose what is false, is clear dogmatic teaching on the great verities of the Faith. By this means we may counteract the evil done by the wild speculations of writers whose great aim is to be original, and who, unrestrained by the recognition of any authority greater than their own judgment, and unhampered by any knowledge of theology, often succeed in producing original views—views so original that we may well concede that they probably never be-

those to be  
dealt with  
to-day.

Our present  
need definite  
dogmatic  
teaching,  
to counteract  
false teaching



fore entered the mind of any orthodox Christian, although their germs may frequently be recognized among obsolete speculations of heretics.

and to satisfy  
seekers after  
truth.

But still more is clear dogmatic teaching needed to supply restless minds thirsting for truth with that which may satisfy their cravings.

A very large  
part of the  
teaching of the  
Articles is  
negative.

If we now return to our examination of the Articles, we find that a very large part of their teaching is negative. This indeed was rendered necessary by the very purpose for which they were drawn up. In the many controversies of the sixteenth century it was most necessary to tell men what they were *not* to believe in regard to Pelagianism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, Zwinglianism, the teachings of Congregationalists, Baptists, Quakers, etc., and the doctrines of certain *Romanenses*; the last named being a school in the Roman Church of that day, many of whose errors were likewise condemned by the Council of Trent.

An illustration  
from medical  
science.

But while these condemnations are most important in their place, they certainly do not form a good basis for a system of theology. What should we think of learning medical science from books principally taken up with disproving and condemning the errors of medical science in past ages—for example, which carefully refuted the Hippocratic theory of disease, that it is humoral, the body containing four humours, a right proportion and mixture of which constitute health, an improper proportion and irregular distribution, disease? Or from books which spent much time in proving that the Roman School of Asclepiades was mistaken in holding that all diseases depend upon alterations in the size, number, arrangement, or movement of the atoms of which, according to Epicurus, the body consists? Or the so-called Pneumatic School of Athenæus, by

which the normal as well as diseased actions of the body are referred to the operation of the *πνεῦμα* or universal soul? Or the theory of Paracelsus, that the human body is a microcosm, corresponding to the macrocosm, and containing in itself all parts of visible nature,—sun, moon, stars, and poles of heaven?

The examination of these theories would be most appropriate and interesting in a history of medicine, but students who had been trained chiefly in the refutation of them would not find their studies of much value to them when as physicians they had to deal with serious cases of disease. And so our theological students who have been through a course on the Thirty-Nine Articles, whilst they may be able to detect tendencies towards the various false doctrines against which they have been warned, have very often but little definite idea in regard to the positive doctrines which they need to teach.

If we examine Bishop Harold Browne's treatise on the Articles, as the book most generally used, we find that it is certainly a most "safe" book, in the sense that it avoids expressing any definite opinion on controverted questions. It has been called scholarly, we suppose because the few quotations from Latin and Greek are correctly translated, but with respect to theological scholarship it is difficult to see on what grounds its reputation rests, for it shows no extensive reading in theology, and indeed a singular unfamiliarity with the writings of the great theologians. Its chief value seems to consist in its indefiniteness, and the skill with which (except in regard to what are called "extreme" views) it leaves room for almost any opinion, and the man must indeed be a theological genius who from such a text-book could construct for himself a clear and definite theological system.

Such teaching belongs rightly to the history of the science.

The Articles form an unscientific basis for theological study.

An examination of Bp. Browne's treatise.

(iii) Martensen's "Dogmatics."

In not a few dioceses Bishop Browne's book on the Articles is supplemented by Martensen's *Dogmatics*, which candidates for the Ministry are advised to read. We must realize that Martensen is a Lutheran, and therefore that his whole treatise is more or less permeated by the Lutheran heresy (to the evil tendencies of which we have especially drawn attention in Chapter IX.), and that in addition to this he is the inventor of a heresy in regard to our LORD'S Person, which goes under the name of the Martensen theory of the Kenosis, and which has been described on pages 182 and 183.

(2) The practical result of studying such books.

Is it then wonderful if, from an English Bishop who avoids teaching anything definite, and from a Lutheran who teaches some very definite heresy, the unsophisticated student derives somewhat chaotic ideas of the science of theology, and later comes to find that much which he has learned is false doctrine, and that he needs to study theology again from the beginning, and on a very different basis?

The lack of method leads to unbalanced views of truth,

If, however, we pass over both what is indefinite and what is erroneous in such teaching, there still remains the lack of method, which leads to a disproportionate view of truth; doctrines being considered separately, as though they were not each of them a necessary part of the great body of truth, the Catholic Faith.

Here we may quote from Bishop Burnet, whom no one will suspect of Catholic views. In his work entitled *Discourses of the Pastoral Care*, he says: "A system of divinity must be read with exactness. . . . Here is a vast error in the first forming of our Clergy, that a contempt has been cast on that sort of books. . . . The throwing off of these books makes that many who have read a great deal, yet have no entire body of divinity in their head. They have no scheme

or method, and so are ignorant of some very plain things, which could not have happened to them if they had read and digested a system."

This has not only been the most fruitful source of actual heresy, but it leads to an unbalanced and illogical grasp of truth. There are some, doubtless, who regard this as an advantage ; for not a few among our Clergy dread nothing more than the application of logic to theology, because they feel (and justly) that the conclusions of logic carry them irresistibly on to doctrines which, because they are unpopular, they are not prepared to teach, and would therefore very much prefer not to hold.

There are others, too, (like the Kenotists,) who earnestly warn us against bringing logic to bear on theological truth, since such application has resulted, they tell us, again and again in heresy ; and in support of this they generally instance Arius. Their objection to it probably arises from an unpleasant apprehension that their own pet heresy would not for a moment stand the application of logic. But what is logic ? A well-known definition is, *Logica est ars recte utendi ratione*. Those who object to the "right use of reason" in the investigation of truth lay themselves open to the suspicion of having an uncomfortable conviction that such a process would be fatal to their own views, and that this is the motive of their solemn warnings against the application of logic to theology, by which they mean their own peculiar theology.

In theology, for a conclusion which is *de fide* both the premises must be drawn from revelation and so declared by the Church ; and even for a theological conclusion (as we have seen, page 153) one premise must be a revealed truth, and the other must be a truth

as well as to actual heresy.

(3) Some object to logic in theology, from fear of unpopular doctrines ;

others because it is fatal to their special views.

Definition of logic.

Logic applied to heresy.

known in some other manner, that is, known to be true.

The "reductio ad absurdum" fatal to heresy.

Now logic has a method of exposing the falsity of premises which is called the *reductio ad absurdum*, when from certain premises a conclusion follows contradicting some other known truth. This method, so often used in Euclid, is the *bête noire* of heresy, but one of the most valuable tests of truth in the Church.

Heresy generally starts from false premises.

The trouble with heretics is generally that their premises are false, and therefore their conclusions untrue ; but this is not the fault of logic, and it is part of the province of logic to expose such errors.

Logic has its limits.

It is quite true that logic, like human reason, has its limits, but within those limits we entirely deny that it has ever led to heresy ; and beyond those limits it ceases to be logic, for it is then the *wrong* use of reason.

ii. Lack of theological works in English.

The second cause, itself a result of the lack of method in theological training in the past, is the very small number of treatises on theology in the English language, and the fact that many of those we have deal with their subject in an exaggerated and disproportionate manner, or else are so inaccurate as to be worse than useless.

By this we mean that many works which are really learned and accurate treat their subject as though it had no relation to theology in general, and so often give their readers an impression that the subject occupies a far more important place in theology than it really does, and thus perhaps they lead others to still greater exaggeration in regard to it. We thankfully recognize that there is an increasing number of really valuable theological works, to which this criticism does not apply, but these are, we believe without exception, on special subjects.

On the other hand a large number of books are so inaccurate as only to lead astray those who follow them. These for the most part are written, as we have said, by men whose great desire is to be original, and whose flights of imagination are quite unfettered by any knowledge of scientific theology.

Hence at times an attractive theory becomes very popular because it has appeared in a new book, or has been taught by some popular preacher, but after it has been quite widely adopted some one discovers that it is a condemned proposition, harmless, perhaps, in itself, but condemned because it conflicts with some article of faith. This last class of books is, of course, productive of nothing but harm.

The constant reading of books of the former class by those who have little systematic theological knowledge results very much as when in music a person picks out a tune by ear, and then, delighted with it, another, and so on until almost anything can be played by ear, two unfortunate results generally following : first, that however well the harmonies may sound to uncultivated ears, they are practically certain to contain false progressions ; secondly, that those who learn to play thus by ear never can become thorough musicians. So it is with a large number of our Clergy, who have picked out this doctrine and that doctrine, as various books came out, without any real grasp of the true place of each in the great body of theology, or its right relation to other doctrines. If this course is persevered in long enough, it becomes almost impossible for a man to get that theological insight and judgment without which he can never be a good theologian, and which is really the power of grasping a truth in the place where it should stand in relation to the whole body of truth.

iii. Inability  
of the Clergy  
to read Latin  
easily.

A third cause of lack of theological knowledge is the inability of most of the Clergy to read Latin easily. While most have had what is called a classical education and have spent a good deal of time over Latin grammar and a critical study of some of the best Latin authors, very few can read Latin as readily, for instance, as they can read French.

Now nearly all theological works of value are written in Latin, just as most heretical works are written in German. Apparently from this very reason German theology is generally translated into English and sown broadcast (like the tares in the parable), while the Latin books are left in their original tongue. It is surely most suggestive that (to take but one publisher), in Messrs. Clark's *Foreign Theological Library* alone, 134 volumes have been translated, all of them the works of schismatics or heretics, some of them quite valuable, but scarcely any without serious theological errors.

On the other hand, so far as we are aware there is not in existence the translation from the Latin of one work on dogmatic theology. There are translations of some ascetical works, of patristics, homiletics, histories, etc., but (to take what is admitted on all sides to be the greatest of such works) no translation of the *Summa* of S. Thomas, or indeed of any other work on scientific theology.

If these facts be true (and we have not intentionally overstated them), we must consider what can best be done to meet and to alter this condition of affairs.

To take the last point first: since we cannot get translations of Latin works, we must learn to read Latin readily, which, for those who have a good knowledge of the grammar of the language, requires only a

2. The remedies  
for our  
lack of theo-  
logical  
knowledge:  
1. A practical  
knowledge  
of Latin;

little patience and perseverance. Theological Latin is extremely easy, and in a very short time one who practises reading Latin will find no more difficulty in it than in reading French.

Secondly, a good general outline of theology should be mastered, a sort of panorama of the ground afterwards to be studied in detail.

ii. mastery of a good outline of theology.

The simplest and most perfect sketch of universal theology is to be found in the *Summa* of S. Thomas. Like most things that are perfect, it is extremely simple. He divides the whole subject into three parts. In the first he considers GOD as He is in Himself; in the second as He is in the creatures, their Beginning and End; in the third he considers the movement of the creatures themselves towards GOD through CHRIST and the Sacraments. In the First Part, which contains 119 Questions, he treats of GOD, the HOLY TRINITY, the world, Angels, and men. The Second Part has two subdivisions. In the *Prima Secundæ*, which consists of 114 Questions, S. Thomas treats of beatitude, human acts, passions, habits, virtues, sins and vices, laws, grace, and merit. In the *Secunda Secundæ*, containing 189 Questions, he discusses the theological and cardinal virtues, their opposite vices, gifts (or *gratia gratis data*), divisions of life, and the duties and various states of men. In the Third Part he treats of the Incarnation, the life of CHRIST, and the first three Sacraments. This part, which contains 90 Questions, was interrupted in the midst of the treatment of the Sacrament of Penance, by the death of S. Thomas. The *Supplementum* of the Third Part, which is taken from S. Thomas' Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, completes the work, and in a series of 99 Questions concludes the Sacrament of Penance

The divisions of the "Summa" of S. Thomas.



and treats of Extreme Unction, Orders, Matrimony, the Resurrection, the Last Judgment, the Saints, and the lost.

When we have obtained a good grasp of this outline, special attention should be paid to the great verities, especially to the Being and Attributes of God, which are often passed over quickly (a great mistake); then the Incarnation; then some clear knowledge of man in his natural, restored, and supernatural state, and of his gifts and endowments; then of the Sacraments, and lastly of the less important teachings of the Church.

II. Latin theological treatises.

As we are writing chiefly for beginners in the study of theology, we shall venture before concluding the chapter to make some suggestions with respect to those books of Latin theology which will be found most useful. We must, however, confine ourselves to a few only out of many valuable works.

General works:  
Schouppe,  
Hurter,  
Tanqueray,

Franzelin,  
Perrone.

For a general survey of the whole ground we would recommend Schouppe's *Elementa* (2 volumes octavo), Hurter's *Theologiæ Dogmaticæ Compendium* (3 volumes octavo), Tanqueray's *Synopsis Theologiæ Fundamentalæ atque Dogmaticæ* (4 volumes octavo, the last not yet issued), Franzelin's *Works* (8 volumes octavo) and Perrone's *Prælectiones* (8 volumes octavo). The last work, which does not follow the ordinary scholastic method, is especially valuable for the appendix which follows each chapter, in which are answered the objections ordinarily brought against the teachings of that chapter.

Gousset (in French).

Any one of these works would afford a good general view of theology. Schouppe is the shortest, Tanqueray the most recent. For those who cannot read Latin Cardinal Gousset's *Théologie Dogmatique* (in French) may be useful.

Of course above all the *Summa* of S. Thomas should be read, but although its Latin is very easy, yet the fulness of treatment of the various subjects makes the work somewhat long. It would perhaps be well to read in full the Third Part, which treats of the Incarnation and the Sacraments, and only articles of special interest in the other two parts.

The *Promptuary* of Ferraris is an excellent work for theological reference. It is a five-volume folio, but can often be obtained for a very moderate sum of Mr. Baker\* or of some other good theological bookseller.

The best modern treatment of the Sacraments is perhaps that of De Augustinis, *De Re Sacramentaria* (2 volumes octavo). There is a shorter and less valuable work which covers the same ground by Billot, *De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis* (2 volumes octavo).

Among special treatises may be mentioned Gasparri's works, *De Ordinatione*, *De Matrimonio*, *De Eucharistia* (each in 2 volumes octavo); Mazella's *De Gratia* (1 volume octavo); Denzinger's *Enchiridion*, a most useful manual of creeds, canons, and decrees; and the *Manuale Ecclesiasticorum*, which (while not belonging strictly to dogmatic theology) contains the principal decrees of the Sacred Congregation in regard to practical questions.

With the exception of S. Thomas and Ferraris all these treatises are modern and of comparatively small size. For those who have the opportunity of reading them the three great works are (1) the *Disputationes* of De Lugo (8 volumes large octavo), who next to S. Thomas was perhaps the greatest theologian of the Church, though unfortunately he died before his work had extended to the whole ground of systematic theology.

\* 1 Soho Square, London.

S. Thomas.

Ferraris.

Special works  
on the Sacra-  
ments:  
De Augustinis,  
Billot,

Gasparri.

On other sub-  
jects, Mazella,  
Denzinger,

"Manuale  
Ecclesiastic-  
orum."

The three  
great theolo-  
gians after S.  
Thomas:

De Lugo,

Vasquez,

(2) Vasquez (9 volumes folio), called "the Augustine of Spain," whose works, while not to be followed without caution, are especially valuable as containing a discussion of the opinions of theologians of his own time and some centuries before, so that in reading Vasquez we have many most interesting theological opinions brought before us.

Suarez.

(3) Suarez (30 volumes large octavo), in some sense the prince of theologians; his works, admirably indexed, form a very library of theology.

Other able writers: Bellarmine, Estius, Petavius, Tournely, Billuart. Roman works untrustworthy on two subjects, Papal claims and Cultus of B. V. M.;

Bellarmino, Estius, Petavius, and Tournely are also interesting and helpful, and we may find much that is useful in Billuart's *Commentary on S. Thomas* (10 volumes octavo).

Roman books must of course be read with a realization that there are subjects in which they cannot be followed. These, however, are much fewer than might be supposed. Indeed, they may be reduced to two, the Papal claims and the cultus of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and even in regard to the latter the most objectionable teachings are found not in works on dogmatic theology, but in devotional manuals.

The Papal claims and all that is based upon them must be looked upon with suspicion or absolutely rejected; but outside of this there is very little in Roman theology (except when written for controversial purposes) which need trouble us.

but Roman dogma far more conservative than practice.

The more objectionable doctrines and practices of modern Romanism are generally passed over, and theological opinion is much more conservative in dogmatic treatises than theological practices on the Continent would lead us to suppose.

Examples:  
S. Thomas,

For example, it is doubtful whether in S. Thomas anything could be found which could be called purely

Roman, and even his commentator Billuart does not hesitate to express disagreement with the teachings of Popes. Thus, to give an instance, in treating of *Matrimonium Ratum* he refuses to admit the power of the Pope to dispense, and to those who advanced the argument that many Popes had so dispensed he replies that "the action of Popes does not constitute an established law," quoting the saying of Dominic de Soto, *Factum pontificum non facit articulum fidei*; and further, to those who brought forward the dispensations granted by Martin V., Paul III., Pius IV., and Gregory XIII. he boldly answers, "To these Pontiffs I oppose Alexander III., Innocent III., and Nicholas I., who neither recognized nor admitted that they possessed this power." \*

Billuart.

Inasmuch as but few theological and ecclesiastical writers are included in ordinary encyclopædias of biography, a table of the principal writers of the Church, arranged under the centuries in which they flourished, has been added as an appendix to this chapter.

Conclusion.

A table of ecclesiastical writers added.

We would guard against being understood as in any way desiring to discourage the use of the works of English divines who are really learned and orthodox. We would only deprecate the study of books on special subjects *before* the student has really mastered some general treatise on dogmatic theology.

No desire to discourage the study of English divines.

\* Vol. X., pp. 168-170.

## A TABLE OF THE PRINCIPAL THEOLOGIANS AND WRITERS OF THE CHURCH.

### I. EASTERN AND WESTERN WRITERS.

First Century : \* Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Hermas.

Second Century : Ignatius, Polycarp, Papias, Aristides, Justin, Athenagoras, Apollinaris, Melito, Dionysius of Corinth, Hegesippus, Tatian, Irenæus, Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Minucius Felix.

Third Century : Ammonius of Alexandria, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian, Dionysius of Alexandria, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Victorinus of Pettau, Hesychius, Pamphilus.

Fourth Century : Lactantius, Arnobius, Methodius of Tyre, Eusebius, Hilary of Poitiers, Athanasius, Ephrem Syrus, Diodorus of Tarsus, Basil of Cappadocia, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gaudentius, Pacianus, Gregory Nazianzen, Paulinus of Nola, Ambrose, Chromatius, Rufinus, Chrysostom.

Fifth Century : Gregory of Nyssa, Prudentius, Sulpius Severus, Isidore of Pelusium, Jerome, Augustine, Socrates and Sozomen, Cyril of Alexandria, Cassian, Basil of Seleucia, Vincent of Lérins, Peter Chrysologus, Theodoret, Mamertus, Leo the Great, Dionysius the

\* The authors are arranged in the centuries in which they flourished, but not necessarily in which they died.

Areopagite (writer so called), Prosper, Faustus of Riez, Vigilius of Thapsus.

Sixth Century : Cassiodorus, Boëtius, Fulgentius of Ruspe, Cæsarius of Arles, Primatius, Rusticus the Deacon, John Climacus, Benedict of Nursia, Venantius Fortunatus, Gregory the Great.

Seventh Century : Theophylact Simocattes, Isidore of Seville, Andrew of Crete, Hildephonsus of Toledo, Adamnus, Aldhelm.

Eighth Century : Bede, Benedict of Aniane, John of Damascus, Florus of Lyons, George Syncellus, Alcuin.

## II. LATIN THEOLOGIANS SINCE THE DIVISION OF EAST AND WEST.

Ninth Century : Amalarius, Walafrid Strabo, Paschasius Radbert, Remigius, Rabanus Maurus, Ratramnus, Hincmar.

Tenth Century : Odo of Cluny, Liutprand, Notker, Gerbert (or Sylvester II.).

Eleventh Century : Odilo of Cluny, Durandus, Peter Damian, Bruno of Aste, (the author of) the "Micrologus," Anselm of Lucca, Lanfranc, Ivo of Carnot, Hildebert.

Twelfth Century : Anselm of Canterbury, Sigebert, Algerus, Peter of Cluny, Rupert Tuitiensis (of Deutz), Hugo of S. Victor, Robert Pulleyne, Hildegard, Gratian, Bernard, Thomas (Cant.), Peter Lombard, Richard of S. Victor, John of Salisbury, Alanus ab Insulis.

Thirteenth Century : William of Auvergne, William of Paris, Innocent III., Alexander of Hales, Hugo a S. Charo (of S. Cher), Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Raymond of Pennafort, Albertus Magnus, Henry of Ghent, Ægidius Romanus, Roger Bacon, Richard Middleton, Duns Scotus.

Fourteenth Century: Franciscus of Mayro, De Lyra, William of Occam, Durandus of S. Porciano, Gualterus Burlæus, John Bacon (Carmelite), Paludanus, Tauler, Henry Suso, Ruysbroek.

Fifteenth Century: Gerson, Thomas Waldensis, Tur-recremata, John Capistran, Bernard of Siena, Antoninus of Florence, Laurence Justinian, Henry Harphius, Dionysius the Carthusian, Biel, Thomas a Kempis, Bessarion, Savonarola.

### III. WESTERN THEOLOGIAN'S IN COMMUNION WITH THE SEE OF ROME.\*

Sixteenth Century: Cochlæus, Cajetan, Eckius, Hosius, Catharinus, Sanders, Ruardus Tapper, Melchior Canus, Lainez, Dominic Soto, Peter Soto, Sixtus Senensis, Cornelius Jansen of Ghent, Surius the Carthusian, Maldonatus, Salmeron, Molanus, Martin of Navarre, Toletus, Canisius, Molina, Sirmondus, Rodriguez, Valentia, Vasquez, Baronius, Suarez.

Seventeenth Century: Thomas Sanchez, Estius, Franciscus Lucas of Bruges, Bellarmine, Francis de Sales, Lessius, Martin Becanus, Thomassinus, Gaspar Sanchez, Tirinus, Cornelius a Lapide, Sylvius, Reynaldus, Petavius, Menochius, De Lugo, Bona, Diana, Rosweydy and Bollandus, Pallavicini, Labbe, Segneri, Bossuet, Mabillon, Blanchenius, Fénelon, Muratori.

Eighteenth Century: Harduin, Houdry, Le Quien, Huëtius, Alexander Natalis, Du Plessis, the Assemani, Tournely, Calmet, Billuart, Juenin, Catalanus, Bal-

\* Such parts of their works as treat of subjects on which there is a difference between East and West, or between England and Rome, must be read with great caution.

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lerini, Mansi, Benedict XIV., Berthier, Alphonsus Liguori, Bergier, Zaccaria, Muzzarelli.

Nineteenth Century : Liebermann, Jungmann, Mazella, De Maistre, Ignatius de Rossi, Schlegel, Bernard de Rossi, Moehler, Balmes, Chateaubriand, Lingard, Ozanam, Mai, Lenormant, Hurter, Sanseverino, Wiseman, Gousset, Perrone, Felix Dupanloup, Patrizi, Franzelin.\*

\* This list does not include living writers.





## INDEX.

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### A.

- Abduction invalidates consent in Matrimony, 13.
- Abraham, example of his marriage guarded against by Holy Scripture, 68.
- Abyssinian ordinations, action upon, by the Sacred Congregation, 97.
- Addis and Arnold adopt Bossuet's theory of intention, 118.
- Affinity, an impediment to Matrimony, 13, 65; does not bar relations of husband from marriage with those of wife, 71; applies to case of deceased wife's sister, 72.
- Age causes physical incapacity for Matrimony, 13.
- Agility a property of the glorified body, 449.
- Alexander III., Pope, dispensed in *matrimonio rato*, 60.
- Alexander VI., Pope, dispensed to marry in cases of affinity, 61.
- Alexandrian canon of Scripture different from Palestinian, 218.
- Almsgiving, a means of helping the souls in Purgatory, 388.
- S. Ambrose, on mixed marriages, 40; condemns remarriage after divorce, 56; on marriage with deceased wife's sister, 74.
- Ambrosiaster thinks divorced husband may remarry, 56.
- Ammonian sections, division of the Gospels into, 219.
- Anabaptists, the, held theory of "soul-sleep," 344.
- Andrew of Cæsarea's division of the New Testament, 219.
- "Apocryphal," a misleading term as applied to the deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament, 216, and never authoritatively used by the Anglican Church, 217.
- Apollinarianism, taught by Ebrard and Gess, 199; condemned by the First Council of Constantinople, 199.
- Apostolic Canons, the, against marriage with deceased wife's sister, 73.
- Archbishop of Canterbury decided in favour of prayer for the dead, 383.
- Aristotle's use of *μωρφή*, 191.
- Armenians revived the heresy of "soul-sleep," 344.
- Article XI., of justification, 266.
- Article XII., of good works, 315.

- Article XIII., on works done without grace, 315.  
 Article XXII., of Purgatory, 365, 366.  
 Article XXXI., view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice referred to, 129.  
 Article XXXIV., of the Traditions of the Church, 394.  
 Articles, the, defective as a basis of theological study, *see under* "Study of theology," 456-459.  
 S. Asterius on divorce and remarriage, 55.  
 Athenagoras on divorce and remarriage, 51.  
 Attributes of GOD necessary in thought, 196.  
 S. Augustine, on the difficulties of the subject of marriage, 1; on mixed marriages, 40; on S. Cyprian's silence about remarriage after divorce, 53; condemns remarriage, 56; on marriage with deceased wife's sister, 74; on prayer for the dead, 381, 390; on relation of fear to love as causing penitence, 440.  
     B.  
 Babylon, the seat of recent discoveries destructive of higher criticism, 243.  
 Barlow, Bp., his consecration, 90.  
 S. Basil, on divorce and remarriage, 55; on marriage with deceased wife's sister, 74.  
 Baur, the representative of the Tendency School of higher criticism, 240.  
 Beatific Vision, the, *see under* "Heaven," 442-446; differs from faith, 151.  
 Beatitude, defined by S. Thomas, 442; controversy as to its essence, 447; "natural," in the case of heathen and unbaptized, 433.  
 Beatitudes, the, produced by the gifts of the HOLY GHOST, 310.  
 Becanus' view of intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118.  
 Bellarmine, his reply to Canus on the question of Minister of Matrimony, 32; theory of intention necessary for a Sacrament, 119, 122; view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 130; his works recommended for theological study, 468.  
 S. Bernard on question whether Matrimony is a Sacrament, 28.  
 Beron, the only ancient writer who teaches Kenotism, 209.  
 Billot, *De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis* recommended for theological study, 467.  
 Billuart, his works recommended for theological study, 468; differs with teachings of Popes, 469.  
 Boccaccio's *Decameron*, an example of perpetuation of evil, 414.  
 S. Bonaventura on oil as the Matter of Unction, 140.  
 Bossuet's view of intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118.  
 Brandi, Fr., his explanation of Abyssinian decree of Sacred Congregation, 99.  
 Brownie on the Articles defective as a manual of theology, 459.  
 Bucer not ordained with the Edwardine rite, 127.  
     C.  
 Caius, Pope, mentions seven Orders, 83.

- Cajetan on Pope's right to dispense to marry in cases of consanguinity and affinity, 63.
- S. Callistus' action on mixed marriages, 38.
- Calvin's doctrine of justification, 261.
- Calvinists deny the uncertainty of justification, 274, and its defectibility, 276.
- Cana, place of institution of the Sacrament of Matrimony? 27.
- Canaanites, the, incest the special sin of, 65.
- Canon, meaning of the term, and application in theology, 214.
- Canus, Melchior, on the Minister of Matrimony, 31, 32; view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 130; holds a theological conclusion to be *de fide*, 153; on authorship of inspired books, 229.
- Catacombs, the, witness to antiquity of belief in Purgatory, 373; of prayer for the dead, 380; of invocation of Saints, 406.
- Catechumens, difficulty of their marriage with the baptized, 39.
- S. Catharine of Genoa on Purgatory, 371.
- Catharinus, on the institution of Matrimony, 25; view of intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118; on the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 129.
- Cavalier not ordained with the Edwardine rite, 127.
- S. Cecilia married to Valerian, 38.
- Charity, as a virtue, *see under* "Virtues," 305-310; a motive for helping the souls in Purgatory, 390.
- Chemnitz' accusation of Trent on intention for a Sacrament refuted by Bellarmine, 120.
- S. Chromatius condemns remarriage after divorce, 56.
- S. Chrysostom, on divorce and remarriage, 55; recognizes Unction as a Sacrament, 138; on invocation of Saints, 407.
- Cicero's orations against Catiline, their criticism an illustration of method of higher criticism, 250.
- Cienfuegos' view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 131.
- Citadel of a town, an illustration of man's regenerate state, 335.
- Clarity a property of the glorified body, 449.
- S. Clement of Alexandria on divorce and remarriage, 51.
- Clement XI., Pope, did not approve ruling of Sacred Congregation on Abyssinian ordinations, 101.
- Communion of Saints, *see under* "Invocation of the Saints," 395-397.
- Conclementia* omitted from Bull of Paul IV. by Leo XIII., 124.
- Conditional immortality, 437.
- Consanguinity, an impediment to Matrimony, 13, 65; only bars where one party is descended from a parent of the other, 70.
- Conscience, Matrimony of, 21.
- Consent required for Matrimony, qualities of, 6.
- Consummated Matrimony, 21.
- Contenson's view of intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118.
- Coptic ordinations, action upon by Sacred Congregation, 98; no mention of sacrificial office, 115.

- Copula carnalis*, essential to Matrimony? 58.
- Cornelius, Pope, mentions seven Orders, 83.
- Cornill on the sources of the Hexateuch, 242.
- Corporal works of mercy, the, applied by S. Francis de Sales to the souls in Purgatory, 390.
- Corrionero's view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 130.
- Council of Arles, on mixed marriages, 39; on divorce and remarriage, 55.
- Council of Carthage, the Fourth, quoted by Canus on Minister of Matrimony, 32, and by Bellarmine in reply, 33.
- Council of Chalcedon, œcumenical, 157; defined relation of the two Natures in the Incarnation, 201; against Kenotism, 202; its answer to the heresy of Beron, 209.
- Council of Constantinople, the First, œcumenical, 157; condemned the Apollinarians, 199.
- Council of Constantinople, the Second, œcumenical, 157.
- Council of Constantinople, the Third, œcumenical, 157.
- Council of Eliberis (Elvira), on mixed marriages, 39; on divorce and remarriage, 54; on marriage with deceased wife's sister, 74.
- Council of Ephesus, œcumenical, 157; condemns the Kenotist view of our LORD's miracles, 200.
- Council of Florence, on intention necessary for a Sacrament, 119; not œcumenical, 157.
- Council of Hippo, on mixed marriages, 40; determined the canon of Scripture, 219.
- Council of Lyons, the Second, not œcumenical, 157.
- Council of Neo-Cæsarea on marriage with deceased wife's sister, 74.
- Council of Nicæa, the First, œcumenical, 157.
- Council of Nicæa, the Second, œcumenical, 157.
- Council of Trent, quoted by Canus on the Minister of Matrimony, 32; by Bellarmine in reply, 32; on dispensation to marry in cases of consanguinity and affinity, 62; English Bishops invited to, 92; refused to condemn English Orders, 93; on requirements as to intention necessary for a Sacrament, 119, 120; misquoted by Leo XIII. as to chief power of priesthood, 127; on Sacrament of Unction, 135; definition of Purgatory, 365, 367; on prayer for the dead, 381; on invocation of Saints, 408.
- Councils, œcumenical, a part of the Church's extraordinary teaching office, 157.
- Creed, the Apostles', teaches invocation of Saints, 396.
- Creed of S. Athanasius teaches eternal punishment, 422.
- Creed of Nicæa, Kenotism conflicts with, 197.
- Creeds, the, a part of the Church's extraordinary teaching office, 157.
- S. Cyprian, on mixed marriage, 38; on divorce and remarriage, 53.
- S. Cyril of Alexandria, his ninth anathema, against those who teach that our LORD worked His miracles by the help of the HOLY GHOST, 200; quoted in support of Kenotism, 206.

## D.

Death : Eschatology belongs largely to speculative theology, 330 ; its discussion valuable for exposing error, 330 ; inferences from revelation and theological opinions not to be rashly rejected, 330 ; the limits of theological speculation to be here observed, 331 ; death, 331 ; different senses in which the term is used, 331 ; physical death defined, 331 ; is death natural to man ? 332 ; the origin of death in the world, 333 ; death the penalty of sin, 333 ; not, however, arbitrary, but remedial, 334 ; it is the antidote of sin, 334 ; and like Goliath's sword destroys him who wielded it, 334 ; it is the close of the conflict between flesh and spirit, 334 ; illustration from the citadel of a town, 335 ; death brings no blessing to the unrepentant, 335 ; but to those who die in CHRIST it is indeed a blessing, 335 ; the properties of death : its certainty, 336 ; its uncertainty, 336 ; it happens but once, 336 ; it is an unknown experience to each, 336 ; the accompaniments of death : adverse conditions, 337, of bodily and mental weakness, 337 ; the presence and activity of evil spirits, 337 ; to help us,—the Angel, GOD's special grace, prayer of the Church and of friends, Sacraments, 338 ; great possibilities at the hour of death, for sinners, of repentance ; for some, apparently righteous, of a bad death, 338 ; death an opportunity for

GOD to help His child, 338 ; danger of our condition being concealed from us, 339 ; the responsibility of telling the dying of their state, 339 ; danger of being drugged at the time of death, 339 ; such dangers should be provided against, 340 ; these considerations enforce the need of preparation for death, 340 ; elements of preparation : a knowledge of GOD and of His revelation, 340 ; conquest of the besetting sin, 340 ; habits of prayer, 340 ; Sacraments received with right dispositions, 340 ; what is to be desired for a good death, 340 ; what takes place at the moment of death : we see our LORD and are judged by Him, 341 ; the particular judgment differs from that of the Last Day, 341 ; the evidence of the particular judgment rests on the necessities of thought, 341 ; and on revelation, 341 ; the fact is *de fide*, 342 ; different opinions as to the details, 342 ; commonly held that it takes place at the moment of death, and in the place where one dies, 342 ; after this judgment the soul passes into Heaven, Hell, or Purgatory, 342.

De Augustinis, on the Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 109 ; *De Re Sacramentaria* recommended for theological study, 467.

De Castro on the institution of Matrimony, 25.

Deceased wife's sister, marriage with, *see under* "Difficulties in regard to Matrimony," 68, 71-75.

- Decision in Arches Court of Canterbury, in favour of prayer for the dead, 383.
- De Dominis on the Church's right to constitute and dispense matrimonial impediments, 64.
- De Lugo, on the Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 108; view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 131; on theological conclusions as *de fide*, 154; his *Disputationes* recommended for theological study, 467.
- Denzinger's *Enchiridion* recommended for theological study, 467.
- Deposition from Holy Orders, 87.
- De Soto on the institution of Matrimony, 25.
- Deuterocanonical books of the Bible, 215, 216.
- Diodorus of Tarsus on marriage with deceased wife's sister, 74.
- Dionysius the Areopagite recognizes three Holy Orders, 83.
- Divorce, 14; among the unbaptized, 19; thirteen causes in the Eastern Church, 24; permitted before CHRIST, 67.
- Doctors a means of the Church's ordinary teaching, 161.
- Documents, historical, a means of the Church's ordinary teaching, 162.
- Döllinger's view of S. Matt. xix. 7-9 on divorce, 47.
- Dorner's view of Kenotism, 211.
- Dowry a difficulty in the sacramental view of Matrimony, 29.
- Driver on the sources of the Hexateuch, 242.
- Dulia* distinguished from *latría*, 405.
- Duns Scotus' view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 129.
- Durandus a S. Porciano on question whether Matrimony is a Sacrament, 28, 29.
- Dynamical theory of inspiration, 226.

## E.

- Ebrard, his theory of the Kenosis, 182, 211; teaches Apollinarianism, 199.
- Ecstasy described, 446.
- Eden, the place of institution of the Sacrament of Matrimony? 25.
- Egbert's Pontifical, its form for blessing oil for Unction, 139.
- Ember Seasons, the times of ordination,—their antiquity, 88.
- Endowments of man, *see* "Virtues," 278-316.
- Enoch's translation, account of, a witness to belief in a future life, 378.
- S. Epiphanius on divorce and remarriage, 55.
- Erastianism in the Eastern Church, 22.
- Error invalidates consent in Matrimony, 13.
- Eschatology, its place in theology, 330.
- Estius, on the grace conferred in Matrimony, 30; on the Minister of Matrimony, 32; on dispensation to marry in cases of affinity, 62; his works recommended for theological study, 468.
- Eternity defined, 452.
- Eucharistic Sacrifice, the, *see* under "Orders," 128-133.
- Eugenius IV., Pope, quoted

**Eugenius IV.—Continued.**

by Bellarmine on the Minister of Matrimony, 32; refused to dispense for marriage in case of affinity, 61; his view of the Matter of Holy Orders, 104, 109.

Euphrosyne's marriage, 38.

Eve, errors about everlasting punishment compared with her temptation, 438.

Existing marriage contrary to the unity of Christian Matrimony, 14.

**F.**

Faith, the rule of: Relation between Holy Scripture and Tradition, 148; the Church asserts her ability to prove her articles of faith from Holy Scripture, 148; preliminary considerations: faith as a habit of the soul, 149; definition, 149; explanation of terms: "virtue," 149; "supernatural," 149; supernatural as to object of faith, 150; as to its motive or ground, 150; as to its origin in the soul, 150; a "theological" virtue, 150; the "mind," 150; "firm assent," 150; "Divine authority," 150; "revelation," the material object of faith, 150; difference between faith and opinion, 151; between faith and feeling, 151; between faith and knowledge, 151; between faith and the Beatific Vision, 151; different species of faith: in reference to the object it is "Divine" and "Catholic," 151; in respect to the subject faith is "living" or "dead," 151; in respect to the manner faith is "explicit" or "implicit,"

151; three main divisions of the subject, 152; the object of faith, 152; the "material" object of faith, 152; the material object of "Divine" faith, 152; truth "formally" revealed, 152; truth "virtually" revealed, 152; truths are formally revealed "explicitly" or in their proper terms, 153; "implicitly" or in equivalent terms, 153; truths virtually revealed called "theological conclusions," 153; definition, 153; is a theological conclusion the object of faith? 153; view of Melchior Canus, 153; of the Thomists, 154; of Suarez, De Lugo, and others, 154; private revelations, 154; many examples in the Bible and in the lives of the Saints, 154; not *de fide*; approbation of the Church only witnesses that they are not contrary to faith or morals, 155; they should not be rejected as untrue, 155; the person who receives such a revelation, if convinced of the fact, ought to believe it, 155, but it may be doubted, or even denied, by others without heresy, 155; the material object of "Catholic" faith, 155; this division not strictly logical, 155; for Catholic faith two conditions, formal revelation and declaration by the Church, 155; the Church unable to put forth any new article of faith, 156; it is the office of the HOLY GHOST to unfold truth as the growing needs of the Church require it, 156; the Church exercises her teaching office in two ways, "ex-



**Faith—Continued.**

traordinary" and "ordinary," 156; the "extraordinary" teaching office of the Church, 156; œcumenical councils: all things contained in their decrees and canons not equally matters of faith, 157; the Seven Œcumenical Councils: Nicæa I., Constantinople I., Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople II., Constantinople III., Nicæa II., 157; Lyons and Florence not œcumenical, though Greeks were present, 157; the three Creeds, 157; the Apostles' Creed, 158; the Nicene Creed (so called), 158; the Athanasian Creed, 159; the "ordinary" teaching office of the Church exercised in her liturgies, 160, in the consent of the Fathers, 160, doctors, 161, theologians, 161, by the general sense of the faithful, 162, and through historical documents, 162; what is meant in the Roman Communion by the authority of the Church, 162; two channels of authority peculiar to Rome, 162, the decrees of the Pontiffs and of the Sacred Congregation, 163; neither infallible, 163; Tanqueray's statement of this, 163; instances of error in both these channels, 163; the "formal" object or grounds of faith, 165; distinction between grounds of faith and of credibility, 165; the ground of faith the authority of GOD, 165; dispute between Thomists and Scotists, 166; is faith discursive? 167; the act of faith, 167; preparation of an act of

faith, 168; the revelation of a truth, 168; the proposition or declaration of such revelation, 168; the grounds of credibility, 169; moral certitude, absolute and relative, 169; the production of an act of faith, 170; the subjective or effective causes, 170; the intellect, 170; the will, 171; actual grace, 171; the evidential or objective causes of faith, 172; the evidences of credibility, 172; the infallible authority of the Church, 172; the authority of GOD, 172; the properties of an act of faith, 173; the subjects of an act of faith: the Holy Angels and the Saints, 174, the holy souls in Purgatory, 174, the devils and the lost, 174, those in the Church Militant, the righteous, infidels, sinners, heretics, 174; relation of faith and reason, 175; two clearly distinct means of knowledge, in respect of evidence, 175; in respect of principle, 175; in respect of the object, 176; no real conflict possible between reason and faith, 176; they are allies and co-workers, 176; the rule of faith imposes limits to theological speculation, 178; faith as an instrument of justification, 266; as a virtue, *see under* "Virtues," 296, 297, 299-302.

Faithful, the, their "general sense" a means of the Church's ordinary teaching, 162.

Fasting (including all acts of penance) a means of helping the souls in Purgatory, 389.

- Fathers, the, quoted by Canus on the Minister of Matrimony, 32; their consent a method of the Church's ordinary teaching, 160; they condemn the theories involved in the Kenosis, 186; to be consulted for the Church's interpretation of Holy Scripture, 235; all but four hold that the Saints are now in Heaven, 361; testify to prayer for the dead, 381; on the intercession of the Saints, 399; on eternal punishment, 430.
- Ferraris' *Promptuary* recommended for theological study, 467.
- Forbes, Bp., describes "the Romish doctrine of Purgatory," 366.
- Force invalidates consent in Matrimony, 13.
- Form, of Matrimony, 8; of Holy Orders, 83-85; a ground of Roman objection to Anglican Orders, 95-116; of Unction, 141.
- Fortitude, *see under* "Virtues," 282, 284-286.
- Fort Sumter, its bombardment an illustration of attacks on Holy Scripture and their result, 231.
- S. Francis de Sales, his view of Purgatory, 371; on works of charity for the souls in Purgatory, 390.
- Franzelin's works recommended for theological study, 466.
- Fruits of the SPIRIT, the, produced by the gifts of the HOLY GHOST, 310.
- G.
- Gasparri, modifies De Lugo's view of Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 109; his works recommended for theological study, 467.
- Gehenna the special name of Hell in the New Testament, 422.
- Gess, his theory of the Kenosis, 181, 211, followed in America, 183; teaches Apollinarianism, 199.
- Gifts, the, of the HOLY GHOST produce the fruits of the SPIRIT and the beatitudes, 310.
- Godet introduced the Kenosis into England, 180, 211.
- Good Samaritan, parable of, used as illustrating the methods of higher criticism, 256.
- Good works, unnecessary for justification according to Protestant view, 260; their condition of merit, 314; definition, 387; effects, 388.
- Gotfredus on question whether Matrimony is a Sacrament, 28.
- Gousset's *Théologie Dogmatique* recommended for theological study, 466.
- Grace, habitual, *see under* "Justification," 270-272, 277; grace a gift to sanctify daily life, 283.
- Grafting illustrates relation of natural and supernatural virtues, 295.
- Gratian's view of the *interpelatio* in Matrimony, 18.
- S. Gregory the Great, Form of Unction in Sacramentary of, 142; on authorship of inspired books, 229; on the present condition of the Saints, 362.
- S. Gregory Nazianzen, on invocation of Saints, 407; on future punishment, 430.
- S. Gregory Nyssen, on invoca-

- S. Gregory Nyssen—*Cont.*  
tion of Saints, 407; on future punishment, 430.  
Gregory IX., Pope, his opinion on Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 110.

## H.

- Hagiographa, the, a division of the books of the Bible, 217.  
Harnack's opinion of purpose of introduction of "the Communion of Saints" into the Apostles' Creed, 396.  
Harper's admission that higher criticism cannot rely on the basis of the Names of the Deity, 249.  
Heaven : None can now comprehend the glories of Heaven, 441, but revelation tells us much about them, 418, 441; Heaven will be the working out of our life here, 441; it is a place as well as a state, 441; definition of beatitude, 442; the glory of Heaven is twofold: the glory of the soul, 442, consists in its union with GOD by an act of the intellect and of the will, 442; definition of the Beatific Vision, 442; it is distinct, 442, intuitive, 443, but not comprehensive, 443; in the Vision we see GOD'S Essence, 443, not with bodily eyes, but by an elevation of the powers of the soul through the bestowal of a special gift, 443; this quality called "the light of glory:" it bestows three gifts: it elevates the intellect, 443, expands it, 444, directs and assists it, 444; the Saints differ in capacity for the Vision, 444; this difference depends chiefly on faithful use of GOD'S talents here, 444; two objects are seen in the Vision: GOD Himself, 445, and the creatures in Him, 445; this second knowledge is threefold: the mysteries of the faith, 445, the laws of nature, 445, individual interests, 445; by an act of the will the blessed love GOD perfectly, 446; the will is attracted to the highest Good, the intellect recognizing GOD as this, 446; the will is enabled to love GOD perfectly, 446; the effect of this beatific love is twofold: ecstasy, 446, and perfect union with GOD, 446; a controversy as to the essence of beatitude, 447; the Scotist view, 447; that of the Thomists, 447; a Jesuit theory combining these, 447; summary of this part of the subject, 447; the glory of the body, 448; all men shall rise at the Last Day with their own bodies, 448; the resurrection-body will be perfect and entire, 448, but no longer dependent upon the functions of animal life, 448, and will be of perfect development, 448; the four properties of the glorified body, 1 Cor. xv. 42-44, 448; impassibility, 449; its cause according to S. Thomas, 449; subtlety, 449; its cause, 449; agility, 450; its cause, 450; clarity, 450; its cause, 450; other elements of joy in Heaven: the negative joys, 450; the individuality of the joys in Heaven, 451; this implied in the imagery of S. John, 451; the special

Heaven—*Continued.*

glory of each Saint largely the result of the struggles of earth, 451; Heaven is eternal, 452; eternity defined, 452.

Hell: Awfulness of the subject, 419; tendency of the age to pass over or tamper with the doctrine, 419; the responsibility of explaining away what is clearly revealed by our LORD, 419; nearly all we know of Hell comes from the lips of CHRIST, Who teaches this doctrine again and again, 420; our LORD knew exactly in what sense the Church would understand these words, 421; proof of the existence of Hell: the Old Testament, Isa. xxxiii. 14, lxvi. 24, Dan. xii. 2, 421; two passages in the deuterocanonical books: Eccclus. vii. 16, 17, 421; Judith xvi. 17, 422; both apply Isa. lxvi. 24, 422; the views of the Talmudists, 422; in the New Testament, Hell is unmistakably revealed, has a special name, Gehenna, and a long series of passages refers to it, 422; testimony of the Church: the Athanasian Creed, which is authoritative in the Latin and English Communions, 422; the Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church, 423; nature of the punishments of Hell, 423; all agree about the *pæna damni*; what this involves, 423; the common opinion that there is a *pæna sensus*, 424; no consensus in regard to the fire, whether material or metaphorical, 424; the companionship in

Hell, 424; the worm of remorse, 424; duration of punishment the same for all, but of unequal severity, 424; accidental mitigations, 425; diminution of punishment, 425; theory of successive mitigations, 425; prayers for the lost, in old missals, 425; the eternal duration of Hell, 425; the testimony of Holy Scripture, 425; the Old Testament, 426; the deuterocanonical books, 426; the New Testament,—three classes of texts: those that use the term *αἰώνιος*, 2 Thess. i. 9, S. Jude 13, S. Matt. xxv. 41, 46, and xviii. 8, 426; those that speak of the punishment as having no end, S. Mark ix. 43-48 (five times), 1 Cor. vi. 9, Gal. v. 21, S. Matt. iii. 12, S. Luke iii. 17, 426, 427; those that speak of an unchangeable state, (Eccles. xi. 3,) S. Mark iii. 29, S. Matt. xi. 32, S. Luke xvi. 26, 427; the first class of texts—the use of *αἰώνιος* in the New Testament, 427; the parallelism of everlasting punishment with everlasting life, S. Matt. xxv. 46, 428; the second class of texts, 428; the force of *ἀσβεστός* considered, 428; the third class of texts, 428; an “unchangeable state” explained, 428; two passages adduced in favour of Universalism: Acts iii. 19-21, 428; the exegesis of the passage, 429; 1 Cor. xv. 28,—the context considered, 429; testimony of the Fathers, 430; S. Polycarp, S. Justin Martyr, 430; consensus of Fathers except

**Hell—Continued.**

Origen, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, and a few others, 430; Origen's views, 430; he denies the restoration of Satan, 430, generally teaches the orthodox view, and disclaims any certainty about Universalism, 431; condemned by an oecumenical council, 431; summary of authority against Universalism, 431; a warning against unwarranted representations of the doctrine of Hell, 432; extent of what the Church teaches, 432; extenuating considerations, 432; the heathen and unbaptized may attain to natural beatitude, 433; the moral question involved, 433; Newman on our moral sense and everlasting punishment, 433; we must argue from what we know to what we do not know, 434; no reason to suppose that a moral nature can be arbitrarily changed, 435; eternal punishment may be only the necessary consequence of sin and free will, 435; the choice man's, not GOD'S, 435; vindictive punishment and our moral sense, 435; the power of this doctrine as a deterrent from sin, 435; the principal modern substitutes for this doctrine: Universalism, 436; its difficulties, 436; probation after death, 437; its immoral influence on sinners, 437; conditional immortality, or annihilation, 437; unsupported by revelation, 437; and contrary to what we know of the indestructibility of matter and of force, 438;

misbelief and disbelief in everlasting punishment compared with the first temptation of Eve, 438; the method, first to doubt the fact of the revelation, 438, then to deny its truth, 439; to deceive man as to the consequences of sin is always Satan's method, 439; the revelation of Hell is from the lips of CHRIST, 439; it was part of His kindness, 439; with many of the Saints fear was the first motive of repentance, 440; S. Augustine on the relation of fear to love, 440.

Henry VIII. on the institution of Matrimony, 25.

Hermas on divorce and remarriage, 51.

Herod's marriage with Herodias witnessed against in the New Testament, 71.

Higher criticism, *see under* "Scriptures," 235-259.

S. Hilary of Poitiers, condemns remarriage after divorce, 56; claimed in support of Kenotism, 208; his teaching on our LORD'S miracles, on His being in Heaven whilst on earth, and on His Omniscience, 208.

Hippolytan Sacramentary contains no mention of *Sacerdotium*, 116.

S. Hippolytus' account of action of S. Callistus on mixed marriages, 38.

Homilies, the, on justification, 266; against prayer for the dead, but their teaching not necessarily that of the Church, 383.

Hope as a virtue, *see under* "Virtues," 297, 302-305.

Hostiensis on question whether Matrimony is a

Sacrament, 28.

Hugo a S. Charo first divided the Bible into chapters, 220.

Hunter admits difficulties in Roman Ordinal, 104.

Hurter's *Compendium* recommended for theological study, 466.

# I.

Immutability of GOD, the, destroyed by Kenotism, 197.

Impassibility a property of the glorified body, 449.

Impediments to Matrimony, 10; on the Church's claim to constitute and dispense, 61.

Impotence causes physical incapacity for Matrimony, 13.

Incest, the special sin of the Canaanites, 65; not tolerated by GOD, 67; abhorrent to Him, 67; its guilt in proportion to degree, 70.

Indissolubility of Matrimony, 10; an essential property, 57.

S. Innocent I., condemns remarriage after divorce, 56; recognizes Unction as a Sacrament, 138.

Innocent III., Pope, dispensed in *matrimonio rato*, 60.

Innocent XII., Pope, his opinion of Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 110.

Inspiration, *see under* "Scriptures," 214, 220-231.

Intention a ground of Roman objection to Anglican Orders, 116-122.

Intercession of the Saints, *see under* "Invocation of the Saints," 396-399.

Intermediate State, the: Hope the special virtue of, 303; the state of the soul after death, 343; where are the

dead, and what is their condition? 343; to this three answers are possible: they sleep in unconscious slumber,—an early heresy, 344, revived in the Middle Ages among the Armenians, 344, and at the Reformation by the Anabaptists, 344; held by Luther, and by the Irvingites, 344; it has always been condemned by the Church, and is contrary to Holy Scripture, 344; view that all souls at death go immediately to Heaven or Hell, 345, also conflicts with both Holy Scripture and reason, 345, unless death itself has wonderful cleansing power, 345; souls not yet perfect at death enter an intermediate state of purification, 346; this the view of the great majority of Christians, 346; what is the relation of the Intermediate State to time and space? 346; three views of the Intermediate State: the view of the Greek Church,—the doctrine of the Telonies or particular judgment, 348; three principal points of the Greek view, 350; extracts from the Orthodox Confession, 350; summary of the Greek view, 351; this compared with the Western view of Purgatory: two differences,—as to the cause of the suffering, 352, as to the manner of relief, 352; moral difficulties of the Greek view, 352; the doctrine of Purgatory flows necessarily from right views of justification, 353; rejected by Luther because in conflict with his theory of

Intermediate State—*Cont.*

imputed justice, 354; the Easterns reject it rather in theory than in practice, 354; the view of those who deny that the souls of the Saints are in Heaven, 354; not a modern error; Pope John XXII. its most celebrated adherent, 354; history of the controversy, 355; three objections to the Catholic view, 356; the first, that the soul without the body cannot enter Heaven, is a mere assumption, 356, conflicting with the teaching of the Church, 356, and with Holy Scripture, 357; Rev. iv. 4, v. 9, 357; objections to these texts considered, 357; Rev. vi. 9-11, 358; answer to the objection that the Catholic view renders the judgment at the Last Day purposeless, 358; answer to objection drawn from the words of our LORD to the penitent thief, 359; S. Paul's use of the word "Paradise," 360; the Catholic view accords with Holy Scripture, 360; our LORD locally in Heaven only, 360; theory of the ubiquity of His Humanity a Lutheran heresy, 360; further Scripture proof: 2 Cor. v. 8, Phil. i. 23, 360; Phil. ii. 10, Rev. v. 13, 361; the teaching of the Fathers: only four writers of antiquity seem to question the fruition of the Saints, 361; authorities for the Catholic view, 362; S. Gregory the Great discusses the subject in his Dialogues, 362; inconsistency of adherents of "Paradise" theory using certain hymns, 363; a cause

of the adoption of this view by some of the Tractarians, 363; summary of authorities for and against this view, 364; it is *de fide* that the Saints are in Heaven, 364; the faithful departed are divided into two classes: the blessed Saints in Heaven, 364, and the holy souls in Purgatory, 364; objection to this term, 364; said to be inconsistent with Art. XXII., 365; history of the article, 365, and of the Tridentine definition, 365, now the only authoritative teaching of the Roman Church on the subject, 365; no protest against the present Roman doctrine, 365, and some doctrine of Purgatory is demanded by the language of the article, 366; what was the "Romish" doctrine against which Art. XXII. is directed? 366; Bp. Forbes describes it, 366; the wise reserve of Trent on this subject, 367; its denunciation of the same "Romish" doctrine, 367; the doctrine of Purgatory considered, 368; its relation to the doctrine of justification, 368; the method of justification, 368; sin has two effects, guilt and penalty, 368; by infusion of grace guilt is removed and eternal punishment remitted, 368; the payment of this "debt" called "satisfaction," 368; the debt must be paid, either in this life or in Purgatory, 369; all that is absolutely needful for salvation is an act of contrition, 369, but this involves certain results, 369; what is Purgatory? 369;

**Intermediate State—Cont.**

distinguish between the essential and the speculative in this doctrine, 370; three effects of Purgatory: in regard to venial sin, 370, evil habits, 370, and temporal penalty, 370; three properties of the holy souls: they are confirmed in grace, 370, 384, are conformed to GOD'S Will, 370, 384, and cannot merit, 370, 384; two views of the sufferings of Purgatory: the mediæval view, 371; that of S. Catharine of Genoa and S. Francis de Sales, 371; S. Catharine of Genoa's opinion, 371; nature of sufferings of Purgatory? 371; *pœna damni*, 371; *pœna sensus* only an opinion, 372; duration of Purgatory, 372; consolations of Purgatory, 372; antiquity of a belief in Purgatory: testimony of the Catacombs, 373, and early liturgies, 373; it removes two great stumbling-blocks in regard to GOD'S Providence: the salvation of two men, one of whom has lived a godly life, the other has only turned to GOD at the last, 373; the unequal distribution of suffering in this life, 374; the teaching of the Church alone meets these difficulties, 374.

*Interpellatio*, the, in Matrimony, Gratian's view of, 18.

Invalid Matrimony, 21.

Invocation of the Saints, the:

Difference between a doctrine and a practice of the Church, 393; a doctrine, to be *de fide*, must have formed part of the Pentecostal deposit, 393; the

Church cannot put forth new dogmas, nor retract those defined, 393; the opposite is the case with the practices of the Church, 393; the rejection of a practice very different from that of a doctrine of the Church, 394; Article XXXIV. on the Traditions of the Church, 394; inference drawn from these facts, 395; some examples, 395; important that the doctrine on which a practice rests should be unassailable, 395; practice of invocation of Saints follows from the Communion of Saints, 395; this article inserted in the Creed to meet the heresy of Vigilantius, who denied the intercession of the Saints, 396; history of the article, 396; Dr. Harnack's opinion, 396; the invocation follows from a belief in the intercession of the Saints, 397; the intercession of the Saints, 397; testimony of Holy Scripture: Old Testament, 397; New Testament, 399; testimony of the Fathers, 399; invocation of Saints, 400; two methods, direct and indirect, 400; few object to the latter, 400; objections to direct invocation answered, 400; that the Saints do not know our prayers contrary to Holy Scripture and theological opinion, 401; we have no certain knowledge of the manner in which the Saints know our prayers: certainly not by natural hearing, 401; various theories: that the Saints see us "in the WORD," or in the mirror of



Invocation of the Saints—*Cont.*  
 the HOLY TRINITY, 402, or by some particular manifestation from GOD, 402; answer to objection that, having perfect charity, the Saints do not need to be asked to pray for us, 402; that the time spent in invocation would be better spent in prayer to GOD, from which it detracts, 403; this is true of all intercession, yet Scripture enjoins it both by precept and example, 403; besides, the prayers of the Saints may be more effectual than ours, 403; objection that invocation makes the Saints mediators, and so detracts from our LORD's mediatorship, 404; the Church's teaching in regard to the veneration of the Saints, 404; distinction between *latría* and *dulia*, 405, one not of degree, but of kind, 405; illustrated by the use of the word "worship," 405; objection that many abuses have arisen from the cultus of the Saints, 406; extract from sermon of the Archbishop of York, 406; evidences for the practice of direct invocation: authorities and examples: the Catacombs, 407; S. Gregory Nyssen, 407; S. Gregory Nazianzen, 407; S. Chrysostom, 407; S. Jerome, 407; testimony of the Eastern Church (Orthodox Confession), 408; testimony of the Latin Church (Council of Trent), 408; the Anglican Communion entirely alone in its neglect of invocation, 409; the cause of its re-

moval from our Prayer Book its abuse, 409; popularity of S. Thomas of Canterbury, 409; dangerous teaching in regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary, 409; "but the abuse of a thing doth not take away the lawful use of it," 410; to some souls invocation is especially helpful, 410.

S. Irenæus claimed in support of Kenotism, 204.

Iron, natural and magnetized, an illustration of natural and supernatural virtue, 295.

Irvingites, the, held the doctrine of "soul-sleep," 344.

Iteration, of Holy Orders impossible, 87; of Unction, not in the same illness, 147.

## J.

Jacob, example of his marriage guarded against by Holy Scripture, 68.

S. Jerome, on mixed marriages, 40; condemns remarriage after divorce, 56; on prayer for the dead, 390; on invocation of Saints, 407.

Jews, the, their belief in a future life, 378.

Job testifies to belief in a future life, 378.

John a Lasco's peculiar form of ordination permitted by Edward VI., 126.

John XXII., Pope, most celebrated adherent of view that the Saints are not in Heaven, 354.

S. Joseph's marriage with S. Mary an example of *matrimonium ratum*, 56.

Judas Maccabæus an instance of prayer for the dead, 379.

Judgment, the general: Not purposeless because there are souls now in Heaven, 358; the judgment an article of the Creed, 411, and a special revelation of the New Testament, 411; Lacordaire's assertion that the sense of responsibility implies a judgment, 411; the judgment, like death, a most certain and a most uncertain event, 412; difference of the two judgments: if there be a particular judgment, what is the object of the general? 412; difference of purpose in the two: the first to decide the destiny of the soul, 412, the second to manifest three things: the Justice and Love of GOD in His providential ruling of the world, 412, the Majesty of our Blessed LORD, 413, and the glory of His elect, 413; difference in the nature of the two judgments: in the former the soul is judged, in the latter body and soul, 413; at the former no other man present, at the latter every one, 414; the matter both of sins and good works incomplete until the Last Day, — effects of S. Stephen's prayer, 414; of Boccaccio's *Decameron*, 414; the chief constituents of this judgment are truth and completeness, 415; the time of the judgment, 415; the circumstances, 415; a question concerning those who are living when CHRIST appears, 416; the subjects of the judgment, all men and the fallen angels, 416; the matter of the judgment: deeds, words, and thoughts,

417; are the sins of the Saints known at the judgment? — Pulleyne's view, 417; Peter Lombard's, 417; the more common view, 417; manner of the judgment, — the imagery of Holy Scripture true, but not to be taken literally, 417; the judgment probably not by words, but by illumination, 417; the separation between the good and evil, 418; the vision of Heaven described by S. John, 418.

Judgment, the particular, *see under* "Death," 341, 342; settles the state of the soul forever, 358; difference between the two judgments, *see under* "General judgment," 412-415.

Juenin on the Minister of Matrimony, 32.

S. Juliana martyred for refusing to contract mixed marriage, 37.

Julius II., Pope, dispensed to marry in a case of affinity, 62.

Julius III., Pope, his brief falsely said to refer to the Edwardine Ordinal, 126.

Jurisdiction necessary to legitimate ordination, 85.

Justice, *see under* "Virtues," 282, 290-293.

Justification: Importance of right views of justification, 260; the Protestant doctrine, 260; the Lutheran view, 261; by justification Luther meant not renewal of man's nature, but imputation of CHRIST's righteousness, 261; the Calvinistic view, 261; difference between the Church's view and these, 261; under the Protestant system man not made, but imputed right-

Justification—*Continued.*

eous, 261, the Sacraments unimportant, 261, and good works unnecessary, 262; three extracts from Luther's works, 262; his doctrine compared with S. Paul's, 262; effects of this doctrine in our day, 262; the meaning of *δικαιούν*: "to declare righteous," 263; GOD's declaration effects what it declares, 263; the Lutheran view contradicts this, 263; Newman's Lectures on Justification, 264; justification also used for sanctification, 264; definition of justification, 264; four points: the negative element, remission of sins, 265; the positive, sanctification, 265; the means, free acceptance, 265; the effect, righteousness, 265; causes of justification five: the final cause, 265; the efficient cause, 265; the meritorious cause, 265; the instrumental cause, 265; the formal cause, 265; the dispositions required for justification, 266; Art. XI. and the Homilies, 266; relation of faith and the Sacraments as instruments, 266; what kind of faith is required? 266; in what does justification consist? 266; in the remission of sins, 267; in the bestowal of habitual grace, 267; the effects of justification, 267; it renders us pleasing to GOD and makes us His friends, 267; characteristics of this friendship, 268; it makes us GOD's children by adoption—meaning of "adoption," 268; it makes us partakers of the Divine

Nature, 269; we become the dwelling-place of GOD, 269; this indwelling in us common to the Three Persons of the HOLY TRINITY, but attributed especially to the HOLY GHOST, 270; definition of habitual grace, 270; it is a "quality," 270; "supernatural," 271; it "inheres in the soul," 271, "permanently," 271; it "makes us partakers of the Divine Nature," 271; some illustrations, 272; this participation is more than "moral," and is in a sense "physical," 272; yet this is only by analogy, 273; the properties of justification: its uncertainty, 273; its signs: the testimony of conscience, 273; love of GOD, 273; contempt for the world, 273; some have had special revelations of their justification, 274; the first property is denied by Lutherans and Calvinists, 274; the inequality of justification, 274; scriptural proof of this, 274; the second property is also denied by the Lutherans, 275; defectibility of justification, 275; testimony of Scripture, 275; this property denied by Lutherans and Calvinists, 276; habitual grace and mortal sin mutually exclusive, 277; habitual grace and the virtues and gifts it infuses constitute the spiritual, or "new" life, 277; S. Leo's exhortation, 277; justification bestows the gifts of the HOLY SPIRIT, 310; Luther's view of it leads to denial of merit, 311; justification cannot be merited, 316; right views of



Justification—*Continued.*

it lead to the doctrine of Purgatory, 353; the method of justification, 368.

S. Justin Martyr, on divorce and remarriage, 51; on eternal punishment, 430.

## K.

Keble's view of S. Matt. xix. 7-9 on divorce, 47.

Kenosis, theories of the, *see under* "Limits of theological speculation," 179-212.

Klingius on the institution of Matrimony, 25.

## L.

Lacordaire's assertion that sense of responsibility implies a judgment, 411.

Lactantius on divorce and remarriage, 55.

*Latria* distinguished from *dulia*, 405.

Launoius defends De Dominis on constitution and dispensation of matrimonial impediments, 64.

Lawful Matrimony, 20.

S. Leo's exhortation on the dignity of the state of grace, 277.

Leo XIII., Pope, on the Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 111.

Leonine Sacramentary, the, contains no mention of *Sacerdotium*, 116.

Leopold, Duke of Tuscany, asked by Synod of Pistoia to remove certain matrimonial impediments, 65.

Lessius, his view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 130; a leader of a Jesuit theory of essence of beatitude, 447.

Levirate marriage, 72.

"Light of glory," the, 443.

Lightfoot on the use of *μωρφη*, 191.

Liturgies, a method of the Church's ordinary teaching, 160; to be consulted for the Church's interpretation of Holy Scripture, 235; witness to antiquity of doctrine of Purgatory, 373.

Logic, defined, and applied to theology, *see under* "Study of theology," 461, 462.

Love as a virtue, *see under* "Virtues," 297, 305-310.

Luther, originated the modern Kenotic theory, 210; his doctrine of justification, 260, 262, 263; held the doctrine of "soul-sleep," 344; rejected the doctrine of Purgatory, because inconsistent with his view of justification, 354.

Lutherans, the, deny the uncertainty of justification, 274, its inequality, 275, and defectibility, 276; teach ubiquity of our LORD'S Humanity, 360.

## M.

Macaulay's varied style an illustration of a fallacy of higher criticism, 247.

Manning's correspondence with the Sacred Congregation on the bearing of their decree upon Anglican Orders, 99.

*Manuale Ecclesiasticorum* recommended for theological study, 467.

Marcion's misrepresentation of Phil. ii. 5-8, in support of Docetism, 210.

Martensen, his theory of the Kenosis, 182, 211, the most popular view of it in England, 183; his *Dogmatics* defective as a manual of theology, 460.

Martin V., Pope, dispensed in *matrimonio rato*, 60, in a case of affinity, 61.

Martyr, Peter, not ordained with the Edwardine rite, 127.

Mary, the Blessed Virgin, her marriage an example of *matrimonium ratum*, 56; dangerous teaching about invocation of her, 409; on her cultus Roman works untrustworthy, 468.

Matrimony: S. Augustine's opinion of the difficulties of the subject, 1; antagonism between East and West, 2; the three states of Matrimony: its institution, 2, in the fallen state perverted, 2, in the Christian dispensation restored, 3; essential difference in these states the presence or absence of grace, 3; purpose of Matrimony, 3; definition, 4; two aspects: as an act, 4, as a state, 4; Matrimony as a Sacrament, 4; when instituted, 5; its essence, 6; the consent required must be true, 6, deliberate, 6, mutual, 6, present, 7, expressed, 7, simultaneous, 7, free from error, 7, free from fear, 7; the Minister of Matrimony: two views, 7; Matter and Form, 8; subjects, 8; effects: of the contract, 8; of the Sacrament, 8; the ends of Matrimony: offspring, 9, remedy for sin, 9, mutual society, 9; the benefits or goods of Matrimony: offspring, 9, mutual fidelity, 9, the Sacrament, 9; the properties of Matrimony: unity, 9, indissolubility, 10; the impediments of Matrimony, 10; the two divisions,

11; *impedimenta dirimentia*, 12; *impedimenta impedientia*, 12; classification of *impedimenta* into *dirimentia*, and *impedientia*, 12; subdivision of *dirimentia*: *de jure naturali*, 13, *de jure Divino*, 13, *de jure ecclesiastico*, 13; division not logical, 13; difficult to limit right of dispensation exactly, 13; five clearly *de jure naturali*: error, force, and abduction invalidate consent, 13, impotence and age cause physical incapacity, 13; consanguinity and affinity partly *de jure Divino*, partly *ecclesiastico*, 13; existing marriage contrary to property of unity, 14; lack of Baptism invalidates the Sacrament, 14; divorce—of two kinds, *a vinculo*, 14, *a toro et mensa*, 14; no divorce *a vinculo* in the Sacrament of Matrimony, 14; this *de jure Divino*, 14; S. Matt. xix. 9 refers only to divorce *a toro et mensa*, 15; divorce permitted in *matrimonio tantum rato*: for religious profession, 15, and by dispensation, 15; nullification of marriage, 15; separation *a toro et mensa*, 16; rehabilitation, 16; radical rectification, 16; non-sacramental Matrimony, 16; *privilegium Paulinum*, 17; 1 Cor. vii. 12–16, 17; Gratian's view of the *interpellatio*, 18; divorce among the unbaptized, 19; mixed marriages—between baptized and unbaptized, 19; different classes of Matrimony: valid and lawful, 20; ratified, 20; consummated,

**Matrimony—Continued.**

21; morganatic marriage, 21; Matrimony of conscience, 21; invalid Matrimony, 21; unlawful Matrimony, 21; other questions of Matrimony belong to moral theology, 21; difficulties about the Sacrament of Matrimony, 22; fundamental difference between East and West, 22; Erastianism in Eastern Church, 22; its causes: influx of the world, 23; influence of the Court, 23; authority of the civil law, 23; Western Church free from these, and so more severe, 23; a warning to the Church to-day, 24; thirteen causes of divorce in the Eastern Church, 24; institution of the Sacrament of Matrimony, 24; instituted in Eden? 25; authorities: Henry VIII., Rochester, Pighius, De Castro, Klingius, De Soto, Catharinus, 25; this view stated, 25; proofs, 25; a modern adaptation of it, 26; objection, 27; Matrimony instituted at Cana? 27; in S. Matt. xix. 6? 27; in the Great Forty Days? 27; history of the different views of the Sacrament of Matrimony, 27; sevenfold division of the Sacraments in 12th century, 27; objection to including Matrimony, 28; Peter Lombard, S. Thomas, 28; Durandus a S. Porciano, 28; Gotfredus, Hostiensis, S. Bernard, 28; argument of Durandus, 29; difference of Matrimony from other Sacraments: no outward sign, 29; no sacramental grace, 29; difficulty of

dowry, 29; the Church cannot alter the conditions of a Sacrament, but has changed them in Matrimony, 30; the case of valid Matrimony becoming sacramental, 30; Vasquez on the sacramental character of Matrimony, 30; Estius on the grace conferred, 30; dispute about the Minister of Matrimony, 31; a practical question, 31; view of theologians generally, 31; of Melchior Canus, 31, supported by Estius, Sylvius, Juenin, Tournely, etc., 32; Perrone's account of the controversy, 32; Canus and his followers argued from the Fathers and from the Fourth Council of Carthage, 32, from the Council of Trent, 32, and from analogy of the other Sacraments, 32; Bellarmine and others replied by reference to Eugenius IV., 32, to the Council of Trent, 32, to effect of the Sacrament itself, 33, to want of authority for Canus' view, 33, to question of second marriage, 33, to the Fourth Council of Carthage, 33, and to fewness of adherents of this view, 34; William of Paris, 34; Prayer Book statement, 34; mixed marriages, 35; a practical question in the mission field and in America, 35; a difficult question for the Clergy, 35; witness of Holy Scripture against mixed marriages, 35: 1 Cor. vii. 39, 36; Tertullian considers this prohibitory, 36; 2 Cor. vi. 14—vii. 1, 36; 1 Cor. vi. 15, 37; 1 Cor. vii. 14, 37; witness of history, 37; SS.

**Matrimony—Continued.**

Susanna and Juliana, 37; S. Cecilia, Euphrosyne, 38; S. Cyprian, Tertullian, 38; S. Hippolytus on S. Callistus, 38; disparity of sexes in early Church, 38; Council of Eliberis, 39; laxity introduced after conversion of Constantine, 39; difficulty about catechumens, 39; S. Monica and Patricius, 39; Council of Arles, 39; S. Ambrose, S. Jerome, 40; S. Augustine, Council of Hippo, 40; after 6th century stricter discipline, 40, but dispensations given, 40; mixed marriages non-sacramental and invalid, but not unlawful, 40; indissolubility and divorce, 41; importance of the question, 41; if the *vinculum* is indissoluble, divorce impossible, 41; sentiment and expediency of no weight, 42; before Christianity Matrimony was dissoluble, 42; our LORD acknowledges this and accounts for it, 42; Baptism in the subjects makes Matrimony sacramental, 42; teaching of Holy Scripture: S. Matt. v. 31, 32, 43; S. Mark x. 2-12, 43; S. Luke xvi. 18, 44; Rom. vii. 1-3, 45; I Cor. vii. 10, 11, 45; result of these passages, 46; S. Matt. xix. 7-9, 46; can this contradict all other Scripture? 46; the text very corrupt, 46, and therefore very uncertain, 47; if the *Textus Receptus* be accepted, four views: that it does not refer to Christian Matrimony (Keble), 47; that it refers only to pre-nuptial sin (Döllinger), 47; that it

refers only to divorce *a toro et mensa*, 47; that it refers to remarriage, 48; Tertullian's reply to this, 48; the theory that adultery dissolves the *vinculum*, 48, involves adultery in the innocent partner, 48; if discovery of guilt dissolves the *vinculum*, "being found out" is the sin, 48; impossibility of the *vinculum* binding only the guilty partner shown by reason, 49, and by our LORD's express words, 49; this text only permits the *man* to remarry, if so much, 49; summary of evidence from Holy Scripture, 50; teaching of the Church, 50; for three centuries no recognition of remarriage, 50; Hermas, 51; Justin Martyr, 51; Athenagoras, 51; Theophilus of Antioch, 52; S. Clement of Alexandria, 52; Tertullian, 52; Pusey's note on Tertullian, 52; Origen, 53; S. Cyprian, S. Augustine on S. Cyprian, 53; Council of Eliberis (or Elvira), 54; whole testimony of primitive Church against any remarriage, 54; Council of Arles, 55; Lactantius, 55; S. Basil, 55; S. Epiphanius, 55; S. Asterius, 55; S. Timothy of Alexandria, 55; S. John Chrysostom, 55; Theodoret, 56; in the West SS. Ambrose, Chromatius, Jerome, Augustine, Innocent I., and Hilary all alike condemn remarriage, 56; Ambrosiaster the only exception, 56; is *matrimonium ratum* dissoluble? 56; the ordinary view, 56; case of the Blessed Virgin Mary and S. Joseph, 56; indis-

**Matrimony—Continued.**

solubility an essential property of the Sacrament, yet *matrimonium ratum* is not indissoluble, 57; the difficulty here, 57; the only two possible solutions, 58; some therefore make the *copula* essential, 58; the other solution considered, 58; it depends on the legality of Papal dispensations, 58; many great theologians deny their validity, 58; Sanchez gives the two views and the arguments for each, 59; of the four on the Papal side all are fallacies, 59; the history of such dispensations: Alexander III., A.D. 1180, 60; Innocent III., 1210, 60; Martin V., 1431, —Paul III., 1549, —Paul IV., 1559, 60; the power disputed until 17th century, 60; its earliest exercise near end of 12th century, 60; on the Church's claim to constitute and dispense "impediments," 61; the ground on which dispensations stand, 61; history of dispensations: earliest in case of affinity, Martin V., 1427, 61; Eugenius IV. refused to dispense, 61; Alexander VI. dispensed, 61, and Julius II., 62; Council of Trent, 62; Estius, 62; Cajetan's dilemma, 62; the general opinion of Latin theologians, but exceptions of note, 63; the English Church has never dispensed, 63; the controversy of 17th century, 64; De Dominis, *De Repub. Eccles.*, 64; Lanoius, *Regia in Matr. Potest.*, 64; Synod of Pistoia, 1786, 65; Leopold,

Duke of Tuscany, 65; on the impediments of consanguinity and affinity, 65; the fact of Divine prohibition, — *de jure Divino* in the Old Testament, 65; incest the special sin of the Canaanites, 65; Lev. xviii., 66; three lists: Lev. xviii., Lev. xx., Deut. xxvii., 66; God's toleration of certain laxity on account of man's moral hardness, 67; divorce and polygamy, 67; incest not tolerated, 67; Levitical prohibitions *a fortiori* binding on Christians, 67; incest abhorrent in the sight of God, 67; comparison of lists, 67; principle clear, though examples defective, 68; two cases redundant, specified because of the examples of Abraham and Jacob, 68; prohibitions number fourteen or fifteen, 68; the relationships through husband and wife are analogous, 68; Lev. xviii. cannot be exhaustive, 68; the principle of affinity, 69; prohibited degrees in the American Church, 69; the guilt of incest in proportion to degree, 70; principle of limitation of degrees, 70; consanguinity only bars where one party is descended from a parent of the other, 71; affinity does not bar relations of the husband from marriage with those of the wife, 71; case of deceased wife's sister, 71; witness of the Old Testament, 71; various views of Lev. xviii. 18: that "sister" means any woman, 71; that it forbids simultaneous marriage with two sisters, 72; the pro-



**Matrimony—Continued.**

hibition does not rest on this verse, 72; analogy of levirate marriage, 72; principle of affinity found to apply, 72; argument from expediency a mere assumption, 72; violates family unity, and is therefore most inexpedient, 72; witness of the New Testament: Herod's case, 73; Tertullian thinks Philip was dead, 73; 1 Cor. v. 1-5, 73; witness of the Church: Tertullian, 73; Apostolic Canons, 73; Council of Eliberis, 74; First Council of Neo-Cæsarea, 74; S. Basil, Diodorus of Tarsus, S. Timothy of Alexandria, S. Ambrose, S. Augustine, 74; neither Scripture nor Church ever allows marriage with deceased wife's sister, 75; method of computing degrees of kinship in Eastern Church, 75; in Western Church, 75; spiritual kinship, 75; the sanctity of family life and the good of society require the prohibitions, 76; marriage of deceased wife's sister illustrates this, 77; Matrimony and Holy Orders differ from the other Sacraments, 78.

Matter, of Matrimony, 8; of Holy Orders, 83-85; of Unc-tion, 138.

Mazella's *De Gratia* recommended for theological study, 467.

Mechanical theory of inspiration, 226.

Meditation the exercise of faith, 302.

Melancthon thought Luther's Kenotic view savoured of Docetism, 210.

Merit, *see under* "Virtues," 310-316; not in the power of souls in Purgatory, 370, 384; inalienable, 388.

*Meritum de condigno*, 315.

*Meritum de congruo*, 315.

Minister, of Matrimony, 7; of Holy Orders, 85; of Unc-tion, 143.

Mixed marriages—between baptized and unbaptized, 19.

S. Monica married to Patri-cius, 39.

Morganatic marriage, 21.

Morinus' influence on theory of Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 106.

## N.

Nag's Head Fable, the, 90.

Newman, on justification, 264; on our moral sense and everlasting punishment, 433.

Nullification of Marriage, 15.

## O.

Obscurity a property of faith, 301.

Offspring, an end of Matri-mony, 9; a benefit of Matri-mony, 9.

Orders, Holy: The Church a kingdom, needing officers for its administration, 78; our LORD provided for this need in the Sacrament of Orders, 78; dignity of the Sacrament, 78; Orders and Matrimony differ from the other Sacraments, in that they are limited to certain individuals, 78, and are necessary to the perpetua-tion and perfection of the Church, 79; this Sacrament provides both a hierarchy and a means of its perpetua-

Orders, Holy—*Continued.*

tion, 79; definition of Sacrament of Orders, 79; its sacramental nature examined: its institution by CHRIST, 79; the two essential powers of the priesthood, to offer Sacrifice and to absolve from sin, separately conveyed, 79; the first on Maundy Thursday, 79; the second on Easter Day, 80; the outward sign ordained by CHRIST mediately through the Apostles, 80; S. Paul in two places speaks of this sign or Matter, and of the grace conferred by it, 80; the objection that *χαρισμα*, not *χαρις*, is used, therefore *gratia gratis data*, and not *gratum faciens*, is implied, 80; two replies: *χαρισμα* sometimes used of sanctifying grace, 81; S. Paul refers both to the grace and to the priestly character, which is better expressed by *χαρισμα*, 81; the number of Orders in the Church: in the Roman, seven, three sacred and four minor, 81; the Eastern and Anglican Churches recognize only three Orders as properly so called, 81; Romans exclude episcopate as only superior grade of priesthood: their argument for this, 82; view that all the Orders have reference to the Holy Eucharist,—found in S. Thomas, 82; views of Dionysius the Areopagite, 83; the seven Orders very ancient: mentioned by Pope Cornelius (252) and Pope Caius (283), 83; Form and Matter: great difference of opinion, 83; five different views about Matter: correc-

tion of instruments, 83; this together with imposition of hands, 83; these two separated, the former conveying the power to consecrate, the latter to absolve, 84; the imposition of hands connected with the anointing, 84; imposition of hands the sole Matter,—now the prevailing view, 84; four different opinions about Form: "Receive the power to offer Sacrifice," etc., 84; "Receive the HOLY GHOST," etc., 84; both these formulas, 84; neither, but any prayer which "informs" the Matter,—now the prevailing view, 84; in the East the Matter and Form simply the imposition of hands with prayer, 84; question about position of the Form and Matter in the Roman Ordinal, 85, in the Anglican, 85; Minister of Orders a Bishop having jurisdiction, 85; for consecration of a Bishop three Bishops required, 85; subject of Orders a baptized male free from impediments, 86; should not be ordained *per saltum*, 86; this, though irregular, is valid, 86; subject should have a distinct vocation, 86; canonical age, 86; effects of Orders: grace, sanctifying, 87, actual, 87; character, 87; iteration and deposition, 87; times of ordination the Ember Seasons, 88; their antiquity, 88; Roman objections to Anglican Orders, 89; spirit of the objections, 89; the attack on historical grounds, 89; consecration of Parker, 89; evidence of it, 89; impugned by Nag's

Orders, Holy—*Continued.*

Head Fable, 90; six versions of this story, 90; Barlow's consecration next attacked, 90; positive evidence of it, 90; his precedence in the House of Lords, 90; the new law, under which confirmation and consecration were commanded by the same royal instrument, 91; the mode of consecration made Barlow's part immaterial, 91; in the Greek and English rites only one Bishop consecrates, in the Roman all three, 91; in Parker's case all four repeated the Form, and so consecrated, 92; the positive proof: invitation of the English Bishops to Trent, 92; their claim to seats on the ground of their canonical ordination, 92; refusal of Trent to condemn English Orders, 93; for eleven years all Catholics communicated in the English Church, 94; offer of Pius IV. to acknowledge English Prayer Book,—Walsingham's letter, 94; the great writers of 16th and 17th centuries do not speak of English Orders as invalid, 94; the present Roman position authoritatively stated in the Bull of 1896, 95; sufficient to answer it from recognized Roman theologians, 95; defect of Form the first objection of Leo XIII., 95; he denies the sufficiency of the Form "Receive the HOLY GHOST," 95; this alone never the Form in the Edwardine Ordinal, 96; the Apostles were apparently ordained with the same words as in the Edwardine rite, 96;

the Pope's dictum opposed to the teaching of Roman theologians, 96, and practice of Roman Court, 96; the Abyssinian case, 97; Canon Estcourt's statement of it, 97; resolution of the Sacred Congregation, 98; in 1860 the decree reaffirmed in the case of the Copts, 98; in 1875 attention of Sacred Congregation drawn by Card. Manning to the bearing of this on Anglican Orders, 99; Card. Patrizi's reply, 99; Fr. Brandi's explanation, 99; the *dubia* of the Apostolic Prefect for Ethiopia, 99; the Consultor's *votum*, 100, referred back for investigation of the Abyssinian Form, 100; the new *quæsitum*, 100; the second *votum*, 100; this did not receive approval of Clement XI., 101; the ancient *relatio*, 101; the inference to be drawn from Fr. Brandi's statement, 101; of what value is the accuracy of the Sacred Congregation, since this was acted upon for 171 years? 102; *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM* the Form with which all Roman Bishops are consecrated, 102; the rubric in the Pontifical, together with Form and prayer following, 102; *Accipe SPIRITUM SANCTUM* not the sole Form, but its application, 103; difficulties in the Roman Ordinal, 103; Hunter's admission of this, 104; he gives three principal opinions, 104; the only point certain, that Matter and Form occur before the Consecration in the Mass, 104; view of Eugenius IV. shown

**Orders, Holy—Continued.**

to be faulty because lacking antiquity, 104 ; summary of Hunter's position, 105 ; the majority now consider imposition of hands alone the essential Matter, 105 ; so apparently does Leo XIII., 105 ; tangle in Roman view caused by three distinct theories : the mediævalism of S. Thomas, the 16th century reaction, and the scientific antiquarianism of Morinus, 106 ; in the Anglican rite is there sufficient expression of purpose to confer priesthood? 107 ; the Romans have to meet difficulties in regard to the "imposition" theory, 107, and to the "porrection" view, 107 ; De Lugo's proposed solution of the difficulty, 108 ; a moral unity in the whole rite, 108, so that from first imposition to porrection there is moral concurrence of the Matter, 109 ; Gasparri's modification of this view, 109 ; De Augustinis holds a similar opinion, 109 ; the opinions of four Popes as to Matter compared : Eugenius IV. (1439), 109 ; Innocent XII. (1697), 110 ; Gregory IX. (1227-1241), 110 ; Leo XIII. (1896), 111 ; no canon of procedure when Popes differ, 111 ; Leo XIII. apparently not without misgivings on the subject, 112 ; what is the adequate Form in English rite? 113 ; the Pope admits the prayer "Almighty GOD," etc., might be the Form, but for lack of intention in the service, 113 ; but this most clearly expressed in Ordinal, 114 ; the

Pope assumes a non-Catholic sense, but the preface refutes this, 114 ; the Roman and Coptic Forms contain no mention of the power of consecrating and sacrificing till 9th century, 115 ; the Pope in condemning Anglican Orders condemns his own, 116 ; *Sæpius Officio* notes that there is no mention of the *Sacerdotium* or its grace and power in the Hippolytan and Leonine Sacramentaries, 116 ; the Pope's second argument is defect of intention,—really the only one, 116 ; strict force of the term "intention," 117 ; what the Pope seems to mean, 117 ; Suarez' statement of the three theories of intention, 117 ; he holds the first two necessary, but admits S. Thomas probably thought the first sufficient, 118 ; this the view of Catharinus, Salmeron, Becanus, Contenson, and Bossuet, 118 ; Ryder considers it an open question, 118 ; Addis and Arnold, and Scannell adopt the above view, 118 ; in Edwardine Ordinal, both first and second intention clearly expressed, 119 ; Bellarmine's theory of intention, 119 ; a general intention of doing what the Church does is sufficient, 119 ; taught by the Councils of Florence and Trent, 119 ; no need to intend to do what the Roman Church does, 119 ; an intention contrary to this would not invalidate the Sacrament, 119 ; that the Council of Trent requires an intention in regard to the "end" of the Sacrament is

Orders, Holy—*Continued.*

false, 120; this charge of Tilmann and Chemnitz "an unmitigated lie," says Bellarmine, 120, who proves it from the practice of the ancient Church in regard to those baptized by Pelagians, and in his day by Zwinglians and Calvinists, 120; the same teaching in Tournely, 120; these definitions applied to the Edwardine Ordinal, which satisfies them, 121; doubtful whether the Pope requires the third intention, 121, but quite certain that his English vindicators do, 122; the Pope implies that the intention to do what the Roman Church does is wanting; Bellarmine says it is unnecessary, 122; the Pope's misstatements, 123; no mention of *Sacerdotium*, of which "every trace had been deliberately struck out," 123; and yet four distinct mentions of it, 123; and more, it is mentioned as the purpose, or intention, of the Bishop in ordaining, and of the Church in continuing the old Orders, 124; misquotation of a passage from Bull of Paul IV. in regard to dispensations, 124; the word *conscientia* omitted in Pole's copy, 124, but found in the Vatican copy, 125; omitted in the Bull so as to change the statement of Paul IV., 125; the full Latin text, 125; the dispensation does not refer to Orders, the Bull explicitly declaring that the Orders and benefices will be received, 126; the dispensations and indults,

having been received from the King, were null in the eyes of Rome, but the Orders are expressly ratified as valid, 126; statement that the brief of Julius III. must refer to the Edwardine Ordinal, 126; this is false in fact, and the Committee had evidence of existence of peculiar rite of John a Lasco, 126; instances of those so ordained found in Martyr, Tremellio, Cavalier, and Bucer, 127; misquotation of the Council of Trent, 127; the omission of reference to the Sacrifice, 128; state of theological opinion about the Sacrifice in 16th century, 128; then no consensus whatever, 129; view of Catharinus, 129; view referred to in Art. XXXI., 129; Duns Scotus, Scotists, 129; Scotists according to Vasquez, 130; Canus, Corrionero, Bellarmine, 130; Vasquez, 130; Lessius, 130; Suarez, 131; De Lugo, 131; Cienfuegos, 131; some reasons why the compilers of our Ordinal returned to the norm of the ancient rites, 132; not that the English Church ever desired to reject the Eucharistic Sacrifice, as is clearly shown in confining to the priesthood the power of offering it, 132; Bp. Wordsworth on the Sacrifice, 132; the Prayer Book clearly sets forth that the purpose of the institution was the Sacrifice, 133; that in the Eucharist the Body and Blood of CHRIST are objectively present, 133; that this Sacrifice is offered for the remission of sins of the

Orders, Holy—*Continued.*  
whole Church, 133; it is therefore a propitiatory Sacrifice for quick and dead, 133.

Origen, on divorce and remarriage, 53; recognizes Unc-tion as a Sacrament, 137; quoted in support of the Kenosis, 204; views on future punishment, 430, 431.

Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church, on the Intermediate State, 350; on prayer for the dead, 381; on invocation of Saints, 408; on eternal punishment, 423.

## P.

Pain, *see* "Suffering."

Palestinian Canon of Scripture different from the Alexandrian, 218.

Papal claims, Roman authors untrustworthy on, 468.

Paradise, the term incorrectly used for Purgatory, *see under* "Intermediate State," 359, 363.

Parker, Abp., his consecration, 89, 92.

Patricius the husband of S. Monica, 39.

Patrizi's reply to Manning on ruling of Sacred Congregation as to Form of Holy Orders, 99.

S. Paul, describes the effects of justification, 278; on charity, 308; on suffering, 327; his use of the word "Paradise," 360; witness to prayer for the dead, 380.

Paul III., Pope, dispensed in *matrimonio rato*, 60.

Paul IV., Pope, dispensed in *matrimonio rato*, 60; his Bull *Præclara Carissimi* misquoted by Leo XIII., 124.

Pearson on the Creed defective as a basis of theological study, 455.

Perrone, account of controversy on Minister of Matrimony, 32; his *Prælectiones* recommended for theological study, 466.

Perseverance, final, cannot be merited, 316.

Pessimism and the mystery of suffering, 317.

Petavius' works recommended for theological study, 468.

Peter Lombard, on question whether Matrimony is a Sacrament, 28; whether the sins of the Saints are known at the judgment, 417.

Pighius on the institution of Matrimony, 25.

Pistoia, *see* "Synod of Pistoia."

Pius IV., Pope, his offer to acknowledge English Prayer Book, 94.

Plato, his use of *μορφή*, 191; illustration of the cardinal virtues, 283.

*Pena damni*, in Purgatory, 371; in Hell, 423.

*Pena sensus*, in Purgatory, only an opinion, 372; in Hell, the common opinion, 424.

S. Polycarp's witness to eternal punishment, 430.

Polygamy permitted before CHRIST, 67.

Practice, a, different from a doctrine of the Church, *see under* "Invocation of the Saints," 393-395.

Prayer, the special exercise of hope, 305; the fundamental function of the spiritual man, 305; a help at the hour of death, 338, 340; helps the souls in Purgatory, *see under* "Prayers for the dead," 384-392.

Prayer Book of Edward VI., its rubric on the anointing in Unction, 141; its Form of Unction, 143; contains prayer for the dead, 382.

Prayer Book of Elizabeth, offer of Pius IV. to acknowledge, 94.

Prayer Book, present, on the Minister of Matrimony, 34; prayer for the dead, 382.

Prayers for the dead, follow from a belief in Purgatory and in the Communion of Saints, 376; the term "Saints," 376; the HOLY GHOST, the life-blood of the Mystical Body of CHRIST, 376, effects the unity of all the members, 376; this illustrated by the parts of a tree, the sap circulating through every part; so in the Body of CHRIST all the members are joined together by the operation of the HOLY GHOST, 377; this unity involves a fellowship of interest and prayer, 377; quite inconceivable that it can temporarily cease in the case of the holy dead, 378; evidence for the practice of prayer for the dead: the instincts of natural piety, 378; the witness of almost all religions, 378; its place among the Jews, 378; belief in a future life among the Jews: testimony of Job, 378; the case of Enoch, 378; teaching of Eccles. iii. 21 and xii. 7, 379; the case of Samuel, 379; prayer for the dead in the case of Judas Macabæus, 2 Macc. xii. 43-45, 379; the New Testament: the argument from silence applied to Holy Scripture, 380; example of S. Paul,

380; ancient interpretations of S. Matt. v. 26 and xii. 32, 380; testimony of the Catacombs, 380, of ancient liturgies, 380, and of the Fathers, — S. Augustine, Sermon 172, 381; authoritative teaching of the East (Orthodox Confession), 381; of the Latin Church (Council of Trent), 381; discouraged at the English Reformation on account of gross views of Purgatory, but never condemned, 382; found in the first English Prayer Book, 382; (part of this now in *American Prayer Book*, Burial of the Dead, Additional Prayers), 382, and in the present book, 382; a Homily against it, but the Homilies not necessarily the teaching of the Church, 383; the judgment in its favour in 1838, 383; the growth of the practice among us, 383; the practice itself, 383; the condition of the faithful departed, 384; they are confirmed in grace, 384, conformed entirely to the Will of GOD, 384, and can no longer merit, 384 (*see also* 370), and must therefore depend for help upon the Church Militant and Triumphant, 384; we should strive to pay the debt of sin in this life, 384; in what ways can our prayers help the faithful departed? 385; do the holy souls know of our prayers, and do they pray for us? 385; their consolations: the knowledge that they are saved, 386; their possession of joy and peace, 386; angelic ministrations, 386; the prayers

Prayers for the dead—*Cont.*

of the Church, 386; an objection noticed: are our prayers, if unavailing for the soul, therefore useless? 386; our LORD'S words to the Seventy, S. Luke x. 5, 6, 387; how can we help the holy souls?—by prayer, almsgiving, fasting, and by offering the Holy Sacrifice for them, 387; what is meant by "good works," 387; every good work has three effects: merit, which is inalienable, 388, impetration, which can be offered for others, 388, and satisfaction, which also can be offered for others, 388; we can help the holy souls by prayer (some examples), 388, by almsgiving (examples), 389, by fasting, which includes all acts of penance, 389, and by offering the Holy Sacrifice (both East and West dwell on this), 389; what motives should impel us to care for the holy souls?—charity, 390,—S. Augustine, S. Jerome, 390; S. Francis de Sales applies the corporal works of mercy to the holy souls, 390; the thought that we may need the same charity, 392; helpfulness of the practice in reminding us of our own death, 392, and in teaching us to make our satisfaction here, 392.

*Privilegium Paulinum* in Matrimony, 17.

Probation after death, 437.

Prodigal Son, the parable used to illustrate the methods of higher criticism, 253.

Protocanonical books of the Bible, 215.

Prudence, *see under* "Virtues," 282, 288–290.

Pulleyne, Robert, on question whether the sins of the Saints are known at the judgment, 417.

Purgatory, *see* "Intermediate State."

Pusey's note on Tertullian on divorce and remarriage, 52.

## R.

Radical rectification of marriage, 16.

Ratified Matrimony, 20.

Reason, its relation to faith, *see under* "Faith," 175–177; a gift to sanctify daily life, 283; effect upon it of the virtue of faith, 299, 300.

*Reductio ad absurdum*, the, applied to heresy, 462.

Rehabilitation of marriage, 16.

Rochester on the institution of Matrimony, 25.

Roman objections to Anglican Orders, *see under* "Orders," 89–133.

Ryder on the intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118.

## S.

Sacraments, the, sevenfold division in 12th century, 27; objection to including Matrimony among them, 28; as instruments of justification, 266; a help at the hour of death, 338, 340.

Sacrifice of the Mass, *see* "Eucharistic Sacrifice."

Saints, the question of their present condition, 354–364; different meanings of the term "Saints," 376; invocation of Saints, *see* "Invocation," etc., 393–410; will their sins be known at the judgment? 417; they differ



Saints—*Continued.*

in capacity for the Beatific Vision, 444.

Salmeron's view of the intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118.

Samuel, account of his appearance after death an instance of a belief in a future life, 379.

Sanchez on right of Pope to dispense in *matrimonio rato*, 59.

Satisfaction, the payment of the debt of temporal punishment, 368; beyond the power of souls in Purgatory, 369, 370; can be offered for others, 388.

Scaunell adopts Bossuet's theory of intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118.

Schouppe's *Elementa* recommended for theological study, 466.

Scotists, their view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 129, according to Vasquez, 130; dispute with Thomists about revelation as a condition of faith, 166; view of essence of beatitude, 447.

Scriptures, the Holy: Definition, 213; relation between Holy Scripture and Tradition, 148, 213; analogy between Holy Scripture and the Incarnate Word, 213; two elements, human and Divine, in each, 213; the canon of Holy Scripture, 214; meaning of "canon," 214; its application in theology, 214; distinction between canonicity and inspiration, 214; classification of the books of the Bible: Old and New Testament, 215; protocanonical, and deuterocanonical books, 215;

Hebrew canon contained only the protocanonical, 216; deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament, 216; of the New Testament, 216; authority of the deuterocanonical books, 216; term "apocryphal" misleading, 216, and not authoritatively used in the Anglican Church, 217; Jewish division of the Old Testament into Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa, 217; the Law, 217; the Prophets, earlier and later, 217; the Hagiographa, 217; twofold division of the New Testament, 217; fourfold division of the whole Bible into:—Legal Books, 217, Historical, 217, Sapiential, 218, Prophetical, 218; a threefold division, 218; difference between Palestinian and Alexandrian canons of the Old Testament, 218; canon finally determined before the close of the 4th century, 218; Council of Hippo (393), 219; divisions of text, 219; Ammonian sections, 219; Andrew of Caesarea's division, 219; Hugo a S. Charo first divides the Bible into chapters, 220; Robert Stephanus (1548) into verses, 220; inspiration of Holy Scripture, 220; origin of the term, 220; definition of inspiration, 220; it is a grace *gratis data*, 221; the Old Testament prophets claim to be inspired, 221; earliest use of term "inspiration" (A.D. 180), 221; difference between inspiration and revelation, 222; inspiration does not preclude the ordinary labours of an author, 222; inspiration differs from assistance, 222;

**Scriptures, the Holy—Cont.**

the Church has never defined the method of inspiration, 222; some inadequate views, 223; two factors in inspiration: the natural powers of the writer, and the Divine impulse, 223; Holy Scripture not only contains, but is, the Word of GOD, 223; GOD the efficient Cause, man the instrumental, 224; three steps in inspiration: the movement of the will to write, 224, illumination of the intellect, 224, and Divine assistance, 225; individuality of the writers preserved, 225; some inadequate views examined: Divine assistance only, 225; approbation of the Church, 225; mechanical theory, 226; reaction from this, 226; dynamical theory, 226; the twofold agency in Holy Scripture accounts for its phenomena, 227; analogy between the Bible and the Incarnate Word, 227; Holy Scripture both a revelation and a veiling of Divine truth, 228; some corollaries: a book need not be in all its parts the work of its reputed author; existing documents may have been used, 228, but the inspired mind must have passed judgment on them, 229; not necessary that the titles of books or their reputed authorship be correct, 229; this canon not invented to meet difficulties of to-day, but found in S. Gregory and in Melchior Canus, 229; no authoritative system of chronology, 230; errors may have crept into MSS., 230; difficulty about

numbers often due to this, 230; received interpretation often erroneous, 230; Dr. Whewell on the influence of current philosophy on interpretation, 230; illustration from Fort Sumter, 231; no Scripture "is of any private interpretation," 231; facts of science recorded as they appeared to the writer, 231; the interpretation and use of Holy Scripture, 232; the various senses of Holy Scripture, 232; first division twofold, literal and spiritual, 232; the literal sense twofold, proper and metaphorical, 233; the spiritual sense has three subdivisions: tropological, allegorical, and anagogical, 233; the mystical interpretation has the authority of CHRIST, 234; the accommodative sense, 234; two sets of canons of Scriptural interpretation, the Bible being human and Divine, 234; on the human side: exact meaning of the text to be sought, 234; the context to be observed, 234; parallel passages to be considered, 235; opinions of commentators to be weighed, 235; on the Divine side: the Church's interpretation to be followed; may be sought in liturgies, Fathers, and theologians, 235; another theory of Holy Scripture advanced by higher criticism under the guidance of unaided human reason, 236; methods by which the Church and the critics respectively reach conclusions: the Church's method, 236; the method of higher criticism, 236; the Church's

Scriptures, the Holy—*Cont.*

method may reach absolute truth in the premises, the critics' cannot, 237; infallibility of the Church here assumed, but elsewhere discussed, 237; apart from the authority of the Church, three lines of evidence for Holy Scripture: archæology, internal literary evidence, and internal moral evidence, 237; archæology shows the narrative of the Pentateuch to be true to the life and customs of its assumed date, 238; moral sense altogether contrary to higher criticism, 238; higher criticism described, 239; its origin and history, 239; Strauss (1835), Baur (1844), 240; the three premises of higher criticism, 240; the attack first on the New Testament, 240; since 1878 shifted to the Old Testament, but on the same lines, 241; the late date of books argued from absence of literary activity in Moses' time, 241; alleged component parts of the Pentateuch: Priestly Code, 241; the Narrative, 242; the Deuteronomist, 242; subdivisions of each, 242; redactors required, 242; no agreement as to how many sources, — Driver requires six, 242, Cornill fifteen, 242; dates assigned, P, 450; D, 640; J-E, 800 B.C., 243; recent archæological discoveries at Tel-el-Amarna and in Babylon trace literature back to Sargon, 3800 B.C.; higher criticism therefore 2500 years out, 243; examination of date assigned to J-E, — Babylonian affinities of J, Egyp-

tian affinities of E, 244, but little intercourse with either country between 1290 and 586 B.C., 244; on this ground Moses the most probable author, 244; recent discovery at Sippara of a J-E tablet of 14th century destructive of literary analysis of higher criticism, 244; examination of method by which the different sections are determined, 245; the method plausible, but a vicious circle, 246; the criteria derived from diversity of diction, 246, and an arbitrary assumption of different authors, 246; illustration from Macaulay's works, 247; how the frequent conflicts between criteria are met, 247; higher criticism an attempt to solve an indeterminate equation of two unknown quantities: the whole theory purely hypothetical, 247; difficulties increase in the Pentateuch and culminate in Joshua, 248; two reasons why people accept higher criticism, 248; the theory works only for a few chapters of Genesis, 248; an example of its inconsistency in the account of the Flood, 248; Dr. Harper's admission on this point, 249; a summary: the method being vicious, the conclusions are not trustworthy, 249; the history of higher criticism shows that the ground has been shifted frequently, 249; illustrations of the viciousness of the method of higher criticism from the criticism of the Catilinarian Orations of Cicero, 250; application of the method to certain

Scriptures, the Holy—*Cont.*

parables, 252; conclusion, 258; importance of internal evidence recognized, 259; the quarrel not with the results, but with the method of higher criticism, 259; recognition of discoveries made by critics, but such not contrary to the Church's teaching, 259; the conclusions of higher criticism which contradict the Church's teaching have been answered in detail by many writers, 259.

Second marriage, the question of, 33.

Semi-Arians, the moderate Ke-  
notists compared with, 184.

Sin, twofold effect of, 368.

Sippara the seat of a discovery  
destructive to higher criti-  
cism, 244.

Spiritual kinship an impediment to Matrimony, 75.

Stephanus, Robert, first di-  
vided the Bible into verses,  
220.

S. Stephen's dying prayer an  
example of perpetuation of  
a good deed, 414.

Strauss the representative of  
the Mythical School of high-  
er criticism, 240.

Suarez, his statement of the  
three theories of intention,  
117; view of the Eucharistic  
Sacrifice, 131; on theological  
conclusions as *de fide*,  
154; a leader of a Jesuit  
theory on essence of beati-  
tude, 447; his works recom-  
mended for theological  
study, 468.

Subject, of Holy Matrimony,  
8; of Holy Orders, 86; of  
Unction, 144.

Subtlety a property of the  
glorified body, 449.

Suffering, the mystery of:

Universality of suffering,  
317; unlike sin it extends  
even to the brute creation,  
317; upon right views of  
suffering depends our ex-  
planation of other myster-  
ies, 317; without pretend-  
ing to solve the mystery,  
its purpose may be learned  
from its effects, 317; pessi-  
mists use the existence of  
suffering as an argument  
against a benevolent Crea-  
tor, 317; this requires suf-  
fering to be purposeless,  
therefore useless, 318; when  
it is shown to be a benevo-  
lent factor in man's devel-  
opment, pessimism is over-  
thrown, 318; human life is  
developed in three spheres:  
physical, moral, and spirit-  
ual; in each, suffering neces-  
sary to progress, 318; suf-  
fering in physical life, 318;  
pleasure and pain the two  
guides of life, acting as a  
spur and as a curb, 318;  
pain a safeguard in the pur-  
suit of pleasure, and fore-  
warns man against disease,  
319; in epidemics suffer-  
ing leads to preservation  
and improvement of the  
race, 319; suffering in moral  
life, 319; pain not only  
warns man from paths of  
sin, but is a great factor in  
his restoration after a fall,  
319; it is preventive, reme-  
dial, strengthening, and  
educative, 320; suffering in  
the spiritual life adds to its  
other functions by becom-  
ing sacramental, 320, sac-  
rificial, 320, and meritori-  
ous, 321, and is the agency  
by which God trains man  
for eternal happiness, 321;

**Suffering—Continued.**

the subject treated more generally, 321; the origin of suffering not revealed, 321, but related generally to sin, 321; pain as a factor in the development of character in the presence of sin, 321; sin is transgression of law; pain the penalty of this, but also the antidote, 322; suffering is evidential, 322; as punitive, an evidence of GOD's Justice, Holiness, and hatred of sin, 322; as revealing to us GOD's compassion, and by our LORD's example teaching us sympathy, 323; as revealing GOD to be man's only refuge, 323; its twofold effect seen on Calvary in the two robbers, 323; suffering as a witness to truth, 324; the power of martyrdom, 324; not only is deserved suffering efficacious, but undeserved has still greater power, 324; we see this in the attraction of the Passion, which still lives on, 324; the vicarious suffering of CHRIST the climax of the suffering by which man has progressed, 325; pleasure and joy leave no legacy to the race, 325; its riches spring from suffering, 325; man's whole life demands vicarious suffering, 325; vicarious suffering points to the solidarity of the race, 325; the teaching of Heb. ii. 10, 326; all suffering rightly borne is gathered up and sanctified in the Cross, 326; pain as a gift to be accounted for, 326; the danger of wasting it, 326; rightly used, pain be-

comes the gold of Heaven, 326; suffering in relation to eternity, 327; S. Paul's teaching: 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18, 327; present suffering the raw material of future glory, 327; S. Paul's "moment," 327; S. Paul's "light affliction," 327; the condition on which the glorious result depends, 328; the danger of self-pity, 328; the importance of seeing things in their true relation to each other, 329; the danger of exaggerating suffering, 329; of letting it make us dizzy from fear, 329; unequal distribution of suffering rectified by Purgatory, 374.

*Summa*, the, of S. Thomas, recommended for theological study, 465, 467.

S. Susanna martyred for refusing to contract mixed marriage, 37.

Sylvius on the Minister of Matrimony, 32.

Synod of Pistoia on civil power over matrimonial impediments, 65.

## T.

Talmudists, the, on the future life, 422.

Tanqueray, his statement of value of decrees of Pope and Sacred Congregation, 163; his *Synopsis* recommended for theological study, 466.

Teaching office of the Church, *see under* "Faith," 156-165.

Tel-el-Amarna the seat of recent discoveries destructive to higher criticism, 243.

Telonies, the, or particular judgment according to Greek Church, 348.

Temperance, *see under* "Virtues," 282, 286, 287.

Tertullian, on 1 Cor. vii. 39 as to mixed marriages, 36; on mixed marriages, 38; on adultery and the matrimonial bond, 48; on divorce and remarriage, 52; on the marriage of Herod with Herodias, 73.

Theodoret on divorce and remarriage, 56.

Theologians of the Church, a means of her ordinary teaching, 161; to be consulted for her interpretation of Holy Scripture, 235.

Theological conclusion defined, 153.

Theological speculation, the limits of: The rule of faith imposes limits to theological speculation, 178; rash speculation a danger in times of religious revival, 178; some canons limiting speculative theology, 178; in regard to Holy Scripture, 179; in regard to the Church's authority: extraordinarily expressed by Councils and Creeds, 179; ordinarily by Fathers, theologians, etc., 179; not only the opinion, but its consequences, must not conflict with the Church's teaching, 179; opinions from schismatical or heretical sources should be suspected, 179; the modern "Kenotic" theory tested by these rules: its elements of danger, 180; no attempt here to discuss this theory exhaustively, 180; its introduction into England traced to Godet's works, 180; his statement of the theory, 181; the theory of Gess, 181; of Thomasius,

181; of Ebrard, 182; of Martensen, 182; the more radical forms of Kenotism have few followers in England, 183; Martensen's view apparently the most popular there, 183; the objection to it, 183; in America the theories of Thomasius and Gess have more followers, 183; the moderate Kenotists compared with the Semi-Arians, 184; the parallel a warning to the Church today, 185; the appeal to Holy Scripture, 185; the assumption that the question has never been really faced by the Fathers and theologians, 186; this not the case, 186; teaching of theologians about our LORD's knowledge, 186; the Fathers indirectly confirm this, 186; the principles involved in Kenotism: change in the Being of GOD, 187; the surrender of some attributes of GOD, 187; separation between the FATHER and the SON, which destroys the doctrine of the HOLY TRINITY, 187; Kenotism and Holy Scripture, 188; exegesis of Phil. ii. 5-8, 188; the text of the passage, 188; the context, 188; the phrase "Who, being in the form of GOD," 188; *ὑπάρχων* implies pre-existence, (Gal. ii. 14, 2 Cor. viii. 17,) 189, and continued existence, (S. Luke xxiii. 50, Acts ii. 30, 2 Cor. viii. 17, 2 Cor. xii. 16, Rom. iv. 19,) 189, 190; the exact force of *μορφῇ*, 190; observations of Bp. Lightfoot, 191; usage of Plato and Aristotle, 191; the full phrase then de-

Theological speculat'n—*Cont.*  
 scribes CHRIST JESUS as pre-existing and continually subsisting in the form of GOD, 192; ἵσα Θεῷ, 192; ἀρπαγμὸν, 193; action of λαβῶν coincides with that of ἐκένωσε, 194; μορφῇ δούλου, 194; the modern Kenotic view finds no support from this passage, 195; Kenotism and the teaching of the Church, 195; absence of a uniform theory among Kenotists, 195; Thomasius' attempt to distinguish between GOD's relative and essential attributes, 196; the attributes of GOD not assigned by arbitrary speculation, but necessary in thought, 196; the term as applied to GOD, 196; the human intellect as an instrument for the apprehension of truth, 196; the Church's approval gives the conclusions of the intellect the highest authority, 196; Kenotism and the Church's extraordinary teaching, 197; Kenotism destroys the attribute of Immutability, and thus conflicts with Nicæa, 197; answer of Kenotists to this charge, 197; surrender of Immutability involves that of other attributes, 197; consequences of the surrender of Immutability destroy our conception of GOD, 198; Kenotists object to what they call *a priori* views of GOD, 198; Ebrard and Gess teach Apollinarianism, 199; the Council of Constantinople condemned the Apollinarians, 199; this view found in two stages of development, 199;

the Council of Ephesus and the Kenotist view of our LORD's miracles, 200; the 9th anathema of S. Cyril against those who say that CHRIST "received from the HOLY SPIRIT ability to work miracles," 200; the explanation the Kenotists give, 201; the Council of Chalcedon (451) defined the relation of the two Natures in the Incarnation, 201; the acceptance of this definition inconsistent with Kenotism, 202; Kenotism and the Church's ordinary teaching, 203; no Father or theologian since S. Augustine's time countenances Kenotism, 204; examination of four earlier Fathers claimed as favourable to Kenotism, 204; Gore admits they do not teach "limitation of knowledge," 204; but their reference to the self-emptying without this no support to Kenotism, 204; the passage quoted from S. Irenæus considered, 204; teaching of Origen on this subject, 205; of S. Cyril of Alexandria, 206; no support for Kenotism in these three, 207; S. Hilary of Poitiers uses "form" for the manifested glory, not for the essence of the Godhead, 208; three passages inconsistent with Kenotism, 208; S. Hilary on our LORD's miracles, on His being in Heaven whilst on earth, and on His Omniscience, 208; the only ancient writer who teaches Kenotism the heretic Beron, about 6th century, 209; his theory that the Incarnation introduced limits into

Theological speculat'n—*Cont.*

GOD Himself, 209; the Chalcedonian decree the answer to this, 209; the earliest attempt to misrepresent Phil. ii. 5-8 was that of Marcion in the interests of Docetism, 210; the modern view of the Kenosis may be traced to Luther, who, however, confined it to our LORD'S Humanity, 210; Melancthon thought this savoured of Docetism, 210; the source of Kenotism entirely schismatical or heretical; difficulty of this, 211; Zinzendorf the father of the Kenotism of to-day, 211; the Lutherans,—Thomasius, Gess; the Reformed,—Eb-  
 rard, Godet, 211; Dorner's view of Kenotism, 211; the Danish Bp. Martensen, 211; summary of argument against Kenotism, 211; if it be true, the Church in error since the first œcumenical council, 212; this inconsistent with our LORD'S promises that the gates of Hell should not prevail against the Church, and that the HOLY GHOST should lead the Church into all truth, 212; limits of theological speculation to be observed in eschatology, 331.

Theology, the study of: Excellent work done by English scholars in Biblical criticism and exegesis, 453, in editing MSS., 453, and in other departments of theology, 453, but dogmatic theology neglected, 454; the lack of knowledge of systematic theology among Anglicans, 454; the average priest has a good education,

but theology as a science omitted, 454; the result of this, 454; the necessity of facing it, 454; the root of the evil is the spirit of Protestantism, which is the right of private judgment, 455; from it three fruits have sprung: lack of method in theological study, 455; the books mostly used: Pearson on the Creed, 455; the Articles; their value, 456; their defects as a manual of theology, 456; the purpose for which they were intended, 456; the conditions to be met in 16th century, 456; those to be dealt with to-day, 457; our present need definite dogmatic teaching, 457, to counteract false teaching, 457, and to satisfy seekers after truth, 458; a very large part of the teaching of the Articles is negative, 458; an illustration from medical science, 458; such teaching belongs rightly to the history of the science, 459; the Articles form an unscientific basis for theological study, 459; an examination of Bp. Browne's treatise, 459; Martensen's *Dogmatics*, 460; the practical result of studying such books, 460; the lack of method leads to unbalanced views of truth, 460, as well as to actual heresy, 461; some object to logic in theology from fear of unpopular doctrines, 461; others because it is fatal to their special views, 461; definition of logic, 461; logic applied to heresy, 461; the *reductio ad absurdum* fatal to heresy, 462; heresy generally starts



Theology—*Continued.*

- from false premises, 462; logic has its limits, 462; lack of theological works in English, 462; inability of the Clergy to read Latin easily, 464; the remedies for our lack of theological knowledge: a practical knowledge of Latin, 464; a good outline of theology should be mastered, 465; the divisions of the *Summa* of S. Thomas, 465; Latin theological treatises, 466; general works: Schouppe, Hurter, Tanquerrey, 466; Franzelin, Perrone, 466; Gousset (in French), 466; S. Thomas, 467; Ferraris, 467; special works on the Sacraments: De Augustinis, Billot, 467; Gasparri, 467; on other subjects: Mazella, Denzinger, 467; *Manuale Ecclesiasticorum*, 467; the three great theologians after S. Thomas: De Lugo, 467, Vasquez, 468, Suarez, 468; other able writers: Bellarmine, Estius, Petavius, Tournely, Billuart, 468; Roman works untrustworthy on two subjects, Papal claims and cultus of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 468, but Roman dogma far more conservative than practice, 468; examples: S. Thomas, 468; Billuart, 469; a table of ecclesiastical writers added, 469; no desire to discourage the study of English divines, 469.
- Theophilus of Antioch on divorce and remarriage, 51.
- S. Thomas, doubts whether Matrimony is a Sacrament, 28; his view that all Holy Orders have reference to the Holy Eucharist, 82; influence on the theory of Form and Matter of Holy Orders, 106; view (according to Suarez) of intention necessary for a Sacrament, 118; on oil as the Matter of Unc-tion, 140; his *Summa* recommended for theological study, 465, 467; free from Romanism, 468, 469.
- S. Thomas of Canterbury, popularity of his shrine before the Reformation, 409.
- Thomas a Kempis on charity, 307.
- Thomasius, his theory of the Kenosis, 181, 211, followed in America, 183; attempts to distinguish between GOD's relative and essential attributes, 196.
- Thomists, the, deny that a theological conclusion is *de fide*, 154; dispute with Sco-tists about revelation as a condition of faith, 166; their view of essence of beatitude, 447.
- Tilman's accusation of Trent on intention required for a Sacrament refuted by Bellarmine, 120.
- S. Timothy of Alexandria, on divorce and remarriage, 55; on marriage with deceased wife's sister, 74.
- Tournely, on the Minister of Matrimony, 32; on the intention for a Sacrament, 120; his works recommended for theological study, 468.
- Tractarians, a cause of their use of the term "Paradise," 363.
- Tradition, its relation to Holy Scripture, 148, 213.
- Tree, an illustration of the Communion of Saints, 377.
- Tremellio not ordained with the Edwardine rite, 127.

## U.

Unction, Extreme: Titles, 134; meaning of "Extreme Unction," 134; institution, 135; S. James v. 14, 15, 135; relation of the anointing mentioned in S. Mark vi. 13 to this Sacrament, 135; view of Trent, 136; Extreme Unction as a Sacrament, 136; definition fulfilled by Extreme Unction as described in S. James v. 14, 15, 136; the outward sign, 137, conferring grace, 137, and permanently instituted, 137; the Sacrament recognized in the first centuries of the Church, 137; Origen, 137; S. Chrysostom, 138; S. Innocent I., 138; Matter and Form, 138; Matter, of two kinds: remote Matter, olive oil blessed by a Bishop, 138, or a delegated Priest, 138, or (in the East) by a parish Priest having ordinary jurisdiction, 139; Pontifical of Egbert, 139; proximate Matter, the act of anointing, 139; the Matter the oil itself, an opinion rejected by SS. Thomas and Bonaventura, 140; what parts are to be anointed, 140; two opinions, a five-fold or a single anointing, 140; the *Rituale Romanum* requires a sevenfold anointing, 141; the rubric in Edward VI.'s first Prayer Book, 141; Form, 141; the Roman Form, 141; the Greek Form, 141; Form in the Sacramentary of S. Gregory, 142; Form from old English Pontifical, 142; Form in Prayer Book of 1549, 143; Minister, a Priest, 143;

methods of administration, 144; subject, 144; effects, 144; primary effects, 145; secondary effects, 145; some difficulties considered, 145; necessity and iteration, 147. Unity a property of Matrimony, 9. Universalism, *see under* "Hell," 428-431, 436. Unlawful Matrimony, 21.

## V.

Valid Matrimony, 20. Vasquez, on the sacramental character of Matrimony, 30; his account of Scotist view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 130; his own view, 130; his works recommended for theological study, 468. Vicarious suffering, *see under* "Suffering," 324, 325. Vigilantius' denial of intercession of the Saints, 396. Virtue, explained, 149; defined, 279. Virtues, the cardinal (The endowments of man): S. Paul's description of the effects of justification, 278; the change made by justification implies certain endowments of the spiritual man, 278; these called "virtues" and "gifts," 278; virtue a habit, —examination of the term "habit," 278; distinction between habit and disposition, 278; habits are essential, or operative, 279; three classes of habits: natural, acquired, infused, 279; infused habits are not "powers" of the soul, but qualities, 279; definition of "virtue," 279; virtues also are natural, acquired, and infused, 279; man may be considered in the

**Virtues, cardinal—*Cont.***

natural, or the supernatural order; in both he has certain endowments; same virtues in both orders, but different in their "end," 280; infused virtues imply natural virtues raised to the supernatural order, 280; virtues divided into intellectual and moral from the power they perfect, theological and moral from their object, 280; theological virtues have GOD as their object, 280; moral virtues have the perfection of the act itself as their end, 280; the four cardinal virtues,—generally considered, 281; meaning of the term "cardinal," 281; the cardinal virtues the foundation of the active life of the Christian, 281; they must all be present in each human act which aims at perfection, 281; these virtues well known in Greek philosophy and mentioned in Scripture,—Wisdom. viii. 7 (Prov. viii. 14), 281; the moral virtues philosophically examined, 281; a virtue may reside in the intellect as prudence, 282, in the will as justice, 282, in the concupiscible appetite as temperance, 282, in the irascible appetite as fortitude, 282; these virtues existed in a high degree among the heathen, 282; the difference between them in the natural and supernatural order is found in their "motive" and "end," 282; three gifts to sanctify daily life: reason, free will, grace, 283; the cardinal virtues enable us to do all our

duty, to bear our cross, and to act rightly, 283; these virtues may be exercised actively, passively, and in a combination of these two manners, 283; a perfect act of virtue has three factors, the motive, rule, and test, 283; the four conditions of perfection in an act of virtue are that it be done consciously, deliberately, unselfishly, and upon principle, 283; there are four elements in a moral choice: the wish, the deliberation, the decision, the will, 284; an act of virtue to be perfect must pass through four stages, viz., the cardinal virtues, 284; Plato's illustration of the four virtues, 284; another illustration, 284; the cardinal virtues considered: fortitude, 284, regulates the irascible appetite, 285; it is the mean between cowardice and rashness, between fear and desire, 285; fortitude compared with temperance, 285; fortitude may be exercised towards our neighbour, self, and GOD, 285, actively, passively, and in a combination of these two, 285; the golden mean is to avoid excess or defect, 286; the mean for fortitude, its excess, and defect, 286; temperance, 286, governs the fleshly appetite, inducing moderation in the lawful use of GOD's gifts, 286; temperance implies the neglect of a lesser good to gain a greater, 286; here a contrast to fortitude, which endures a lesser evil to avoid a greater, 286; fortitude like the spur, temperance the

**Virtues, cardinal—*Cont.***

curb, 286; temperance claims supremacy over all man's appetites, 287; by it we acquire detachment from creatures, 287; temperance has many forms, 287; has three modes of exercise: physically, intellectually, and in combination, 287; its mean, excess, and defect, 287; prudence, 288, governs the intellect, 288; illustration of the way in which all four virtues must be present in a perfect act of virtue, 288; prudence both an intellectual and a moral virtue, 288; as a virtue it must look to a worthy end, 289; prudence needs the support of the other moral virtues, 289; prudence has four elements: wisdom, judiciousness, vigilance, and perseverance, 289; its golden mean, excess, and defect, 289; prudence sometimes seems, but never is, akin to cowardice; like fortitude it includes perseverance, 290; justice, 290, governs the will, 290; the functions of justice are threefold according to its object: towards GOD, our neighbour, and self, 290; justice may be exercised positively, negatively, and intellectually, 291; methods in which justice may be exercised towards GOD, 291, towards our neighbour, 292, towards ourselves, 292; the golden mean, excess, and defect in justice towards GOD, 292, our neighbour, 292, and ourselves, 293.

**Virtues, the theological (The endowments of man, continued):** A "theological"

virtue defined, 150; the endowments of the soul which accompany sanctifying grace, 294; the theological virtues: some preliminary considerations, 294; likeness and difference in natural and supernatural virtues, 294; illustrated by process of grafting, 295; difference between natural and supernatural virtues chiefly in their motive and end, 295; illustrated by process of magnetizing iron, 295; relation between natural and supernatural virtues: faith, in the natural man, 296, in the supernatural man, 296; difference of motive and end in natural and supernatural faith, 297; hope, in the natural man, 297, in the supernatural man, 297; love, as a natural virtue, 297, as a supernatural virtue, 297; the endowments of faith, hope, and love enable man to live as the child of GOD, 298; the theological virtues in man illustrated from a plant, 299; the theological virtues considered in themselves: faith, 299, has for its subject the reason, which it perfects, 299; it bestows on the reason strength, 300, and light, 300; illustration of a man born blind, 301; "obscurity" a property of faith, 301; the theological virtues given to us potentially, and therefore need to be exercised, 301; "meditation" the exercise of faith, 302; some think they cannot meditate, 302; hope, 302, has its seat in the will, 302; hope rests on GOD'S Omnipotence, 302; its fruit

Virtues, theological—*Cont.*

is joy, 303; hope intermediate between faith and love, 303, and between presumption and despair, 303; it is the special virtue of the Intermediate State, 303; it is the stimulus of all spiritual effort; to its neglect may be traced most sins, 304; an examination of the three kinds of sins: of the fallen angels, 304, of Adam, 304, and of fallen man, 304; hope is exercised especially by prayer, which is the operation in us of the HOLY SPIRIT, 305; prayer the fundamental function of the spiritual man, 305; charity, 305; faith and hope can co-exist with mortal sin; charity cannot, 306; the relation of charity to sanctifying grace, 306, and to the HOLY SPIRIT, 306; why charity is called a theological virtue, 307; natural and supernatural charity, 307; what Thomas a Kempis says of charity, 307; what S. Paul says of it, 308; it enables us to possess GOD, 308; the effect of charity in regard to our neighbour, 308; charity needs to be exercised by self-sacrifice, 308, but especially in worship, 309; this exercise seen in the offering of the Holy Eucharist, 309, in which the law of sacrifice is fulfilled, 310; in addition to the virtues, justification bestows the gifts of the HOLY SPIRIT, which produce the "fruits" and the "beatitudes," 310; Christians should recognize the richness of their endowments and use them, 310; the doctrine of merit, 310;

merit described, 311; Protestant denial of merit the logical result of Luther's view of justification, 311; merit depends solely upon GOD's merciful promise, 312; no injustice had GOD promised no reward, 312; our LORD tells us how GOD might have dealt with us, 312, but distinctly promises that He will not do so, 313; many passages of Scripture teach this doctrine: 2 S. Tim. iv. 7, 8, 313; Heb. vi. 10, 314; Rom. ii. 6, 7, 314; S. Matt. v. 12, 314; the conditions of merit: only works done in grace are meritorious, 314; this excludes works of the law and those done through natural virtue, 314; the teaching of Articles XII. and XIII., 315; *meritum de condigno*, 315; *meritum de congruo*, 315; things we cannot merit: justification, final perseverance, 316.

## W.

Walsingham's letter mentioning offer of Pope Pius IV. to acknowledge English Prayer Book, 94.

Whewell on the influence of current philosophy on interpretation of Scripture, 230.

Will, free, a gift to sanctify daily life, 283.

William of Paris on the essence of the Sacrament of Matrimony, 34.

Word, the Incarnate, and the Holy Scriptures, analogy between, 213, 227.

Wordsworth, Bp., on the Eucharistic Sacrifice, 132.

Y.	Z.
York, Archbishop of, extract from sermon, 406.	Zinzendorf the father of the Kenotism of to-day, 211.

## INDEX OF GREEK WORDS.

*αἰώνιος*, 426, 427.*ἀρπαγμὸν*, 193.*ἄσβεστος*, 428.*δικαιοῦν*, 263.*ἐκένωσε*, 194.*ἴσα Θεῷ*, 192.*λαβόν*, 194.*μορφή*, 191.*μορφὴ δούλου*, 194.*ὑπάρχων*, 189.*χάρις*, 80.*χάρισμα*, 80, 81.



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